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Thesis Summary
This dissertation investigates the role of aspirations and beliefs in explaining chil-
dren’s educational outcomes, and explores how they can exacerbate socioeconomic
disadvantage in education. Chapter 1 proposes an easily-implementable methodology
to estimate the potential size of aspirational poverty traps in a given population—an
important quantity which indicates the scope for reducing achievement gaps by
lifting aspirations. Chapter 2 shows that policy uncertainty about student finance
can alone deepen achievement gaps as early as upon entering middle school. This
finding highlights that reducing uncertainty in student finance could alleviate barri-
ers in access to higher education for vulnerable populations. Chapter 3 indicates
that higher-achieving peers not only improve test scores, but also trigger a host
of behavioral changes in children and parents, yet these intermediate responses do
not explain peer effects in test scores. This finding suggests that peer assignment
policies such as tracking or school admission policies can be leveraged to increase
students’ aspirations and reduce achievement gaps. Chapter 4 shows that teachers
rely on imperfect signals about children’s ability, and form systematically biased
expectations about their potential, intensifying disadvantage in the short and longer
run. This study, however, also suggests that the consequences of teacher bias can be
limited by admissions policies in which teacher assessments have little weight. This
dissertation, overall, demonstrates that aspirations and beliefs of students, parents
and teachers matter for children’s educational success, and that educational policies
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Introduction
"The main hope of a nation
is the proper education of its
youth".
Erasmus
The Promise of Equality of Opportunity in Education
One of the most successful ideas of the Enlightenment—perhaps the most successful
idea—has been the universal right to education. Throughout the 19th and 20th
century, education has progressively become one of the largest and consistently
unchallenged public investments in most countries. This culminated in the adoption
in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “everyone
has the right to education. [. . . ] Technical and professional education shall be
made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit.” (Article 26, Paragraph 1). Ever since, education has been
generally perceived as a universal right, and providing access to education as a duty
of governments.
The general idea that access to education is a moral objective to strive for has led
to a global expansion of education throughout the 20th century. While the average
years of schooling in the Netherlands was just below 3 years in 1870, it was above
12 years in 2017; in China over the same period, most people received no formal
schooling in 1870 to almost 8 years in 2017 (Lee and Lee, 2016). Lee and Lee (2016)
show that as much as in 1870 most of the world population received at most 3 years
of formal education, compulsory schooling laws across the world have led to the
world population receiving on average 7 years of schooling by 2010.
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The expansion of education was achieved through large public spending programs:
in 1940, the Netherlands spent 1.4% of GDP on education expenditures and 5.5%
in 1993; in the United States, education expenditures represented 4% of GDP in
1960 and 5.5% in 1993. Public investment took place through various educational
policies, used across the world to provide greater access to education to ever larger
number of children from all social classes: school building programs, compulsory
schooling laws, government-backed student loans and subsidies tuition fees and
scholarships, teaching schools. The expansion of education reached children of all
sub-populations, thus achieving an immense decline in inequality in educational
attainment (Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2013).
The expansion of education throughout the 20th century largely paid off with the
fastest economic growth the world has ever seen. Roser and Ortiz-Ospina (2016),
among many others, show that the expansion of education in the 20th century
correlates with the progress of democracy and with large increases in GDP per
capita across the world. In an unprecedented endeavor, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser
(2020) estimate the return on investment of 133 historical policies in the United
States since the 1950s, and find that education and early life health investments
yield the largest returns, essentially because they target young populations whose
gains in earnings translate in higher taxes paid back to the community over ever
longer lifetimes.
Socioeconomic gaps remain, however, disappointingly pervasive at all levels of ed-
ucation. Family background remains the single most important determinant of
educational achievement, in spite of decades of educational policies and interventions
aiming at weakening the link between socioeconomic disadvantage and low educa-
tional attainment—ranging priority rules in school admissions, to school quality
monitoring, education vouchers and charter schools. James Heckman has shown
that socioeconomic gaps in child cognitive and non-cognitive development emerge in
the first five years of a child’s life, before even entering education, and never cease
to increase during education. Susan Dynarski has shown throughout her career
that poorer children and children of less educated parents are systematically less
prepared to enter college, less likely to go to college, and less likely to graduate.
In many developed countries, the education expansion has stalled in the wake of
the Great Recession, and recent years have even seen a resurgence of socioeconomic
gaps in educational attainment between the rich and the poor, between young men
and women, between migrant and native children. In the European Union, the
rising number of youth that are not in employment, education or training—largely
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low-educated young men, with large disparities between countries—has revealed that
education systems are increasingly failing to prepare youth to enter labor markets
and contribute to society. In the United States, Raj Chetty questions the myth that
America is a “land of opportunity”: throughout several influential studies, he shows
that the earnings of working adults are largely explained by early life experiences
with teachers, neighborhoods, and family, yet good experiences are systematically
associated with higher family socioeconomic status.
Recent studies reveal that disadvantaged children might face soft barriers in access
to higher education, often arising from complex and inefficient design of education
institutions. In 2015, Caroline Hoxby and Sarah Turner have revealed that informa-
tion is a barrier to higher education: a large share of high-achieving students from
low-income background in the United States don’t even apply for college because
they over-estimate the costs of higher education (Hoxby and Turner, 2015). In
2012, Eric Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long and Phillip Oreopoulos have shown that
institutional complexity is also a barrier: many students fail to graduate from college
because they struggle navigating the complex financial aid system (Bettinger et al.,
2012). In 2018, Alberto Alesina, Michaela Carlana, Elena La Ferrara and Paolo
Pinotti have shown that prejudice in the school system is another barrier: teachers
themselves hold negative stereotypes against immigrant children, and play a role in
their lower educational trajectories (Alesina et al., 2018). These studies all reveal
that closing socioeconomic gaps in educational achievement will require to rethink
the roots of disadvantage.
While the 20th century has been one of education expansion, the 21st century must
be one of education revolution: gaining a deeper understanding of the origins of
socioeconomic disadvantage, identifying the multi-faceted barriers hindering the suc-
cess of disadvantaged children, and redesigning policies levers to close socioeconomic
gaps.
A New Paradigm of Persisting Achievement Gaps:
Behavioral Barriers
The idea that complexity leads to worse decisions is not new. Behavioral scientists
such as Dan Ariely, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have revealed over the past 20
years that people’s decisions can be nudged by the tiniest details—a default option,
the framing of a question. They have also shown that nudges are simple and cheap
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to implement, and yield powerful results, making them ideal tools for policymakers.
Yet beyond the policy implications of nudges, what we have learned is that internal
constraints matter a great deal for people’s decisions—perhaps as much as hard,
external constraints like budgets or production constraints. In his best-selling
psychology book “Thinking Fast and Slow”, Daniel Kahneman shows that people make
imperfect decisions that depend greatly on their immediate environment (Kahneman,
2011). In his seminal anthropological work in 2006, Arjun Appadurai argues that poor
people don’t just lack material resources, but also “the capacity to aspire” (Appadurai,
2004). Economists Anandi Mani, Anuj Shah, Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir
formulated an even bolder hypothesis: that beyond material deprivation, the state
of poverty in itself creates mental scarcity, imposing psychological constraints to
decision-making (Shah et al., 2012; Mani et al., 2013). In an influential study in 2012,
they show that experimentally induced mental scarcity impedes cognitive functioning,
which leads directly to worse decisions. Since then, recent studies in economics have
found that poverty causes stress, loss of self-control, inattention, all of which in turn
have a negative causal impact on decision-making (e.g. Haushofer and Fehr, 2014;
Bernheim et al., 2015). Thus, the idea that people could make choices under internal
constraints has brought new perspectives in economics, borrowing from other social
and human sciences with a long tradition of studying the role of beliefs, values and
identities in people’s decisions—psychology, sociology, anthropology, ethnology and
history.
This idea that there could exist internal constraints, creating behavioral barriers to
economic success also brought deep change in the design of development interventions
and anti-poverty programs, to focus not just on improving material conditions but
also on the improving the psychological state of the poor. In a series of studies, Travis
Lybbert and Bruce Wydick argue that hopelessness is an essential aspect of poverty,
such that psychological coaching should be an core component of anti-poverty
programs (Lybbert and Wydick, 2018). They implemented this program around the
world, to find important and persistent positive impacts on indicators of poverty
reduction. The World Health Organization, recognizing the large potential gains
from implementing low-cost psychological coaching, has since launched “Thinking
Healthy”, a world-wide poverty-reduction program based on cognitive behavioral
therapy.
The existence of internal constraints has immense implications for the economics
of education, possibly leading to a major overhaul of many common policy tools
to close socioeconomic gaps. In an influential article in 2016, Adam Lavecchia,
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Heidi Liu and Philipp Oreopoulos review an impressive number of interventions,
and conclude that “education represents a relatively new avenue for behavioral
economics, one that holds many opportunities. [. . . ] The examples we’ve presented
here suggest that interventions shaped by behavioral theory are likely cost-effective
and easy to implement, while delivering significant results. They are exciting, testable
and tenable” (Lavecchia et al., 2016). In her presidential address at the European
Economic Association in 2018, Elena La Ferrara argued that economists should
pay more attention to aspirations, how they form and how they drive life-changing
decisions, such as going to university and what to study: “Aspirations are a potentially
important determinant of individuals’ educational investments and occupational
choice. This opens the way for policy interventions aimed at changing people’s
aspirations as a way of lifting them out of poverty.” (La Ferrara, 2019).
Very recent studies—most of them not even yet published in academic journals—have
started to explore internal constraints in education. Mukherjee (2015) show that
Indian students and parents’ ethnic identity and caste can lead them to refrain
from investing in higher education. Guyon and Huillery (Forthcoming) find that
poor children and children of migrant backgrounds in France have lower educational
aspirations than their peers, at all levels of ability.
This dissertation builds on this emerging body of work testing for new forms of
behavioral barriers and constraints, and explores how they exacerbate socioeconomic
disadvantage in education. This dissertation makes four key contributions to the
discipline. Chapter 1 proposes an easily-implementable methodology to estimate
the potential size of aspirational poverty traps in a given population. This is an
important quantity which indicates the scope for reducing achievement gaps by lifting
aspirations. Chapter 2 shows that policy uncertainty about student finance can alone
create or exacerbate achievement gaps as early as upon entering middle school. This
finding highlights that access to higher education could be improved by reducing
uncertainty in student finance, and that uncertainty about future policies can harm
vulnerable populations, worsening inequality of opportunity. Chapter 3 indicates that
high-achieving peers not only improve test scores, but also make children exert less
school effort, increase their aspiration to go to university, and increase their parents’
time investments and strictness. More importantly perhaps, this study also shows
that peer effects in test scores are not explained by intermediate effects on students’
effort, aspirations and parental time investments and strictness. This finding suggests
that peer assignment policies such as tracking or school admission policies can be
leveraged to achieve lower achievement gaps and increase students’ aspirations.
Chapter 4 shows that i) teachers rely on imperfect signals about children’s ability,
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and form systematically biased expectations about their potential, ii) teacher bias
disadvantages vulnerable students, and iii) has long-lasting consequences on STEM
major choice in high school. Suggestive findings also indicate that teacher bias
can be limited through admissions policies in which teacher assessments have little
weight.
Before presenting the problem statement of this dissertation and delving into each
chapter in more detail, I argue in the next section why my research belongs to
economics, and what the key challenges are conceptually, methodologically and
empirically.
An Economic Approach to Behavioral Barriers in Education
Building on insights from several other disciplines, this dissertation belongs to
economics for three key reasons: first, because it builds on classical economic theory
and enriches economic theory to study internal constraints in education; second
because it relies on modern econometric tools and quasi-experimental research
designs that are common to economists, and third and perhaps more importantly
because it provides answers that are directly useful to contemporary discussions in
economics.
Compared to other social sciences, economics has traditionally studied 1) how isolated
individuals make decisions in light of their environment, 2) how individual decisions
aggregate into market-level outcomes such as prices, and 3) how markets interact to
produce societal-level equilibria such as social norms. Within the social sciences, the
most distinguishing feature of economics is its systematic use of the scientific method,
much like the natural sciences. Since the early days of the discipline, economist
have focused on developing parsimonious and falsifiable theoretical models of human
behavior, and systematically designing experiments to test empirical predictions of
models.
Within economics, the economics of education is a field in which researchers study
the drivers of children’s educational outcomes, and how to design education systems
to give the same chances to all while efficiently allocating resources. Although
a relatively young sub-field, the economics of education has become one of the
densest ones, in which economists explore these two problems through two essential




Human capital theory expands the borders of classical microeconomic theory to
the labor market and to education. Stemming from the pioneering work of Gary
Becker and Jacob Mincer in the 1960s, human capital theory proposes that workers’
skills are a special type of capital affecting the productivity of firms; wages are
paid to workers as a return on their investment, and the level of wages depends on
the contribution of their human capital to firm production (see e.g. Becker, 1964;
Mincer, 1958). As a consequence, people’s decision to acquire education is a decision
to invest in human capital; educational choices should thus resemble investment
choices, and depend on factors such as costs, returns, and risk. Since the 1960s,
economists keep finding evidence consistent with this theory; Charles et al. (2018)
recently showed, for example, that local housing booms and bursts change relative
wages for high and low educated workers, which in turn affect the decisions of local
students to go to college or not.
The education production framework expands the borders of classical microeconomic
theory of firms, emphasizing the role of public resources in the educational outcomes
of children. The education production framework links education “outputs” to
“inputs”, thus opening a new avenue for studying the optimal allocation of public
resources between children, and therefore the design of education policy (see e.g.
Hanushek, 1979). In this framework, human capital can be seen as the output of
a production process involving inputs of all sorts, such as teacher wages, teacher
training, class size or school quality. Thus, one can hope to explain heterogeneity
in educational outcomes as the results of differences in abilities and choices, and
differences in resources. Under some modelling assumptions, it thus allows the
researcher the relate changes in outputs to changes in inputs.
Modern research in the economics of education has sought to expand both human
capital theory and the education production framework. In an influential study
published in 2003, Petra Todd and Kenneth Wolpin proposed an augmented educa-
tion production function, incorporating that the human capital of children is the
result of repeated investments of multiple agents (parents, teachers, schools) – an
insight from developmental psychology (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Since Todd and
Wolpin’s influential work, an emerging strand of literature has started systemati-
cally exploring how various agents and inputs interact in the education system, to
achieve more credible estimates of the impact of educational policies. For example,
Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) show that parents of children who are admitted to
elite secondary schools reduce their money and time investment in their children.
This study thus indicates that estimating the impact of school quality on child test
scores must account for how parents adjust their inputs.
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At the knowledge frontier in the economics of education, one of the key challenges
is to understand what drives individual beliefs and how they affect educational
outcomes in the form of internal constraints creating behavioral barriers to the
success of some. Understanding how beliefs affect education outcomes is of crucial
importance: if differences in outcomes between low and high socioeconomic status
students are driven by individual preferences, then differences in outcomes are simply
heterogeneity and don’t necessarily reflect inequality of opportunity; if, however,
differences in outcomes arise from differences in beliefs, then informing individuals
might be required to ensure the same chances are given to all. In addition, while
beliefs can be changed with information, altering preferences is at best barely possible,
if not ethically questionable.
Yet studying beliefs in economics turns out to be challenging from both a theo-
retical and an empirical perspective. Theoretically, it requires relaxing some core
assumptions in both human capital theory and the education production function
framework; empirically, it requires careful research designs performed on well-chosen,
highly detailed data, originating from settings with specific institutional features.
The Conceptual Problem of Internal Constraints in Economics
At the theoretical frontier, studying the role of beliefs in educational outcomes
requires augmenting human capital theory and the education production function
framework by relaxing the seemingly innocuous assumption that individuals have
complete information. Yet, lifting this fundamental assumption is problematic in
three ways.
First, conceptually, it is unclear how to operationalize beliefs in economic decision
models, and consequently how to measure beliefs. In arguably some of the most
important work on beliefs in economics, Charles Manski lays out a program for
integrating beliefs in economic models: he first proposes to provide a structure to
beliefs in the form of subjective probabilistic expectations, which allows beliefs to
be compared between individuals and within individual, and then argues that with
appropriate measures of subjective expectations, we can relate changes in outcomes
to changes in subjective expectations induced by shocks in the decision environment
of individuals (Manski, 1993a, 2000).
Second, even with measures of subjective expectations, once we lift the assumption
that decision-makers are fully informed, we encounter a fundamental identification
problem: with different information, agents are likely to express different preferences,
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such that separately assessing the role of beliefs from preferences on observed
outcomes becomes strenuous. Some studies for example explore experimentally to
what extent belief-changing information shocks affect preferences over outcomes.
Thus, to study the role of beliefs on educational outcomes, it is best to choose a
setting where individual preferences are less likely to play an important role.
Third, economists do not yet have the theoretical tools to aggregate the decisions of
individuals with heterogeneous beliefs into markets, and further into societal-level
equilibria. In a series of theoretical studies since 2007, Douglas Berheim and Antonio
Rangel have been slowly developing the theoretical foundations for welfare economics
incorporating findings from behavioral economics.
In a series of studies on health insurance markets since 2015, Benjamin Handel
presents a striking illustration of how difficult it is to incorporate beliefs in modern
economic models to conduct welfare analyses and policy. He shows that i) people
systematically under invest in health insurance due to misinformation and behavioral
biases; ii) wrong decisions are eventually costlier for disadvantaged people who suffer
from generally worse health; lastly, iii) ignoring the presence of these biases, we
would design insurance policies that are highly regressive.
Yet compared to the economics of health care insurance, the economics of education
presents the additional layer of complexity that multiple agents and multiple inputs
interact in producing child human capital. In such, even with augmented human
capital theory and the education production framework to incorporate the beliefs
of children, parents and teachers, drawing clear policy implications has never been
harder.
Empirical Challenges of Estimating Behavioral Barriers in Education
At the empirical frontier, studying the role of beliefs in educational outcomes requires
carefully designed experiments, and utmost caution when interpreting statistical
estimates and deriving policy implications.
Over the past 30 years, the “credibility revolution” in applied microeconomics has
shown that for empirical studies to infirm or support economic models of decisions,
they must remain as close as possible to the ideal experiment. An ideal experiment
is a theoretical experiment that allows the researcher to discern unarguably the
empirical predictions of one model from any the predictions of another model,
following the scientific method. Yet constructing such ideal experiments or even
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staying close to this standard is a challenge for three key reasons.
First, turning a broad problem statement into an ideal experiment is not as obvious
as it may sound. It requires formulating a narrow research question focused on a
causal relationship of interest, that is informative of a broader theoretical economic
model. This approach thus consists in focusing on a specific parameter at a time in
a theoretical model, and to conceptually determine the causal effect of this factor
on a given outcome of interest. Thus, the first main challenge of modern empirical
microeconomics of education is to achieve causal estimates of a particular factor on
education outcomes.
Second, even once we have identified a target relationship of interest between a
factor and an outcome of interest, constructing a research design that is close to
the ideal experiment is also not trivial. To meet this goal, the researcher must find
or construct an empirical setting in which a randomly selected group of people is
assigned to a treatment – say a given value of the factor of interest, while another
randomly selected group is assigned to a placebo – say a baseline value of the factor.
This way, the mean difference in outcomes between the treatment and the placebo
or control groups is an unbiased estimator of the causal effect of the treatment on
the outcome. Thus, the second main challenge of modern empirical microeconomics
of education is to argue to what extent statistical estimates do capture the true
causal effect of a factor on an outcome.
Chapter 2 tests whether disadvantaged students are discouraged early on from
university education, due to uncertain costs of studying, a mechanism hypothesized
by some studies to contribute to achievement gaps in college enrolment (Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo, 2016). To test this hypothesis, this chapter estimates the effect of
exogenous, unexpected policy announcements which took place in the Netherlands
in 2010 to study how students change their educational orientation in response
to increasing uncertainty about future financial aid at university. The treatment
is receiving information about the upcoming policy. Treated students are thus
those who receive information, and control students are those who do not receive
information. Since the policy announcements took place at the national level, the
treatment affects all students from the release of the policy announcement, thus,
to the extent that the policy announcement is as good as random, such that past
cohorts are comparable to treated cohorts, we can achieve causal estimates of the
effect of the policy announcement on changes in the education choices of treated
students.
Chapter 3 estimates the impact of classroom peers on a myriad of educational inputs,
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and whether intermediate input responses explain student test scores. This chapter
uses a natural experiment which takes place in the education system of Taiwan: a
national mandate dictates that middle school children must be randomly assigned
to classes within their school. Thus, conditional on being in a given school, we can
compare the effect of being randomly exposed to classroom peers of various types
on standardized test scores. In this configuration, the treatment that children are
assigned to is not binary but is the classroom composition, such as the average test
scores of classroom peers: the comparison thus becomes children in the same school
assigned to either a classroom with lower or higher achieving peers. To the extent
that children are indeed similar across classrooms within schools, this comparison
yields causal estimates of the impact of classroom peer characteristics on educational
inputs and test scores.
Chapter 4 estimates the impact of older siblings on teacher subjective assessment
about the ability of children. In this chapter, I use the relative rank of older siblings
in their primary school class in a national test of ability that Dutch pupils take upon
exiting primary school. In this setting, we compare two similar younger siblings,
whose older siblings had the same teacher and received the same score in the test,
but one of them was top of his class, and the other was not. In this quasi-experiment,
the treatment is having an older sibling with a higher relative rank. Thus, to the
extent that younger siblings are similar, this comparison yields causal estimates of
the impact of sibling rank on younger siblings’ outcomes.
Naturally, each methodology has its flaws. The validity of each estimation method-
ology relies on assumptions which cannot always directly be tested. In applied
microeconomics, since the “credibility revolution”, researchers have been increasingly
expected to discuss the limitations of their methodological choices, the assump-
tions under which estimates uncover causal relationships between treatments and
outcomes, and how much we can interpret from them. This endeavor to achieve
ever more methodological transparency, has come at the cost of lengthier yet more
narrowly-defined research questions, but with the gain of more precise and robust
findings.
Data Challenges to Study Behavioral Barriers in Education
Finding statistical data about students’ experience in education used to be trouble-
some. Historically, researchers relied on large surveys such as labor force surveys,
which only report outcomes of but never processes in education, and household
surveys such as the DNB Household Survey in the Netherlands, which almost never
11
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
collect student test scores or ability measures, nor student experience in education.
There were also occasional cohort studies, such as the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth in the United States, which have the advantage of following respondents for
a long time, yet information about schooling environments is almost never available,
and natural attrition and small samples often make it laborious to explore nuanced
mechanisms. Lastly, these types of data sources are rare, because of their high
implementation and maintenance cost, not available in many countries and at any
time. Even then, accessing existing data of this type is often easier said than done.
The past 10 years have, however, witnessed an explosion in the use of new data
sources, starting with administrative individual-level data. Figlio et al. (2016) argue
that the “promise of administrative data in education research” is three-fold: large
sample, often population-level data, allowing researchers to i) achieve more precise
estimates to bring new answers to older researcher questions; ii) focus on small,
vulnerable populations which are under-represented in surveys; and iii) highlight
new mechanisms which have small but important theoretical implications. Lastly, in
some settings, administrative data can be linked to uncover or test new phenomena:
in the United-States, the states of Texas, North-Carolina or Florida have notoriously
allowed researchers to link education records to birth records, which allowed, for
instance, David Figlio and co-authors to show the long-term negative impact of
adverse health conditions at birth on educational outcomes of children (Figlio et al.,
2014). Luckily, I was granted access to the Dutch administrative data infrastructure,
CBS, thanks to which I was able to conduct research using linked education registries,
birth, housing and labor market records for all Dutch pupils since the mid 2000s.
Administrative microdata sources do not only originate from government agencies,
nor do they always represent the entire population. Some of the most innovative
studies of the past 10 years in economics have been conducted using administrative
data from isolated educational institutions. These sources give access to highly
detailed, new information on the progress of students throughout the education
system. This permits new research designs to emerge, and the testing of finer
mechanisms on intermediate outcomes, e.g. retention, orientation and specialization
in majors, test scores and teacher assessments. For example, Todd Stinebrickner
and Ralph Stinebrickner collected a panel study at Berea College in United States
in the 2000s, linked the data to administrative records to explore how students learn
about their ability as they progress, and ultimately why students drop out (see e.g.
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2001, 2006). Ulf Zölitz and Jan Feld have used
the administrative records of the School of Business and Economics at Maastricht
University and written some of the most convincing articles in recent years on peer
12
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effects (see e.g. Feld and Zölitz, 2017; Zölitz and Feld, Forthcoming).
Still, administrative microdata sources are not a panacea. First, accessing adminis-
trative data sources remains challenging and restricted for confidentiality reasons.
Not many administrations give access to their administrative data, and often only to
citizens or residents. Acquiring individual records from school districts, individual
schools or firms is even more complicated because, as much as access can easily be
granted, it can just as easily be revoked. Second, many high-quality administrative
microdata cannot be matched to other sources. For example, in the United-States,
administrative education microdata is only available at the state-level, but due to
high geographic mobility, many students disappear from state-level administrative
records because they moved to another state. Second, even when available, adminis-
trative data remains costly, sometimes prohibitively costly to acquire. Third, since
administrative data were never meant for research purposes, they require a large
investment in time and effort to understand institutional context, what exactly is
being recorded and why. These data often don’t come with detailed codebooks nor
questionnaires, such that they also require experience with more standard data to
diagnose issues.
Estimating behavioral barriers in education adds an additional set of complications.
Conducting empirical research on behavioral barriers in education requires high-
quality measures of beliefs, which is not widely spread. Administrative data only
records outcomes that are useful for administrative purposes, and individual beliefs,
perceptions, as well as many social and demographic characteristics are typically
not recorded. Even in survey data, occasional measures of beliefs are seldom good
enough: they could be very noisy, or be formulated in a faulty manner such that
there is no variation in answers. For example, the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth measures students’ knowledge of occupations, but possible answers are
sufficiently obvious that these data don’t seem to contain a lot of useful information
for researchers. The Taiwan Education Panel Study is one rare example of a panel
study combining large-scale sampling, low attrition across waves of survey, and
high-quality measures of beliefs and outcomes of students.
Problem Statement and Dissertation Structure
This dissertation investigates if, how and how much individual beliefs can become
behavioral barriers in educational success. To address this problem statement, I




1. What is the scope of internal constraints for explaining the persistence of
socioeconomic inequality of opportunity in the long-run?
2. Are disadvantaged students discouraged early on from participating in university-
preparing education simply by uncertain access to financial aid?
3. Can we lift the aspirations of disadvantaged students by exposing them to
high-achieving peers? How much do lifted aspirations translate into higher
educational performance?
4. Can teacher beliefs become behavioral barriers to the success of disadvantaged
children?
Chapter I: Quantifying Aspirational Poverty Traps
There is little evidence of the economic relevance of behavioral barriers in education
as an explanation for the persistence of socioeconomic inequality. Therefore, an
important and natural initial research question for any researcher entering this field
of economics is: to what extent can we reasonably expect these types of barriers to
matter in the long-run and at the macro-economic level?
As naïve as it may sound, this is a crucial question, both from an academic and
from a policy perspective. Until we are able to answer this question, it remains
unclear to what the extent we should care about behavioral barriers for the design
of public policies. In Chapter 11, I explore the scope of a specific type of behavioral
barrier as an explanation for the persistence of inequality in long-term individual
wealth: aspirational poverty traps, socioeconomic environments in which people
systematically exert low effort and achieve low economic success. Yet if quantifying
poverty traps is hard, quantifying aspirational poverty traps is yet harder.2
Conceptually, quantifying aspirational poverty traps requires to establish two sepa-
rate cause-to-effect relationships linking individual circumstances and effort choices
to outcomes: i) to establish at the micro-economic level how internal constraints
makes people under-achieve relative to their potential; and ii) to establish to what
extent internally-constrained v. unconstrained people compare in the long-run in
the population. To this day, the evidence on the existence of and the impact of
internal constraints on individual outcomes remains contextual and limited to small,
2Joint work with Nicolás Salamanca at the Melbourne Institute, The University of Melbourne.
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narrowly defined estimates. The evidence on the impact of internal constraints in
a wider population and in the long-run is virtually nonexistent. Yet, even in the
presence of short-term effects of behavioral barriers on educational outcomes of
children, whether these effects would translate into long-term differences in outcomes
remains unclear, let alone whether these differences would reflect macro-economic
sub-optimal equilibria.
In this first project, I first propose a simple econometric methodology to estimate
in any national context the location and size of aspirational poverty traps, under
minimal data requirements. I start from Dalton et al. (2016)’s theoretical model
describing how people form aspirations, and how these aspirations affect long-run
investments, among which in education. This model is the first to show that
theoretically, there could exist aspirational poverty traps. I extend the model to
show that aspirational poverty traps imply systematically low intergenerational
socioeconomic mobility, yet higher mobility than material poverty traps.
Quantifying empirically aspirational poverty traps using my methodology requires i)
data on long-term trajectories of individual to assess the plausibility of such predic-
tions – this kind of data turns out to be quite rare; and ii) nationally representative
data. Individual outcomes in the long-run is key, because if small scale behavioral
mechanisms have no impact in the long-run, then studying such mechanisms might
not be our best use of research funding. On the other hand, if small scale behav-
ioral mechanisms do matter in the long-run, then investing in channeling these
mechanisms in policies could turn out to be the most efficient use of public funds.
Nationally representative data is required because my methodology entails detecting
changing regimes of social mobility in a given population. To be able to detect such
changes, we need the maximum amount of data across the distribution of wealth.
I then provide some initial results on the empirical importance of aspirational failure
as a factor explaining heterogeneous lifetime earnings of individuals. I apply this
methodology to the United States, and find that roughly 5.5% to 7.5% of the
population could be in such a trap, and that these people would be located just
below the median household in terms of wealth, around the 37th and 42nd percentile
of the distribution of wealth.
This initial exercise is important because it suggests that there could be scope for
improving the lives of an economically significant share of the population by raising
their aspirations. This study calls for several avenues of follow-up research work. A
first one could be to extend this analysis to many countries, in order to investigate
the role of institutions in the existence, size and location of aspirational poverty
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traps. A second one, which I have chosen to pursue ever since, is to focus on how
public policies can reduce or exacerbate inequality by triggering behavioral responses
of individuals.
Chapter II: Early Discouragement from Uncertainty About Financial
Aid
In this chapter, I investigate whether disadvantaged students could be discour-
aged early on in their educational career from participating in university-preparing
education; this is a specific way that beliefs can become behavioral barriers to
opportunities in education.
Over the past five years, several studies have shown that informing students about
the cost of higher education can have a large impact on their decision whether
to apply to higher education, at which institution and which major. One of the
emerging ideas in this literature is that underprivileged students could be shying
away from university-preparing education early in their educational career due to
biased beliefs about the true cost of education (see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo,
2016). While a handful of studies have shown that disadvantaged students often
over-estimate the cost of higher education and under-estimate their eligibility to
financial aid, there is virtually no evidence that they shy away from university-
preparing education early on in their educational career. Yet understanding this
early discouragement effect is crucial for designing optimal financial aid and higher
education financing systems, balancing the right amount of incentive for students to
exert study effort while attracting high-achieving students to higher education.
In Chapter 23, I study the role of students and their families’ beliefs in their early
discouragement to pursue university-preparing education. To do this, I focus on
the impact of policy uncertainty about financial aid on the tracking outcomes of
secondary school students in the Netherlands.
There are two key reasons why policy uncertainty about financial aid is a good exper-
iment to study whether the early discouragement effect exists. Firstly, while policy
uncertainty is largely understudied in applied microeconomic studies, macroeconomic
studies have shown that people respond to uncertainty in their decision environment:
traders respond to central bank announcements even before any policy change takes
3Joint work with Jan Kabátek at the Melbourne Institute, The University of Melbourne.
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place, job seekers update their expectations about finding jobs when government
reveal national unemployment statistics. Although many applied microeconomics
studies show that people do learn from their experience, there is however hardly
any evidence that students and families respond to uncertainty about future costs
of higher education. Secondly, as much as administrative data does not collect
individual beliefs, policy uncertainty prior to actual policy changes allows us under
reasonable assumptions to interpret changes in educational trajectories as responses
to changes in expectations, not responses to changes in actual prices.
To investigate how uncertainty about the future of financial aid can discourage some
students from going to higher education, I exploit announcements of a controversial
Dutch reform of financial aid, which turned universal, unconditional grants for
higher education into income-contingent loans. Specifically, I use the staggered
policy announcements of the “Sociaal Lensteelsel” and its later implementation, in
the academic year 2015-2016: In June 2010, the Dutch government announced its
general intention to move away from the subsidy-based system of student finance
towards a loan-based system, without giving specific details. This announcement
increased the expected price of higher education for all students by making the
prospective receipt of financial aid uncertain. This initial announcement created a
heated debate in the Netherlands, with news outlets, political parties and student
trade unions heavily speculating on the government’s potential bill while a general
panic spread through the student population. In October 2012, after new elections,
the government revealed in a second announcement the details of the new system,
including its name “Sociaal Lensteelsel”, its conditions and the first cohort of higher
education students to be affected, while also revealing that vocational education
students would be exempted.
I first propose a theoretical framework to describe in what way we can expect un-
certainty about future financial aid conditions alone to affect educational decisions.
I build on a simple model of human capital investments in which students make
educational choices at every stage of their education anticipating on their complete
trajectory. I then enhance this model by explicitly modelling uncertainty in parame-
ters associated with student finance at higher education and studying the role of
uncertainty in educational choices. The central prediction of my framework is that
students’ subjective probability of having to pay back financial aid can discourage
low-income students from higher education, as early as when they can opt-out of
tracks associated with higher probabilities of having to pay back.
Using administrative records for the universe of Dutch high school students, I
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find that the first policy announcement led to a sharp decrease in the share of
students enrolling in college-preparing tracks, and to an immediate jump in the
share of students dropping out of these tracks into the vocational track. The second
announcement led to a further decrease in the share of students enrolling in college-
preparing tracks while dropout rates decreased. While we can expect students
through the education system to respond to policy announcements concerning major
university access reforms, this study makes a simple yet important contribution to
this literature, by providing the first evidence that policy uncertainty alone about
financial aid alone can lead a substantial share of secondary-school students to avoid
college-preparing education.
Lastly, I perform a battery additional analyses to show that these results are unlikely
to find better suiting alternative explanations. In particular, because all students
were exposed to nation-wide announcement shocks at once, there is no obvious
control group other than past cohorts, such that this study could only rely on a
comparison of cohorts over time. The central concern with comparing cohorts before
versus after policy announcements, is that there could be many confounding factors
correlated with the timing of reform announcement shocks. To address this concern,
I show that there are no trend breaks in 12 different potentially confounding factors
correlated with the timing of reform announcements: 1) earnings of new graduates
by education type, 2) employment rates of new graduates by education type, 3)
minimum wage rates, 4) youth unemployment, in particular throughout the Great
Recession, 5) high school graduation rates, 6) average time to graduation in post-
secondary education, 7) costs of attending post-secondary education – tuition fees,
other financial aid amounts, conditions, interest rates, 8) parental unemployment, 9)
school capacity constraints, 10) other changes of the Dutch education system, 11)
cross-country trends in track choice, and 12) cross-country trends in the take-up of
STEM education.
Ultimately, this study tells us that policy uncertainty about the future can be
devastating for people’s educational plans. Children can shy away from university
education as early as upon entering middle school, because of uncertainty about
the future cost they will have to pay to go to university. This study suggests that
policy announcements alone can exacerbate inequality of opportunities by triggering
students’ behavioral responses; students perceived uncertainty about financial aid
affects their trajectories earlier than ever shown in previous research.
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Chapter III: Lifting Aspirations for Better Educational Outcomes
In this chapter, I explore whether exposing disadvantaged students to high-achieving
peers can lift their aspirations, and whether lifting aspirations can improve educa-
tional achievement. Chapter 34 follows up project on Chapter 1. While Chapter
1 shows that there is scope for lifting people out of aspirational poverty traps,
Chapter 3 provides some initial answers to the important question of how. Expos-
ing children to high-achieving classroom peers appears as a naturally promising
and relatively low-cost policy for lifting aspirations of students from disadvantaged
backgrounds. Chapter 3 explores whether and to what extent classroom peers can
improve educational outcomes by lifting aspirations.
Before even delving into how peers may or may not be able to lift aspirations, a
major roadblock is that while an immense empirical literature has documented that
peers in school do affect test scores, we still know very little about why and how
peers matter. Several recent studies have elicited potential mechanisms of peer
effects in isolation and across various settings, yet decades of research on education
have shown that students performance is shaped by several simultaneous inputs
from students, parents and teachers. The main issue with studying mechanisms in
isolation is that it does not address the crucial question: what drives academic peer
effects?
To address my research question, I need to investigate in one and the same setting 1)
whether high-achieving peers matter for test scores, 2) whether high-achieving peers
affect intermediate outcomes including aspirations, which are potential mechanisms
through which peers affect test scores, and 3) whether high-achieving peers matter
for test scores through these educational inputs. This study is the first to provide
answers to all three steps jointly.
I use rich survey data from Taiwan on a representative sample of middle school
pupils. Through a stratified nested sampling design, the survey collected detailed
information about 20,000 students, their parents, teachers and school administrators,
across multiple classrooms per school, firstly just after random assignment, and
then two years later. Importantly, middle schools are mandated to randomly assign
students to classrooms, such that students’ exposure to higher- v. lower-achieving
peers is as good as random within schools. I find that when exposed to classrooms
4Joint work with Nicolás Salamanca at the Melbourne Institute, The University of Melbourne.
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with 1 standard deviation higher-achieving peers, pupils experience a 5.4 percent of
a standard deviation boost in standardized test score two years later. Next, I find
that exposure to high-achieving peers also decrease student school effort such as
homework, and increase university aspirations and expectations, as well as the time
pupils spend with their parents. Perhaps most importantly, the positive effect of
high-achieving peers on test scores is not explained by any of these intermediate
effects.
While testing whether the data were indeed consistent with random assignment to
classes, I designed the “Fishing Algorithm”, a methodology I developed to exclude
from the estimation sample specific schools where random assignment does not
seem to hold. After first constructing an index of concentration of student types
in classrooms within schools, the algorithm then uses randomization inference
techniques and finite-mixture modelling to construct for each school a probability
that pupils are assigned to classes not at random. Beyond the application of this
algorithm in this paper, this algorithm is of independent interest and can be used,
e.g. to detect clustered violations of randomization to treatment in RCTs.
I perform an extensive set of sensitivity analyses and find that my results are
remarkably robust to various estimation decisions and identifying assumptions.
Because these findings rely crucially on the assumption that students are indeed
randomly assigned to their classroom within their school, I run multiple tests for
conditional random assignment of children to classes in schools. I also propose
alternative estimates with an exhaustive set of controls, and discuss to what extent
correlated selection on unobservable characteristics could explain away the results.
Because the mediation findings rely on the size of effects of high-achieving peers, I
perform further sensitivity analyses: I further compute alternative estimates using
bias corrections for measurement error in student ability and for incomplete sampling
of classes, I use inference corrections using randomization inference and multiple
hypotheses testing adjustments, and I extensive explore the extent of heterogeneity
in peer effects and their mediation.
This is the first study showing causal evidence that randomly assigned high-achieving
peers affect educational aspirations and expectations of students, and is also the
first study to show that the effects of peers on intermediate educational inputs do
not mediate the positive effects of peers on outcomes. This is an important finding,
because if peers have a separate effect on beliefs and on outcomes, then they have
the potential to create behavioral barriers that are unrelated to student performance
by lowering aspirations. This study, however, also tells us that the potential of
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treatments increasing students’ aspirations for improving outcomes remains limited:
while exposing disadvantaged children to high-achieving peers might improve their
aspirations, higher aspirations are unlikely to translate into higher performance,
either because peers don’t increase aspirations enough, or because aspirations don’t
translate much into better educational outcomes.
Chapter IV: Teachers’ Biased Beliefs and Inequality of Opportunity
This last chapter address a key question: can teacher beliefs become behavioral
barriers to the success of disadvantaged children? As exposure to teachers is hardly
a margin that disadvantaged students can act upon, assessing whether teachers have
biased beliefs about pupils, and the extent to which teachers’ beliefs can exacerbate
inequality of opportunity is crucial. Few studies have found evidence that some
teachers hold biased views about their pupils, yet we know very little about why
teacher bias arises, and what policies can reduce the consequences of bias. Recent
randomized control trials have shown suggestive evidence that teacher bias may
be reduce by training teachers to recognize their biases; these solutions, sadly, are
neither scalable, nor are they immune to more pervasive types of biases. In Chapter
4, I focus on one of the simplest, most common ways that teachers might form biased
expectations about the ability of a child: by knowing their older siblings.
I use administrative data from the Netherlands over 2003 to 2016, and exploit two
specific features of the Dutch school system that allow me study teacher bias: first,
pupils exit primary schools with a standardized test score which is comparable over
time and throughout the Netherlands, and second teachers formulate a subjective
assessment of their pupils’ ability to pursue secondary education into one of three
secondary school tracks. For every child, I construct his relative rank on the
standardized test within his primary school cohort. As cohort composition varies
between schools and within schools over time, for any specific test score, a child’s
relative rank goes from being at the top to being at the bottom of the cohort’s
ability distribution. For over 530,000 pairs of siblings, I then estimate the effect of
older siblings’ relative rank in their primary school cohort on their younger siblings’
i) own primary school test score, and ii) teacher subjective assessment.
The relative rank of a child’s older sibling is thus a good experiment to estimate
teacher bias for two key reasons: firstly because, from the younger sibling’s perspec-
tive, his older sibling’s relative rank is as good as random conditional on the older
sibling’s absolute test score; secondly because, while the absolute performance of the
older sibling contains information about cognitive ability that may legitimately also
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apply to the younger sibling (e.g. genetics, family resources and family environment),
the relative rank of the older sibling is a direct function of the test scores of the older
siblings’ peers, and therefore contains no residual information about the younger
child’s endowments.
I find that older siblings’ rank increases younger siblings’ standardized test scores
and, conditional on younger siblings’ test scores, improves their teacher’s subjective
assessment. In a form of “shielding” effect, teachers are more lenient with younger
siblings whose older siblings have already shown high academic potential relative
to their cohort, even after controlling for the direct effect on younger siblings’ own
performance. I also find that older siblings’ rank impacts the educational trajectory
of their younger siblings in the long-run, by increasing their probability of graduating
from high school with a STEM specialization. That older siblings’ rank affects the
test scores of younger siblings highlights that sibling spillovers effects may occur
through motivation, even in the absence of additional human capital.
More importantly, my findings demonstrate that teacher biased expectations arising
from older sibling rank effects also have the potential to exacerbate inequality of
opportunity for disadvantaged students. When comparing native-born sibling pairs
to first and second generation migrant sibling pairs, I find that older siblings with
higher ranks provide a similar boosting effect on younger siblings’ performance,
but older siblings rank improve teachers’ assessment only of native-born younger
siblings. While teachers could have private information that families of migrant
children tend to be more attracted towards vocational education, gender differences
are more difficult to explain. Comparing sisters and brothers, I find that older
sisters’ rank has a larger positive effect on younger sisters’ Math score compared to
younger brothers’, and a stronger positive effect on the probability that the teacher
recommends the academic track for younger sisters compared to younger brothers.
Older brothers’ rank, on the other hand, has a larger negative effect on their younger
brothers’ Math score, but a large positive effect on their language score, and precisely
estimated null effects on teacher recommendations. Overall, these findings indicate
that children with different demographic characteristics are judged differently by
teachers, possibly in a manner consistent with statistical discrimination. Because
my study exploits sibling spillover effects to elicit teacher biased expectations, my
results can be interpreted as a lower bound of the impact of teacher bias in general
on children’s educational trajectory.
Lastly, I explore to whether simple educational policies can reduce the adverse
effects of disadvantage on teacher bias. To do this, I further exploit two educational
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policies that reduced the role of teacher subjective assessments on the admission of
pupils at secondary schools and tracks. I find that when teacher assessment matter
less for the admission chances of pupils in secondary school, sibling rank effects
on teachers’ subjective assessment seems to disappear, while the effect on younger
siblings’ performance remains.
This study highlights that teachers’ beliefs about pupils’ ability can be unrelated to
their true ability, and have long-lasting impact of children’s educational outcomes.
At the same time, my findings also suggest that teachers’ expectations can potentially
be altered by educational policies.
Lastly, I conclude this dissertation with a summary of the contributions of each




Quantifying Aspirational Poverty Traps

The first chapter of this dissertation investigates the empirical relevance of internal
constraints as a potential explanation for the persistence of inequality in long-
run labor market outcomes and wealth. In Chapter 1, we focus on a specific
type of behavioral barrier as an explanation for the persistence of socioeconomic
inequality: aspirational poverty traps, socioeconomic environments in which people
systematically exert low effort and achieve low economic success.
We first develop a methodology to estimate the location and the size of aspirational
poverty traps in any population using a modest amount of data. We start from
the theoretical model of Dalton et al. (2016) which describes how individuals make
decisions to invest either high or low effort to achieve future wealth, under budget
constraints and with aspirational goals. In their model, there are two types of
individual decision-makers: on the one hand, fully rational individuals who fully
internalize that their aspirations affect their effort, such that they choose both their
aspirations and their effort level; on the other hand, behavioral decision-makers
have not internalized that aspirations affect effort, such that their effort choices
are entirely dependent on their initial draws of aspirations. Two concrete examples
will help illustrate this idea. Imagine two individuals: Peter, and Paul. Peter
and Paul both have the same childhood dream of becoming firemen. Growing up,
Peter updates his dream to teacher, which requires exerting more study effort in
the form of going to university. Accordingly, Peter exerts this extra effort, and
eventually becomes a teacher. Paul, on the other hand, takes his childhood dream
unquestioningly as given, and accordingly does not go to college. Dalton et al.
(2016)’s model is the first to show that, theoretically, there could exist aspirational
poverty traps. The key lessons from their model is twofold: on the one hand, people
who imperfectly update their aspirations have lower chances of receiving high wages
or accumulate wealth compared to people who can update their aspirations over time
to self-motivate to exert high effort; on the other hand, if poverty increases the chance
that a person imperfectly updates his aspirations, then the sole existence of this
imperfect aspiration updating implies that there will be aspirational poverty traps.
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To understand this second insight, consider again Peter and Paul. An aspirational
poverty trap emerges if pupils like Peter tend to belong to wealthy families, while
pupils like Paul tend to belong to poorer families.
In the theoretical part of Chapter 1, we extend the model of Dalton et al. (2016) to
determine two key quantities: the size and the location of aspirational poverty traps
in a given distribution of permanent income or lifetime wealth. We show that the
existence of imperfect aspiration updating in the population implies systematically
low intergenerational socioeconomic mobility at the bottom of the distribution
of initial conditions driven by low aspirations, then discreetly increasing rates of
within-lifetime income growth as initial conditions improve. Importantly, that intra-
generational and intergenerational socioeconomic mobility is nonlinearly distributed
in the population is a stylized fact, that now receives a deeply rooted economic
interpretation.
A second important contribution of this study is to provide us with a simple
methodology, with minimal data requirements, to estimate the size and location
of aspirational poverty traps: with data on lifetime earnings, structural breaks in
intragenerational mobility indicate the location of the population potentially trapped
in low-aspiration low-effort equilibria.
In the empirical part of the study, we provide some initial results on the empirical
importance of aspirational failure as a factor explaining heterogeneous lifetime
earnings of individuals, using well-known survey data from the United-States to
showcase our methodology in the case of the United States. Since 1979, the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 has been following annually or bi-annually a
representative sample of over 12,000 people born between 1957 and 1964. Since our
main theoretical finding is that the presence of behavioral people precisely leads to
regime-switching points in intragenerational socioeconomic mobility, we estimate
models of intragenerational socioeconomic mobility using threshold regressions.
Although threshold regressions have not traditionally been used in this literature,
threshold regression models present the key advantage that they allow the relationship
between regressors such as initial conditions and outcome variables such as permanent
income to switch discreetly, without necessarily knowing ex-ante the location of these
switching points. Our methodology provides us with some of the first estimates of the
location of regime-switching points, and then estimate models of intragenerational
mobility with structural breaks.
Our theoretical analyses indicate that aspirational poverty traps are located in
the middle region the distribution of intragenerational mobility, and our empirical
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analysis using the NLSY79 indicates that approximately 5.5% to 7.5% of the
population could be in such traps in the United States, located just below the
median household in terms of wealth, around the 37th and 42nd percentiles.
Our additional analyses suggest that our empirical findings are unlikely explained
by other possible explanations. In particular, we show that the structural breaks we
find in the relationship between initial conditions and lifetime earnings are not driven
by systematic differences in locus of control, self-esteem nor job search strategies.
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1.1 Introduction
Inequality of opportunity is one of the most pressing socioeconomic issues in the
21st century, and has been widely studied by social scientists since the beginning
of the 19th century. A central research question in this field is to understand how
cross-sectional inequality transmits from one generation from the next. A handful of
studies show theoretically and empirical how local institutions and market failures
can generate poverty traps, and economists have only recently begun to understand
that poverty traps come in different types. Classical poverty traps caused external
constraints creating material deprivation, are characterized by the poor being so
constrained by their material well-being that they cannot improve it.2
Recently, a growing literature in economics has proposed a new approach to poverty,
and has shown that material deprivation often generates a psychological burden,
which can hinder decision-making and forward-looking behavior, such as human
capital investments. Focusing on psychological or behavioral dimensions of poverty,
the new economics of poverty shows that the psychological burden of poverty can
be thought of as imposing internal constraints that impair decision-making (e.g.
Bertrand et al., 2004; Mani et al., 2013).3
1This study is joint work with Nicolás Salamanca at the Melbourne Institute.
2Several types of material deprivation have been documented to generate classical poverty traps,
for instance: poor health conditions and malnutrition (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986), limited access
to credit or insurance (Loury, 1981; Banerjee and Newman, 1991, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993),
the resources to develop productive skills (Kremer, 1993), or well-developed institutions (Bardhan,
1997), and the limiting effect of people’s geographical and social environment (Hoff and Sen, 2005,
2006).
3Several types of psychological factors of poverty have already been documents: hopelessness and
the lack of willpower (Duflo, 2012), the cognitive load imposed by poverty (Mani et al., 2013; Shah
et al., 2012), the role of identity in retaining and acting upon information (Duflo et al., 2011b),
low self-control (Bernheim et al., 2015) and systematically low aspirations (Bernard et al., 2014;
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Recent theoretical findings argue that there could be aspirational poverty traps, a
specific type of behavioral poverty traps which hinders forward-looking behavior and
investments. First documented in the seminal anthropological work of Appadurai
(2004), aspirational poverty traps are a particular type of state in which low-
effort equilibria are perpetuated not by people’s lack of resources but by depressed
aspirations to improve their own welfare – deprivation of the “capacity to aspire”.
Ray (2006) theorized how aspirations can work as incentives for people to invest
in their future, and Genicot and Ray (2017) extends this theory to focus on how
aspirations are socially-determined and what effects this can have on the distribution
of income in the long-run. These models predict a U-shape relationship between
individual initial conditions, aspirations and investments: when aspirations are too
far or too close from initial conditions, they fail at providing the right incentives to
invest. Dalton et al. (2016) are the first to show that theoretically aspirations failure
can actually generate aspirational poverty traps that are empirically and conceptually
distinct from classical poverty.4 Studying aspirational poverty traps is crucial, as
stressed by La Ferrara (2019)’s presidential address at the Journal of the European
Economic Association and Ray and Genicot (2019)’s recent review of the literature.5
Both studies indicate that the existence of such traps is a paradigm-shifter in the way
we think about anti-poverty programs in developed and in developing economies.6
More generally, the existence of aspirational poverty traps also has important
implications for the way we understand social mobility and inequality. Classical
approaches to economic inequality and social mobility can be divided into two broad
categories: the first approach focuses on measuring intergenerational mobility using
Beaman et al., 2012; Dupas et al., 2020).
4A notable other and earlier study outside of the development literature and in line with Dalton
et al. (2016) is the study of Page et al. (2007), which offers an interpretation of aspirations
as reference points in a prospect theory framework, and provides experimental evidence that
aspirations drive the choices of students.
5Notable empirical studies on aspirations and associated concepts such as reference points in
economics include: Beaman et al. (2012); Bernard et al. (2014); Macours and Vakis (2014);
Mukherjee (2015); Lybbert and Wydick (2018); Ross (2019); Janzen et al. (2017); Guyon and
Huillery (Forthcoming); Contreras Suarez and Cameron (2020).
6First, the existence of such traps implies that there are people who we can pull out of poverty
by readjusting their expectations through interventions, which could be substantially less costly
than their corresponding transfers from a traditional welfare program (e.g. Bernard et al., 2014;
Goux et al., 2017). Second, the existence of such traps could also explain why for some people cash
transfers are ineffective in helping them out of poverty (e.g. Dupas et al., 2020; Contreras Suarez
and Cameron, 2020). Lastly, the existence of aspirational poverty traps could also explain why
treatments combining cash transfers with non-cognitive skills training and psychological support
have been so effective at improving people’s outcomes (Heckman and Kautz, 2013).
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correlations between parents’ and their children’s’ earnings at the same age in their
life-cycle, and the second approach focuses on measuring the role of specific factors
in the earnings of one generation –the children’s generation – controlling for initial
socioeconomic circumstances.
In the first approach to social mobility, the existence of aspirational poverty traps
could imply distinct regimes of the transmission of socioeconomic conditions from one
generation to the next, through parental decisions and external economic conditions
that children are exposed to during their childhood. Aspirational poverty traps
could contribute to explain some of the latest evidence on racial differences in
intergenerational mobility, even after comparing children growing up in the same
block and with similar fam(Chetty et al., 2020). Aspirational poverty traps could
also contribute to explain that Durlauf et al. (2017) and Kourtellos et al. (2020)
find evidence of non-linear intergenerational mobility in the United-States, with
low mobility at the top and at the bottom of the wealth distribution, and high
mobility around the mean. They show that a part of this non-linear pattern is
related to non-cognitive skills of parents. Expanding on the seminal work of Becker
and Tomes (1979), Becker et al. (2018) propose a unifying theoretical model of
intergenerational mobility that incorporates the role of parental non-cognitive skills
in the trajectory of their children. Thus, aspirational poverty traps could explain
the finding that low-SES parents invest less in the human capital of their children
than more affluent parents. A handful of studies has found some evidence for this
mechanism. Janzen et al. (2017) show that parents in rural Nepal form aspirations
about the schooling of their children based on their neighbors, and that these
aspirations predict actual investments in human capital. Beaman et al. (2012) show
that, in India, a policy allowing women to be elected in local councils increased the
education and occupational aspirations of parents of girls.
In the second approach to social mobility, the existence of aspirational poverty traps
could imply distinct regimes for the level of or the return to individual factors in
lifetime earnings, thus contributing to cross-sectional heterogeneity in earnings level
and trajectories. There is growing correlational evidence that disadvantaged people
have lower aspirations (Bernard et al., 2014; Guyon and Huillery, Forthcoming), and
there is also emerging evidence that people’s aspirations have a causal impact on
their own educational outcomes (Goux et al., 2017; Ross, 2019), yet more research
is needed to understand how, why and when aspirations form and can be pivotal
for educational outcomes of children. Above all, we know very little about the role
of aspirations on long-run inequality, and in such, whether aspirational poverty
traps exist. There is, in fact, little empirical evidence of the existence and economic
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relevance of aspirations, and of aspirational poverty traps in particular.
In this study, we propose a simple and tractable methodology to determine the
size and location of aspirational poverty traps under minimal data requirements.
We extend the model of aspirations failure of Dalton et al. (2016) to show the-
oretically that aspirational poverty traps would imply empirically sharp changes
in income growth rates in the cross-sectional distribution of socioeconomic initial
circumstances, that is, aspirational poverty traps would generate three distinct
regimes in intragenerational social mobility: until some threshold in family earnings,
children with low initial circumstances experience low social mobility and remain at
the lowest percentiles in the distribution of earnings within their generation; from
a higher point in the distribution of family earnings, children with highest initial
circumstances experience low social mobility and remain at the highest percentiles in
the distribution of earnings within their generation. In between these two thresholds,
we find a zone of high intragenerational social mobility, which upper part corresponds
to an aspirational poverty trap. Aspirational poverty traps thus correspond to a
regime of intermediate intragenerational social mobility, where individual aspirations
could be pivotal in making better forward-looking decisions.
We then propose an application to the United States using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). We estimate thresholds regression
models of intragenerational mobility, and find robust evidence for non-linear in-
tragenerational mobility, that is, we show that there are sharp changes in income
growth experienced by individuals starting from different socioeconomic circum-
stances. Although we cannot directly pinpoint to the causal role of aspirations in
determining individual income growth regimes, we argue that the sharp changes in
the rate of income growth in the cross-section can be used as an indication of the
location of aspirational poverty traps in the distribution of initial circumstances,
and an upper bound of the size of these traps. We find that roughly 5.5% to 7.5% of
the US population could be in an aspirational poverty trap, and concerns children
with initial conditions around the 37th and the 42nd percentile of the distribution
of wealth.
Our empirical methodology brings us close to Durlauf et al. (2017), who use threshold
regressions to document nonlinearities in intergenerational mobility in the United
States, which they consider to be the first evidence for what they call “status traps” –
a type of socioeconomic disadvantage below which intergenerational mobility sharply
drops. Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, our study
complements the literature on intergenerational mobility which has recently started
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to document systematic heterogeneity in social mobility: Durlauf et al. (2017) and
Kourtellos et al. (2020) emphasize that parental cognitive and non-cognitive traits
are important for the intergenerational social mobility of their children, while Chetty
and Hendren (2018) and Chetty et al. (2020) suggest that Black youth in the Unites
States experience better outcomes when paternal figures are present. Our study
complements this literature by providing new micro-economic foundations to the
empirical regularity that social mobility is non-linear. Thus, our study complements
theirs by showing that aspirational poverty traps would empirically materialize by
the existence of non-linear individual income growth over the life-cycle, in other
words, intragenerational mobility. Second, our study provides some of the first
empirical grounds for the existence of aspirational poverty traps in a developed
context. Third and perhaps most importantly, our study provides a simple and
easily implementable methodology with minimal data requirement to determine
whether there could be aspirational poverty traps, their location and their size. This
methodology is useful for the design of policy interventions targeted at disadvantaged
youth. With an idea of which part of the population could be in an aspirational
poverty traps, policymakers could target research studies more easily, and design
more efficient interventions aimed at raising aspirations.
This paper is organized as following. Section 1.2 reviews the aspiration failure
model by Dalton et al. (2016), and presents our macro-economic implication for
intragenerational social mobility. Section 1.3 presents our estimation methodology.
Section 1.4 details our empirical application to the United States using the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Section 1.5 discusses the robustness of our
empirical findings, and Section 1.6 concludes. Technical details can be found in
Appendix.
1.2 A Theory of Aspirational Poverty Traps
Aspirational poverty traps have been modelled theoretically in three main models.
Ray (2006) develops a theoretical model in which individual aspirations work as
incentives for investment behavior, and Genicot and Ray (2017) extends this model
to focus on long-term dynamics of inequality under different regimes of aspirations
formation. Dalton et al. (2016) is the only study, to the best of our knowledge,
which explicitly shows how a lack of aspirations generates poverty traps that are
conceptually different from classical poverty traps. In this sense, Dalton et al. (2016)
provide another way of looking at the relationship between aspirations and effort
provision. In their model, failing to aspire is a cognitive bias in which individuals
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fail at integrating that their aspirations and effort provision are endogenous. They
show that even when this cognitive bias is randomly distributed in society, poverty
worsens the consequences of this cognitive bias, thus generating a poverty trap that
is conceptually different from a classical poverty trap. We build on their findings by
deriving testable predictions from their theory that would allow us to empirically test
the existence of aspirational traps and quantify their economic importance. We show
that aspirational traps manifest themselves empirically through a highly non-linear
relationship between people’s initial and final wealth. The essential features of
this non-linear relationship, which can inform us of the existence and significance
of aspirational traps, can be estimated using threshold regressions with multiple
thresholds.
1.2.1 Aspirations Failure in Dalton, Ghosal and Mani (2016)
In this subsection, we briefly explain the aspiration failure model of Dalton et al.
(2016), which gives rise to the aspirational traps that we later analyze. We keep their
notation throughout the paper. The model describes how people with exogenously-
given heterogeneous levels of initial wealth (θ0 ∈ R+) and potentially endogenous
aspirations about their final wealth (g ∈ R+) make effort choices (e ∈ {0, 1}), and
how all of these elements together jointly determine their final wealth (θ ∈ R+).
Formally, people’s utility function is modeled as:




where b describes classical consumption utility from final wealth, ν is a reference-
dependent value function capturing the additional utility gained or lost from com-
paring one’s final wealth to a reference point — in this case the aspired level of
final wealth g —, and c is a cost of effort function. These functions are assumed
to be well-behaved and to fulfill some additional conditions discussed in Dalton
et al. (2016). The final wealth production function is assumed to be θ = (1 + e)/θ0 ,
reflecting the assumption that, for a given level of effort exerted, wealthier people
can obtain a higher level of final wealth. Finally, this model classifies individuals
into two mutually exclusive types, rational or behavioral, as defined by the way their
aspirations are determined7.
7Dalton et al. (2016) consider consistent effort-aspiration pairs as equilibria for their model, which
effectively rules out situations where a person fails to meet their aspirations (as opposed to e.g.,
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In this model, aspirations g are in principle endogenous and are affected by the level
of effort exerted by people. Herein, however, lies the difference between rational
and behavioral individuals. Since more effort is rewarded with higher final wealth,
people’s intention to exert higher effort should also result in them having higher
aspirations, and this relation is fully internalized by rational individuals. Choices of
rational individuals are thus described by them choosing effort levels e to maximize
Equation (1.1) subject to g = θ = (1 + e)/θ0. Behavioral individuals, on the other
hand, are subject to a cognitive bias which makes them fail to fully internalize
the fact that aspirations should respond to their exerted effort. Their choices are
thus described by them choosing effort levels to maximize Equation (1.1) subject to
g = ḡ(θ0), where ḡ is a fixed aspirations level akin to a steady state in an adaptive
preference mechanism, and g0 is the initial preference draw from a stable distribution
which results in aspirations being set at ḡ.8
The main results of Dalton et al. (2016) can be summarized as following:
1. There exists a threshold level of initial wealth, θ̂, which determines the behavior
of rational individuals:
(a) If θ0 < θ̂, rational agents will exert no effort (e = 0) and obtain θ = θ0
(b) If θ0 ≤ θ̂, rational agents will exert effort (e = 1) and obtain θ = 2θ0.
2. There exists two additional threshold levels of initial wealth, θL and θH , which
determine the behavior of behavioral individuals:
(a) If θ0 < θL, behavioral agents will exert no effort (e = 0) and obtain θ = θ0
(b) If θL ≤ θ0 ≤ θH , behavioral agents can end up in either a low-effort
and low-wealth outcome (e = 0; θ = θ0), or in a high-effort high-wealth
outcome (e = 1; θ = 2θ0).
(c) If θ0 ≥ θH , behavioral agents will exert effort (e = 1) and obtain θ = 2θ0.
3. Lastly, θL ≤ θ̂ ≤ θH .
Ray (2006) and Genicot and Ray (2017) who also discuss inconsistent pairs. Our derivations also
rely on this assumption. However, the authors do discuss in their appendix how their model can
be extended to incorporate such aspiration gaps. The strength of their model is that aspirational
poverty traps can emerge even when considering only consistent effort-aspiration pairs.
8For the sake of brevity, we introduce some notation at this point. See Dalton et al. (2016), p.174
for a more detailed explanation of this process, in particular their footnote 15.
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Among behavioral agents whose initial wealth lies between θL and θH , some indi-
viduals will end up sub-optimally exerting low effort and achieve low wealth. This
occurs for behavioral agents whose initial aspirations g0 are too low and they failed
to update them by noticing that if they exerted higher effort they could aspire to
more.
Dalton et al. (2016) further characterize the range of initial aspirations g0 for which
agents are located in an aspirational poverty trap - traps from which they could
in principle be pulled out. They define a stable cumulative distribution function
M from which g0 is drawn, such that M(x) = P(g0 < x). They further show that
there exists some level g̃(θ0) which determines the effort regime that a behavioral
agent will choose: draws of initial aspirations g0 < g̃(θ0) lead to low-effort equilibria,
while draws of initial aspirations g0 ≥ g̃(θ0) lead to high-effort equilibria. The
authors lastly show that g̃ is a decreasing function of θ0 (Lemma 5), which implies
some correlation between material poverty and low aspirations — a result which is
consistent with the evidence found in developing countries.
Dalton et al. (2016)’s model makes several key contributions to the literature: they
show that aspirational poverty traps can theoretically exist, and be conceptually
and empirically different from classical poverty traps although correlate. There can
be behavioral agents whose initial wealth is such that θ̂ ≤ θ0 ≤ θH and whose draw
of initial aspirations land them in a low-effort equilibrium. These agents are in an
aspirational trap, in the sense that they could be optimally exerting high effort and
enjoying a high wealth had their initial aspiration not been set so low.
1.2.2 The size and location of aspirational poverty traps
In this section, we extend the model of Dalton et al. (2016) to derive the key
quantities of interest to our study: the size and location of aspirational poverty
traps. We first recast the model as follows:
1. The probability that a rational person lands in a low–effort, low–wealth
equilibrium can be expressed as: p =
1 if θ0 < θ̂0 if θ0 ≥ θ̂
2. The probability that a behavioral person lands in a low–effort, low-wealth
equilibrium can be expressed as: p̃ =

1 if θ0 < θL
M(g̃(θ0)) if θL < θ0 < θH
0 if θH < θ0
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1 if θ0 < θL
λ+ (1− λ)M(g̃(θ0)) if θL < θ0 < θ̂
(1− λ)M(g̃(θ0)) if θ̂ < θ0 < θH
0 if θH < θ0
(1.2)
Where λ ∈ {0, 1} is the share of rational agents in the population, or the uncondi-
tional probability that an individual has the rational type.
Finally, we can now characterize final wealth outcomes θ as a function of P, the
thresholds θL, θH and θ̂, and the wealth accumulation process determined by
θ = (1 + e)/θ0 where effort is a binary choice:
θ =

θ0 if θ0 < θL




if θL < θ0 < θ̂




if θ̂ < θ0 < θH
2θ0 if θH < θ0,
(1.3)
Equation (1.3) provides us with a first testable implication of this model in the form
of a highly nonlinear relation between initial wealth and final wealth. To more easily
characterize the form of this segmented relationship, we take the partial derivative





1 if θ0 < θL




if θL < θ0 < θ̂




if θ̂ < θ0 < θH
2 if θH < θ0,
(1.4)
with ρ1 = λ+ (1− λ)[2−M(g̃(θ0))− θ0 ∂g̃(θ0)∂θ0 .
∂M(g̃(θ0))
∂θ0
], and ρ2 = λ+ ρ1.
Proposition 1 1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 2.
Proof in Appendix A.1.
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This concludes on the testable predictions we derived from Dalton et al. (2016). We
now turn to the empirical counterpart to these predictions.
1.2.3 A Macro-Economic Interpretation of the Model
In Figure 1.1 we present a stylized depiction of the relationship between initial
conditions and final wealth . In this figure, θL, θH and θ̂, correspond to the thresholds
defined by Dalton et al. (2016). This figure helps us illustrate our predictions and
provide a novel, macro-economic interpretation to their model.
Figure 1.1: Macroeconomic Testable Predictions after Dalton et al. (2016)
Note: This figure illustrates the cross-sectional relationship between
initial wealth and final wealth based on our predictions from Dalton
et al. (2016). Legend: θL, θH and θ̂ are thresholds defined by Dalton
et al. (2016), and and are slopes in wealth accumulation obtained in
our calculations.
Individuals with initial wealth levels below θL will choose to exert low effort irre-
spective of whether they are the behavioral or rational type; as a consequence of
this effort choice, they will not be able to increase their level of final wealth θ above
their initial wealth. Thus, in this region of initial circumstances, individuals are
unable to accumulate wealth at a faster pace than 1.
Individuals with initial wealth levels that are higher than θL but lower than θ̂ will
exert low effort if they have the rational type and not increase their final wealth above
the level of their initial wealth, while the choices of individuals with the behavioral
40
CHAPTER 1. QUANTIFYING ASPIRATIONAL POVERTY TRAPS
type are subject to multiple equilibria depending on their initial aspiration draw.
Those who had a draw of high aspiration will exert high effort and experience
improved outcomes. Thus, in this region of initial circumstances, some behavioral
individuals are able to accumulate more wealth than others, raising the average rate
of wealth accumulation to ρ1.
Individuals with initial wealth levels that are higher than θ̂ but lower than θH
will exert high effort if they have the rational type and achieve higher final wealth
compared to their initial wealth. Behavioral individuals will choose effort levels
depending on their initial draw of aspirations, and a larger share of behavioral will
now choose to exert high effort. Thus, in this region of initial circumstances, all
rational individuals and some behavioral individuals are able to improve their final
wealth, raising the average rate of wealth accumulation to ρ2.
Lastly, individuals with initial wealth levels above θH will all choose to exert high
effort irrespective of whether they are the behavioral or rational type. Therefore,
in this final region of initial circumstances, individuals are all able to increase
their initial wealth. Thus, the thresholds θL, θH and θ̂ correspond to structural
breaks in the process of wealth accumulation, and ρ1 and ρ2 correspond to wealth
accumulation rates in the different regions of the income distribution. This gives
us a testable implication for the model of Dalton et al. (2016): on cross-sectional
data, we expect to find three structural breaks in the relationship between initial
individual circumstances and final wealth, and increasing slopes in the relationship.
We therefore have a method to test for the existence, the size and the location of
aspirational poverty traps. Behavioral individuals with initial wealth between θ̂ and
θH who choose to exert low effort can theoretically be nudged into exerting higher
effort and experience higher final wealth. These are the individuals in an aspirational
poverty trap. The size of this trap is given by the number of individuals in this
situation, that is, the number of behavioral individuals with initial wealth between
θ̂ and θH , who choose to exert low effort. With our parameters and distributional
assumptions, this size corresponds to the integral of (1− λ)M(g̃(θ0)) between θ̂ and
θH (Equation (1.2)). Thus, an upper bound of the size of this trap is the population
share of behavioral individuals between θ̂ and θH . Note that this aspirational poverty
trap, located between θ̂ and θH , is distinct from a material poverty trap: individuals
in this group are closer to the median of the income distribution than the left-tail
of the distribution. Additional lessons can be drawn from this model; for example,
note that ρ1 and ρ2 are also informative about the stochastic process determining
aspirations M(g̃(θ0)), the elasticity of aspirations to exogenous changes in income
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g̃′(θ0) and the unconditional probability λ that an agent has the rational type.
1.3 Empirical Methodology
Our theoretical predictions indicate that the presence of aspirational poverty traps
should manifest itself by nonlinearities in the relationship between initial wealth and
final wealth. This implies that our empirical exercise will entail jointly estimating 1)
point estimates of locations of breaks, and 2) point estimates of slope changes from
one regime to the next.
We resort to threshold regression methods for this exercise. Threshold regression
methods belong to the same family as statistical methods for the detection of
structural breaks in data—similar methods are regime-switching models using
Markov chains, splines, and segmented-regression analysis. Threshold regressions
mostly gained popularity in macroeconomics and time series econometrics, because
they provide simple and easily interpretable models for nonlinear relationships
between variables. Hansen (2000) describes these methods as a natural way of
exploring coefficient stability across subsamples in a population (e.g., poor versus
rich) using linear regressions, when the subsamples to be explored are defined by a
continuous variable, and one wishes to be agnostic as to the value of that variable
that splits the sample. For example, a popular application in economics has been
the idea that there exists a “tipping point” in neighborhood racial segregation in the
United States (see e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Card et al., 2008).
The empirical counterpart of our theoretical problem is given by the following
threshold regression equation: Yi = X ′iβ11{q1≤γ} + X ′iβ21{q1>γ} + εi, where β1 is a
slope parameter on the subsample on which qi is below some threshold γ, and β2 is
a slope parameter on the complementary subsample where qi is above the threshold.
This equation is usually rewritten into: Yi = X ′iβ1+X ′iδ1{q1>γ}+εi, where β1 remains
the regression coefficient parameter, δ = β2 − β1 is a discrepancy parameter and γ
is the threshold parameter.
Estimation and inference of threshold regression models when the all regressors and
threshold variables are exogenous is discussed in detail in Hansen (2000). Caner and
Hansen (2004) and Kourtellos et al. (2016) further discuss identification and inference
when some of the regressors, including the threshold variable, are endogenous. Yu and
Phillips (2018) propose a nonparametric estimator, the integrated difference kernel
estimator (IDKE), which presents the advantage that the discrepancy coefficients
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can be statistically identified using only the local information around each threshold
points. Thus, in contrast to Caner and Hansen (2004) and Kourtellos et al. (2016),
the approach in Yu and Phillips (2018) does not require additional instruments for
identifying either threshold points or discrepancy coefficients, although instruments
can be used to increase efficiency — instruments remain, however, necessary for
identifying slope parameter βj.
We focus on the simplest case using the methodology proposed by Hansen (2000),
which we adapt to detect multiple thresholds. Our setting requires us to estimate a
regression with multiple threshold, which can be re-express from Equations 1.3 and
1.4, and Figure 1.1 as follows:
θi = α + β1θ0i + δ1θ0i1{θL ≤ θ0i < θ̂} (1.5)
+ δ2θ0i1{θ̂ ≤ θ0i < θH}
+ δ3θ0i1{θ0i ≥ θH}+ εi
The parameters to be jointly estimated in this model are: i) the intercept α; ii) the
initial slope parameter β1; iii) the three discrepancy coefficients δj, with j ∈ 1, 2, 3;
and iv) the three threshold location parameters θL, θ̂ and θH . In Equation (1.5),
discrepancy parameters capture differences in wealth accumulation slopes from
one regime to the next, and threshold location parameters correspond to regimes
switching points in the distribution of initial conditions. We are only to a lesser
degree interested in regression coefficients βj. These are not directly informative
for our problem and their estimates are not required for identifying the discrepancy
coefficients δj.
The estimation methodology proposed by Hansen (2000) uses a grid-search algorithm.
For detecting the presence of one structural break in the relationship between two
variables, the grid-search algorithm goes as follows:
1. for each possible value of γ denoting the threshold location parameter in the
x-axis variable, estimate a spline model with a structural break at x = γ
2. Among all the spline models estimated – one per potential value of γ, find the
value γ̂ which minimizes the Concentrated Sum of Squares
3. Construct confidence intervals for the point estimate γ̂ by inverting the
likelihood-ratio.
4. Compare the fit of the model without structural break to the fit of the model
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with structural break at the estimated threshold location parameters, using a
chosen information criterion (e.g. Bayesian, Akaike, Hannan-Quinn).
To continue searching for additional thresholds, take the model with γ̂ as the baseline
model, and repeat steps 1) to 4) separately for values of γ above and below γ̂.
At this stage, it is important to clarify that we are not treating the threshold points
as exogenous realization of random variables, which may or may not have a causal
effect on the wealth accumulation regime that individuals are subject to. That is to
say, we are not claiming that we can fully isolate the causal effect of the thresholds
on wealth accumulation of individuals and we are not aiming to conduct inference on
any of the parameters. Rather, our aim is to test for the presence of such thresholds,
and to estimate an economically relevant quantity using these thresholds.
1.4 Empirical Application: Aspirational Poverty Traps in
the United States
To estimate the size of aspirational poverty traps using threshold regressions, we
need data spanning the income distribution, to allow detection of structural breaks
at various points in the relationship between initial conditions and later life earnings.
Thus, a first and minimal data requirement for our study is a large, representative
sample. Our testable predictions require, in addition, good measures for i) initial
conditions, ii) final wealth, and iii) intermediate outcomes which can explain some
of the relationship between initial conditions and final outcomes or changes in this
relationship across income. Such measures include proxies for effort, aspirations, or
demographic characteristics which affect the wealth accumulation process.
1.4.1 Data: The 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 meets our data requirements. It is
a widely-used dataset from the United States, which has been following since 1979 a
cohort of 12,686 individuals who were between 14 to 22 years old at the time of first
interview. The survey was conducted yearly between 1979 and 1994, then biennially
from 1994 onward. We decided to use the NLSY79 for several reasons: first it
contains detailed information on respondents’ participation to welfare programs of
all sorts, as well as their spouse, which we need to determine the initial conditions
of individuals. It contains rich background information on respondents and their
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family, which will be important for us to test whether rational or behavior decision-
makers can be identified ex ante and targeted with different types of interventions.
Lastly, it also contains rich information on cognitive ability through the AFQT test,
expectations about the future, hours worked and preferences which are all potential
factors that affect the relationship between initial conditions and final outcomes.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of the NLSY79
All Men Women
Characteristics: (1) (2) (3)
Male 0.50 1.00 0.00
Age 35.16 35.14 35.18
AFQT score, perc. adj. 50.48 50.30 50.67
Years of education 12.67 12.55 12.79
Edu. attainment:
Less than high school 0.17 0.19 0.15
High school diploma 0.43 0.44 0.43
Some college 0.21 0.19 0.24
4-year college 0.18 0.18 0.18
Race:
Hispanic 0.16 0.16 0.16
Black 0.25 0.25 0.25
Neither 0.59 0.59 0.59
Household composition:
No children 0.53 0.64 0.42
Marital status:
Never married 0.38 0.43 0.33
Married / de facto 0.46 0.43 0.48
Divorced, Separated, Widowed 0.11 0.09 0.12
Parental education:
Mother years of education 10.87 10.94 10.80
Father years of education 10.95 11.00 10.89
N.Obs. 12,686 6,403 6,283
Note: This table presents summary statistics on the raw data extracted from the
NLSY79 Investigator (Column (1)), on the cleaned data (Columns (2) and (3)).
The final estimation sample excludes men from the clean sample (Column (3)).
Our methodology involves estimating threshold regressions models of intragenera-
tional mobility, that is, individual lifetime income growth. To do this, we regress
a measure of permanent income on a measure of initial income. We construct two
main measures of permanent income. Our first and main measure is the inverse
hyperbolic sine of average family net worth between ages 40 and 48. To construct
this measure, we start by constructing yearly family net worth, by summing income
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from all sources net of all sources of debts. To avoid issues with temporary income
loss in any one year which would generate noise in our measure, we take the average
between ages 40 and 48. Finally, we take the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of this
average. The IHS presents the advantage that it behaves like the natural logarithm
while allowing us to include observations with zero income, which is crucial for
our purpose of maintaining the widest possible range of initial conditions to detect
thresholds.
Our second measure is the residual in the regression of the first measure on an
extensive set of control variables: age, AFQT adjusted score, the age of the youngest
child in the household, sex, race, a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent grew up
in the Southern states of the U.S., a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent was
living in a rural area at age 14, the level of education of respondent and the year.9
We construct a measure of initial wealth conditions by taking the IHS of average
family net worth between ages 22 and 25, which allows us to focus on the relationship
between individual initial conditions and final outcomes after the effect of family
background on human capital investments has already mostly been realized. Thus,
this measure makes the comparison of this relationship between circumstances and
outcomes more comparable across individuals with very different circumstances. We
further construct the annual average number of working hours between ages 40 and
48, and use it is a measure of individual effort in later life. We use this variable to
explore one key prediction from Dalton et al. (2016), that “behavioral” individuals
pay on average less effort compared to rational individuals, keeping income and
observable characteristics constant.
In our regressions analyses, we include control variables that are likely to systemati-
cally affect either the initial conditions, final outcomes or the relationship between
these two: AFQT score, highest educational attainment of respondents, their marital
status and their fertility at age 22-25, parental educational attainment, sex, race, age,
region of residence as defined by Census, a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent
was living in a rural area at age 14, 0 otherwise. We exclude individuals which don’t
have at least three non-missing values in each of the key variables: marital status,
9We find our measures of initial and permanent income to be preferable to alternative measures
commonly used in the literature on inter- and intragenerational mobility. Other studies use rank-
rank regression models, which capture a person’s personal change in position within the distribution
of wealth, or percentile-percentile regression models, which capture similarly individuals moving
from a specific percentile to another, the result of which is a mobility table. Neither these methods
are adequate for detecting structural breaks in initial conditions.
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number of children, educational level, initial income, final income, working hours in
later life. Further technical details on data preparation can be found in Appendix
A.2.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics on our estimation sample, compared to the
unrestricted initial sample. Overall, our estimation sample is very comparable to
the raw extracted data: 50% of the sample is male, 15% have less than a high school
degree by 1990 (when respondents are between 25 and 33 years of age), 45% have
a high school degree, 22% some college and 18% have completed a 4-year college
degree.
1.4.2 Estimation Results
Baseline Intragenerational Socioeconomic Mobility
Table 1.2 presents OLS estimation results for a baseline model of individual income
growth over the life course. We regress an individual’s permanent income (proxied
by the log average household income between ages 40 and 48) on the individual’s
initial income (proxied by the log average individual income between ages 22 and
25). We find correlations between initial and permanent income ranging between
0.194 and 0.33, which are stable to including more individual characteristics. This
means that between 20 and 30% of individual permanent income is predicted by
individual initial wealth after completing education.
Table 1.2: Baseline Model of Intragenerational Social Mobility
Final Family Net Worth (ages 40-48, IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Family Net Worth 0.329∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(ages 22 -25, IHS) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Dummies for zero wealth Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y
Dummies for education level Y Y
AFQT Y
R2 0.07 0.16 0.26 0.28 0.29
N. Obs. 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131
Note: This table presents the results of regressions of permanent net worth on initial net worth,
as measured by the inverse hyperbolic sine of household net worth between ages 22 and 25. Each
column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Full table including all control variables in Appendix Table A.1.
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These correlation coefficients between initial conditions and final outcomes summarize
complex processes in the intragenerational mobility, which combine stochastic and
deterministic factors, as well as opportunities, endowments and effort. In our next
step, we investigate nonlinearities in the relationship between initial conditions and
final outcomes.
Detection of Structural Breaks in Intragenerational Mobility
Figure 1.2 shows that using the grid-search algorithm defined by Hansen (2000), we
find two structural breaks in the relationship between initial conditions and final
outcomes, which are consistent across the fit criterion we use.
In each panel of Figure 1.2, we plot the relationship between initial conditions on
the x-axis, measured by log family net worth between ages 22 and 25, and final
outcomes on the y-axis, measured by log family net worth between ages 40 and 48 on
the y-axis. Red lines indicate the estimated locations of structural breaks using the
grid-search criterion until model fit could not be improved with additional estimated
thresholds. Bigger markers indicate a larger number of individual observations.
Importantly, we consistently find the same two structural breaks across the Bayesian
(Figure 1.2a), Akaike (Figure 1.2b) and Hannan-Quinn information criteria (Figure
1.2c); these are the thresholds we plug into our threshold regression model in the
next step of our analysis.
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Figure 1.2: Detected Thresholds and Model Fit Criteria
(a) Bayesian Information Criterion
(b) Akaike Information Criterion
(c) Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion
Note: This figure represents the result of the sequential grid-search algorithm of Hansen (2000) used
to detect thresholds in the relationship between log family net worth at ages 22 to 25 and log family
net worth at ages 40 to 48. Red lines indicate the estimated locations of structural breaks using
the grid-search criterion until model fit could not be improved with additional estimated thresholds.
Bigger markers indicate a larger number of individual observations.
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Models of Intragenerational Social Mobility with Structural Breaks
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 support the hypothesis that there are important nonlinearities in
the intragenerational social mobility, that are consistent with our main predictions
that there could be a non-negligible part of the U.S. population locked in aspirational
poverty traps. Our results consistently indicate at least 3 regimes of within-lifetime
income mobility, with low mobility at left of the distribution of initial wealth, high
mobility in the middle of the distribution, and again low mobility at the right tail of
the distribution although higher than at the left tail of the distribution.
Table 1.3: Two-Threshold Regression Models of Intragenerational Social Mobility
Final Family Net Worth (ages 40-48, IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Family Net Worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.038 0.073∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 −1.782∗∗∗ −1.361∗∗ 1.445∗∗∗ −1.162∗
(0.683) (0.628) (0.324) (0.612)
Above Threshold 2 0.996∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.068) (0.063) (0.067)
Threshold 1 4.79 4.73 3.05 4.73
Threshold 2 6.24 6.24 5.53 6.24
Dummies for zero wealth Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y
Dummies for education level Y Y
AFQT Y
N. Obs. 5,346 5,131 5,131 5,131
Note: This table presents the results of regressions of permanent net worth on initial net
worth, with 2 structural breaks. Initial net worth is measured by the inverse hyperbolic sine of
household net worth between ages 22 and 25. Each column represents a separate regression.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Full details in
Appendix Table A.2.
Table 1.3 reports the results of threshold regression models of final family net worth
on initial family net worth, without imposing any number of thresholds in the
grid-search algorithm. The grid-search algorithm consistently detects two thresholds,
which location is robust to including control variables. That threshold estimates
are consistent across specifications suggests that the underlying process causing the
structural breaks are orthogonal to the control variables. We find that the estimated
correlation coefficient between initial conditions and final outcomes is consistent
across specifications, but varies systematically around the thresholds: below the first
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threshold and above the second threshold, we find positive correlations, larger above
the second threshold, while we find negative correlations between the thresholds.
Table 1.3 indicates low intragenerational mobility at left and right tails of the distri-
bution of initial wealth, although higher mobility at the right tail, while the middle
of the distribution is characterized by high mobility. This evidence is thus largely
consistent with our predictions based on Dalton et al. (2016). Between the two
thresholds, however, we find a negative correlation coefficient with large standard
errors, which suggests a part of the distribution with important heterogeneity and
potentially additional thresholds between the two thresholds we found. Lastly, we
notice that the explanatory power of control variables varies along the spectrum of
initial conditions: at the bottom of the distribution of initial conditions, the largest
move in the correlation coefficient occurs when adding dummies for education level,
while at the top of the distribution, the most important set of control variables is
individual characteristics such as race and gender. This suggests that intragenera-
tional mobility could be driven by systematically different processes at the different
regions of initial conditions.
Table 1.4 reports the results of threshold regression models of final family net worth
on initial family net worth, now imposing 3 thresholds in initial family net worth
in the grid-search algorithm. Notice that by imposing to the grid-search algorithm
the search of an additional threshold, we find a third threshold that is generally
located on the right of the second threshold, but with a location that is not robust
to the inclusion of control variables. In comparison, we find consistently 2 thresholds
at the same locations as in Table 1.3. This is clear evidence that the model with
2 thresholds is preferable to a model with 3 thresholds, although Table 1.4 does
provide suggestive evidence of a threshold located around log initial family net
worth of 6—this complements the notable difference in the correlation coefficients in
regimes 2 and 3.
The Location and Size of Aspirational Poverty Traps
Overall, our results indicate the presence of important nonlinearities in intragener-
ational social mobility in the United States, with low income mobility in the left
tail of the distribution of initial conditions, high mobility in the middle, and lowest
income mobility in the right tail of the income distribution. This evidence allows
us to bound the size of a potential aspirational poverty trap and to determine its
location in the population in Figure 1.3.
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Table 1.4: Three-Threshold Regression Models of Intragenerational Social Mobility
Final Family Net Worth (ages 40-48, IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Family Net Worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.037 0.073∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 −1.782∗∗∗ −1.358∗∗ 12.727∗∗∗ −1.161∗
(0.683) (0.628) (4.796) (0.612)
Between thresholds 2 and 3 1.064∗∗∗ −5.339 1.427∗∗∗ −6.190
(0.141) (4.795) (0.402) (4.872)
Above Threshold 3 0.384∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.067) (0.063) (0.067)
Threshold 1 4.79 4.73 3.05 4.73
Threshold 2 6.24 6.24 3.53 6.24
Threshold 3 9.84 6.84 5.53 6.84
Dummies for zero wealth Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y
Dummies for education level Y Y
AFQT Y
N. Obs. 5,346 5,131 5,131 5,131
Note: This table presents the results of regressions of permanent net worth on initial net
worth, with 3 structural breaks. Initial net worth is measured by the inverse hyperbolic sine of
household net worth between ages 22 and 25. Each column represents a separate regression.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Full details in
Appendix Table A.3.
Figure 1.3 indicates the location and size of a potential aspirational poverty trap in
the United States. The figure presents a kernel density plot of the inverse hyperbolic
sign of initial net worth, and places the two thresholds that we have located using
our threshold regressions. The first threshold corresponds to the 37th percentile
and the second threshold to the 42.5th percentile of the distribution of initial family
net worth. This implies that at most 5.5% of the U.S. population are potentially
located in an aspirational poverty trap, and that this potential aspirational poverty
trap would capture individuals in the low-middle range of the distribution of family
wealth (around a log of initial family net worth of 4.8 to 6.3, corresponding to
roughly $1,150 to $1,650 net worth at ages 22 to 25). With three thresholds, this
trap would roughly capture individuals between the 37th and the 44.5th percentile,
for a total of roughly 7.5% of the population.
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Figure 1.3: Location and Size of Aspirational Poverty Traps in the United States
Note: This figure presents the results of a threshold-regression model of log
family net worth at ages 40 to 48 on the inverse hyperbolic sine of family
net worth at ages 22 to 25. The location of thresholds is obtained using the
sequential grid-search algorithm of Hansen (2000), based on the Hannan-Quinn
Information Criterion. Red vertical lines represent the location of thresholds
detected using the grid-search algorithm. The green line represents a spline
model of log permanent wealth on the inverse hyperbolic sine of initial wealth
circumstances.
1.5 Robustness of Findings
Other models and mechanisms could produce such empirical regularities on the
persistence of disadvantage, with different regimes of wealth accumulation over the
life course.
We have already shown that our results are largely robust to specifications, and to
searching for more thresholds. We now turn to discussing what other mechanisms
than breaks in the formation of aspirations could explain our stylized fact. Our
main concern is that there could be omitted factors correlated with initial conditions
or final outcomes, which have structural breaks instead of the breaks we found in
initial conditions. We call “confounding thresholds” these thresholds in confounding
and omitted variables.
We consider three groups of factors that could in principle also produce regime-
switching points in the within lifetime accumulation of wealth: 1) non-cognitive
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skills; 2) credit constraints; 3) networks.
To test whether these factors could confound the low-social mobility traps we
have identified as aspirational poverty traps, we construct a falsification test as
following. For each factor, we start by taking our estimated thresholds in initial
conditions as parameters in the model, and run the grid-search algorithm to detect
the presence of additional thresholds. If we find no evidence of thresholds, we
conclude that there are so significant nonlinearities in the factor considered that
could generate regimes in wealth accumulation. If we do find evidence of thresholds in
the factor, we then graphically investigate whether these structural breaks correspond
roughly to the breaks we find in initial conditions—these are break that could be
confounding our previous thresholds. We re-run our fully controlled threshold
model, additionally controlling for the confounding variable, and observe whether
the correlation coefficients in each regime of initial conditions is affected by this new
control variable. Lastly, we re-run the fully interacted model allowing now for the
confounding variable to vary across regimes of initial conditions. If we find that
this variable has a significantly different explanatory power for final outcomes in
each regime, then we can conclude that this variable is a confounding factor of the
aspirational traps we have identified in our main analysis.
1.5.1 Non-Cognitive Skills: Locus of Control, Self-Esteem, and Self-
Concept
Consider a model of human capital investments in which non-cognitive skills can
be either high or low, and have positive labor market returns. If we additionally
assume that a proportion of individuals in the population possess high non-cognitive
skills, then non-cognitive skills could in principle generate different regimes in the
accumulation of wealth, which could be observationally equivalent to the aspirational
poverty trap that we have identified through our structural breaks. Non-cognitive
skills would therefore confound our analyses if i) we detect breaks in the relationship
between non-cognitive skills and final wealth, ii) non-cognitive skills correlate highly
with initial conditions, and iii) the structural breaks we find in non-cognitive skills
overlap with the breaks we find in initial conditions, or are close enough.
We use three measures of non-cognitive skills that have been widely used in the
NLSY79 and that have been linked to a variety of outcomes and economic decision-
making (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2006; Caliendo et al., 2015): locus of control
measured in 1979 (Rotter, 1966), self-esteem measured in 1980 (Rosenberg, 1965),
and self-concept measured in 1992 (Pearlin et al., 1981). We show results here for
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Figure 1.4: Locus of Control and Permanent Income
Note: This figure represents the results of the grid-search algorithm to detect
the presence of thresholds in the relationship between Rotter’s external local of
control score and log family net worth at ages 22 to 25 (Rotter, 1966). Red
horizontal lines represent the location of thresholds in log family net worth at
ages 22 to 25 (initial conditions), and green vertical lines represent the location
of potential thresholds in locus of control. Dots meeting at the crossing of a
green and a red line indicates that the threshold detected in initial conditions
could be driven by a correlated threshold in locus of control.
locus of control, and report the remaining results for self-esteem and self-concept in
Appendix A.3.10
We first run our grid-search algorithm to detect the presence of structural breaks in
the relationship between locus of control and final outcomes. Figure 1.4 plots the
relationship between locus of control and final outcomes, green lines indicate the
estimated thresholds in locus of control, and red lines recall the thresholds we find
in initial wealth.
10For additional details on Rotter (1966); Rosenberg (1965); Pearlin et al. (1981) scales measured
in the NLSY, see https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/other-documentation/codebook-
supplement/nlsy79-appendix-21-attitudinal-scales
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Table 1.5: Intragenerational Social Mobility and Locus of Control
Final Family Net Worth (at 40-48)
(1) (2) (3)
Initial Family Net Worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.189∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.039) (0.039)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 0.193∗∗∗ −1.305∗∗ −1.292∗∗
(0.022) (0.595) (0.594)
Above Threshold 2 0.169∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Rotter external locus of control (1979) −0.071∗∗
(0.032)
Rotter external locus of control (1979)
by region of initial wealth:
Below Threshold 1 −0.063
(0.062)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 −0.132
(0.127)
Above Threshold 2 −0.071∗
(0.037)
Thresholds in locus of control:
Threshold 1 7
Threshold 2 12
Thresholds in initial wealth:
Threshold 1 4.73 4.73
Threshold 2 6.24 6.24
Dummies for zero wealth Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y
Dummies for education level Y Y Y
AFQT Y Y Y
N. Obs. 5,083 5,083 5,083
Note: This table presents the results of threshold regressions of permanent net worth on
initial net worth augmented by locus of control, using the sequential grid-search algorithm of
Hansen (2000) for the detection of thresholds, and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion
for model selection. Initial net worth is measured by the inverse hyperbolic sine of household
net worth between ages 22 and 25. Each column represents a separate regression. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Full details in Appendix
Table A.4.
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Table 1.5 shows that locus of control predicts final outcomes and presents potential
structural breaks, but our intragenerational mobility correlation coefficients are
robust to either controlling linearly for locus of control or flexibly across the regions
of initial conditions. Column (1) reports the results of a threshold regression where
we search for thresholds in locus of control. In this specification, we fully control
for demographic characteristics, we plug in the estimates of thresholds in initial
wealth as threshold parameters of the threshold regression model, and allow for the
intragenerational mobility correlation coefficient to vary across regimes of initial
conditions delimited by the estimated thresholds.
The specification in column (1) allows us to understand whether there are potential
thresholds in locus of control that are distinct from the breaks in initial conditions,
and whether potential regimes in locus of control change the relationship between
initial conditions and final outcomes in a systematic way. We find evidence of two
thresholds at respectively 7 and 12 in the Rotter scale of locus of control, suggesting
three regimes in the relationship between locus of control and permanent income:
individual with internal locus of control experience better final wealth outcomes,
while individuals with external locus of control experience significantly lower wealth
outcomes.
Comparing Column (2) of Table 1.5 to our preferred specification in Column (4) of
Table 1.3, we find that controlling for locus of control barely affect our estimated
correlation coefficients in each regime of initial conditions: this suggests that although
locus of control is an important predictor of final wealth, it is does not highly correlate
with the regimes in initial conditions. This finding is confirmed by Column (3) where
we allow for locus of control to flexibly vary across regimes of initial conditions, and
find that locus of control is not a strong predictor of outcomes within each regime.
We complement this analysis by considering self-esteem in Appendix Figure A.1 and
Table A.5, and self-concept in Figure A.2 and Table A.6. We find similar results,
and thus conclude that non-cognitive skills are unlikely to confound the aspirational
poverty traps that we have identified using regimes in initial conditions.
1.5.2 Credit Constraints: College Loans and Home Ownership
Consider now a model of wealth accumulation in which there are constraints in
access to credit. The presence of credit constraints has been the subject of much
research in the United States, and it could entirely be possible that credit constraints
generate different regimes in the accumulation of wealth, which could confound what
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we have identified as aspirational poverty traps. We consider two types of credits in
the NLSY: educational loans, and mortgages.
Constraints in access to educational loans could generate structural breaks in the
relationship between initial conditions and final outcomes by preventing poorer
individuals from accessing higher education, and thus to higher paying occupations.
Figure A.3a, however, provides graphical evidence summarizing our main threshold
regression finding: we find no evidence of structural breaks in access to educational
loans in the NLSY.
Discontinuities in access to mortgages could also generate regimes in wealth accumu-
lation. Figure A.3b plots the share of individuals in our sample who are homeowners
at age 25 by initial family net worth. This figure suggests important nonlinearities
in the relationship between early home-ownership and initial conditions: a stable
20% of respondents are homeowners at age 25 for most of the sample, until roughly
log family net worth at ages 22-25 of 8, from which home-ownership jumps to almost
90%. We formally test for the presence of structural breaks in the data in threshold
regressions in Table A.7 in Appendix. Note that home-ownership is a dummy so
we are not searching for breaks in home-ownership status, but estimating the fully
controlled threshold regression model first adding a control for home-ownership
status, and then flexibly controlling for home-ownership status in each regime of
initial condition. We find that home-ownership status does not linearly explain
the relationship between initial conditions and final outcomes. When we flexibly
control for home-ownership status across the three regimes of initial conditions, we
find that home-ownership status has a systematically different contribution to the
relationship between initial conditions and final outcomes, which suggests that our
aspirational poverty traps could correlate with access to mortgages. However, the
estimated correlation coefficients between initial conditions and final outcomes are
stable to considering home-ownership as additional control variables, which suggests
that the contribution of home-ownership to the relationship remains modest.
1.5.3 Networks: Job Search and Current Job Found Through Personal
Networks
Consider now a model of human capital investments in which individuals rely on
networks to access educational and labor market opportunities. In such a model, the
presence of structural breaks in the intragenerational income mobility could reflect
social clusters which are more or less organized or able to provide opportunities to
their members. There is evidence of heterogeneity in human capital investments
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across immigrant communities in the United States, and there is also evidence of
heterogeneity in returns to human capital investments across demographic groups.
We explore this idea using questions about job search that asked in the 1982 wave
of the NLSY. In 1982, respondents were asked how they found their current job,
and they could answer a combination of job search strategies including friendship
network, relatives, community organizations, school placement, teachers, personal
contacts. Figure A.4 plots the share of respondents who indicated using a particular
type of job search strategy against initial conditions. We could not detect the
presence of any structural breaks in these relationships, except for community
organizations as job search strategy, for which we find suggestive evidence that
respondents around the median of initial wealth use this strategy. In Table A.8, we
find that including a linear control for job search through community organizations
has no impact on the correlation coefficients we find in each regime of initial
conditions, but allowing for job search through community organizations to vary
systematically across regimes, we find that the correlation coefficient in the left tail
of the distribution of initial condition increases while it decreases substantially at
the right tail of the distribution, and becomes insignificant in the middle of the
distribution. This suggests that although the effect is modest, community-based
job search strategies correlate with the regimes of wealth accumulation, and have
distinct effects on the transmission of wealth.
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a simple and tractable methodology for estimating the
presence of aspirational poverty traps, their size and location in the distribution of
wealth. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study attempting such an
exercise, in spite of the growing number of studies documenting the importance of
aspirations for economic outcomes.
Our methodology provides insights on a key economic quantity for policy makers,
since it would indicate how many individual lives could be dramatically improved by
simple and low-cost interventions such as information campaigns about education,
or role modelling interventions. We find that at most 7.5% of the US population
could be located in such aspirational poverty traps.
Our estimates indicate that the population located in aspirational poverty traps
is not quite poor: we find that aspirational poverty traps are located around the
37th to 42nd percentile of the distribution of wealth, that is, families with positive
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wealth not too far below the median. In addition, our findings complement an
empirical regularity documented by several studies across several countries, that
intergenerational social mobility is lowest at the tails of the income distribution.
We complement this regularity by showing that it also applies to intragenerational
mobility, that is, within person wealth accumulation within their lifetime. We find
that wealth accumulation is slowest at the bottom of the income distribution, fastest
at the top, with sharp changes in the slope of wealth accumulation within the life
course.
Importantly, we started from a theory for the micro-foundations of aspirations poverty
traps, we derive theoretical macro-economic predictions corresponding exactly to
this empirical regularity. Thus, our study proposes for the first time a micro-founded
explanation for the macro-economic regularity that social mobility is lowest at the
tails of the distribution of income.
Further research could entail using alternative methods to detect structural breaks in
data, to determine how robust is the location and size of the aspirational poverty trap
that we found. Another possible route could be to find micro-economic exogenous
shiftier of aspirations—such as income shocks, changes in one’s social environment,
policy announcements. With a valid treatment shifting aspirations, we could then
estimate the causal mediating role of aspirations in the relationship between initial
conditions and final outcomes.
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Chapter II:
Early Discouragement from Uncertainty
about Financial Aid

The second chapter of this dissertation focuses on the consequences of internal
constraints on the educational trajectories of disadvantaged children. In Chapter
2, we focus on uncertainty about financial aid as a natural experiment to study
whether disadvantaged students could be discouraged at an early stage of their
educational career from later participating in university-preparing education. As
much as vast literature has shown that people do learn from their experience, there
is little evidence that students and families respond to uncertainty about future
costs of higher education, and how early they do so.
We evaluate the impact of policy uncertainty about financial aid on the tracking
outcomes of secondary school students in the Netherlands, using administrative
records for the entire population of Dutch pupils between 2005 and 2017. In the
absence of direct measures of people’s beliefs, a good experiment to study how beliefs
respond to uncertainty is to exploit policy announcements prior to implementation.
Policy announcements are information shocks that generate uncertainty about future
states of the world. Because of this, policy announcements affect beliefs alone and
not budget constraints. Therefore, we can then interpret changes in educational
trajectories after policy announcements as responses to changes in beliefs, and not
responses to changes in actual prices.
We study the introduction of the controversial Sociaal Lensteelsel in the Netherlands.
This major reform turned universal and unconditional grants for higher education
into income-contingent loans for students starting higher education in the academic
year 2015-2016. Importantly, the policy was announced in stages, sparking a heated
debate and triggering wild speculations about the future student finance system in
news outlets, student unions and political parties. The first announcement in June
2010 took place as the Dutch government announced its intention to move away from
the subsidy-based system of student finance towards a loan-based system, without
specific details. The second announcement took place in October 2012, when the
newly-elected government revealed the detailed reform plan, including the name of
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the new Sociaal Lensteelsel system, its conditions and its date of implementation,
while also revealing that vocational education students would be exempted. Our
analyses of Google Trends indicate that none of these details were known until
October 2012.
The first contribution of this study is to conceptualize how these policy announce-
ments are likely to affect beliefs for different types of students, and eventually
their tracking outcomes. To do this, we propose a theoretical framework based on
classical human capital theory to describe how uncertainty about financial aid affects
educational choices of students. This framework predicts that when the chances of
having to pay back for financial aid increase, low-income students are discouraged
from pursuing educational tracks associated with higher probability of paying back,
and they opt-out as early as they can from these tracks.
We find that the first policy announcement led to a sharp decrease in the share of
students enrolling in tracks leading to higher education, and to an immediate jump
in the share of students dropping out of these tracks into the vocational track. The
second announcement led to a further decrease in the share of students enrolling in
tracks leading to higher education, while dropout rates decreased.
We provide a battery of additional findings and sensitivity analyses, which indicate
that alternative explanations for our findings are unlikely. In particular, we find
that students also reorient towards higher-paying specializations such as STEM
and Medicine field of study and are substantially less likely to drop out of these
fields after receiving announcements. We find no evidence of trend breaks in 12
potential confounding factors –ranging from high school graduation rates and time
to post-high school degree completion, to labor market opportunities for youth, costs
of studying, school institutions, and broader macro-economic trends.
This study highlights that policy announcements can harm vulnerable students when
they increase uncertainty about future costs of education. Announcements about
future educational reforms can change the educational trajectories of vulnerable
pupils, even if the reforms eventually implemented are milder than previously
announced or don’t eventually affect these particular students. Two specific features
of the Dutch system make this lessons particularly relevant: on the one hand, early
tracking forces children and families to specialize early in educational paths, and on
the other hand, entry into post-secondary education requires track-specific diplomas,
such that tracking mistakes are hard to correct even just a few years later in a child’s
life.
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2 | Policy Uncertainty and Early Discouragement1
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, several studies have shown that informing students about the cost
of higher education can have a large impact on their decision whether to apply
to college, and it can also influence their choices of college location and study
major (see e.g. Hoxby and Avery, 2013; Hoxby et al., 2013; Hoxby and Turner,
2015; Oreopoulos and Dunn, 2013; Pallais, 2015; Peter and Zambre, 2017). Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo (2016) suggest that, in principle, low-SES students could be
shying away from college-preparation because of uncertainty about their eligibility
to financial aid, yet there is no evidence of this discouragement effect. This study is
among the first to show that uncertainty about financial aid might affect students
much earlier than in their final year of high school.
The effects of college financial aid on student outcomes have been analyzed in a
multitude of national and institutional contexts. The consensus of this literature is
that financial aid can increase college enrollment and graduation rates of financially
constrained students. Yet, these effects vary considerably across countries. While
studies based on the United States generally find large and positive effects (see
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2013), European studies find effects that are more
ambiguous in terms of their magnitude and direction.2 Indeed, some European
1This study is joint work with Jan Kabátek at the Melbourne Institute. I am particularly thankful
to my supervisor Olivier Marie for his advice and support throughout this project. I also thank
participants at seminars and conferences for helpful comments, in particular Marianne Bitler and
Esmee Zwier at the 21st IZA Summer School. I also thank Fatima El Meslaki and her team at
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) for their support.
2see Canton and De Jong (2005); Belot et al. (2007); Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010) for studies
in the Netherlands, Dearden et al. (2014); Azmat and Simion (2017); Murphy et al. (2019) in the
United Kingdom, Hübner (2012) in Germany, Nielsen et al. (2010) in Denmark, Montalbán (2019)
in Spain.
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studies even find null or small negative effects of financial aid on student performance
and time to graduation (Belot et al., 2007; Murphy et al., 2019; Montalbán, 2019).
This may be related to the fact that students in many European countries face little
to no financial barriers to enter college (Chowdry et al., 2013); while non-selective
admission procedures and low enrollment costs at European universities can attract
students from many socioeconomic backgrounds, it can also attract low ability
students and students exerting little study effort.
The policy discourse in several European countries has recently shifted towards
replacing generous university subsidies by income-contingent loan programs (see e.g.
Murphy et al., 2019). Proponents of this instrument argue that income-contingent
loans are able to counter the negative selection inherent to non-targeted financial aid
programs, while ensuring that financially-constrained students are provided with the
necessary financial aid to pursue their degrees. The other major advantage of loan-
based programs is that the cost of these programs is predicted to be substantially
lower than the cost of current subsidy-based programs.3. Opponents to policy change
from subsidy-based to loan-based programs argue that that the loss of the study
subsidy and unwillingness to borrow may discourage some students from pursuing
tertiary education. Although the magnitude of these discouragement effects is
generally expected to be low, there is very little empirical evidence that these effects
occur at all.4
Very little of the last argument is based on solid empirical footing, largely because
national systems of student finance tend not to be subject to major structural
changes, such that policymakers rely on lessons learned from changes of smaller
targeted programs (see e.g. Belot et al., 2007; Dearden et al., 2014). Although
these lessons may prove indicative of students’ responses to major national reforms,
they can also be distorted by a multitude of factors and intermediate mechanisms,
3While total government expenditures in education have steadily risen from €20 billion in 2000
to €30 billion in 2010, over the same period, student finance – subsidies and loans – have risen
from €2.4 billion in 2000 to €3.8 billion in 2010, of which 1 billion alone in basic grant subsidies
for living expenditures (for itemized details, see government yearly budgets (in Dutch) available
https://www.rijksbegroting.nl) Student finance altogether has thus represented a stable 1/10th
of total expenditures in education. Source: CBS Statline, accessed on August 28, 2020, series
“Government; expenditure on education and student grants, loans since 1900”.
4Following a national survey among the student population conducted in 2010, the National
Student Union Lsvb suggested that a substantial share of students could drop out of education
if student finance were ever to be replaced by a loan system (see e.g. news archives from
2010 https://www.nu.nl/binnenland/2217351/niet-studeren-zonder-studiefinanciering.html and
opinion pieces such as https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/studeren-wordt-iets-voor-de-
rijken bb4bfd71/
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ranging from greater salience of national reforms to aggregate supply and demand
effects. Another concern with using estimates from previous studies is that we
do not know at what age do students start responding to the financial aid regime
they expect to be exposed to during their studies. Some of the most prominent
studies of financial aid programs are based on comparing the decisions made by two
cohorts of secondary school students, with one cohort graduating right before some
policy change and the other graduating right after (see e.g. Linsenmeier et al., 2006).
However, if students start responding to financial aid ahead of the graduation year,
we may expect reform effects to be more pronounced among following cohorts, who
were exposed to information about the reform for a longer time. Other excellent
studies have use descriptive approaches over the long run to characterize the impact
of broad changes in student finance systems on the student population attracted to
university education (see e.g. Dynarski and Bailey, 2011; Murphy et al., 2019).
In this paper, we use administrative records of all students residing in The Nether-
lands to study how secondary school students respond to an announcement and the
later implementation of a major reform of student finance, which was eventually
implemented in 2015. This reform turned a universal and unconditional subsidy
for higher education students into a low-interest, income-contingent loan. By doing
so, it increased the price of higher education for the median student by 50%, from
roughly €2,300 per year to roughly €3,400 per year. The reform announcement
consisted of two stages. In June 2010, the Dutch government announced its intention
to move away from the subsidy-based system of student finance to a loan-based
system. This announcement increased the expected price of higher education for all
students by making the prospective receipt of financial aid uncertain. The second
stage followed in October 2012, when the government revealed the details of the
new system, especially the first cohort of college students to be affected by the new
regime. The government also revealed that vocational education students would be
exempted from the reform, hence increasing the attractiveness of vocational studies
relative to other post-secondary studies.
This announcement increased the expected price of higher education further by
removing uncertainty regarding whether the new student finance regime would
be implemented at all. The progressive information release makes this setting an
ideal natural experiment for studying the effect of changes in beliefs about the
price of higher education on early sorting in high school. We find that the first
policy announcement led to a sharp decrease in the share of students enrolling in
college-preparing tracks, and to an immediate jump in drop-out rates of these tracks.
The second announcement led to a further decrease in the share of students enrolling
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in college-preparing tracks while dropout rates sharply decreased. Following the 2015
reform implementation, high school track choices resumed their pre-announcement
trends, however the college-preparing track is yet to regain the student shares
attained in year 2010.
Our analyses yield additional results that are consistent with students responding to
policy uncertainty and avoiding risky choices. First, students who respond most are
those who would be most negatively impacted by policy uncertainty (i.e., low-income
and low-ability students). Second, students who remain in college-preparing tracks
become more likely to focus on STEM subjects, which allows them to choose college
majors with higher earnings potential. Third, female students respond more than
male students, which is in line with higher levels of risk aversion generally found,
including in this setting (see e.g. Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Falk et al., 2018).
Fourth, college students affected by the reform become more likely to cohabit with
their parents, suggesting that students make living arrangements decisions to avoid
taking larger student loans. Overall, this implies that students are attempting to
minimize their indebtedness and maximize their repayment capacity.
To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of articles have assessed how do
the different types of student finance affect students’ decisions and outcomes, and
there have been no studies focusing on the effects of uncertainty of financial aid
receipt.5 Linsenmeier et al. (2006) and Rothstein and Rouse (2011) exploit a unique
policy change in an elite college in the United-States, in which student loans were
suddenly replaced by student grants for freshmen. Linsenmeier et al. (2006) show
that admitted students eligible for grants were not more likely to enrol into the
college compared to students eligible for loans. In contrast, Rothstein and Rouse
(2011), show that students eligible for loans were more likely to choose majors that
led to occupations with higher earnings potential. Field (2009) conducted a field
experiment with law students at NYU, finding that the students were willing to
5There is a separate strand of literature showing that student under-utilize student loans. The
three main explanations for this pattern are: i) there might be market failures in access to credit
during college or later in the life cycle, such that it might be rational to avoid taking on early debt
(see discussion in Rothstein and Rouse, 2011); ii) students lack information or are misinformed
regarding the availability and conditions of student loans (e.g. Schmeiser et al., 2016); iii) students
might be subject to debt aversion (see Rothstein and Rouse, 2011; Field, 2009). This may lead
students to prefer working during their studies over borrowing (see e.g. Oosterbeek and van den
Broek, 2009; Booij et al., 2012), at the expense of their study performance. A growing body of
evidence has indicated that students tend to have wrong expectations about the costs and returns
to college education, and that these expectations contribute to the SES gap in college enrollments
(see e.g. Avery and Hoxby, 2004; Jacob and Linkow, 2011; Hoxby and Avery, 2013; Hoxby and
Turner, 2015; Delavande and Zafar, 2019).
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trade away their preferred major and occupational choice so that they could avoid
taking on debt. Both Rothstein and Rouse (2011) and Field (2009) argue that their
findings are in line with students exhibiting substantial debt aversion. Dynarski et al.
(2018) show that guaranteed financial aid over multiple years has positive effects on
college enrollments of low-income students compared to non-guaranteed financial
aid.6 Lastly, Bahrs and Siedler (2019) show that the introduction of tuition fees in
German universities decreased the intentions of graduating high school students to
pursue higher education degrees, and that low-income students were driving most of
their estimated effect.
Our study makes a simple yet important contribution to this literature, by providing
the first evidence that policy uncertainty alone about financial aid alone can lead a
substantial share of secondary-school students to avoid college-preparing education.
We also demonstrate that secondary-school students respond to the financial aid
information well ahead of their graduation year, which has important consequences
for empirical design of studies that focus on student responses to the incentives
embedded in the system of higher education. Our findings suggest that financial aid
can be used to increase the rates of college enrollment and reduce socioeconomic
inequalities in higher education attainment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides the necessary details on
the institutional setting. Section 2.3 develops a conceptual framework to predict
how does the uncertainty of financial aid receipt affect high school track choice and
subject choice, and which students are more likely to respond to this uncertainty.
Section 2.4 presents the data. Section 2.5 explains our identification strategy. Section
2.6 presents the main results. Section 2.7 presents additional results to support our
framework, and Section 2.8 discusses in details robustness checks and threats to
identification. Section 2.9 concludes.
6They conducted a randomized controlled trial among aid-eligible students at a four-years public
college in the United States, in which the control group received a regular letter explaining the
financial aid package for the first year of college, while the treatment group received additional
guarantees their eligibility to financial aid during the entire four years of college.
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2.2 Institutional Setting
2.2.1 Secondary School in The Netherlands
Dutch children enter secondary school at age 12, following six years of primary
schooling. The Dutch system of secondary schooling is distinct from other national
systems in that it sorts children into ability-based tracks at a relatively early age.
There are three available tracks: 1) vocational, 2) general, and 3) academic track.
Students are assigned to tracks in secondary school based on their standardized test
scores exiting primary school (CITO), on the subjective assessment of their head
teacher exiting primary school, as well as based on their performance in the first
years of secondary school.7The timing of the track choice varies between secondary
schools and students, however by the end of the third year, every secondary school
student is assigned to a track. The initial track choice is crucial, because it shapes
the entire educational path of the child. An example of this is that the university
enrollment is only available to students who hold a diploma from the academic track.
Students can change their initial track, but this is costly in terms of time and effort.
In the fourth year, students in the general and academic tracks choose a ‘subject
profile’. This is a broad subject field that the students will focus on for the rest of
their secondary schooling. The offered subject fields can be broadly divided into
two categories: 1) STEM and Medicine, and 2) Social Sciences and Humanities.
Similarly, to the initial track choice, the choice of the subject field is a high-stakes
decision, because field-specific subjects often constitute pre-requisites for higher
education courses in these fields. More details are available in Appendix B.1.8
2.2.2 Post-Secondary Education and Student Finance
In the last year of high school in April, students submit their applications to post-
secondary education institutions. These institutions include: 1) vocational schools,
2) professional higher education institutions (also known as universities of applied
8As there is no catchment area policy in the Netherlands, parents can choose any secondary school
for their child. Although technically secondary schools allocate students to tracks, parents can try
to negotiate. If parents are unhappy with the tracking outcome of their child in a given school,
their only option is to choose another school.
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sciences), and 3) universities.9 Post-secondary education in the Netherlands is almost
exclusively public and non-selective. Tuition fees are set centrally, being indexed to
consumer prices and fixed across programs and schools. In 2014, the nominal value
of annual university tuition fees was €1,903, which is equivalent to roughly 9.5% of
the full-time annual minimum wage. Tuition fees are low compared to tuition fees
in Anglo-Saxon countries, but similar to tuition fees in neighboring countries such
as France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, or Sweden (for a comparison
of European systems see Eurydice, 2012).
In 1986, the Dutch government introduced a system of student finance for post-
secondary students which offers 3 types of financial support: 1) a universal basic
subsidy, 2) a means-tested subsidy, and 3) an opt-in loan with below-market interest
rates. The universal basic subsidy was awarded at two rates depending on students’
living arrangements, and it was accompanied by a free public transport card. The
award rate of the means-tested subsidy depended on students’ living arrangements,
family composition and parental income. Eligibility for any financial support was
conditional on: 1) being less than 30 years old,102) enrollment in a full-time or dual
post-secondary program, and 3) being a Dutch national or a Dutch resident with
same financing rights (for further details, see of Education of The Netherlands),
2018). Booij et al. (2012) show that Dutch students were well-informed about
financial aid and its conditions.11
In 2015, the Dutch government implemented a major reform of the student finance
system. This reform brought forth two main changes, which differed in coverage: 1)
the universal basic subsidy was turned into a loan, and 2) the repayment period of
student loans was extended from 15 to 35 years. The first applied only to students
at Universities and Universities of Applied Sciences, while the second was universal.
This meant that vocational school students were allowed to retain the universal basic
subsidy and to enjoy the extended loan repayment period. The reform also simplified
the means-tested subsidy, making it independent of living arrangements, which
benefited students who would live with their parents in the absence of the policy
change. The reform further changed the maximum amount of the means-tested
subsidy, lowering it for students entering vocational schools, and increasing it for
9Universities and Universities of Applied Sciences constitute the Dutch higher education sector.
Vocational schools are classified as post-secondary non-tertiary education institutions.
11Vocational school students younger than 18 years of age receive only the transport card. They
become eligible for the basic subsidy from the first trimester after their 18th birthday. Students at
Universities and Universities of Applied Sciences face no minimum age requirement.
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students entering higher education institutions. The latter was meant to compensate
low-income students in higher education institutions for the loss of the basic subsidy.
Table 2.1 summarizes key features of the old and the new system.
The first cohort of students affected by the reform entered post-secondary education
institutions in the academic year 2015-2016. Students who started their studies
prior to this academic year were allowed to finish their degrees under the old regime
with the prospect that any financial aid for their follow-up degrees would be set
according to the new financing rules. The eligibility criteria remained unaffected by
the reform. The 2015 reform constituted a major change in the mode of student
financing, leading to large changes in the price of higher education. For most higher
education students, the change of subsidies increased the price of a 4-year degree by
either €5,000 or €14,000 (depending on the students’ living arrangements).12 This
corresponds to two to six times the value of annual tuition fees in 2014 (€1903).
However, not all students were made worse off. Disadvantaged students who were
eligible for the full means-tested subsidy, and who were intending to live with their
parents saw their total monthly subsidy increase by €31, amounting to a total
reduction of €1,488 in the cost of a 3-year degree. In addition, the expansion of
the loan program and extension of the repayment period created a buffer for the
overall price increase, benefiting particularly those students who would have taken
up a student loan regardless of the policy change (approximately 10 to 15% of the
students).
12For student living independently, the universal basic grant amounted to €290 monthly, so €290 *
12 * 4 = €13,920 over the course of a 4-year bachelor degree; for student living with their parents,
the grant amounted to €100 monthly, so €100 * 12 * 4 = €4,800 for a 4-year bachelor degree.
Assuming no interest, repaying these student debts over 30 years would correspond to monthly
repayments of respectively €40 and €15.
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Table 2.1: Student Finance in the Netherlands Before and After 2015
Before 2015 Reform After 2015 Reform
(1) (2)
Panel A. University and University of Applied Sciences
Basic subsidy:
Living with parents €100.2 €0
Living independently €279.1 €0
Means-tested subsidy:
Maximum awarded €258.3 €378.2





Maximum Amount €295.73 €475.91
Repayment period 15 years 35 years
Panel B. Vocational education
Basic subsidy:
Living with parents €79 €81
Living independently €257.9 €264.4
Means-tested subsidy:
Maximum awarded €345 €260.5





Maximum Amount €172.17 €176.49
Repayment period 15 years 35 years
Note: Information collected from yearly legal archives of Rijksoverheid. For
detailed yearly information since 2002, see Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix
B.1.
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2.2.3 Student Finance Reform Announcements and Implementation
The 2015 student finance reform was preceded by a long announcement period
during which the initial reform proposal was being turned into an actionable bill.
This period covered the years 2010-2014 and consisted of two main stages in which
the information about the reform was progressively revealed to the public.
In the first stage, the government announced its intention to reform student finance.
This announcement followed the June 2010 general elections, which took place
in the context of austerity. Campaigns of political parties therefore emphasized
budget cuts in non-priority areas. Education was one of the more controversial
topics of the elections, with some parties advocating cuts to the education budget
and other parties strongly opposing such measures. The general elections were
unexpectedly won by the conservative-liberal party (VVD), which had campaigned
in favor of removing the basic subsidy from the student finance package. At this stage,
however, the winning party had no exact plan for implementing the reform of student
finance. For prospective students, the election outcome introduced uncertainty about
the future availability of financial aid, and thereby increased the expected cost of
vocational and higher education.
In the second stage, the government revealed the prospective changes to the student
finance system. This announcement took place in October 2012, following another
round of general elections. Disagreements within the 2010 coalition led to its
dissolution, and new elections were held in September 2012. Shortly after the
elections, the new coalition (led again by VVD) announced the timing and exact
contents of the student finance reform. The reform was to be introduced in the
academic year 2014-2015, implementing the changes that we describe in Section
2.2.2. For prospective students, this resolved the uncertainty about prospective
financial aid, further increasing the expected costs of higher education and lowering
the expected cost of vocational education.
The eventual implementation of the reform was also facing challenges. In late May
2014, the coalition announced that the implementation of the reform would be
postponed until September 2015 (academic year 2015-2016). This postponement
was a result of political instability which led to delays in passing new legislation.
The student finance bill was passed in May 2014, which was deemed too late for
the new system to be implemented in the upcoming academic year. Note that, in
late May, the next cohort of freshmen had already sent their applications to higher
education programs and student finance at latest in April, under the expectation
74
CHAPTER 2. EARLY DISCOURAGEMENT
that they would enroll under the new regime of student finance.
The long announcement period allowed prospective students to respond to the reform
well ahead of its implementation. The 2012 information shock in particular prompted
a non-negligible number of high school graduates to expedite their post-secondary
admissions (by skipping a gap year or by accepting a second-best non-selective
program) in order to qualify for the old student finance package.13We note that this
strategic behavior is an identification concern for analyses of students’ college-entry
decisions, rendering the standard discontinuity-based methods of causal inference
largely invalid. However, our analyses are unlikely to be affected by this behavior.
This is because we focus on the decisions made by the secondary school students
well ahead of their graduation. As such, the students who were making the studied
decisions after the 2012 information shock were all under the impression that they
will be subject to the new student finance regime, irrespective of their strategic
choices.14
2.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we present a conceptual model of students’ decision making. The
model allows us to illustrate the responses of students to the reform and highlight the
expected margins of heterogeneity in these responses. We build on the conceptual
model of Charles et al. (2018), which we adapted and expanded to fit our setting.
The key distinguishing feature is that our model allows us to study the effects of
uncertainty regarding the prospective receipt of financial aid on students’ decision
making.
2.3.1 Setting
Similar to the actual setting we study, secondary school students in our model must
choose among three mutually exclusive education tracks: vocational (V ), general
(G), and academic (A). In contrast to the real setting, we treat the track choice
as irreversible and deterministic of student’s eventual education attainment. The
tracks differ in terms of their length, with V being shorter than G and G being
shorter than A (that is, tV < tG < tA). For simplicity, we also assume that students
14Based on auxiliary analyses of our estimation sample, that are beyond the scope of this chapter.
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receive financial aid over the entire duration of their studies, and that the yearly
financial aid rates are identical across tracks. To simplify notations, we also assume
that students make decisions at the same time t.
Financial aid is defined as a government transfer s that consists of a universal transfer
s0 and a means-tested transfer s1. Receiving the means-tested transfer is conditional
on student’s eligibility status, such that s = s0 + s11{eligible}. The take-up of
financial aid is assumed to be universal. Let p0,j and p1,j be the probabilities that
s0 and s1 must be paid back to the government for a student in track j – i.e. the
probabilities that the study subsidies are turned into loans. Students choose the
track that maximizes their expected lifetime payoff. For a student i with ability
θi ∼ unif(0, 1), the expected lifetime payoff of following track j is Rji (θi).
Normalizing the expected lifetime payoff of the vocational track to RVi (θi) = 0, we












[(1 + b)(Fj − (1− p0)s0 − (1− p1)s11eligible) + κj(1− θi) + E(Y Vt )]
The first sum corresponds to the expected accumulated labor market premium of
track j over track V from graduation tj until retirement L. Πjt denotes the difference
between stochastic wages Y jt and Y Vt corresponding to the given time period. The
next two sums represent the excess costs of pursuing education track j. The costs
are computed over two periods, one covering the length of the vocational track tV ,
and the other covering the excess time spent in track j. In the first period, the costs
have two parts: 1) direct out-of-pocket costs Fj in the form of living expenditures
and tuition fees, and 2) psychic (or effort) costs of attending education j, κj(1− θi),
where κj captures the difficulty of track j (κV < κG < κA ). Psychic costs are
decreasing with students’ abilities θi. The costs are compensated by financial aid
; however, this term is irrelevant in the first period as there are no differences in
the receipt of financial aid across tracks. In the second period, the costs of track
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j are compensated by the excess financial aid, and the psychic costs of vocational
education are replaced by expected forgone earnings of graduates from the vocational
track E(Y Vt ). We assume that these costs are covered by student loans procured at
an interest rate b. We assume that students face no borrowing constraints, which is
in line with the real setting we study, where students are allowed to borrow from
the government regardless of their financial situation.
When choosing an education track, students take into account their own abilities.
For each education track j, the expected lifetime payoff increases with ability
(∂Rji/∂θi > 0). To avoid corner solutions, we assume that students with lowest
abilities reap the highest payoffs from the vocational track and the lowest payoffs
from the academic track. This ordering is reversed for students with highest abilities.
RVi (0) > R
G
i (0) > R
A
i (0)
RVi (1) < R
G
i (1) < R
A
i (1)
Under these assumptions, there exists an ability level θ∗G at which the lifetime payoff
functions RVi (θ) and RGi (θ) intersect, rendering the students at this ability level
indifferent between tracks V and G. Similarly, there exists an ability level θ∗A at
which students are indifferent between tracks G and A. Accordingly, students with
abilities lower than will choose track V , students with abilities in between θ∗G and
θ∗A will choose track G, and students with abilities higher than θ∗A will choose track
A. The closed-form solutions for θ∗G and θ∗A, and comparative statics of the effects
of a policy shock are available in Appendix B.2.
2.3.2 Model Predictions: Reform Announcements and Implementation
Prediction 1 Overall reform effects We consider a simplified version of the
2015 reform. At baseline B, prior to the reform and its announcements, the
probabilities of repayment p0 and p1 are zero for both the universal and the means-
tested subsidy, such that we have: pB0j = pB1j = 0. Under this policy regime, students
sort themselves into education tracks according the baseline ability thresholds θB∗G
and θB∗A . Once implemented, the reform B changes the student finance system by
setting the probability of repaying the universal transfer to one for all students in
tracks A and G, that is, pR0A = pR0G = 1. Students in track V are exempted from this
change, so pR0V = 0. The probability of repaying the means-tested transfer eventually
remains zero under the new system, and all transfer rates remain the same, so we
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have pR1A = pR1G = pR1V = 0. This change shifts the ability thresholds to the right,
with students above the first threshold moving from track A to track G, and students
above the second threshold moving from track G to track V . Intuitively, we would
expect the outflow from track G to be stronger than the outflow from track A. This
intuition is however not necessarily the case for all possible parameterizations of
the model. In our case, this arises because we assume that the gap in duration
of studies and difficulty is larger between general and academic tracks than it is
between vocational and general tracks.
Prediction 2 Uncertainty and means-testing The reform implementation is
preceded by a period of policy uncertainty U . Under this policy regime, students do
not know whether they will receive any study subsidy. This means that the subjective
probabilities of repayment increase for both the universal and the means-tested
transfer (pU0j > 0, and pU1j > 0). Similar to the reform itself, policy uncertainty alone
shifts the ability thresholds rightwards from baseline, such that we have θU∗A > θB∗A
and θU∗G > θB∗G . Importantly, the magnitude of this shift is contingent on students’
eligibility for the means-tested transfer.
On the one hand, students who are ineligible for the means-tested transfer respond
to the policy uncertainty less than to the reform itself, because they still have a
non-zero chance of receiving the universal subsidy.
Students who are eligible for the means-tested subsidy, on the other hand, respond
more to policy uncertainty than the ineligible students, assuming the two groups
have similar ability distributions around thresholds θ∗G and θ∗A. This is because
eligible students risk the repayment of both subsidy types. Although the model
does not indicate whether the response of eligible students grows further under the
reform regime R, under realistic parameterizations of the model, we can expect the
eligible students to be less affected by the resolution of uncertainty than the ineligible
students. This is because their loss of the universal subsidy is compensated by the
newly-established certainty of receiving the means-tested subsidy. For sufficiently
large values of p1 and s1, their response to U may be actually stronger than their
response to R.
Prediction 3 Uncertainty and gender Our model does not explicitly con-
sider gender-specific effects. However, gendered responses may arise if male and
female students differ from each other in characteristics that are relevant for their
decision-making process. Here, we focus on the role of relative risk aversion. Women
are generally found to be more risk averse than men (see e.g. Charness and Gneezy,
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2012; Falk et al., 2018) – including in controlled laboratory settings using univer-
sity students – and this risk aversion may influence their behavior under policy
uncertainty.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the higher risk aversion of female students
translates into higher subjective probabilities of repayment under uncertainty. Within
this setup, our model predicts female students to have stronger behavioral responses
to policy uncertainty compared to male students. Once the reform is implemented
and uncertainty is resolved, we expect gendered responses to become more aligned.
We may, however, still see some residual gender differences if low-income students
face uncertainty regarding the receipt of the means-tested subsidy. This would be
more aligned with the real-world setting. Low-income secondary school students
in the Netherlands are never completely sure that they will become eligible for the
means-tested subsidy. This is because: 1) the eligibility is tested against future
parental income, and 2) the income cut-offs are not disclosed to public.
2.4 Data
Our empirical analysis draws on data provided by the Dutch national statistics agency,
Statistics Netherlands. The cornerstone of our dataset is the education register,
which tracks the population of students at every level of the Dutch education
system between years 2005 and 2017.15 Based on this registry information, we
create a dataset of student-year education records, extracting the characteristics
of the education program pursued by each student at the start of each academic
year. The education register contains unique personal identifiers, which allows us
to link it to other registry data and retrieve a rich set of students’ background
characteristics. These include gender, age, immigration background, employment
and income histories (both own and parental), residential history, and standardized
test scores taken in Grade 6 (age 11), accompanied by teacher’s high school track
recommendations.
15The education registry contains student enrollments at all levels as of December 1st of every year.
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2.4.1 Sample Selection
Our analyses use several subsets of the full education dataset. These smaller datasets
contain students that are observed at the same stages of their education paths over
the period of observation. Our primary analytical dataset contains students who
are in their fourth year of secondary school (Grade 10). As outlined in Section 2.2.2,
this is the first year in which we are able to determine the chosen education track
for all secondary school students, and it is also the year in which academic and
general track students choose their subject field. For other analyses, we use datasets
of Grade 11 secondary school students, and first-year students in post-secondary
education programs.





Female 53.2% 50.3% 47.7%
Age 15.6 16 15.9
Native Dutch 82.8% 80.9% 75.5%
CITO score (percentile) 83.2 60.8 30.3
[14.0] [19.2] [20.7]
Annual household income 81.6 65.2 49.8
(in thousands €) [71.2] [46.6] [33.3]
Urbanization index 2.8 3.0 3.0
Number of students 549,649 770,106 1,431,798
Share of cohort in track 19.98% 27.99% 52.03%
of which STEM/Medicine field: 57.21% 37.06% N/A
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the estimation sample. The sample
covers the near-universe of Dutch students in Grade 10 between 2005 and 2017. Num-
bers in brackets correspond to standard deviation from the mean. The Urbanization
index ranges from 1: urban to 5: rural.
Our analytical datasets are not subject to any substantive selection criteria, as we
are primarily interested in the reform effects on the entire cohort of secondary school
students. We only exclude students who are enrolled in special education programs
(which constitute a standalone secondary school track for children with learning
disabilities), as they do not qualify for higher education.
In Table 2.2, we present descriptive statistics corresponding to the focal group of
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Figure 2.1: Tracking Trends in The Netherlands, Years 2005-2017
(a) Grade 10 track shares in 2005
(b) Changes in the track shares relative to year
2005
Note: Authors’ calculations of high school track shares over the period of observation. Figure 2.1a
plots the Grade 10 high school track shares in year 2005, and Figure 2.1b tracks changes of the
high school track shares over the next twelve years, taking the shares in year 2005 as the point of
reference. Dutch education register data for Grade 10 high school students, excluding students in
special education institutions, years 2005-2017. Red dashed lines indicate the timing of two reform
announcements and the eventual reform implementation.
Grade 10 students. Over the period of our study, 20% of students were following the
academic track, 28% were following the general track, and 52% were following the
vocational track. Among academic track students, 57% chose to study STEM and
Medicine subjects. Among general track students this share was 28%. Next, we note
that students’ characteristics differ systematically across tracks. Students in the
academic track are more likely to be female, native Dutch, live in urbanized areas,
and have higher standardized test scores and parental income. The characteristics
of students in the vocational track are reversed.
2.4.2 Students Tracking Outcomes over Time
In Figure 2.1, we present the dynamics of Grade 10 track shares over the period of
observation. The aim of this exercise is to highlight the trends in students’ track
choices at baseline, prior to any reform information shock, and to contrast them with
the choice patterns observed during the period of reform announcement (2010-2014)
and implementation (from 2015 onwards). The first panel of Figure 2.1 shows the
Grade 10 track shares in the first year of observation (2005), and the second panel
shows how these shares evolved over the following years.
In Figure 2.1, we present the magnitudes of track enrollment shares in relative terms,
taking the 2005 track shares as reference points, to highlight dynamic changes in track
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enrollment trends over the period. The figure shows that over the pre-announcement
period (2005-2009), the three high school track shares followed sustained trends.
Academic and general tracks grew consistently between 2005 and 2009, to the point
of being 5% larger in 2009 compared to 2005. This growth was at the expense of the
vocational track, which saw a steady decline in student numbers during this period.
The first reform announcement took place in June 2010; although we do not see
2010 track shares already deviating from the pre-announcement trends as of the
academic year 2010-2011, we do see a clear trend break starting with the academic
year 2011-2012. That we do not yet see a trend break in 2010 is not surprising,
given that the 2010 student cohort received the information only a few weeks prior
to entering Grade 10.16
Starting with the 2011 cohort, however, we see a clear reversal of the pre-announcement
trends. The share of students in the vocational track starts increasing, the share of
students in the general track plateaus, and the share of students in the academic
track starts declining. The trend reversal is sustained through both phases of the
reform announcement and eventually the year 2015 when the reform was eventually
implemented. From 2016 onward, our figure suggests that enrollments trends seem
to revert to pre-reform trends, which suggests that the reform led to an overall drop
in the demand for academic and general high school education, without however
changing the underlying trends in demand for these education tracks.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in modelling how students’ trajectory in high school depends on
their beliefs regarding the future receipt of financial aid. Because we cannot observe
students’ beliefs directly, we exploit the timing of the 2015 reform announcements
as quasi-random shocks to those beliefs. As described above, the announcements
generated exogenous variation in the probability of receiving the more generous pre-
reform financial aid package, first by introducing uncertainty regarding its receipt,
and later by setting the probability of receiving the universal subsidy to zero.
The primary outcome of interest is students’ track, as observed in Grade 10. Since
16Pupils likely to respond to this first announcement shock in June 2010 are those leaving primary
school with marginally passing Grade 6 test scores; for most pupils, test scores and teacher
recommendations are already known by June.
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students can choose from three tracks, we model tracking using a multinomial logit
model. Other outcomes of interest correspond to choices between two alternatives,
leading to standard logistic model.
The dynamics of our outcomes of interest show substantive changes in students’
behavior over the period of the reform announcement and implementation. In this
section, we introduce the statistical models we use to quantify the effects of the
reform on student’s choices. We first outline the principal model specifications for
the choice of high school track and the field of study, and then discuss the validity
of assumptions for our models to identify causal effects of the policy announcements
we study.
A model of Tracking
Our first set of analyses concerns how students choose their high school track (which
we only observe with confidence in Grade 10). Since the choice is between three
mutually exclusive high school tracks, we model students’ tracking outcome in a
multinomial logit framework as following:
P(Yi = j∗|xi, β) =
exp(xiβj∗)∑3
j=1 exp(xiβj)
Where Y is a choice variable, j∗ is the selected high school track (Academic, General
and Vocational), xi is a vector of covariates, and β is a set of choice-specific parameter
vectors, with
xiβj = β1j + β2jf(ti) +
2017∑
y=2010
β3yj1{ti = y}+ ziβ4j
where i indexes students and j indexes high school tracks. The functional form
consists of a time trend, a set of eight yearly dummies covering the period of the
reform announcement and implementation, and students’ observable characteris-
tics including gender, immigration and ethnic background, parental income, and
residential characteristics.
We consider two main specifications of the time trend: a linear time trend which
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stops in year 2009, and a linear time trend which runs throughout the entire
period, corresponding respectively to assuming f(ti) = f1(ti) = ti1{ti < 2010}, and
f(ti) = f2(ti) = ti. The first specification controls for the pre-trend and assumes that
the captured trend does not extend past the initial reform announcement, whereas
the second specification assumes that the pre-trend continues beyond 2009.
The reform effects are captured by the set of eight yearly dummies covering the
period of reform announcement and implementation. A specification with year
dummies allows for cohort-specific responses to the decision environment they are
in, while having one coefficient per period would allow us to identify the effects
of the shocks on average across the cohorts treated by each shock, thus assuming
that between two shocks cohorts respond similarly The set of yearly dummies is
preferable to a single reform indicator due to the staggered announcement which
made the reform and its details more salient to the later cohorts. Students who
began their studies later had more time to adjust to the new student finance regime,
which would imply stronger reform effects among the later cohorts. This model is
estimated by maximum likelihood, and standard errors are clustered at the year
level.
A model of Track Dropout
In our second set of analyses, we study how students decide to switch to a lower
track. We model this decision using a logit model.
P(Yi = j∗|xi, β) =
1
1 + exp(−xiβj)
The model specification uses the same set of covariates as the model of track choice.
We further use logit models to study other binary decisions, such as the choice of
the field of study (STEM and Medicine or Social Science and Humanities), or to
dropout from a field of study. These models are estimated by maximum likelihood,
and standard errors are clustered at the year level.
Leveraging our linked, administrative data, we use an extensive set of control
variables including gender, immigration and ethnic background, parental income,
and residential characteristics. To account for the pre-announcement dynamics of
track choices (see Figure 2.1), we use linear time trends, and include region fixed
effects.
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We capture the effects of the reform announcements and later implementation
using a set of yearly dummies that cover the period of reform announcements and
implementation. The identifying assumptions are that the students are comparable
across cohorts (conditional on their observed characteristics and the time trend),
and that the only changing factor in their decision environments is their exposure
to reform information shocks. Given that these are both strong assumptions, we
conduct several supplementary analyses and discuss to what extent they are likely
to hold (see Sections 2.7 and 2.8).
2.6 Main Results
2.6.1 Effects on Tracking Outcomes
The key results corresponding to the model of Grade 10 track choice are presented
in Table 2.3. To simplify the exposition of our results, we aggregate the reform effect
estimates into three coefficients, one for the first announcement period (2010-2012),
then for the second announcement period (2013-2014), and the last one for the
implementation period (2015-2017). These coefficients correspond to average reform
effects over the given period of observation and they are derived by applying linear
transformations to the original year-specific reform dummies. The estimates are
presented as average marginal effects (AME), and they are expressed both in absolute
(Panel A) and relative terms (Panel B).
In line with the trends in tracking outcomes presented in Figure 2.1, Table 2.3
indicates that policy uncertainty following the 2010 announcement lowered the share
of academic track students by 1.07 percentage points, lowered the share of general
track students by 0.54 percentage points, and increased the share of vocational
track by 1.61 percentage points. These numbers capture the effects of the 2010
announcement, relative to the no-reform counterfactual in which the aggregate track
shares are influenced only by students’ observable characteristics and the general
time trend.
The reform effects become more pronounced following the second announcement,
which is in line with the corresponding resolution of uncertainty. During the post-
implementation period, the effects reach their highest magnitudes. The academic
and general track shares are respectively 3.57 and 3.22 percentage points lower,
whereas the vocational track share is 6.8 percentage points higher than the no-reform
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Table 2.3: The Effects of Policy Announcements on Track Enrollment
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
track Resolution implementation
shares (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Track (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Academic 21.0 −1.07∗∗∗ −2.29∗∗∗ −3.57∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12)
General 29.0 −0.54 −1.59∗∗∗ −3.23∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.30) (0.44)
Vocational 50.2 1.61∗∗∗ 3.89∗∗∗ 6.80∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.37) (0.53)
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Academic −5.37∗∗∗ −11.57∗∗∗ −18.09∗∗
(0.30) (0.43) (0.62)
General −1.94 −5.70∗∗∗ −11.50∗∗∗
(0.77) (1.07) (1.54)
Vocational 3.24∗∗∗ 7.83∗∗∗ 13.69∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.74) (1.06)
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a multinomial logit
model of high school track enrollment as measured in Grade 10, with a linear
time trend. The model uses 2,693,023 individual observations over years 2005-
2017. Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration status, ethnic
background, parental income and employment status, and an urbanization
index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1
significance level.
counterfactual. Following the reform implementation in 2015, the growth of the
yearly effects is sustained. This was to be expected, since all students entering Grade
10 from the academic year 2015-2016 were exposed to the second announcement in
October 2012, ahead of starting their secondary schooling. Thus, they were able
to fully internalize the information about the new student finance system when
choosing their track.
These results strongly suggest that students anticipated the future costs of attending
higher education when making their education track decisions. The relative magni-
tudes of the reform effects are well-aligned with our theoretical framework. First,
we observe that the responses to policy uncertainty are smaller than the responses
to the resolved uncertainty in the second announcement phase. Further, we see
that under the initial policy uncertainty, the magnitude of student outflow from
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the academic track is similar to the magnitude of student inflow into the vocational
track – the magnitudes of the two coefficients are not statistically different from
each other. However, once students become aware that the vocational sector will
be largely unaffected by the reform, the inflow into the vocational track intensifies,
eventually becoming almost twice as large as the outflow from the academic track.
We discuss alternative specification of time trends in Section 2.8.
2.6.2 Effects on Track Dropout
As described in Section 2.2, the education track and subject field choices that we
observed when students are in Grade 10 are not necessarily final. Students may
drop out of their tracks and fields in the following grades, and more than 5% of
students do so at baseline. In Figure 2.2, we plot the yearly shares of students who
switched to a lower track between Grades 10 and 11, combining together academic
and general track students. We report drop-out rates only from 2006 because we
start to observe the cohort of Grade 10 students in 2005. The drop-out rate in
Grade 11 is stable during the pre-announcement period (2006-2009), amounting to
approximately 2,800 students per year. Following the 2010 reform announcement,
drop-out increases dramatically. It peaks in the academic year 2012-2013 with 4,000
Grade 11 students switching to a lower track.
After 2012, the rate of track drop-out declines, and even drops in the post-implementation
period it below pre-announcement levels. This pattern is in line with our results
regarding our Grade 10 track choice after 2015: since students observed in Grades
10 during the post-implementation period were fully informed about the reform
when making their initial track decisions, they did not have to correct their choices
in subsequent grades. In order to capture the effects of the student finance reform
on the probability of switching to a lower track, we estimate a binomial model
of switching choice. The set of covariates is almost the same as for the model of
tracking in Grade 10.17
Table 2.4 shows the effects of the reform on the probability of switching to a lower
track in Grade 11. Our model indicates that the first announcement in 2010 led to
a 1.24 percentage point increase in switching from the academic and general tracks.
17We do not observe any substantive trends in track switching, so we don’t include linear time
trend among the set of covariates. We capture the small variation within the pre-announcement
period by a linear pre-trend variable which is not extended into the reform period. We present
results under alternative specifications in Appendix B.4.
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Figure 2.2: Track Dropout in The Netherlands, Years 2006-2017
Note: Authors’ calculations of the incidence of switching to a lower high school track
in Grade 11 over the period of observation. Track switching is recorded if a Grade 10
student enrolled in an academic (general) track in year 10, was recorded to enrol in a
general (vocational) track in the subsequent academic year. Dutch education register data
for Grade 11 high school students who were enrolled in either an academic or a general
track in Grade 10, years 2006-2017.
The reform effect following the second announcement in 2012 was slightly smaller,
and there was no reform effect during the post-implementation period. That we find
stronger effects on dropout rates following the first than the second announcement
shock contrasts with our findings regarding initial track choices in Grade 10 track,
yet our findings on dropout are consistent with our conceptual model: similar to the
students observed in post-implementation period, many students observed during
the second announcement period did not need to correct these choices, because they
were already (partially) informed about the reform when making their initial track
decisions.
Our results bind together students from the Academic and General tracks, which
might actually have different outside options: while students leaving the Academic
track overwhelmingly enter the General track, students leaving the General track
overwhelmingly leave the public funded education system instead of pursuing the
Vocational Track (additional analyses not shown here). It is likely that they go to
privately funded schools, which specialize in preparing students for qualifying state
examinations for entering higher education. If this is indeed the case, then this would
further strengthen our argument that students and families respond to the policy
announcements, as this type of school would offer a way of entering higher education
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Table 2.4: The Effects of Policy Announcements on Track Dropout
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
track Resolution implementation
dropout (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Track 4.1 1.24∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ −0.08
Dropout (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Track 28.60∗∗∗ 25.47∗∗∗ −1.77
Dropout (3.91) (3.90) (3.88)
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of track dropout
measured in Grade 11 compared to high school track observed in Grade 10, assuming
a linear pre-trend with does not extend past 2009. The model uses 958,512 individual
observations over years 2006-2017. Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration
status, ethnic background, parental income and employment status, and an urbanization
index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1 significance
level.
before the implementation of the new student finance regime. Unfortunately, our
data do not allow us to provide evidence for this behavior, since the education
registry only records students enrolled in publicly funded schools.
2.7 Additional Results and Supporting Evidence
In this section, we discuss heterogeneity of the reform effects, and we analyze other
decisions affected by the reform. First, we consider income heterogeneity. We
use year-specific terciles of the parental income distribution to split the Grade 10
students into three groups (low-income, medium-income, and high-income). For
each income group, we estimate a separate parameterization of the principal model
of tracking and derive the group-specific reform effects. We present the key findings
of these analyses in Table B.3 in Appendix B.3.
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2.7.1 Heterogeneous Effects by Family Income
Interpreting these effects is complicated by large baseline differences in track choice
between the three income groups: low-income students are more likely to enroll in
the vocational track, whereas high-income students are more likely to enroll in the
general and academic tracks. In spite of these baseline differences, our estimated
reform effects are generally aligned with our conceptual framework. Under policy
uncertainty, we observe that a similar share of low-income and medium-income
students started favoring the vocational track (2.17 and 2.29 percentage points,
respectively). Upon the second announcement, low-income students have learned
that they would be partially sheltered from the reform through increased means-
tested subsidy for higher education. In line with this change of incentives, we see
that their responses to the second announcement and eventual implementation
are weaker than the responses of medium-income students. Similarly, low-income
students were most likely to switch to a lower track under policy uncertainty, while
medium-income students were most likely to switch to a lower track following the
resolution of the uncertainty (see Table B.4).
2.7.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Student Gender
Second, we estimate the track choice model separately male and female students.
Table B.5 presents our main results split by student gender. Female students respond
to the initial policy uncertainty more than male students, which is in line with
female students being more risk-averse than male students. Following the second
announcement and extending to the post-implementation period, the responses of
female and male students become more similar, although we still observe much
higher dropout rates of female students from the academic track (Table B.6).
2.7.3 STEM Specialization and Dropout
Third, we analyze the effects of the reform on the Grade 10 choice of STEM +
Medicine subject field (see Figure B.4 and Table B.7). Our model indicates that
the first announcement in 2010 did not lead to an immediate change in the take-
up of STEM + Medicine, consistent with our findings on initial track choice in
Grade 10. However, we do see a 2.28 percentage points increase in the take-up of
STEM + Medicine induced by the second announcement in 2012, which grows to
3.0 percentage points following the reform implementation in 2015. This lag in the
effects of the reform suggests that choosing a different subject field may require more
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time and effort than choosing a different education track.18Additional analyses show
that reform announcements also lowered dropout rates out of subject field in Grade
11. Table B.8 indicates a decline by 32% in the share of students dropping out of
STEM + Medicine students into Social Sciences and Humanities (also see Figure
B.5). Dropout from Social Sciences and Humanities toward STEM is extremely rare
at baseline and remains so throughout.
These results suggest that, in response to the reform, students preferred specializa-
tions which are associated with better job prospects and higher earnings potential,
which is in line with the findings of Field (2009) and Rothstein and Rouse (2011) in
the United States.19
Another way of interpreting our results is that increased enrollments in STEM +
Medicine field of study could be a result of a strong outflow of students interested
in Social Sciences and Humanities to the vocational track. Our supplementary
analyses suggest that this mechanism accounts for approximately a third of the
observed response. The other two thirds are attributable to Dutch high school
students acting upon the knowledge that they will have to take on student loans
in the future, and choosing subject fields with better earnings prospects to secure
the repayment of these loans. In addition, supplementary analyses show sizable
heterogeneity with respect to gender and income: female students respond much
more than male students and medium-income students respond the most, sheltered
low-income students do not respond (full details and discussion in Appendix Tables
B.9 to B.11).
2.7.4 Later Effects: Living Arrangements and Labor Supply in Higher
Education
Fourth, we show that freshmen students who entered higher education under the new
regime of student finance regime became much more likely to live with their parents
during their first year of post-secondary education (see Figure B.6). University
students were most affected; the share of students living at home increased by 18
19Although it is technically feasible, an immediate change of the subject field in response to the
reform announcement can prove challenging. This is because the subject field choices encompass
students’ subject preferences and knowledge accumulated over the first three years of secondary
school. Accordingly, reorienting to a different subject field may require development of new skills
and knowledge. In contrast, the choice of an education track pertains largely to the desired
level of complexity within the preferred subject field. This makes it easier to respond to reform
announcements in terms track choices compared to subject field choices.
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percentage points (from 53% to 71%) between years 2014 and 2015. While the
average commuting time to school increased almost twofold, it seems like students’
choice of place where to study were unaffected. For students starting post-secondary
education in the academic year 2015-2016, their living arrangement decisions appear
to be one of the primary and immediate margins of responses to the new financing
regime. In contrast, we show in a fifth supplementary analysis that students in their
first year of post-secondary education do not seem to respond to the new student
financing regime through their employment choices: we find no sharp discontinuity
around the implementation of the reform (see Figure B.7). The choice of the study
major was likely affected as well, however the presence of substantive anticipation
effects obscures the relative importance of this channel.
Lastly, respondents to the Studenten Monitor also show sharp changes over the
period we study. The Studenten Monitor is a longitudinal survey of a representative
sample of roughly 20,000 higher education students, which has been collected since
2001 by the Dutch Ministry of Education. Yearly reports describe how students
experience and perceive their student life across a variety of topics, including work,
financial aid, and budgeting. From 2010 onward, yearly reports have indicated a
larger share of first-year post-secondary students state that they prefer minimizing
student debt, at the expense of working while studying over taking on more debt and
working less while studying. This suggests that student debt is a topic for higher
education students, which became increasingly salient throughout the announcement
period. From 2015 onward, fewer freshmen seek student finance and employment.
Among respondents who do not take up a student loan, the three main reasons for
doing so remain stable over the time: 1) parents do not agree with student borrowing
(mostly college-educated parents), 2) students have fundamental objections with
borrowing (mostly lower-educated parents), and 3) students lack knowledge about
borrowing conditions. From 2015 onward, respondents become more likely to answer
that they receive enough parental monetary support and do not feel the need to
take up a loan. 2015 freshmen who do, however, take up student loans, are more
likely to have been advised by their parents to take-up a loan, and less likely to
declare that they are not willing to work to finance their studies.20
20see e.g. Van den Broek and Mens (2017); van den Broek et al. (2017); Van den Broek et al.
(2006); Van den Broek and Van de Wiel (2005); Van den Broek et al. (2007)
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2.8 Limitations and Sensitivity of Findings
Our study uses a cohort design, which is imposed by the nation-wide announcement
and implementation of the student finance reform. All students were exposed
to the shocks at once, leaving us with no obvious control group other than past
cohorts. This means that the identifying variation comes from year-on-year changes
in choices made by subsequent cohorts of high school students, conditional on their
observable characteristics and underlying time trends. The implicit assumption is
that the aggregate conditional changes of students’ behavior observed during the
reform period are attributable to the reform and not to other unobserved processes.
This identification strategy is subject to two main types of identification threats:
misspecified time trends, and omitted variables correlated with the timing of reform
shocks.
2.8.1 Alternative Specifications of Time Trends
For our principal model of track choice, we assume that the underlying time trends
are linear. This is motivated by the apparent linearity of time trends observed over
the pre-announcement period (as shown in Figure 2.1). It is also supported by
the aggregate time trends observed in comparable European countries - which we
have collected using yearly enrollments in university-preparing education tracks in
neighboring countries with comparable education systems. The regional average
time trend is linear over the entire observation period (2005-2015), exhibiting no
signs of trend break between years 2010 and 2011 (see Appendix Figure B.12 and
Figure B.13).
In order to assess sensitivity to this assumption, we have estimated models with
alternative time trend specification. First, a model specification with quadratic time
trends yielded similar estimates of the reform effects as our principal specification
(not presented in this chapter). Second, we have also implemented a more radical
treatment of the time trend, assuming that the linear time trend observed over the
pre-announcement period does not extend beyond the first announcement. This
means that in the absence of the reform, the conditional track shares would remain
at their 2009 levels. Table B.12 presents our main results estimated using this model.
While this adjustment necessarily affects the magnitudes of the reform effects, the
results remain largely consistent with our theoretical framework: enrollment in the
academic track declines throughout the reform announcement period, and enrollment
in the vocational track rises after the second announcement. Enrollments in the
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general track remains slightly above the 2009 baseline, which implies that the
number of students moving from the academic to the general track is greater than
the number of students moving from the general to the vocational track. While
this is theoretically possible, realistic parameterizations of our theoretical model
would predict the opposite pattern. This, together with the linearity of international
trends reinforces our conviction that our preferred model specification presented in
Section 2.6 is appropriate for our analysis.
2.8.2 A Systematic Exploration of Potential Confounding Factors
We further explore the possibilities of confounding factors in Appendix B.4. We
analyze the dynamics of various omitted variables and look for trend breaks that
coincide with reform announcements and/or implementation. We consider the follow-
ing variables: 1) earnings of new graduates by education type, 2) employment rates
of new graduates by education type, 3) minimum wage rates, 4) youth unemploy-
ment, in particular throughout the Great Recession, 5) high school graduation rates,
6) average time to graduation in post-secondary education, 7) costs of attending
post-secondary education – tuition fees, other financial aid amounts, conditions,
interest rates, 8) parental unemployment, 9) school capacity constraints, 10) other
changes of the Dutch education system, 11) cross-country trends in track choice,
and 12) cross-country trends in the take-up of STEM education. Our exploration of
these factors did not reveal any trend breaks which could confound our findings.
2.8.3 Measurement of Tracking Outcomes with Error
One concern could be that the trend break we find reflect earlier trend breaks in
tracking outcomes of children, and not a trend break due to policy announcements.
This concern arises because most children are assigned to a track before grade 10,
such that by studying tracking outcomes in grade 10, we could be identifying changes
that occurred in grades 7 to 9 in years prior to 2010. In an earlier robustness check,
we have found consistent evidence of trend breaks in announcement years for children
in earlier grades, indicating that the trend breaks in tracking outcomes that we
found in Grade 10 are not an artefact of trend breaks affecting Grade 9 students
one year earlier, nor trend breaks affecting Grade 8 students two years earlier. This
evidence also indicates that our results, if anything, would underestimate the true
effect of policy announcements on tracking outcomes of pupils.
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2.9 Conclusions
In 2015, the Dutch government implemented a major reform of its post-secondary
student finance system. This reform replaced the universal study subsidy scheme
for higher education students by low-interest loans, thus raising the costs of a 4-year
bachelor degree by roughly 5,000 to €14,000. The reform was revealed in two
announcements. In 2010, the government announced its general intention to scale
down the student finance system, thus creating uncertainty that students would
receive any financial aid in the future. In 2012, the exact contents, timing and
groups of students affected by the reform were revealed, which lifted the uncertainty
and reduced the probability of receiving the universal subsidy to zero for affected
students. In particular, it was only revealed in 2012 that vocational students would
remain unaffected by the reform, and that means-tested financial aid would be
maintained.
In this study, we analyse the effect of the reform on anticipatory decision making of
secondary school students in the Netherlands. Our primary outcome of interest is
the choice of secondary school track, which is instrumental for students’ subsequent
educational and professional pathways. We show that students’ track choices are
clearly contingent on the prospective regime of student financing. In line with our
theoretical framework, students who are informed about the reform become less likely
to choose academic and general tracks, which prepare them for higher education,
and more likely to choose the vocational education track. We show that these effects
emerge already under policy uncertainty following the initial announcement, and
grow larger when this uncertainty is resolved through the second announcement.
The reform announcements also led to a short-lived surge of older students switching
to lower education tracks, correcting tracking decisions made with past information
about financial aid. We show that each of these effects are stronger among the
groups of students who were more affected by the reform.
We also explore several key additional outcomes. We show that the reform raised the
number of academic and general track students specializing in STEM and Medicine
subjects. This indicates that students who are resolved to pursue higher education
do anticipate the higher costs of their degrees and refocus their attention to fields
with higher earnings prospects. Similar changes were observed when analysing older
students’ decisions to abandon STEM and Medicine subjects and focus on Social
Sciences and Humanities instead. Importantly, we note that these behavioural
responses are driven almost exclusively by female students who are relatively under-
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represented in STEM fields. We further show that first-year students enrolled in
higher education programs respond the actual implementation of the reform through
different living arrangements: students at university and university of applied sciences
are much more likely to remain living with their parents and commute to their
schools on a daily basis. By avoiding the costs of rental housing, they lower their
expenditures and reduce the need for additional financing through loans. This is
also reflected in the take-up of student loans which increases only by 20 percentage
points (from a stable roughly 30% between 2001 and 2014 to almost 50% in 2015).
We do not see substantive changes of students’ or parental employment.
Our findings highlight that changes to the mode of student financing can have
far-reaching consequences for students’ educational decisions. The 2015 reform led
to a substantial resorting of secondary school students, reducing the demand for
academic education and increasing the demand for vocational education. In the
proximate future, this resorting is likely to translate into large changes in the demand
for post-secondary degrees and it is also likely to alter the characteristics of new
labor market entrants. Methodologically, our key contributions are twofold. The
first is to show that the Dutch secondary school students are aware of the incentives
embedded in the higher education system, and they respond to them well-ahead of
high-school graduation. These incentives are shown to be shaping students’ interests
and effort levels throughout secondary school, which suggests that early salience of
financial aid information is crucial for informed decision making. Our results imply
that students and their families should be informed about college financial aid as
early as in the first year of secondary school.
The second contribution is to show that uncertainty about the receipt of financial
aid is sufficient to dissuade many students from pursing pathways that lead to
higher education. This uncertainty alone can widen the achievement gaps between
advantaged and disadvantaged students, with these effects being disproportionately
larger among female students. We note that some of these effects were mitigated
by the second announcement. By increasing the means-tested subsidy for higher
education students, Dutch policy makers managed to limit the impact of the reform
on low-income students. However, the low-income students were still observed to
respond to the reform, likely because they were still facing considerable uncertainty
with respect to the receipt and the applicable award rate of this subsidy. Better
understanding how uncertainty about financial aid affects educational choices is a
crucial avenue for future research.
We conclude that many effects of the 2015 reform are not yet available for researchers
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to study. We are so far unaware whether the 2015 reform affected the effort levels of
students enrolled in higher education, for example through changing the average
time to graduation or the likelihood of dropout. The effects are likely to have broader
and longer-run effects on the labor market and in the Dutch economy. The decrease
in demand for academic education may lead to shortages in some high-skill sectors
of the economy, whereas the increase in take-up of STEM subjects may boost other
high-skill sectors and improve national R&D indicators. In addition, the increase
in demand for vocational education may suppress other white-collar sectors, but it
may address some vocational shortages on the Dutch labor market. These are all




Lifting Aspirations for Better Educational
Outcomes

While the first chapter of this dissertation shows that there could be aspirational
poverty traps, and the second chapter indicates that disadvantaged students could
be discouraged from pursuing higher education, Chapter 3 now turns to exploring
whether, conversely, we could lift the aspirations of disadvantaged students and
ultimately improve their educational outcomes. In Chapter 3, we take the example
of a low-cost and easily-implementable policy: exposure to high-achieving classroom
peers.
In Chapter 3, we use data from Taiwan, where middle schools are mandated to
randomly assign Grade 7 pupils to classrooms for a duration of two academic years.
This natural experiment thus allows us to estimate the impact of randomized exposure
to higher v. lower-achieving classroom peers on pupils’ academic performance.
We find that when randomly exposed to classrooms composed of one standard
deviation higher-achieving peers, pupils experience on average a 5.4 percent of a
standard deviation boost in standardized test score two years later, a boosting effect
on test scores that has been found in previous literature. Importantly, however,
exposure to high-achieving peers could have adverse side effect on other outcomes of
students, such that this results is not sufficient to conclude that we could simply
expose disadvantaged students to high-achieving peers to improve their outcomes.
For example, more challenging classrooms could lead to discouragement, and mental
health issues.
We further study the impact of random exposure to higher-achieving classrooms
peers on a myriad of intermediate outcomes including pupils’ aspirations. Recent
research has shown that to understand whether exposure to higher-achieving peers
can improve educational performance through raised aspirations, we must include the
complete set of other potential intermediate factors. We thus consider an extensive
list of the most plausible factors explaining student test scores: student effort,
initiative in class, cheating in exams and truant behavior, mental health, aspirations
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and expectations to go to university, and the child’s perception of their school
environment, as well as parental money and time investments, parental warmth,
discipline and harshness, and teacher engagement.
We show that exposure to high-achieving peers also affects some intermediate
outcomes of students: students pay significantly less time on homework, and are
more likely to aspire to go to university. We also find that the parents of children
exposed to higher-achieving classroom peers spend more time with their child.
Perhaps most importantly, while we find positive effect of high-achieving peers on
test scores and on several intermediate outcomes which likely affect educational
performance, we find that the boosting effect of peers on test scores is not explained
by any of these intermediate effects.
Our analyses allow us to exclude a certain number of possible explanations for this
puzzle. We first show that our puzzling findings are not explained by a failure of
our key identification assumptions to hold: we perform several alternative tests that
confirm that children are as good as randomly assign to classrooms. We also discuss
to what extent correlated selection on unobservable characteristics could explain
away the results, and propose alternative estimates confirming that our results are
not driven by selection on unobservable characteristics. Our sensitivity analyses
also lead us to discuss measurement error that could stem from our sampling design,
or from test scores that are imperfectly capturing true cognitive ability. We show
that our findings are robust to using alternative test score measures, and are also
robust to corrections for incomplete classroom sampling. We also propose alternative
p-values for our statistics using randomization inference corrections and multiple
hypotheses testing adjustments. Our findings are robust to both.
Lastly, we also explore at length the extent to which our puzzling inability to explain
our academic peer effects with students’ and parental intermediate responses could
be explained by heterogeneity in peer effects and their mediation. We first show
that exposure to higher-achieving peers has a similar boosting effect on test scores
for various types of students – male v. female, richer v. poorer, ethnic minority
v. majority, . . . We then show that exposure to higher-achieving peers also has a
similar effect on intermediate responses for these various types of students. Thus,
our puzzling findings are not explained by heterogeneity in the underlying way that
peers improve test scores.
The first lesson of this study is that exposing pupils to higher-achieving classroom
peers is a valid and easily-implementable policy to improve their aspirations to go
to university. In addition, the findings also show that, in this setting, there seem
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to be no behavioral perverse effects associated with exposure to higher-achieving
classroom peers – we find indeed that pupils exposed to higher-achieving peers are
not more likely to cheat on exams or adopt truant or externalizing behaviors such as
smoking, substance abuse or physical violence, and these pupils are also not more
likely to suffer from mental health problems such as depression or anxiety.
A second interpretation of this study is that, while lifting aspirations seems like a
promising way to improve educational outcomes of students, it is unlikely to dra-
matically reduce achievement gaps. Based on this study and this particular setting,
our findings suggest that lifting pupils’ aspirations does not seem to significantly
translate into higher test scores, either because exposure to higher-achieving peers
does not increase aspirations enough, or because aspirations do not translate enough
into better educational outcomes.
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3 | Mechanisms of Exposure to High-Achieving Peers1
3.1 Introduction
Despite an immense literature in economics documenting the importance of peers
for academic achievement, there is still much we do not know about their mecha-
nisms. This remains an important limitation in our understanding of the theoretical
underpinnings of peer effects, and limits our scope for using class assignment policies
as a tool to improve student achievement and educational outcomes (Carrell et al.,
2013; Sacerdote, 2014; Ushchev and Zenou, 2020).
One key reason why it is difficult to make headway in understanding the mechanisms
behind peer effects is that this exercise requires large amounts of data from several
sources. If we think of educational achievement as the output of an education
production function which comprises several simultaneous inputs from students,
parents and teachers (e.g. Cunha and Heckman, 2007), it is also natural to think
that peers can affect educational achievement through any of these inputs. Datasets
that collect information on all, or even many, of these sources are rare. Because
of this limitation, the prevailing approach in the empirical literature on academic
peer effects is to focus on the effect of higher-achieving peers on the few available
outcomes and discuss why these isolated responses may be mechanisms through
which academic peer effects operate. Formal analyses of the share of peer effects
we can explain are often futile with so few mechanisms to look at, leaving the key
unanswered question: what drives academic peer effects?
1This study is joint work with Nicolás Salamanca at the Melbourne Institute. I thank Jan Feld,
Ulf Zölitz, Ingo Isphording, David Figlio and four anonymous referees at the Quarterly Journal
of Economics for helpful comments. I also thank the Survey Research Data Archive (SRDA) in
Taiwan for providing us with data access, and especially Wan-wen Su for facilitating our analyses
of the Taiwan Education Panel Survey.
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To answer this question, we need three key elements in the same setting. First, we
need to establish their existence; that there is a causal effect of being exposed to
higher-achieving peers on students’ own academic achievement. Second, we need to
observe many potential factors that affect academic achievement. And third, we
need to determine whether better peers improve academic achievement by shifting
those factors. Many studies have gained access to one or two of these key elements,
yet to date there is no study that provides empirical evidence all three of them
jointly. We fill this gap.
In this paper, we first show the existence of academic peer effects, as others have
done in different settings (for excellent reviews, see Sacerdote (2011, 2014)). We
exploit a mandate to randomly assign students to classrooms within schools in our
setting as a lynch-pin in our identification strategy, and develop a method to identify
and use only schools that adhere to this mandate in our analyses. We find that
a one standard deviation (1 SD) increase in the average test scores of classroom
peers at baseline increases own test scores by 5.2 percent of a standard deviation
two years later.
Using rich data on students, parents, teachers and schools, we then estimate the
causal effect of higher-achieving peers on a large battery of student, parent, teacher
and school educational inputs, which are all potential mechanisms of academic peer
effects. Together, our measures explain 71 percent of test scores two years later which
suggest we have a very comprehensive set of measures in our data. Higher-achieving
academic peers decrease students’ school effort and increase students’ university
aspirations and their expected ability to go to university. Higher-achieving peers also
increase parents’ time investments and strict parenting style. We do not find effects
of high-achieving peers on students’ initiative in class, truancy, exam cheating, or
academic self-efficacy. We also find no effects on parental investments in private
tutoring, on emotional support or harsh parenting, or on parental aspirations for
their child to go to university. Finally, we also find no effects on students’ perceptions
of their school environment, or on their teachers’ engagement with students, reports
of how hard to manage is the classroom, and how tired they feel about teaching.
Some of the effects we do find complement existing evidence in the peer effects
literature (Feld and Zölitz (2017) on perceived quality of peer interactions; Bursztyn
and Jensen (2015) and Bursztyn et al. (2019) on social pressure and effort provision).
Yet most of our estimates explore unstudied mechanisms behind academic peer
effects; in fact, no study before has been able to test as many candidate mechanisms
as we do.
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Combining our estimates of high-achieving peers on score and on educational inputs,
we then answer the question: How much of the academic peer effect can be explained
by our measured mechanisms? To do this, we begin by estimating the returns of all
our educational inputs on academic achievement using high-quality cumulative value-
added models (Todd and Wolpin, 2007; Fiorini and Keane, 2014). Our estimates
show large returns to many of our explored inputs. We then use these returns to map
the effects of higher-achieving peers on educational inputs to academic achievement
using mediation analyses (Gelbach, 2016). Our estimates show that our battery
of educational inputs mediate a negative share of our academic peer effect—which
means that the effects of high-achieving peers on educational inputs make it harder,
not easier, to explain academic peer effects. This negative mediation is largely
driven by the combined negative effect of high-achieving peers on student effort and
its positive value-added returns. Our other inputs explored have a virtually null
contribution to mediation. This is a surprising and important new insight for our
understanding of academic peer effects and should help guide future research effort
understanding their mechanisms.
Finally, we perform an extensive set of sensitivity analyses for our results including:
additional tests for conditional random assignment, alternative estimates with
an exhaustive set of controls, calculations of the degree of correlated unobserved
heterogeneity needed to explain away our findings, corrections for measurement error
in student ability and for incomplete sampling of classrooms, inference corrections
using randomization inference and multiple hypotheses testing adjustments, and an
extensive exploration of heterogeneity in peer effects, and their mediation.
Our paper makes several contributions to better understand the complex nature of
academic peer effects. This is the first paper to provide a thorough test of the many
possible mechanisms underlying academic peer effects, testing 19 of them covering
all key agents in educational production. In one study, we cover the vast majority of
achievement peer effect mechanisms—hypothesized or tested—in this vast literature
(see Table 3.1). Most previous studies test only a few potential mechanisms for
academic peer effects but never more than three or four at a time, and never in a
formal mediation analysis (though two other studies, Gong et al. (2019) and Zölitz
and Feld (Forthcoming), use mediation analyses to investigate mechanisms behind
the effect of classroom peer gender). This is an important limitation since the many
inputs in the education production function imply equally many mechanisms for
peer effects to work through, and the only way to know how well we can explain
peer effects is to jointly test all these potential mechanisms. The fact that after
our efforts we still do not know how academic peer effects work is a testament to
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their complexity. Our findings rule out a host of mechanisms hypothesized in this
extensive literature. When combined with previous findings, our results point to
two additional mechanisms (direct peer-to-peer learning and endogenous teaching
practices) and one empirical phenomenon (widespread heterogeneity in value-added
functions across schools) as the most promising avenues to explain the surprisingly
little mediation of academic peer effects.
We also make two methodological contributions to the empirical literature on peer
effects. First, we develop an algorithmic approach to conducting balancing tests and
identifying non-compliant schools in quasi-experimental peer effect designs. This
is particularly useful in settings with partial compliance to random assignment of
students to classrooms and no reliable way to know where compliance occurs and
where it does not. In such settings, researchers often try and account for system-
atic violations of random assignment by controlling for additional characteristics
beyond balancing characteristics, which complicates the interpretation of peer effect
estimates and weakens identification strategies. Our approach is a transparent
alternative to improve the validity of quasi-experimental research designs based on
conditional random assignment without relying on conditioning pre-treatment covari-
ates to account for failed randomization. Second, we provide a simple algorithm for
randomization inference that observes the data structure of students within schools
and within classrooms. Maintaining the data structure and, in particular, rigorously
respecting assigned classroom sizes is crucial for correctly calculating permutation-
based t-randomization p-values (Young, 2019) and for producing permutation-based
tests of random assignment, which are commonly used in the empirical peer effects
literature. We can provide Stata code for these two procedures upon request.
3.2 Peer Effects in Education
Economists have been interested in peer effects for a long time, and have published
over 100 articles in economic journals since 2009 on peer effects in education alone,
28 of them in top 5 journals.2One reason for the widespread interest in peer effects
is that they could “be harnessed to cost-effectively improve public [. . . ] services”
(BenYishay and Mobarak, 2019). In other words, the existence of peer effects implies
a social multiplier effect. Inspired by this promise in peer effects, an immense
empirical literature rose to provide evidence on their existence and size—notable in
education but in other fields as well. After two decades of studies, the existence of
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peer effects in education is a well-established fact.3
Peer effects are notoriously difficult to identify for two main reasons (Manski, 1993a):
self-selection into peer groups (i.e., that similar people sort into the same groups) and
the reflection problem (i.e., that estimates capture both my effect on my peers and
the effect of my peers on me). Self-selection introduces bias in peer effects estimates
arising from omitted variables. Reflection ties together the effects of (endogenous)
peer interactions with the effect of (exogenous) peer characteristics, complicating
the interpretation of peer effect estimates.
Empirical studies typically solve the reflection problem by estimating the reduced-
form effect of pre-assignment peer characteristics on student outcomes. Many studies
have in addition convincingly solved the issue of self-selection by exploiting quasi-
experimental assignment of students to peer groups. Two types of identification
strategies have mainly been used to that end. The first strategy leverages (condi-
tional) random assignment to peer groups within an institution. Examples include
roommate assignment in college (Sacerdote, 2001; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2001, 2006; Zimmerman, 2003; Foster, 2006; Brunello et al., 2010; Griffith and Rask,
2014; Jain and Kapoor, 2015; Garlick, 2018), classroom/section/dorm assignment
within institutions (Lyle, 2007; Kang et al., 2007; Graham, 2008; Carrell et al., 2009;
De Paola and Scoppa, 2010; Burke and Sass, 2013; Carrell et al., 2013; Brady et al.,
2017; Feng and Li, 2016; Feld and Zölitz, 2017; Huntington-Klein and Rose, 2018;
Garlick, 2018), and study group assignment within classroom (Lu and Anderson,
2015; Hong and Lee, 2017). The second identification strategy uses natural variation
in cohort composition. Examples include cross-cohort variation within an institu-
tion (Hoxby, 2000; Figlio, 2007); natural shocks or policy-driven changes affecting
peer group composition (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Gould et al., 2004; Imberman
et al., 2012; Figlio and Özek, 2019); admission cutoffs for schools or classrooms
(Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013); and experimental assignment to peer groups
(Whitmore, 2005; Duflo et al., 2011a).4
3For brevity, we focus on studies of peer effects on academic achievement, but many other studies
also document peer effects in e.g. college dropout (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2001), cheating
in school (Carrell et al., 2008), job search (Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2002), substance abuse
(Argys and Rees, 2008; Kremer and Levy, 2008; Card and Giuliano, 2013), crime (Deming, 2011),
technology adoption (Oster and Thornton, 2012), consumption (Moretti, 2011), financial decisions
(Ahern et al., 2014; Bursztyn et al., 2014) and beliefs (Boisjoly et al., 2006).
4It should be clear by now that there are very many studies of peer effects in education — see
Sacerdote (2011, 2014) for two excellent reviews. For studies using cross-cohort variation within an
institution see also: Hanushek et al. (2003); McEwan (2003); Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005);
Hanushek et al. (2009); Lavy and Schlosser (2011); Lavy et al. (2012a,b); Kiss (2013); Diette
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The main findings of this literature are that i) academic peer effects are positive but
generally small; ii) the size of academic peer effects depends non-linearly on students’
own academic ability; and iii) academic peer effects vary in large and seemingly
unpredictable ways across settings.
Recent empirical studies have argued that academic peer effects could be largely
driven by three types of mechanisms: i) student effort (e.g., Kang et al., 2007;
Brunello et al., 2010), ii) group dynamics (e.g., Lavy and Schlosser, 2011; Lavy
et al., 2012a; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015; Brady et al., 2017; Feld and Zölitz, 2017),
and iii) teacher effort or school resources (e.g., Duflo et al., 2011a; Chetty et al.,
2011; Hoekstra et al., 2018; Todd and Wolpin, 2018). Table 3.1 lists several of these
studies, classifying them by the type of mechanisms they explore.
A separate literature, yet directly relevant for our study, emphasizes the importance
of parents as drivers of their children’s academic achievement. This literature models
academic achievement through an education production function framework—that
is, as an output produced from students’, parents’ and teachers’ inputs and governed
by well-defined production technologies (such as dynamic or technical complemen-
tarities). Recent studies in this literature show, for example, that the benefits of
class size reductions are driven by changes in student effort and classroom disrup-
tion (Lazear, 2001; Finn et al., 2003), as well as by changes in teacher behavior
(Sapelli and Illanes, 2016) and parental investments (Bonesrønning, 2004; Jacob and
Lefgren, 2007; Datar and Mason, 2008; Fredriksson et al., 2016). Recent studies
estimate structural models of education production functions that include school
peers, parents and neighborhoods as inputs (e.g. Agostinelli, 2018; Agostinelli et al.,
2020).
and Uwaifo Oyelere (2014); Kramarz et al. (2015); Gibbons and Telhaj (2016). For studies using
natural- or policy-driven shocks see also: Hoekstra (2009); Clark (2010); Vardardottir (2013);
Jackson (2013); Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014); Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2014); Hoekstra et al. (2018).
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In this paper, we estimate the contribution of higher-achieving academic peers to
students’ test scores and to many educational inputs that may also contribute to
improving test scores in their own right. Conceptually, our reduced-form models
map the contribution of higher-achieving peers in a linearized version of education
production functions. The downside of this approach is that we do not use economic
structural information to improve identification. The upside is that our models are
transparent in their identifying variation, econometrically tractable, and can easily
be used to quantify the share of academic peer effects explained by educational
inputs via standard mediation analyses. To take full benefit of this approach we
exploit the pairing of Taiwan’s policy of random classroom assignment within schools
and the rich data in the Taiwan Educational Panel Survey, which we describe in
detail in Section 3.3.
3.3 Institutional Setting and Data
3.3.1 Education in Taiwan
Figure 3.1 shows the basic organization of the Taiwanese educational system. Com-
pulsory education in Taiwan starts at primary school, at 6 years old, and ends at
the end of junior high school (middle school), around 15 years of age. In practice,
however, 95 percent of students continue further onto either General or Vocational
Senior High School or Junior College.
Since the democratization process in Taiwan started in the 1990s, junior high schools
have been managed at the municipal level. Students can attend any school they
chose but there is preferential school access based on catchment areas within each
municipality. The educational curriculum is developed centrally by the Taiwanese
Ministry of Education and has no subject specialization until only after junior high
school. This unified curriculum is centered around sciences and mathematics and its
adoption is often cited as the reason why Taiwanese pupils are consistently placed at
the top on international educational rankings (e.g. 4th out of 72 countries in PISA
2015; Law (2004)).
Critical for our identification strategy, since the 1990s municipalities are also man-
dated by the government to ensure the random assignment of students and homeroom
teachers to classrooms within schools. This requirement was formalized by the Im-
plementation Guideline for Class Assignment of Junior High School Students, later
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Figure 3.1: The Education System in Taiwan
Authors’ figure.
superseded by Article 12 of the Primary and Junior High School Act in 2004.5
Classroom assignment plays a persistent role in students’ education since students
typically remain with their assigned classroom and homeroom teacher (or Dao Shi)
throughout all three years of junior high school.
Students take the National Basic Competence Test at the end of junior high school,
which results play a key role for admissions to senior high schools and senior
vocational schools. A good placement in these competitive schools, in turn, results
in good placements in tertiary education programs, which have high returns in the
labor market afterwards. Consequently, students spend time and effort preparing
for these exams, and schools regularly organize practice exams and other forms
of preparation. Parents are also engaged in their children’s preparation, investing
in extracurricular tutoring in mathematics, English and sciences largely through
5Additional details can be found at http://edu.law.moe.gov.tw/EngLawContent.aspx.
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cram schools—private extra-curricular institutions preparing for higher education
entrance examinations—throughout junior high school or even earlier.
3.3.2 The Taiwan Education Panel Survey
We use data from the Taiwanese Education Panel Survey (TEPS), a project jointly
funded by the Ministry of Education, the National Science Council, and the Academia
Sinica. The TEPS is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of the education
system in junior high school, senior high school, vocational senior high school,
and junior college. The TEPS is a multiple respondent survey, collecting linked
information on students, parents, teachers, and school administrators.
We focus on the junior high school sample of the TEPS because the timing of
interviews allows us to use measures of student ability and educational inputs upon
random assignment to classrooms in Grade 7. The TEPS junior high school sample
includes information on more than 20,000 students, their parents, their teachers and
their school administrators over two waves. The first wave was collected in early
September 2001 at the beginning of students’ first year of junior high school, right
after their assignment to classrooms. The second wave was collected in 2003, at the
beginning of the students’ last year of junior high school.6
Paired with the mandate of random assignment to classrooms in schools, there
are three other key features of TEPS that aid our study. First, its sampling
framework allows us to observe a random sample of classmates in each junior high
school classroom included in the survey. TEPS follows a stratified nested sampling
procedure where first 338 randomly selected junior high schools were sampled (45
percent of all high schools in the country at the time), with different sampling strata
for urban and rural areas, public and private schools, and senior high and vocational
schools. In each of these schools an average of three classrooms of first-year students
were then randomly sampled. In each of these classrooms, around 15 students were
then randomly sampled. The mandated maximum class size at the time was 35
students per class, which implies that observed students in any classroom generally
represent a random half of the classroom.7 This sampling framework is similar to
6In contrast, TEPS conducted the first round of interviews of students in general and vocational
senior high school, and junior college in their second year, one year after assignment to classrooms,
barring us from having baseline measures of ability and educational inputs for these samples.
7There are other minor sampling restrictions that are irrelevant for our empirical design, we refer
the interested reader to TEPS technical reports.
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that of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health),
a panel study of a nationally representative sample of middle and high school pupils
in the United States. Add Health is unique in collecting friendship ties and in
observing multiple cohorts of students in each school, which makes it particularly
appealing for peer effect and network research (e.g. Agostinelli, 2018; Elsner and
Isphording, 2017; Card and Giuliano, 2013; Bifulco et al., 2011; Calvó-Armengol
et al., 2009).
Second, and unlike Add Health, students in the TEPS take a standardized test in
waves 1 and 2 called the Comprehensive Analytical Ability test. This test measures
of students’ cognitive ability and analytical reasoning, and it was specifically designed
to capture gradual learning over time. There are 75 multiple-choice question in
the test, covering general reasoning, mathematics, Chinese and English. These
questions were taken from an extensive bank of questions which includes adapted
questions from other international standardized tests, as well as questions provided
by education and field experts in Taiwan. The Comprehensive Analytical Ability
test scores, constructed as the sum of all correct answers, provide excellent measures
of academic ability for students and their peers.8
Third, TEPS provides a wealth of questions measuring student behavior, attitudes
and beliefs in and outside the school environment, parent-child interactions and
parental investments, as well as detailed information on teachers and school ad-
ministrators. Many of these measures have multiple raters, combining questions
asked to students, parents, teachers and school administrators. We aggregate all
these questions to construct an extensive battery of measures of student, teacher
and parent inputs in students’ educational production function. This large set of
input measures allows us to comprehensively explore potential mechanisms behind
academic peer effects.
Based on previous literature, we identified key inputs of students, parents and
teachers in the education production function that are potential mediating factors
of ability peer effects. For inputs with multiple potential measures, we first identify
entire blocks of items in the questionnaires of all respondents—e.g. blocks of items
related to study effort reported by students, parents and teachers. We then eliminate
8There is some evidence that female students may be disadvantaged compared to male students in
multiple-choice measures of cognitive ability (see e.g. Willingham and Cole, 2013). This is not a
concern for our study since cognitive ability is measured in a consistent manner throughout the
TEPS, and our regression analyses always control for ability at baseline. Nevertheless, we discuss
robustness of our results to measurement error in cognitive ability in Section 3.6.2
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very low correlates to maximize the informational content of each index and reduce
noise. To do this, we compute Spearman correlations between all items under
consideration, assess their Cronbach’s alphas, and perform an exploratory factor
analysis. Once we narrow down the list of items for a scale, we perform an additional
confirmatory factor analysis to validate these items and ensure their item factor
loadings have similar magnitudes. Finally, for each of these potential student, teacher
and parent mediating factors and in each wave, we construct a summative scale
that adds up the answers to each item in the scale. See Appendix C.1 for a detailed
explanation and Appendix Table C.1 for summary statistics and factor loadings on
all scale questions.
We measure student inputs through five scales of student school effort, initiative
in class, mental health, truancy, and academic self-efficacy, and three additional
dummies for whether students cheat in exams, aspire to go to university, and expect
to be able to go to university. We measure parental inputs through four scales of
money investments, time investments, parental strictness and parental support, and
three additional dummies for whether parents have conflicts with their child, use
harsh punishment, and aspire for their child to go to university. Lastly, we measure
school and teacher inputs though two scales of student-perceived quality of the
school environment and of teacher engagement, and two additional dummy variables
for whether teachers reports that the classroom is hard to manage and whether they
feel tired of teaching.
Table 3.1 shows a high-level summary of the academic ability and educational input
measures we construct using the TEPS data. For each measure we list the number
of items used and the number of unique values each measure takes. Wave 1 measures
include many pre-assignment characteristics used in Section 3.4.2 to provide evidence
of random assignment of students to classrooms within schools through a series of
tests and methods we explain in the next section.
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Table 3.1: Description of Academic Achievement and Input Measures in TEPS
Wave 1 Wave 2
Measure Description Nb of Distinct Nb of Distinct
Items Values Items Values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Student inputs
Test scores Comprehensive Analytical Ability std. test 75 66 75 59
School effort Study effort, homework on time (in English, 7 23 7 25
Chinese & math class)
Initiative in class Initiative to ask and answer questions 3 12 3 12
(in English, Chinese & math class)
Cheating in exams Student ever cheats in exams 1 2 1 2
Mental health Feeling troubled, depressed, suicidal, nervous, 6 19 12 22
unfocused, pressured, irritated, isolated, guilty
Truancy Skipping class, fighting, watching porn, drinking 6 19 4 10
alcohol, stealing, running away from home
Academic self-efficacy Focus, diligence, conscientiousness, initiative, 7 22 10 19
eloquence, organization, cooperation, curiosity
University aspirations Student wants to go to university 1 2 1 2
University expectations Student expects to be able to go to university 1 2 1 2
Parental investments
Money investments Out-of-school tutoring for child: cost, intensity 2 10 3 10
Time investments Going to bookstores, cultural events with child 2 7 2 11
Parent-child conflict Student quarrels with father and mother 1 2 1 2
Parental strictness Father and mother use strict discipline with child 2 7 2 17
Parental support Father and mother discuss future, listen, 8 25 8 7
carefully, worry, give advice, accept as is
Harsh parenting Parents use harsh punishment with student 1 2 1 2
University aspirations Parents want student to go to university 1 2 1 2
School atmosphere and Teacher engagement
School environment Student perception: school study ethos, campus 5 16 5 16
safety, school fairness, staff engagement
Classroom management Teacher assessment: classroom is hard to manage 1 2 1 2
Teacher engagement Student perception: teacher knows names, 6 19 6 36
encourages students who work hard, uses several
different teaching materials, gives homework,
cares about students, reviews quest. after exams
Teacher tired Teacher is tired of teaching 1 2 1 2
Note: This table presents our summative scales, and their associated survey items in each wave of TEPS.
Col. (1) and (3) report the number of items used in the construction of each summative scale resp. in
Wave 1 and Wave 2, and Col. (2) and (4) indicates the number of distinct values summing each item. For
example, the summative scale "School effort" in Wave combines answers to 7 items over 23 distinct values;
thus, school effort ranges from 0 to 23.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Testing for Random Assignment of Peer Groups
Peer effect studies vary widely in their preferred test of random assignment to peers.
In this section, we briefly review and discuss the type of tests used in the literature.
A growing number of peer effects studies have relied on experimental or quasi-
experimental data in which students are randomly assigned to peer groups. This
literature typically uses three types of test to show that data is consistent with
(conditional) random assignment of students to groups. In the first method, re-
searchers regress student i’s pre-determined characteristics on the classroom leave-out
mean—that is, the classroom mean after excluding student i — of the key regressor
of interest. This key regressor is usually a classroom leave-out mean of ability, gender
or other pre-determined student behavior (see e.g. Carrell et al., 2013; Eble and
Hu, 2019). A significant coefficient on the classroom leave-out mean indicates that
students “treated” with peers differ in that pre-determined characteristic. Because
this test mirrors balancing-of-covariates tests in the experimental literature, we refer
to them as balancing tests.
In the second method, researchers regress student i’s pre-determined characteristics
on classroom leave-out mean of that same characteristic (e.g. Sacerdote, 2001). A
positive coefficient on the characteristic classroom leave-out mean indicates that
students are sorted into classrooms based on the characteristics tested; hence
we call these sorting tests. Guryan et al. (2009) observe that empirically, even
under random assignment, coefficients of sorting tests present a small negative bias;
they show that this small, mechanical negative correlation between own and peer
characteristics seems to disappear when controlling for school-level leave-out-mean
of the characteristic. Jochmans (2020) shows that Guryan et al. (2009)’s empirical
correction results in low power for detecting sorting. He further derives analytical
expressions for this bias in within-school estimators and proposes a bias-corrected
sorting test which solves the power issue of previous sorting tests.
In the third method, researchers run permutation-based (sorting or balancing) tests
(e.g. Carrell et al., 2013; Lim and Meer, 2017). These tests go as follows. While
keeping the core structure of the data (e.g., assignment to schools), researchers
simulate what would happen under random assignment to treatment (e.g., to
classrooms). Based on this new placebo assignment they then calculate key placebo
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statistics of interest—sometimes for sorting tests, sometimes for balancing tests, and
sometimes for their main results. They repeat this process, say 10,000 times, and
each time store their key placebo statistics. Finally, they calculate the proportion of
times their placebo statistic has a more extreme value than their actual key statistic.
They then calculate the proportion of times the coefficient of the placebo classroom
leave-out mean is more extreme than their coefficient of the classroom leave-out
mean as observed. This proportion of more extreme occurrences under placebo is
a simulation-driven empirical p-value for a test of random assignment and can be
judged by typical standards of statistical significance. These empirical p-values could
be calculated for many statistics of interest, including for sorting and balancing
tests but also for such tests at the school or even classroom level. When many of
these empirical p-values are calculated, researchers can aggregate them into one
overarching statistical test using goodness-of-fit tests for the distribution of p-values,
which should be standard uniform under random assignment to treatment.
All three methods above are valid ways to produce evidence of quasi-random as-
signment, yet all methods also have their shortcomings. Neither method naturally
corrects for multiple testing when researchers use many pre-determined character-
istics in their tests. Using multiple hypotheses testing corrections (e.g. Benjamini
and Hochberg, 1995; Romano and Wolf, 2005a,b) can, in turn, severely decrease
test power. Another approach is to joint-test the significance of all pre-determined
characteristics in predicting treatment but these joint tests have a tendency to
over-reject, especially when using cluster-robust inference methods (Pei et al., 2019).
Permutation tests have the additional problem of being relatively complex to pro-
gram since researchers are required to keep most of the data structure identical (e.g.,
assignment to schools, number of classrooms in each school, class size) while still
reassigning treatment at random, then correctly recalculate all treatment measures,
and ensure that treatment variation is correctly accounted for in all estimates –
which is harder with discrete measures of pre-assignment characteristics like gender
or race. In addition, goodness-of-fit tests used to aggregate many empirical p-values
in permutation tests, such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test, have known power
issues.
Given the volume of peer effect studies out there, it is no surprise that in many of
them there is evidence of some systematic assignment to peer groups (e.g. Krueger,
1999; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001; Whitmore, 2005; Dee, 2004; Ammermueller and
Pischke, 2009; Balsa et al., 2018). When tests of random assignment reject the null
that students are randomly assignment to peer groups, researchers have used three
types of econometric strategies.
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A first approach is to adapt the econometric specification and adjust the interpreta-
tion of estimates accordingly (Krueger (1999), for example, estimates intent-to-treat
effects rather than treatment effects), or to consider the size of the selection bias
when interpreting results (e.g. Dee, 2004). This can be appropriate if the evidence
on systematic assignment is weak, quantitatively small, and does not hint at further
systematic assignment based on unobservable characteristics that affect student
outcomes. The cost, however, is that estimates might be biased if any of these
conditions fail.
A second approach is to remove treatment clusters where the data are consistent with
some form of systematic assignment to treatment (e.g. Krueger, 1999; Whitmore,
2005; Chetty et al., 2011). This approach is valid if there are clear reasons to believe
that random assignment applies to some known treatment clusters but not others,
which usually requires intimate knowledge of the institutional background behind the
data and the presence of markers of these known clusters. In complex institutional
settings, removing data clusters suspected of systematic assignment to treatment
quickly becomes unfeasible and can be very costly in terms of statistical power.
A third approach is to control for pre-assignment characteristics that reveal system-
atic assignment in the preferred specification, thus relying on mean independence of
treatment conditional on these characteristics (e.g. Lavy and Schlosser, 2011; Gong
et al., 2019). This approach is not costly in terms of power and does not require
intimate knowledge of the institutional background, yet it assumes (often implicitly)
that controlling for characteristics related to systematic assignment fully accounts
for related unobserved characteristics that also determine assignment. Economist
are often wary of this assumption. This third approach also comes with other
shortcomings. In particular, it assumes that a single parameter function (e.g., linear)
in the pre-assignment characteristics is sufficient to account for systematic assign-
ment. This assumption is unlikely to hold if there are several such characteristics
or several treatment clusters that differ in their drivers of systematic assignment.
Parametrically relaxing this assumption can quickly become costly in terms of power.
Perhaps more importantly, controlling for pre-assignment characteristics changes
the interpretation of the peer effect estimates, often making them less immediately
available for designing better peer group assignment policies. For example, unbiased
peer effect estimates that control for parental education can only be used to predict
outcomes of reassignment policies that hold parental education constant—a difficult
exercise unless student reassignment to classrooms is done explicitly on parental
education, which is unlikely to happen in practice.
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In sum, there are several ways to test for random assignment of students to peer
groups and several ways to deal with an eventual rejection of random assignment.
None of the tests are perfect, nor are the solutions. In the next section, we show our
main test for random assignment in the TEPS and refer the interested reader to
Section 3.6.1 for the additional tests we run. The case of the TEPS also presents an
interesting challenge that combines i) a national mandate of random assignment of
students to classrooms within schools, ii) incentives for parents and schools to violate
this mandate if they believe that higher-achieving peers affect student outcomes,
and iii) unusually rich pre-assignment data to test the outcome of these two clashing
institutional features.
Perhaps more importantly, none of the existing tests are designed to identify specific
treatment clusters where random assignment is unlikely to hold. In Section 3.4.2
we propose such procedure: a new data-driven method for finding subsamples
where quasi-random assignment is credible, which is particularly useful in complex
institutional settings such as ours.
3.4.2 Random Assignment to Classrooms in TEPS
Our identification strategy exploits random assignment of students to classrooms.
If random assignment holds, we expect our treatment of interest, classroom leave-
out-mean of peer ability, to be as good as randomly assigned to students. Random
assignment to treatment is the main identification assumption under which our
coefficient estimate yields a causal estimate of the effect of peer ability on subsequent
outcomes. Therefore, we first show that our data are generally consistent with
random assignment to classrooms, and then show that our treatment is as good as
randomly assigned to students.
To show that the data are consistent with random assignment to classrooms within
schools, we run sorting tests in the complete TEPS data on standardized test scores
and 17 pre-assignment characteristics. We start from the complete sample, to prevent
missing values to lead to over-rejecting sorting tests of random assignment. In this
complete data, we find evidence of sorting by student ability and by several other
student characteristics. We take this as evidence of non-perfect compliance with the
mandate of random assignment of students to classrooms within schools across the
entire TEPS data (see Appendix Table C.18).
There are many reasons why, in defiance of the national mandate of random assign-
ment, we could find evidence of systematic assignment of students to classrooms.
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These can range from school principals occasionally catering to some parents’ prefer-
ences for their child to be assigned to some classrooms, to institutionally allowed
“talent” classrooms that pool high-ability student together, to a more concerning
blatant disregard for the national mandate across schools. We develop a data-driven
procedure that helps us determine the reason behind this seeming violation of
random assignment in the data, and identify a sample where random assignment
likely holds. We describe the key features of this procedure below, and refer the
interested reader to a more complete description in C.3.
The Fishing Algorithm
Since the law in Taiwan has an explicit mandate of random assignment of students
to classrooms, we suspect that rejecting the null of sorting tests is most likely driven
by few schools that systematically sort students. Unfortunately, our data does not
allow us to infer directly which are these schools to exclude them from our analysis.
We therefore designed a sample trimming method, which combines randomization
inference, clearly pre-defined selection rules and latent-class modeling. Our Fishing
Algorithm is a data-driven approach to identify and exclude the few schools that show
evidence inconsistent with conditional random assignment. Since the norm should
be random classroom assignment at the school level and since we are interested in
ability peer effects, we focus on trimming schools that systematically sort students
of similar academic ability into classrooms. This allows to exclude entire treatment
clusters (schools) rather than within-cluster treatment cells (e.g., classrooms) which
might leave non-random treatment in the remaining cells (i.e., because they are
the complement of non-random treated cells). Our method, however, can be easily
adapted to trim schools that sort on any observed characteristic in the data, and
even on multiple characteristics at once.9
9Our Fishing Algorithm is also not restricted to finding sorter schools; it can be used to find sorter
classes (i.e., classes where students are likely to be sorted based on ability). More generally, it
can be adapted to find violations of balancing in any setting with cluster treatment assignment,
such as treated villages within countries, or families within neighborhoods. Note also that, in
general, our Fishing Algorithm is not equivalent to controlling for observable characteristics
to achieve conditional balancing. Our approach combines knowledge of the intended level of
treatment assignment (schools) and the nature of the treatment (peers) to non-parametrically
identify treatment clusters that likely defy random assignment. Once non-random assignment is
detected, we remove entire treatment clusters rather than trying to keep them and account for the
non-randomness via controls. Only very stringent selection on observable procedures should be
able to capture endogeneity as we do, and even then these would have to apply flexible control
functions at the cost of many degrees of freedom and interpretability of estimates.
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The key five steps of the Fishing Algorithm are the following. First, we construct
for each school a measure of strength of sorting, indicating how strongly the school
sorts students of similar ability into the same classrooms. This measure is akin to
a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of ability concentration in classrooms within each
school, with larger values indicating stronger ability sorting in classrooms in the
school. We call this measure Hs. Second, for each school we use several permutations
of random assignment of students to classrooms within school without replacement
and construct, for each simulated classroom assignment, its corresponding simulated
index Hrandoms . This procedure recovers the distribution of ability concentration
in classrooms for each school under the null of random assignment. Third, for
each school we compute the share of permutations for which the observed index
Hs in the data was larger than the simulated index Hrandoms under the null of
random assignment, and call this share Ss. Under perfect compliance with random
assignment, we expect the distribution of S over schools to be uniform over the [0,1]
interval; if random assignment violated in some schools, we expect more values of Ss
close to 1. Fourth, we estimate the latent probability that each school is a sorter (i.e.,
a school that sorts students into classrooms more strongly than chance would allow).
We do this using latent class modelling—an atheoretical data-driven partitioning
method that finds observations (e.g., school shares Ss) that are likely to be generated
by the same stochastic process (e.g., ability-sorted classroom assignment). Using
school-level data, we fit a finite mixture model where the outcome is Ss, the regressors
are constants for each latent class, and we include school-level variables that could
help identify sorter schools (such as the share of parents who report pushing to get
their children assigned to a better classroom). One or more of the latent classes in
this model correspond to schools with improbably high Ss—the sorter schools—and
the model itself produces school-level posterior probabilities of each school belonging
to this latent sorter class. In the fifth and final step, we flag sorter schools based on
whether their posterior probability of belonging to the latent sorter class is larger
than the combined probabilities of belonging to all other classes. As mentioned
above, a more complete description of this Fishing Algorithm can be found in C.3,
and we provide validation of this procedure using simulated data in C.4.10
10The question on parental pushiness belongs to a block of questions regarding parental investments
in their child’s education, including whether parents have or plan on sending their child to study
abroad, have changed jobs to be more available for their child, or have relocated to a better
educational district to aid their child’s education. We focus on pushy parents because it is the only
one of these items that relates directly to classroom assignment and thus our treatment of interest,
which could affect our within-school estimates.
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Most schools in the TEPS data show evidence consistent with random assignment,
whereas some schools present obvious evidence of sorting (Appendix Figure C.1). As
illustrated in Figure 3.2, our Fishing Algorithm identifies 106 out of the 333 schools
in TEPS as sorter schools, which we exclude from our estimation sample. This
leaves us with a trimmed sample of 13,685 students in these schools, allocated to
853 classrooms (68 percent of the TEPS data). Our trimmed sample is very similar
to the overall TEPS data in terms of all key student and parent characteristics in
wave 1, and is also similar to our final estimation sample of 11,029 observations
with complete information on student and peer test scores and educational inputs
(Appendix Table C.20).
Figure 3.2: Schools Identified as Defying Random Assignment Using the Fishing Algorithm
This figure shows the school-level distribution of our measure for whether schools sort
students into classrooms more strongly than chance would allow, given the school size,
number and classroom size and student composition. The probability of being a sorter
school is the posterior probability of being in a latent class classified as sorters by us and
calculated based on a finite mixture model of school sorting using several school averages
of parental characteristics as class predictors. See C.3 for details.
An important concern in applying our Fishing Algorithm is over-trimming; that is,
to remove schools that by chance look like sorters but are not. Our algorithm will
unavoidably result in some schools being over-trimmed, and these schools would
have contributed useful variation to identify peer effects. With severe over-trimming,
peer effects could be less precisely estimated at best, and biased at worst (upwards
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if e.g., peer effects are strongly driven by positive effects of higher-achieving peers
on high-achieving students). However, over-trimming is also easily diagnosed in
our algorithm; it is revealed by negative and significant post-trimming sorting t-
statistics. If negative post-trimming sorting t-statistics occurs, researchers should
make efforts to improve the performance of the Fishing Algorithm (by e.g., finding
better predictors of sorter schools or exploring different latent lass structures or
models). If no improvement can be made, it is important to highlight the over-
trimming brought on by the algorithm and cautiously interpret findings accordingly.
Fortunately, in our application of the Fishing Algorithm to TEPS we find virtually
no evidence of over-trimming.
Sorting and Balancing Tests in our Trimmed Sample
Table 3.2 presents the results of sorting and balancing tests on the trimmed sample,
once we exclude the schools likely to be non-compliant with the mandate of random
assignment.11 Columns (2) and (3) show sorting tests t-statistics, to be compared
to standard normal critical values, whereas columns (4) and (5) show coefficients
and standard errors of balancing regressions of pre-assignment characteristics on
peer ability.
The main endogeneity concern in our estimates is ability sorting of students; that is,
that high-ability students are assigned together in the same classroom. This type
of sorting is concerning because, if ability is dynamically self-productive as in e.g.,
Cunha and Heckman (2007), it would bias peer effect estimates upwards. The first
row of Table 3.2 shows that this sorting is not a concern in our trimmed sample.
Another common endogeneity concern is whether students are sorted in productive
characteristics other than ability, say parental income. This kind of sorting is tested
in the second and third columns, second row and below, of Table 3.2. Sorting on
parental income can introduce bias in peer effects estimates if these characteristics
are related to student achievement. Note, however, that if income sorting were
related to students’ achievement at baseline, this sorting would have already been
reflected in the baseline achievement sorting. This still leaves the possibility that
11For this discussion, it is useful to keep in mind the omitted variable bias formula for our peer
effect estimator β: E(β|X)− β = γρ, where γ is the conditional effect of any omitted factor on
student outcomes and ρ is proportional to the correlation between the omitted factor and our
peer achievement leave-out-mean. Evaluating all endogeneity concerns against this formula is an
enlightening way to map econometric endogeneity concerns to economic principles.
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parental income has not been productive for student achievement at baseline but
might become productive afterwards. If that is the case, income sorting at baseline
can still bias peer effects upwards over and above achievement sorting.
Table 3.2: Balancing and Sorting Tests on the TEPS Trimmed Sample
Sorting tests (t-statistic) Balancing tests
Treatment Variable: Peer outcome Peer ability
leave-out mean leave-out-mean [std]
Students Guryan et al. Jochmans Coef. Std. err.
(2009) (2020)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-assignment characteristics:
Student test scores [std] 13,685 -0.2 0.1
Female student 13,685 2.1 -0.2 0.008 (0.011)
Student born before 1989 13,611 -0.8 0.6 −0.005 (0.010)
Household income > NT$100k/mo. 13,454 -0.7 -0.3 −0.019∗∗∗ (0.007)
College-educated parent(s) 13,084 -0.8 0.8 0.001 (0.009)
Parent(s) work in government 13,023 1.4 0.0 0.010 (0.007)
Ethnic minority parent(s) 13,081 2.2 1.4 −0.004 (0.009)
Since primary school:
Student always prioritized studies 13,593 -1.7 0.8 −0.010 (0.009)
Student always reviews lessons 13,583 -0.2 1.7 0.003 (0.008)
Student likes new things 13,554 1.5 2.4 −0.001 (0.011)
During primary school:
Student was truant 13,489 1.6 -0.7 0.000 (0.011)
Student had mental health issues 13,486 -0.7 0.2 −0.004 (0.010)
Student quarreled with parents 13,502 -1.5 -1.2 −0.001 (0.009)
Before junior high school:
Had private tutoring 13,525 0.3 1.4 0.004 (0.012)
Family help with homework 13,013 1.2 0.8 −0.020∗∗ (0.008)
Student in gifted academic class 13,554 -1.2 1.8 0.013 (0.008)
Student in arts gifted class 13,554 2.2 2.9 −0.013 (0.015)
Parents made efforts to place child 13,508 2.2 3.2 0.035∗∗∗ (0.010)
in better class
Note: This table presents the results of balancing and sorting tests in our trimmed sample of 232
schools and 850 classrooms. All estimators include school fixed effects. The reference distribution for
the Guryan et al. (2009) and the Jochmans (2020) sorting statistics is the standard normal. The last
column reports cluster-robust standard errors at the classroom level. ***, ** and * mark estimates
statistically different from zero at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence level.
Table 3.2 shows that there is no evidence of sorting on other characteristics in
our trimmed sample, especially when using the Jochmans (2020) state-of-the-art
test. There is some evidence of sorting on intellectual curiosity and, perhaps more
importantly, sorting for students enrolled in gifted arts classrooms and students
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whose parents report making efforts to get them assigned to particular classrooms.
Several institutional settings, including TEPS, could allow for this type of sorting
to occur over and above achievement sorting.
For student sorting on other characteristics to introduce bias in our peer effect
estimates, however, a second necessary condition is for the student characteristic to
be related to our peer achievement leave-out-mean measure. The last two columns of
Table 3.2 show these tests. In our trimmed sample, the only potentially concerning
characteristic which i) could affect student achievement over and above baseline
achievement, ii) students are sorted on at baseline, and iii) is also related to peer
achievement at baseline is whether parents made efforts to get their child assigned
to a particular classroom. Of all the other characteristics that we test, only family
income and family engagement with homework before baseline are related to peer
achievement, and they are negatively related at that. This last finding rather suggests
a potential slight over-trimming in our Fishing Algorithm (since pre-trimming these
relationships were, if anything, positive (Appendix Table C.18). Regardless, in our
main specifications we include the corresponding controls for household income,
family engagement with homework, gifted art classroom assignment, and parents’
pushiness to get child assigned to a particular classroom, which we jointly refer to
as balancing controls. These balancing controls are not crucial for our empirical
design, nor do they affect any of our main results.12
Overall, our algorithm is an effective way to identify schools that systematically
assign student to classrooms in our data. In the schools identified by the algorithm
as balanced we find no substantive evidence of systematic assignment, and we will
keep this trimmed sample as our estimation sample throughout our main analyses.
In Section 3.6 we also show the results of a battery of additional sorting tests, discuss
in detail other ways to identify our estimates, explore the issues of sample selectivity,
and compare our trimmed sample with the initial TEPS sample.
12Also, note that due to the power in our data, we detect small differences in balancing tests
that would have likely gone unnoticed in other designs. Our ex-post Minimum Detectable Effects
(MDEs) for our balancing tests are as small as 2.2 percentage points in the chance of being female,
and less than 1 percentage point in the likelihood of having a migrant background. For comparison,
the MDEs of balancing tests are 17 percent of a standard deviation in math test scores in the
STAR data (Dee, 2004), and 25 percentage points for being female and 10 percentage points for
migrant in the Add Health data (Bifulco et al., 2014).
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3.5 Main Results
3.5.1 Academic Peer Effects on Test Scores
Now that we have established a sample where conditional random assignment of
students to classrooms holds, we go on to establish the existence of academic peer
effects.
Figure 3.3: The Effect of Higher-Achieving Peers Test Scores on Students’ own Test
Scores in Wave 2
This figure reports estimates of regressing standardized student test scores in wave 2 on
standardized average peer test scores in wave 1 in our sample containing 232 schools,
850 classes, and up to 11,029 students. Rows present results of models with different
sets of control variables. The Baseline model includes wave 1 student test scores and
school fixed effects. Balancing controls include household income, family engagement
with homework, gifted art class assignment, and parents’ efforts to get child assigned
to a particular classroom. W1 inputs include standardized scales of student inputs
(school effort, initiative in class, truancy, academic self-efficacy, and mental health),
parent inputs (investment in private tutoring, time investments, parental strictness and
parental support), school and teacher inputs (school environment and teacher engagement).
Horizontal bars show the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals for each estimate, based
on standard errors clustered at the classroom level. Estimates in this figure are also shown
in Appendix Table C.2.
In its most basic form, we test for the existence of academic peer effects in our
setting by regressing students’ standardized test scores in wave 2, TestScoresics2, on
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the standardized classroom leave-out mean of test scores in wave 1, TestScores−iics1,
our measure of average peer test scores. To this simplest specification we add school
fixed effects and students’ own test scores in wave 1. We do not include homeroom
teacher fixed effects since these teachers are also randomly assigned to classrooms so
they cannot confound our peer effect estimates (see Section 3.3.1 and Chang et al.
(2020)). Moreover we do not observe the same homeroom teacher across multiple
classrooms so our estimates would not be econometrically identified in a teacher
fixed effect model. We do consider specifications with and without the additional
balancing controls (household income, family engagement with homework, gifted art
classroom assignment, and parents’ pushiness to get child assigned to a particular
classroom) and standardized scales of student inputs (school effort, initiative in class,
truancy, academic self-efficacy, and mental health), parent inputs (investment in
private tutoring, time investments, parental strictness and parental support), school
and teacher inputs (school environment and teacher engagement). We do this to
assess the extent to which these covariates could capture omitted variable bias in
our peer effect estimates. We cluster standard errors at the classroom level.
Figure 3.3 shows strong positive peer effects in our setting. It further shows that
including balancing controls or wave 1 inputs does not qualitatively change our
estimates, though it does slightly increase precision. This estimate stability is a
reassuring result which provides strong evidence of no omitted variable bias in our
estimates, especially given the wide range of controls included in our educational
input measures.
Our preferred specification is on the last row of Figure 3.3, highlighted in bold. This
specification controls for school fixed effects and student wave 1 test scores, as well
as all wave 1 educational inputs and our four balancing covariates. It therefore
identifies academic peer effects within the Todd and Wolpin (2003) cumulative
value-added specifications; holding constant past outputs and educational inputs.











where Controlsics1 includes balancing controls and wave 1 educational inputs.
These estimates imply that having one standard deviation higher average peer test
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scores in wave 1 increase own test scores by 5.2 percent of a standard deviation in wave
2. Comparing effect sizes in this literature is quite difficult; differences in standardized
effect sizes across studies could capture true differences in responses to peer ability but
could also reflect differences in standard deviations in peer achievement and student
outcomes across settings. Assuming these standard deviations are comparable across
studies, our peer effects are also similar (e.g. Imberman et al., 2012; Brunello et al.,
2010; Booij et al., 2017). Compared to studies where students are randomly assigned
to peer groups, our estimates are around the median of estimate. Yet our estimated
effect measures the impact of two years’ worth of exposure to classroom peers, which
represents a strong dose compare to most comparable studies, thus our effect could
also be seen as relatively small.13
To give this number more perspective, our estimated effect of a 1SD increase in
average peer scores is about a tenth of the estimated effect of a 1SD increase
in students’ own lagged test scores. Our peer effect estimate is about half the
marginal effect of having at least one college-educated parent, and about a sixth
of the unconditional test score gap between children of two-parent households and
single-parent households.
Another way of sizing the impact of higher-achieving peers is through the lens of
socioeconomic inequality. Due largely to school sorting, the peers of poor students
(with household monthly incomes under NT$20,000, corresponding to the poorest
10 percent in the sample) have 68 percent of a standard deviation lower scores
than the peers of rich students (with household monthly incomes over NT$100,000,
corresponding to the top 15 percent). The rich-poor test score gap in wave 2 test
scores gap is 1.1 standard deviations. Putting these two numbers together, our
linear peer effects imply that 3.5 percent of the rich-poor gap in standardized test
scores can be explained by the richer students’ access to higher-achieving peers.
3.5.2 Academic Peer Effects on Educational Inputs
In this section, we estimate the impact of higher-achieving academic peers on nineteen
educational inputs in order to explain how academic peer effects work. We estimate
variations of Equation (3.1) using our measures of educational inputs in wave 2 as
13The combination of partial classroom sampling and random assignment of students to classes
in TEPS implies that these and all other peer effect estimates in our main results might be
biased downwards (Sojourner, 2013). We discuss the source of this bias, and present and interpret
corrected estimates, in Section 3.6.2.
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outcomes. Figure 3.4 shows the effect of a 1SD increase in average peer test scores
on wave 2 educational inputs in our estimation sample. Each row shows the effect
of peer test scores on a different educational input. We show the unconditional
mean of each outcome in square brackets to give context to these estimates. Navy
blue estimates show effects student inputs, maroon estimates show effects on parent
inputs, and teal estimates show effects on school and teacher inputs.
A 1SD increase in average peer test scores decreases students’ school effort in
wave 2 by 5.2 percent of a standard deviation. While these effects are a priori
surprising, they are difficult to benchmark against previous findings. Many studies
have hypothesized study effort to be a key mechanism through which peer effects
operate, yet a handful of them provide estimates of effort responses to high-achieving
peers. The few studies that do find mixed evidence (Feld and Zölitz, 2017; Mehta
et al., 2019; Fang and Wan, 2020).
The negative effect of higher-achieving peers on student effort might seem surprising.
One possible explanation is that exposure to high achieving peers could constitute
a form of relative performance feedback, which can affect effort decisions (Azmat
and Iriberri, 2010). Intuitively, students start with a prior belief about their ability
relative to their peers’, and those exposed to high-achieving peers update their
belief downwards. This has a flow-on effect on effort, which can be positive if
students have competitive or rank-preferences (e.g. Azmat et al., 2019; van Lent
and Souverijn, 2020; Clark et al., 2020) or negative if students become discouraged
by the tournament-like stakes in the classroom (Bedard and Fischer, 2019). Our
negative effects on effort in the TEPS data suggests the discouragement effect is the
larger of the two.
A 1SD increase in average peer test scores also increases students’ aspirations to
go to university by 1.6 percentage points, and their expectations of actually going
to university by 2 percentage points. These seem like small effects, corresponding
to around 3-5 percent of their respective unconditional means, but become more
sizeable when compared to the effect of other known shifters of aspirations. One could
compare them, for example, to the 8.5 percent increase in parents’ higher education
aspirations for girls from opening access to male-dominated professions in India
(Beaman et al., 2012), the 5.2 percent increase in educational aspirations of cast-
priming in high-casts in India as well (Mukherjee, 2015), or the precisely-estimated
null effect of university information on educational aspirations of Colombian students
(Bonilla-Mejía et al., 2019).
A 1SD increase in peer test scores also increases parents’ time investment by 8.1
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Figure 3.4: The Effect of Higher-Achieving Peer Test Scores on Educational Inputs in
Wave 2
This figure reports estimates of regressing educational input measures in wave 2 on
standardized average peer test scores in wave 1 in our sample containing 232 schools,
850 classes, and up to 11,029 students. Rows present results of models with different
educational inputs as outcomes. Unconditional means of each outcome are shown in
square brackets, and [std] marks outcomes that have been standardized to have a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one. All models control for school fixed effects, student
test scores in wave 1, balancing controls, and educational inputs in wave 1. Student,
parent, school and teacher inputs are shown in navy blue, maroon, and teal. Horizontal
bars show the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals for each estimate, based on standard
errors clustered at the classroom level. Estimates in this figure are also shown in Appendix
Table C.3.
percent of a standard deviation. Our time investment measure in TEPS focuses in
dinner time spent with parents, yet our estimated peer effect could be compared
to half of the impact of having one student more in one’s classroom on parents’
likelihood of helping the child with homework in Fredriksson et al. (2016), or with
a fifth of the effect of a child attending a marginally worse school in Pop-Eleches
and Urquiola (2013). 1SD higher-achieving classroom peers also increases parental
strictness by 3.6 percent of a standard deviation, a small effect that has no benchmark
in the peer effects literature.
Finally, Figure 3.4 also shows that we cannot detect effects of higher-achieving
peers on many educational inputs that have previously been considered as key
potential mechanisms behind peer effects, such as student initiative in the classroom,
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classroom disruption and the quality of peer interactions in the classroom (e.g. Booij
et al., 2017; Feld and Zölitz, 2017). We estimate null effects on all measures of
parental investment or parenting behavior other than parental time investments.
This finding is important because while we find no parental behavioral responses to
classroom peer ability, previous studies have shown evidence of parental behavioral
responses to other types of public investments such as school admissions, classroom
size, and teacher qualifications. Lastly, we also find precisely estimated null effects
on mechanisms that others have found potentially relevant including on students’
perception about their school environment (e.g. Feld and Zölitz, 2017), and on
teacher engagement, classroom management and tiredness (Lazear, 2001; Duflo
et al., 2011a; Golsteyn et al., Forthcoming).
Importantly, our null effects on most of these mechanisms are precisely estimated.
Between all our estimates, the largest standard error for a standardized educational
input is 0.026. A standard ex-post Minimum Detectable Effect (MDEs) size calcula-
tion with 95 percent confidence and 80 percent power implies that we could have
detected effects as small as 7.3 percent of a standard deviation for outcomes such as
initiative in class or teacher engagement. A 7.3 percent of a standard deviation in an
outcome is a relatively small detectable effect; close to 10 percent of the gender gap
in effort (women pay more effort than men), 18 percent of the difference between
private tutoring investments of top-income parents and the rest, or 9 percent of the
difference between the time investments of two-person and single-parent households.
Overall, we show that higher-achieving peers decrease student effort, increase student
aspirations and expectations to attend university, an increase in parental time
investments and parental strictness. We can make sense of the first two, seemingly
contradicting, results in the lens of existing theories of performance under uncertainty;
they could be consistent with exposure to higher achieving peers as a form of relative
performance feedback. The sign of these estimates is in line with the theoretical
model and recent field evidence of Azmat et al. (2019). The latter result on time
investments provide new insights on the relatively thin evidence base on parents’
behavioral responses to school inputs. Our effects suggest that parents complement
school inputs (i.e., better school peers) by increasing their own time investment.
This collides with evidence that parents tend to treat school inputs and own time
investments and parental strictness as substitutes (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013;
Fredriksson et al., 2016) but is consistent with other evidence from Taiwan that
showing that parents complement teacher qualifications with financial investments
of their own (Chang et al., 2020).
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More relevant is that — depending on the productivity of these educational inputs
for student achievement — these input responses could all be legitimate mechanisms
for explaining our 5.2 percent of a standard deviation effect of higher-achieving
peers on test scores. In the next section, we calculate how much of our estimated
academic peer effect can be explained by these mechanisms.
3.5.3 Mediation of Academic Peer Effects
We are now able to formally ask how much of the 5.2 percent effect of higher-achieving
peers on students’ test scores can be explained by their intermediate impact on
educational inputs. To do this we follow the decomposition in Gelbach (2016), which
we adapt to our setting in order to use only within-school variation by modifying
the b1x2 Stata package.

















where Ed.Inputskics2 stands for educational input in our set of inputs. The terms
(A) are the causal effects of higher-achieving peers in wave 1 on educational inputs
in wave 2 as shown in Figure 3.4. The only remaining pieces for the calculation of
ME are therefore the terms which are the partial returns (i.e., holding other inputs
constant) to each of the educational inputs on student scores in wave 2.
There is no ideal experiment for estimating (B), not even by independently and
randomly varying each educational input over a period of two years and then es-
timating their causal impact on student test scores. The reason, as expressed by
Todd and Wolpin (2003), is that such experiments would identify “policy parame-
ters”—effect identified out of variation not subject to choices of parents or schools
but exogenously induced—rather than “production function” parameters. Policy
parameters are identified by variation in inputs exogenously pressed onto people,
rather than by naturally-occurring variation through people’s investment decisions
across the population (see e.g. Imai et al., 2013; Keele et al., 2015). Thus, policy
parameters answer many important questions but they do not recover returns to
inputs, so their use is limited in a mediation analysis as described by Equation (3.2).
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Todd and Wolpin (2003) argue for using (cumulative) value-added models to estimate
the (B) term of Equation (3.2). Todd and Wolpin (2007) and Fiorini and Keane
(2014), among others, discuss these models in detail and show that they can identify
the returns to educational inputs under relatively weak conditions, and we find
ourselves in an ideal scenario for estimating these models. This is because in our
setting we i) always use within-school variation which accounts for unobserved
school-level heterogeneity, ii) can control for standardized test scores in wave 1,
iii) can control for a myriad of educational inputs in wave 1, and iv) only need to
estimate returns over a two-year period. For all these reasons, we estimate the terms






ics2 + δCovariatesics1 + γs + νics2 (3.3)
where Covariatesics1 includes student test scores, average peer test scores, and all
other educational inputs in wave 1. To the extent that our school fixed effects
account for school-level unobserved heterogeneity γs and extensive set of high-quality
covariates account for endogeneity in observable educational inputs, Equation (3.3)
will identify unbiased estimates of the average partial return to each of the K
educational input in our data.14
Figure 3.5 presents within-school cumulative value-added estimates of the total
and partial average returns of educational input in wave 2. Total effects are return
parameters estimated one input at the time. Partial effects are the return parameters
estimates β̂k obtained from Equation (3.3) with the complete set of K inputs include
as regressors together. In other words, they are the returns of each educational input
k holding constant all other K − 1 inputs. We rescale test scores and all continuous
inputs in wave 2 so that each value can easily be interpreted as the return of a one
standard deviation increase in standard deviations of scores. The circles show the
14School fixed effects are theoretically not necessary for identifying our value-added parameters,
yet we include them to easily map our academic peer effects on inputs onto a mediation analysis
using shared modelling assumptions. Our value-added parameters do not change when we use
classroom fixed effects, student fixed effects, or remove fixed effects altogether. Attenuation due
to classical measurement error could also affect our value-added estimates, yet this would not
meaningfully change our conclusions since i) most of our input measures combine several items,
which reduces measurement error substantially, and ii) our measures tend to have excellent inter-
item consistency and high Cronbach alphas, which suggest little measurement error left in them.
Back-of-the-envelope models with reasonable levels of attenuation assumed for our value-added
models support these conclusions.
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Figure 3.5: Returns to Educational Inputs from Cumulative Value-Added Models
This figure reports coefficient estimates of regressing student test scores in wave 2 on
educational inputs in wave 2 in our estimation sample containing 232 schools, 850 classes,
and up to 11,029 students. Rows present coefficients of different regressors; Unconditional
means of each input are shown in square brackets and [std] marks inputs that have been
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one; circles show total
effects (one input at the time) and bars represent partial effects (all inputs jointly). All
models control for school fixed effects, student test scores, average peer test scores, and
educational inputs in wave 1. Student, parent, school and teacher inputs are shown in
navy blue, maroon, and teal. Spikes show 95% confidence intervals on partial effects based
on standard errors clustered at the classroom level. These results are also available in
Appendix Table C.4.
total returns of each input, and the bars show the partial effect of each input with
their corresponding 95 percent confidence interval.
We obtain precise estimates of the average partial returns to all educational inputs.
The first row in Figure 3.5, for example, shows that a 1SD increase in school effort
between waves 1 and 2 carries an average return of 9.3 percent of a standard deviation
in test scores in wave 2. There are also positive returns to students’ initiative in
class, university aspirations and expectations, as well as parental money investment
in the form of private tutoring, parental support and university aspirations for their
child. There is evidence of negative returns to students’ academic self-efficacy, and
parental strictness and harshness. The differences between total and partial average
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returns reflect the fact that many of these inputs are correlated.15
Figure 3.6 puts together the results from Figures 3.3 to 3.5 to produce estimates
of the mediated effect of peer effects by our measured educational inputs, as per
Equation (3.2). This figure reports the mediated effects based on a Gelbach (2016)
decomposition of our academic peer effect estimate using only within-school variation
in our complete sample, and allowing errors to be correlated across the scores and
input equations. The bar in green shows that our mechanisms explain a negative
and statistically but not economically significant amount of our estimated peer
effect—which means that the effect of higher-achieving peers on these inputs and
their estimated return jointly make it harder, not easier, to explain the academic peer
effects. Jointly, all our educational inputs explain only -0.8 percent of a standard
deviation of the 5.2 percent of a standard deviation academic peer effect. This
negative mediation is chiefly driven by the negative effects of higher-achieving peers
on effort combined with the large and positive estimate of the returns to effort on
academic achievement. None of the other inputs we consider has a statistically or
economically significant mediating effect.
Overall, the results in this section show that, in spite of having precise estimates of
i) academic peer effects and of ii) the effects of higher-achieving peers on educational
inputs, which could potentially act as mechanisms for these peer effects, our potential
mechanisms explain practically nothing of peer effects. These new results show the
difficulties of learning about the mechanisms that drive social interaction effects and
suggest that the prevailing microeconometric approach to exploring these mechanisms
can be of limited use. Puzzling results such as these open a number of questions and
can prove to be a knowledge base to build on, as long as its foundations are solid.
Precisely because of this, in the next section we show that our main results and
conclusions are robust to a myriad of specification checks and potential concerns. In
particular, section 3.6.4 shows that these results on the absence of mediation are
not hiding heterogeneity in the sense that we find little heterogeneity in the effect of
high-achieving peers on scores and inputs across different subgroups of students.
15The R2 in our cumulative value added model is 0.71 which suggests we explain a substantial
amount of the variation in wave 2 test scores with our data. Our measured inputs contribute the
vast majority of the explanatory power; the same model without school fixed effects has only a
slightly lower R2 of 0.69. There is also not much scope for within-classroom variation to contribute
additional explanatory power since adding classroom fixed effects only increases the R2 to 0.74.
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Figure 3.6: Academic Peer Effects Mediated by Educational Inputs
This figure reports the mediated effects based on a Gelbach (2016) decomposition of our
academic peer effect estimate using only within-school variation in our estimation sample
containing 232 schools, 850 classrooms, and up to 11,029 students. These estimates are
produced using a modified version of the b1x2 Stata package. Rows present the mediated
effect of different educational inputs in wave 2. All models control for school fixed effects,
student test scores, average peer test scores, and educational inputs in wave 1. The total
mediated effect is shown in green, and student, parent, school and teacher inputs are
shown in navy blue, maroon, and teal. p-values shown are based on standard errors
clustered at the classroom level. These results are also available in Appendix Table C.5.
3.6 Sensitivity Analyses
In this section, we discuss the sensitivity of our results along four dimensions: i)
robustness to changes in our identification strategy; ii) robustness to the effects
of measurement error in our data; iii) robustness of our inference to different
constructions of standard errors; and iv) robustness of our conclusions on the
mediation analyses to the presence of heterogeneous peer effects.
3.6.1 Robustness of Identification Strategy
Here, we first provide additional evidence of random assignment of students to
classrooms within schools in our trimmed sample using permutation-based sorting
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tests, and using non-parametric sorting tests. Many of these tests have become
standard in the empirical peer effects literature. We then exploit the richness of our
data—in particular the fact that we observe many pre-assignment characteristics of
students, parents and teachers—to show that proportional selection on unobservable
characteristics is very unlikely to be driving our results.
Permutation-Based Sorting Tests
In the empirical peer effects literature, permutation-based tests of random assignment
of students to peer groups have become very popular. These tests compared the actual
student group composition in the data to counterfactual compositions simulated
under the null of random assignment, as described in Section 3.3.2. As an additional
check for random assignment in our data, we estimate permutation-based sorting
tests akin to those in e.g., Carrell and West (2010); Lim and Meer (2017, 2020) in
our trimmed sample.
For these tests, we simulate 10,000 classrooms under the null of random assignment
of students to classrooms within schools. We do so by randomly drawing sampled
students with replacement and keeping the core structure of the data—respecting
students’ assignment to schools, and number and size of classrooms within each
school. We then calculate the mean of our key pre-treatment characteristics in
each of the 10,000 synthetic classrooms. Finally, for each classroom, we count the
times the synthetic classroom mean of each characteristic was more extreme than
the actual classroom mean, relative to the schools mean. The share of times this
happens corresponds to the classroom-level empirical p-value of a test of random
assignment of students to classrooms within schools based on that characteristic.
Appendix Table C.6 shows these permutation-based empirical p-values for each key
pre-determined characteristic separately. Under random assignment, the shares in
the second through fourth column should be close to the nominal rejection rates of
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 in most or all rows. The evidence in this table strongly supports
the idea of random assignment to classrooms within schools in our trimmed sample.
Non-Parametric Sorting Test
As implemented, balancing tests and sorting tests all have one important shortcoming:
their linearity. Balancing tests, for example, assess whether female students are
assigned to higher-achieving peers. Sorting tests try to capture whether female
students end up in classrooms with other female students. But these tests do not truly
test for what random assignment would imply: whether classrooms systematically
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differ in these pre-assignment characteristics in any way. In other words, these tests
do not test non-parametrically for systematic assignment of students to classrooms.
A few studies do use this non-parametric sorting test (Ammermueller and Pischke,
2009; Sojourner, 2013; Feld and Zölitz, 2017).
We implement this test in the following steps. First, we estimate school-by-school
regressions of each pre-assignment characteristic on a set of classroom dummies.
Second, we jointly test the statistical significance of these classroom dummies and
collect the p-values of these tests. We end up with a set of 2,790 p-values; one for each
of the 227 schools in our sample and each of our key 18 pre-assignment characteristics.
We then note that, under the null of random assignment of classrooms to schools,
these p-values should be uniformly distributed. Therefore, as a third step, we check
whether more than ten, five and one percent of the school-level p-values fall under
the nominal values 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 for each characteristic.
Appendix Table C.7 shows empirical p-value distributions for each characteristic
separately. Consistent with our tests in Section 3.4.2, these results also show some
evidence of minor sorting based on intellectual curiosity, gifted arts classroom enrol-
ment, and parents pushing for assignment to particular classrooms. Overall, however,
these tests provide yet again evidence in strong support of random assignment to
classrooms within schools in our trimmed sample.
Different thresholds for our Fishing algorithm
An important and somewhat arbitrary decision in implementing our Fishing Algo-
rithm is deciding when to classify any particular school as not compliant with the
mandate of random assignment. Recall from Section 3.4.2 that we do so based on
how each school’s probability to belong to the latent class of sorters—the latent
sorter probability, for short. Our intuitive thumb rule is: a school is a sorter if its
latent sorter probability is larger than all other latent class probabilities combined.
However, this is not the only way to classify such schools. Another approach is
to pick a fixed probability threshold and consider any school with a latent sorter
probability above that threshold as a sorter.
In Appendix Table C.8 we show how all our main results on academic peer effects
change had we implemented this fixed threshold approach at different levels, ranging
from 0.5 (relatively strict, removing all schools that are “more likely than not” to be
sorters) to 1 (very relaxed, effectively removing only schools for which Ss is equal
to 1 too). The bottom of the table shows that the sorting statistic of Jochmans
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(2020) grows monotonically with the threshold, as expected, and starts rejecting the
null of no sorting for thresholds of 0.7 and above. For thresholds below 0.7, we find
consistent academic peer effects on test scores of around 5 percent of a standard
deviation, as well as consistent negative effects on student effort and positive effects
on students’ university expectations, and time with parents. We find weaker and less
consistent evidence of positive effects on students’ university aspirations, parental
support, and teacher engagement, and negative effects on conflict with parents. In
general for thresholds 0.7 and below all coefficients are very stable and compare well
to our main effects. For thresholds above 0.7, where sorting tests fail, we tend to find
larger academic peer effects on test scores, smaller effects in magnitude on student
effort and time with parents, and larger effects in magnitude for parental support,
parents’ university aspirations, and class management. Most of these differences are
consistent with stronger ability sorting into classrooms for these schools. Overall,
Appendix Table C.8 shows that our results are not overly sensitive to which threshold
we use in our fishing algorithm as long as the resulting estimation sample passes
Jochman’s sorting test.
Proportional Selection on Unobservable to Observable Characteristics
Our trimmed sample is chosen in a data-driven way that ensures that key pre- as-
signment characteristics are unrelated to average peer test scores. This identification
strategy relies on our ability to find data that reflects a clean quasi-experiment in
classroom allocation, yet systematically excludes entire schools from our sample,
which might lead to sample selection issues. Still, we ask ourselves whether the few
observable characteristics that remain correlated to higher-ability peers could present
reasonable concerns about unobserved heterogeneity. This calls for an analysis of
proportional selection on observable characteristics, as discussed in Altonji et al.
(2005) and Oster (2019). The two conditions for this analysis to make sense are
i) that our observable characteristics for these analyses are a random sample of
all determinants of student achievement, and ii) that the number of observed and
unobserved determinants of student achievement are large and neither element is
dominating. Along the argument lines of Altonji et al. (2005), we assume that the
TEPS fulfils both conditions.
We implement this analysis by calculating the δ statistic from Oster (2019); the
share of proportional selection needed to explain away the entire peer effect we
estimate. Values of δ > 1 imply that the selection on unobservable characteristics
would need to be at least as large as the selection on observable characteristics to
explain away the entire peer effect estimate, which, given the data and data context,
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is an unreasonable assumption. A δ < 1 implies that the omitted variable bias from
unobservable variables positively correlated with the observable variables included
would bias the peer effects away from zero, not towards, and should therefore not be
concerning as confounders. In this type of analysis, thus, finding values of δ between
zero and one is worrisome, and could indicate a potential concern for unobserved
selection affecting results. The observables we use for these analyses are extensive:
they include our balancing controls (household income, family engagement with
homework, gifted art classroom assignment, and parents’ pushiness to get child
assigned to a particular classroom) and our standardized measures of student,
parent, school and teacher educational inputs in wave 1. Assuming that selection
on unobservable characteristics occurs in proportion to the selection on this set
of variables implies, by exclusion, that school fixed effects and students’ own test
scores in wave 1 — a priori essential for our identification strategy and standard
in the literature — cannot inform the proportional selection analyses. We also
use a hypothetical maximum R-Squared value of 1.3 times the R-Squared of the
unrestricted model, which is the standard choice for these analyses.
Appendix Table C.9 shows Oster’s δ for all our main estimates estimating using
the psacalc Stata command. For nearly all our estimates, Oster’s δ is negative
which implies that proportionally selection on unobserved confounders are unlikely
to explain our effects. The one exception is the δ of 0.10 for the effect of higher-
achieving peers on parental investments in tutoring, which is anyway insignificantly
different from zero so none of our conclusions change following the results of this
analysis. Overall, we conclude that proportional selection on unobservable variables
cannot explain away any of our findings.
3.6.2 Robustness to Measurement Error and Classroom Sampling
We now turn our focus to the measurement error in our data We show that our main
estimates i) are robust to using different measures of student and peer academic
ability, ii) are not attenuated by measurement error in average peer test scores, and
iii) are not biased by the fact that we do not observe whole classrooms.
Main Results with Alternative Measures of Ability
Our main results use the TEPS scores in the comprehensive ability test. As discussed
in Section 3.3.2, this test was designed by TEPS team and uses 75 multiple-choice
question to measure of students’ cognitive ability and analytical reasoning. However,
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after a series of factor analyses and after estimating 3-parameter Item Response
Theory (IRT) models, the TEPS team could also identify two highly correlated but
distinct subcomponents measuring analytical ability and mathematical ability based
on disjoint subsets of test questions. The IRT models were also used to produce the
standardized Bayesian posterior means of the three components identifiable in the
test—the general ability component and the analytical ability and mathematical
ability subcomponents.16
Appendix Table C.10 shows that our main results are robust to using the analytical
and mathematical subcomponents of the comprehensive ability test scores as mea-
sures of student and peer ability (columns (1) and (2)). Our main results are also
robust to using the Bayesian posterior means of these components, arguably a more
precise and efficient measure of ability (columns (3) through (5)).
Correction for Classical Measurement Error in Peer Ability
Even in excellent measures of student and peer ability, such as the well-designed
standardized test scores in TEPS, there will still be some measurement error. Under
random assignment and with classical measurement error (i.e., independent of all
covariates and of true ability), this measurement error will attenuate our peer effect
estimates (Sojourner, 2013; Feld and Zölitz, 2017; Angrist, 2014). We can address this
attenuation bias in two similar ways. Noting that the analytical and mathematical
subcomponents of test scores are measured with disjoint sets of questions, we can
use average peer test scores using one subcomponent as an instrument for average
peer test scores using the other in an instrumental variable (IV) estimator (see e.g.
Salamanca et al. (Forthcoming) for a similar approach to account for measurement
error in personality traits). This approach would eliminate attenuation bias from
classical measurement error under two assumption: i) that both subcomponents
have a strong common element of overall ability, and ii) that measurement error in
test questions is uncorrelated across subcomponents. The first assumption is well
supported by our data and by the TEPS team factor and IRT analyses. The second
assumption is stronger; if it does not hold it would result in some attenuation bias
left in the IV estimate.
Appendix Table C.11 shows that, although less precisely estimated due to the usual
16See http://www.teps.sinica.edu.tw/description/TestingReport2004-2-10.pdf (in Mandarin) for a
description of these analyses.
144
CHAPTER 3. PEER EFFECTS AND ASPIRATIONS
efficiency loss from instrumental variable models, the IV point estimates are near-
identical to our main results (columns (1) and (2)). We thus view this as evidence
of little attenuation bias due to classical measurement error in our estimates.
One potential problem with the estimators above is that the IV estimates need
to be interpreted as academic peer effects in analytical and mathematical ability,
rather than in comprehensive ability. We address this problem by constructing
a “mixed IV” estimator. In this estimator, we first construct an ability measure
that, for each student, is randomly defined as either the analytical subcomponent
score or the mathematical subcomponent score with equal probability. This ability
measure is therefore an equal-weighted average of the analytical and mathematical
subcomponents and can be interpreted as measuring general ability. We call this our
‘mixed ability’ measure. We also construct an ability instrument that is defined by
the same random process to be the subcomponent that was not assigned as ability.
For example, if for student ability is measured as the analytical subcomponent
score, then the ability instrument is defined as the mathematical subcomponent
score. We call this our ‘mixed ability instrument’. Under the same assumptions
above, an IV estimate that instruments our mixed ability with our mixed ability
instrument also corrects for attenuation bias while identifying academic peer effects
using general ability, rather than analytical or mathematical ability. We show that
this new estimator produces very similar results to our main peer effect on test
scores (Appendix Table C.11 , column (3)). It also produces slightly larger estimated
magnitudes of the effect of higher-achieving peers on study effort and students’
university aspiration and expectations, and similar estimates for the effect on
parental time investments (Appendix Table C.12). Back-of-the-envelope calculations
show that these slightly larger estimates do not change our conclusions on the
mediated effects of higher-achieving peers. We thus conclude that measurement
error does not alter any of our main findings.
Sojourner (2013) Correction for Incomplete Classroom Sampling
Many empirical peer effect studies, including ours, has incomplete classroom data
which results in incomplete sampling of students’ peer group. Sojourner (2013)
shows that this issue can result in bias in peer effect estimates that is similar to
classical attenuation bias under random assignment, and much more difficult to
sign and quantify under non-random assignment. He also proposes a correction
for this bias that relies on i) weighting estimates by the share of peers sampled
and ii) controlling for these shares at the school level. Often these last controls are
multicollinear with the weighted peer measures, so he also suggests less restrictive
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estimators that control for the share of peers sampled within predetermined school
clusters. We implement both methods in our data to evaluate the extent of this
bias in our main results. The left-most column on the table implements Sojourner’s
preferred correction which can lead to substantial loss of power because it heavily
restricts the identifying variation used by the estimator. The second through sixth
columns implement specifications which trade off more power for less bias reduction,
from left to right.
Appendix Table C.13 shows substantially larger effects of higher-achieving peers
on student test scores, ranging from 8.9 to 13.3 percent of a standard deviation
which nevertheless remain within the range of estimates found in previous studies,
especially considering that peers here have had two years to work their effect on
student achievement. These corrections also yield proportionally larger effects on
students’ university aspirations and expectations and parental time investments,
which is all consistent with Sojourner’s findings and with the data originating from
conditional random assignment to classrooms within schools. The analyses do not
reveal other effects of higher-ability peers. Moreover, since the attenuation in all
our estimates is roughly proportional, our conclusions about mediated peer effects
remains unchanged. This suggests that not observing complete classrooms in our
data could lead to understating the importance of academic peer effects, but does
not affect our (in)ability to explain their mechanisms.17
3.6.3 Randomization Inference and Multiple Hypothesis Testing
Having established the robustness of our point estimates of peer effects, in this
subsection we show that our inference on these effects is robust to i) constructing
standard errors based on recent randomization inference techniques and ii) to
accounting for multiple hypotheses testing in our standard error calculations.
We first reassess inference on our main results using the randomization-t procedure
from Young (2019). Our analyses benefit from this procedure because of the potential
influence of a few high-leverage students, classrooms or schools, and we want to
ensure that our inference is robust to this occurrence. We also want to use inference
that does not make strong assumption on the structure of error terms given the
17There are other potential issues with incomplete classroom sampling, especially if our peer effects
varied with classroom or school size, if the classroom sampling rate were correlated with our
regressors, or if our Fishing Algorithm were selecting schools with different average sampling rates.
Fortunately, none of these occur in our data.
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complexity of the TEPS sampling design and peer treatment. Other benefits of
randomization inference, such as i) correcting for few treatment clusters or ii) issues
of joint testing are less important for this study, because i) we observe several
classrooms per school, and ii) each regression has one treatment effect of interest.
We construct randomization-t based empirical p-values via a very similar simulation
procedure to the one used for permutation tests. The key difference is that, in
each simulation, we capture the t-statistics of interest—the coefficient of the key
variable of interest divided by its cluster-robust standard error—and construct
empirical p-values based the share of occurrences where simulated t-statistics are
more extreme than our actual t-statistic of interest. We use 10,000 simulations
of random assignment to classroom within schools to produce randomization-t
empirical p-values for our main results. Appendix Table C.14 shows that when using
randomization-t inference p-values for conducting inference, our main conclusions
on the effects of higher-achieving peers hold at the 5% significance level for student
achievement and parental time investments, and at the 10% significance level for
student university aspirations and expectations.
In a second analysis, we adjust our inference for multiple hypotheses testing: the
problem that the chance of falsely rejecting a correct null hypothesis increases with
the number of tests performed. We adjust for this by implementing the Romano-
Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Romano and Wolf, 2005a,b) using the rwolf
Stata command (Clarke et al., 2019). This procedure ensures that the familywise
error rate—the probability of committing at least one Type I error across a set of
hypotheses tested—does not exceed its predetermined significance. We consider
all our main results to be part of the same family of tests. Appendix Table C.14
shows that our main conclusions on the effect of higher-achieving peers on student
achievement and on parental time investment hold at the 10% significance level, but
our evidence on students’ university aspirations and expectations now appear not to
be statistically significant.
Overall, with these different inference methods we still find strong evidence of
academic peer effects in our data but somewhat weaker evidence of significant effects
on educational inputs. This reinforces our conclusions of no mediated effects for
academic peer effects.
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3.6.4 Heterogeneous Peer and Mediated Effects
Finally, we explore the sensitivity of our mediation analyses. Our chief concern
here is the possibility that our lack of meaningful mediation can occur not because
educational inputs cannot explain academic peer effects, but rather as the result of
heterogeneity peer effects across subgroups. Heterogeneity can occur in two forms:
firstly, academic peer effects could vary widely across subgroups—a result found in
several studies across ability (Carrell et al., 2009), gender (Whitmore, 2005; Lavy
and Schlosser, 2011), race (Hoxby, 2000; Hoxby and Weingarth), but secondly and
perhaps most importantly, the drivers of peer effects for each subgroup could also
widely differ, as suggested by (Brady et al., 2017). For example, higher-achieving
peers could improve test scores of low-ability students because they reduce the
amount of classroom disruption (see e.g. Lavy et al., 2012a) and improve test scores
of high-ability students because they increase effort. Yet we might be unable to
detect enough mediation via truancy and effort on the average academic peer effect.
This form of heterogeneity would wrongly lead us to conclude that truancy and effort
cannot explain at least part of academic peer effects. One way to assess whether
this particular type of heterogeneity is a likely explanation for our findings is to
estimate the heterogeneity of peer effects and their mediation via educational inputs
across various subgroups.
There are countless dimensions to explore heterogeneity in academic peer effects in
our data. Based on existing heterogeneous effects in the academic peer literature,
and on a broader literature on the sociodemographic predictors of student test
scores, we explore peer effect and mediation heterogeneity across: student ability,
gender, household income, parental education, public vs private schooling, and
teacher experience. Appendix Table C.15 shows that, by and large, there is little
subgroup heterogeneity in our estimated academic peer effects and their mediation.
Academic peer effects are slightly larger at the top and middle of the student
ability distribution, with highly experienced teachers, and in private schools, yet are
the same across student gender, household income, and parental education. More
importantly, our inputs can still mediate either small or negative parts of these
academic peer effect for any one of these subgroups. Altogether, we show strong
evidence of little heterogeneity in academic peer effects and in mediated effects.
We also consider the possibility that our mediation is affected heterogeneity of
the value-added parameters across the peer ability distribution. This could occur
if higher-achieving peers change e.g., the productivity of some teaching practices
(Aucejo et al., 2020). There is evidence of similar heterogeneity in our data: having
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higher-achieving peers increases returns to student effort and initiative in class,
decreases returns to private tutoring and time spent with parents, and increases the
penalty for being in a hard-to-manage classroom (see Appendix Table C.16). This
heterogeneity is broadly consistent with higher-achieving peers being complements
to some student and teacher investments in class and substitutes to some parental
investments at home in the education production function. However, note that for
the two inputs where we find both significant academic peer effects and significant
heterogeneity (school effort and time with parents), higher-achieving peers would
increase the return to effort and decrease the return to time with parents. Since
academic peer effects are negative for effort and positive for time with parents, this
together adds up to even less mediation when we allow for heterogeneity in our
value-added estimates.
Based on these results we conclude that subgroup heterogeneity is not a likely
explanation for the fact that our many educational inputs do not mediate academic
peer effects.
3.7 Conclusions
We estimate the effect of being randomly assigned to classrooms with higher-
achieving peers on students’ standardized test scores two years later, and on 19 other
intermediate outcomes of students, their parents, and their teachers. We conduct
a formal mediation analysis of academic peer effects to explore several potential
mechanisms, one of the first ones of its kind in a field with over twenty years of
research and hundreds of articles. Our study thus gives the most comprehensive
view of how much academic peer effects are explained by changes in educational
investments in a setting with a credible identification strategy.
For producing these results, we use data in a setting with a well-documented country-
wide mandate of random assignment of students to classrooms within schools. The
data, however, shows that this random assignment was likely not upheld everywhere,
which is not entirely surprising: we can think of legal and illegal ways in which
sorting can still occur—for example, via allowed “talent” classrooms in schools, or
due to principals sorting students into classrooms in defiance of the mandate. Similar
violations to national mandates are common in similar settings (e.g. Gong et al.,
2019; Eble and Hu, 2019). We develop a data-driven procedure to remove schools
likely to be defying the mandate of random assignment from our estimation sample
and show that data in this trimmed sample is strongly consistent with random
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assignment. This Fishing Algorithm can be used to improve quasi-experimental
designs in settings where random assignment to peers is suspected to be violated in
some, but not all, assignment groups. It can more generally be used in any setting
where researchers suspect imperfect compliance of (quasi-)experimental treatment
assignment in some clusters.
One might wonder if our results can really tell us something about academic peer
effects in other settings. Yet data from the Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study (TIMSS) in 1999 shows that Taiwan’s educational setting is altogether
not that different from many others across the world (Appendix Table C.17). And
while students in Taiwan do spend relatively more days per year in school, and have
lower rates of absenteeism, none of these differences helps us explain why we still find
positive academic peer effects of similar size to many other studies, yet no evidence
of mediation.18 Moreover, Taiwan is comparable to other countries—especially in
the Australasia and Pacific region—in most other key dimensions including class
size, student-teacher ratios, daily study hours, dropout rates, or class disruption.
Since our academic peer effects remain largely unexplained, it could be tempting to
conclude that academic peer effects are unexplainable by current methods. Instead,
we see at least two avenues for future research.
The first avenue is to keep on striving to find data on potential mechanisms. It is
true that most potential mechanisms for academic peer effects proposed in previous
studies feature in one way or another in the TEPS (see Appendix Table 3.1), many
of them more carefully measured than ever before. Two notable exceptions are:
direct learning from peers and detailed teaching practices. Measuring direct peer
learning (e.g., discussing tasks and coordinate among group mates) requires data on
peer-to-peer interactions which is difficult to gather, yet could indeed be the missing
explanation for academic peer effects (e.g., Garlick, 2018; Zárate, 2020; Kimbrough
et al., Forth.). Detailed teaching practices (e.g., how teachers pair students for group
work or the amount of material covered in each lesson ) are also hard to measure yet
some of them are strongly related to student achievement gains (e.g., Kane et al.,
2011) and one can easily think of ways in which teachers adapt their teaching style
to classroom ability.
18What some of these differences could explain, however, is why we find negative effects of higher-
achieving peers on student effort. Taiwanese students might be exerting so much effort already
that the demoralizing effect of these peers takes hold easier.
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The second avenue is to further explore heterogeneity in the value-added of ed-
ucational inputs. Imagine a world in which academic peer effects exist in every
school, but they occur via different channels. In one school higher-achieving peers
increase effort while in another they decrease class disruption, and in yet another
they increase parental engagement. Such dramatic differences in the mechanisms of
peer effects become increasingly likely with school segregation and specialization. In
such a world, we would find positive peer effects across schools and no mediation
on average, just as we do. Such cancellation of mechanisms is not unheard of; it
is documented in Bursztyn et al. (e.g., 2019) where they show that making effort
observable can either increase or decrease student effort depending on the social norm
in the school. One could explore this hypothesis in the academic peer effect context
via school-specific academic peer effects and value-added functions. Unfortunately
the data requirements for such exercise are enormous: we would need rich data on
many schools with many classrooms, where random assignment holds and with a
longitudinal dimension to it. We simply do not know of a dataset with these features,
not even the TEPS.
Our results also get us closer to using peer effects to confidently inform and design
classroom assignment policies. A pervasive concern with systematic assignment
policies is that their benefits might come with unmeasured cost on, e.g. classroom
disruption, increasing stress and deteriorating mental health for both students and
teachers, and higher effort to keep up with one’s higher-achieving peers. Our study
shows that many of these concerns are unfounded. If anything, higher-achieving
peers seem to improve classroom atmosphere, an effect which has been found in e.g.
Feld and Zölitz (2017). In the absence of measurable costs, our results suggest that
higher-achieving peers could be an effective way to increase student achievement,




Teachers’ Biased Beliefs and Inequality of
Opportunity

As I have shown through Chapter 3, lifting students’ aspirations could prove to
have only a limited impact on test scores. In the last chapter of this dissertation, I
explore whether teachers’ beliefs can become behavioral barriers to the success of
disadvantaged children in education - perhaps contributing to explaining the puzzling
findings of Chapter 3. The goal of this last chapter is to broaden our discussion
of inequality of opportunity in education, to highlight that behavioral barriers to
success for disadvantaged children are pervasive and multifaceted. Eradicating these
barriers will likely require holistic educational policies based on a deep understanding
of how pupils, parents and teachers interact in the education system.
In Chapter 4, I present new empirical evidence of teacher bias, and highlight new
mechanisms through which teacher bias operates. I estimate the effect of older
siblings’ relative rank in their primary school cohort, on the test scores and teacher
assessment of their younger sibling – an effect indicating that teachers clearly exploit
information that does not directly apply to the younger sibling. This represents a
natural experiment of teacher learning, which I use to reveal perhaps the simplest,
and most common ways that teachers could form biased beliefs about a child’s
academic ability: by knowing their older siblings. Older siblings’ test scores do
contain information that may legitimately also apply to the younger sibling (e.g.
genetic predisposition, family resources, learning environment), yet their relative
rank depends directly on their cohort composition: when comparing older siblings
with the same test scores but only different relative ranks, any effect of relative
rank on teachers’ beliefs about younger siblings is unrelated to younger siblings’
true ability. To capture teacher biased beliefs, I therefore use the following natural
experiment: I compare the subjective assessment of teachers for two children with
the same observable characteristics, who only differ in the relative rank that their
older sibling had in their primary school cohort. Essentially, I estimate the effect of
growing up with an older sibling who is at the top v. at the bottom of his or her
cohort in primary school, fixing everything else, in particular actual test scores.
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To study this natural experiment, I use education records of all children in the
Netherlands leaving primary school between 2003 to 2016. The Dutch educational
system presents two institutional features that make it ideal to study this experiment.
Pupils leave primary school with two key pieces of information about their ability: i)
a standardized test score, that is comparable over time and across the Netherlands;
and ii) a subjective assessment of their primary school teacher, about the child’s
“best fitting” secondary school track. Importantly, these two pieces of information are
available in the Dutch education records, making it a unique case of administrative
data in which beliefs are recorded.
My findings indicate that teachers do form biased opinions about younger siblings
in response to the relative rank of their older sibling. Younger siblings who grow
up with a higher ranked older sibling, keeping constant the older sibling test score,
enjoy a significant boost in their test scores, as well as a higher chance that their
teacher advises the academic track, even after accounting for younger siblings’ own
test scores. That is, the higher the relative rank of older siblings in their cohort, the
more lenient teachers become with younger siblings, above and beyond the younger
siblings’ actual academic performance.
Additional analyses allow me to exclude a certain number of possible alternative
interpretations of our findings. In particular, my findings are neither explained by
parents exerting pressure on teachers, nor by parents increasing investments in their
younger child in response to the relative rank of their older child.
I further show that the effect of sibling rank on teacher leniency exacerbates inequality
of opportunity. First, I show that older siblings’ rank in primary school has a long-
lasting impact on the educational trajectories of their younger sibling, by increasing
their probability of specializing into STEM fields of study in high school. Enrolling in
STEM higher education majors in the Netherlands requires high school specialization
in STEM, and STEM majors are associated with higher wages on the labor market
and higher employment probabilities. Thus, the effect of older siblings’ rank in
primary school has the potential to exacerbate or generate inequality of opportunity
between younger siblings who grow up with high ranked or low ranked older siblings.
Second, I show that teachers’ response to sibling rank puts vulnerable children at a
disadvantage, thus exacerbating socioeconomic gaps in educational outcomes. In a
first exercise, I compare the effect of older siblings’ rank on younger siblings’ test
scores and teacher assessments between native and migrant children. I find that
the boosting effect of older siblings’ rank on younger siblings’ test scores is similar
between native and migrant children, and yet the effect on teacher leniency is only
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present for native children. This result suggests that teachers tend to be positively
biased towards native children, but it could also be that teachers have private
information e.g. that families of migrant children are less interested in academic v.
vocational education, such that interpreting track advice as teacher belief could be
hiding family preferences rather than true teacher beliefs about the child’s ability. I
address this concern with a second exercise, comparing the effect of older sisters and
brothers’ rank on younger sisters and brothers’ test scores and teacher assessments.
Older sisters’ rank has a larger positive effect on younger sisters’ Math score than
on younger brothers’, and a larger positive effect on the probability that the teacher
recommends the academic track. Older brothers’ rank, on the other hand, has a
larger and negative effect on younger brothers’ Math score v. younger sisters’, but a
larger positive effect on younger brothers’ language score, and precisely estimated
null effects on teacher recommendations. The findings of these two exercises indicate
overall that teachers form different expectations about children depending on their
demographic characteristics, thus exacerbating inequality of opportunity.
Lastly, I provide suggestive evidence that teacher bias could be limited by lowering
the weight of teacher assessments in school admission policies in the Netherlands.
First I show that the effect of older siblings’ rank on teacher assessment disappears in
zones where secondary school admissions are lottery-based due to over-subscription
to schools, while the effect of older siblings’ rank on younger siblings’ test score is
stable. Second, I show that the effect of older siblings’ rank on teacher assessment
disappears for younger siblings exiting primary school after a reform that reduced
the weight of teachers in younger siblings’ primary school report card relative to
test scores, while the effect of older siblings’ rank on younger siblings’ test score
remained stable after the reform.
This study indicates that teachers’ beliefs can and do become behavioral barriers
to the success for disadvantaged children: teachers’ beliefs about children’s ability
are systematically biased by their past experience, and have a long-lasting impact
on their educational outcomes. As children are imposed their teachers, teachers’
biased beliefs seem like a source of unacceptable inequality of opportunity that
educational institutions would best eradicate. Importantly, this study also provides
suggestive evidence that school admission policies could be a solution to eliminate
behavioral barriers arising from teacher bias. While recent randomized control trials
have shown suggestive evidence that training teachers to recognize their obvious
biases could help reduce these biases, we argue that a more efficient approach could
be, instead, to design better incentive systems.
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4 | Siblings and Teachers’ Biased Expectations1
4.1 Introduction
Through social interactions, public investments in any member of a network or
community may also impact its non-treated members. Spillover effects through
social interactions are often called “social multiplier” effects, because the existence of
such spillovers increases the returns of public investments. In the presence of social
multiplier effects, investing in few members of a community – e.g. through positive
discrimination policies – could impact many members of a community, making it
faster and cheaper to achieve desirable equilibrium outcomes, such as the reduction
of inequality in educational attainment. At the same time, adverse experiences of
some could exacerbate the consequences of socioeconomic disadvantage in education,
increasing achievement gaps between privileged and underprivileged groups.
In this paper, I estimate the causal effect of older siblings’ rank in primary school
on their younger siblings’ standardized test scores and subjective assessment of their
teacher. Sibling spillover effects represent a special case of peer effects, in which
many aspects of how peers interact are fixed: sibling share genetic endowments,
family and social environments. This feature of sibling interactions allows researchers
to focus on other driving factors explaining social interaction effects in general. I
exploit the experience of older siblings as a treatment on their younger sibling to
highlight two new, understudied channels through which social interaction effects
occur: how teacher form subjective expectations about the academic ability of
children, and how peers have a motivational effect on each other. I use high-quality
1I thank Jan Feld, Ulf Zölitz, Ingo Isphording and Nicolás Salamanca for helpful discussions at
earlier stages of this project. I am also grateful to my supervisors Olivier Marie and Rolf van
der Velden for their feedback, for helping me gain access to the Dutch administrative data and
for contributing to funding this work (Statistics Netherlands CBS - Project number 8308). I also







Building on decades of economic research evaluating the impact of various educational
policies on many outcomes of students, this PhD dissertation highlights the role of
internal constraints in the persistence of socioeconomic disadvantage in education.
The general ambition of this thesis is not to bring definitive answers regarding the
existence and the extent of internal constraints in education—beliefs that students,
parents and teachers might hold, which exacerbate socioeconomic gaps in educational
outcomes. Rather, this dissertation sheds light on these emerging explanations and
potentially new mechanisms through which socioeconomic disadvantage might persist
in education, in spite of over a century of educational policies to improve access to
opportunity.
I first present the key findings of this dissertation, and then discuss the limitations
of this work, and suggest avenues for future research.
New Approaches and New Answers to Old Questions
Chapter I: Quantifying Aspirational Poverty Traps
The first chapter of this thesis indicates that there could exist aspirational poverty
traps. A consequence of internal constraints preventing people from making optimal
decisions, aspirational poverty traps are socioeconomic environments in which people
systematically exert low effort and achieve low economic success. Since there is still
little evidence on the economic relevance of internal constraints in education for
the persistence of socioeconomic inequality, this first chapter addresses the crucial
initial issue of knowing to what extent behavioral barriers are likely to matter in the
long-run and at the macro-economic level. Chapter 1 indicates that theoretically,
aspirational poverty traps are systematically related to intragenerational income
mobility, and finds empirical evidence suggesting that a substantial part of the
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United States population could be in aspirational poverty traps.
Chapter 1 presents a new methodology to estimate the potential size of aspirational
poverty traps in a given population, a decisive quantity suggesting the scope for
achieving more equality of opportunity by lifting people’s aspirations. Starting from
a theoretical model describing how people’s effort decision endogenously relate to
their aspirations, I show that aspirational poverty traps at the micro-economic level
generate threshold-like effects in intragenerational socioeconomic mobility at the
macro-economic level. Thus, the existence of aspirational poverty traps explains
an important and unexplained stylized fact: people in the middle of the income
distribution enjoy high rates of income growth within their lifetime, while others
remain stuck with little prospects of providing a better lifetime to their children.
This study shows that the existence and location in the income distribution of these
threshold-like structural breaks in intragenerational socioeconomic mobility indicate
the size of aspirational poverty traps.
Conceptually, this study makes two key contributions. First, it expands previous
literature regarding the existence of classical poverty traps to a radically new type of
poverty trap, in which people exert low-effort and achieve low-outcomes, not because
they lack material resources, but rather because they lack the “capacity to aspire”
(Appadurai, 2004). This study indicates that theoretically, aspirational poverty traps
at the micro-economic level translate into regimes of low v. high rates of income
growth within people’s lifetime, in other words, intragenerational income mobility.
Thus, these findings suggest that low aspirations at the individual level can have far
reaching consequences in the long-run, through low income growth within a person’s
lifetime which transmit to the next generation, and at the aggregate level, through
large disparities between individuals achieving similar outcomes at radically different
effort decisions. The existence of such types – those who realize that aspirations
are endogenously formed, and those who don’t – implies that we cannot hope to
distinguish the deserving from the undeserving poor from simply observing either
effort or outcomes. As aspirational poverty traps emerge from internal constraints,
their existence is a paradigm-shifter: they imply a conceptual failure of the trade-off
between equity and efficiency on which almost all social safety nets and anti-poverty
programs rely.
The second way in which this study is innovative is its methodology to emphasize
how aspirational poverty traps could be a key mechanism for the persistence of
socioeconomic disadvantage. While studies revealing the presence of classical poverty
traps rely on detailed measures of the institutional features preventing people from
196
GENERAL CONCLUSION
improving their material conditions, detecting the existence of aspirational poverty
traps requires detailed experimental measures of aspirations and effort decisions,
data that can reasonably be collected at the small scale of randomized controlled
trials, but not at the national level in order to estimate the size of such traps and
later design large-scale policies. Thus, the innovation of this study is to show how to
estimate the size of aspirational poverty traps in the absence of detailed measures of
aspirations linked to effort decisions.
This study also make an important empirical contribution. I apply this methodology
to the United States using a widely-used panel survey, the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, and I find that 5.5% to 7.5% of the United States population could
be stuck in an aspirational poverty trap, located just below the median household in
terms of wealth, around the 37th and 42nd percentile of the distribution of wealth.
This study, lastly, also stresses that new theoretical tools are crucially needed to
understand how internal constraints operate, and to renew traditional welfare policies.
These tools are key to identifying specific policies and natural experiments which
can potentially lift aspirations and relax internal constraints. Only then can we hope
to estimate the extent to which behavioral constraints contribute to socioeconomic
gaps in educational attainment.
Chapter II: Early Discouragement from Uncertainty About Financial
Aid
The second chapter of this thesis investigates whether disadvantaged students could
be discouraged early on in their educational career from participating in university-
preparing education, because of uncertainty regarding the future availability of
financial aid. When a consequence of wrong beliefs, early discouragement is a
specific way that beliefs can become behavioral barriers to opportunities in education.
Chapter 2 shows that theoretically, uncertainty about student finance can in itself
can create an early discouragement effect, and shows that, in practice, the Dutch
recent reform of student finance could have discouraged a substantial part of the
student population from enrolling in university-preparing tracks, which exacerbates
achievement gaps.
Hypothesized yet largely understudied, uncertainty about financial aid could in
principle discourage disadvantaged students from enrolling in university-preparing
education. The first contribution of this study is to provide a theoretical framework
that pinpoints how exactly uncertainty about future eligibility to higher education
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financial aid can create early discouragement effects, and could thus be a central
mechanism through which socioeconomic gaps persist. The framework shows that the
simple perspective of not receiving financial aid in higher education can make some
students prefer educational paths with lower earnings prospects but no uncertainty
about future costs of studying. This framework is crucial for understanding which
students are most negatively impacted by uncertainty regarding financial aid, and
why uncertainty alone is costly even for students who are eventually not impact by
actual changes. In this sense, one could also consider that this study deals with
background risk, a distinct literature which focuses on how people make decisions
when their decision environment entails more or less risk, even when that risk does
not apply directly to them.
A second contribution of this study is to combine the use of administrative data
with policy announcements of a controversial reform of student finance. As much
as administrative data does not collect direct measures of individual beliefs, in
particular the state of students’ knowledge about upcoming policy changes, exploiting
exogenous, unexpected policy announcements prior to actual policy changes allows
the researcher under reasonable assumptions to interpret changes in educational
trajectories as responses to changes in expectations, not responses to changes in
actual prices. While policy evaluation techniques typically assume that the timing
of policy implementations is as good as random for individuals, this study shows
that policy announcements can actually reveal substantial behavioral responses in
anticipation of changes to come.
Beyond highlighting that the individual beliefs – students’ and teachers’ — matter
for children’s educational outcomes, this study also bears direct lessons for design-
ing better, fairer and arguably cheaper student finance systems. As pointed by
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2016) and more recently by Findeisen and Sachs (2016,
Forthcoming), designing higher education financial aid that optimally trade-off
equity and efficiency, relies crucially on achieving the perfect balance of incentives
to study hard and attraction of talented students, and insurance of access for disad-
vantaged students. Chapter 2 indicates that access to higher education could be
improved by reducing uncertainty in student finance; for example, by reducing early
announcements before policies are actually ready to be revealed to the public, or
by announcing early that disadvantaged students will be shielded. Recent work by
Dynarski et al. (2018) also suggests that guaranteeing financial aid over multiple
years could substantially improve access to college for low income students, compared
to the standard year-to-year financial aid.
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Lastly, this study suggests that there could be an interesting tension between the
political cost of imposing reforms without announcements, and the economic cost of
policy uncertainty which arises from receiving too much and too early information
about potential policy changes.
Chapter III: Lifting Aspirations for Better Educational Outcomes
The third chapter of this thesis investigates whether classroom assignment policies
can improve aspirations, and improve test scores as a result. Chapter 3 indicates
that high-achieving peers not only improve test scores, but also make children exert
less school effort, while increasing their aspiration to go to university, and increasing
the time they spend with their parents. Most importantly perhaps, this study shows
overall that peer effects in test scores are not explained by intermediate effects on
students’ effort, aspirations and parental time investments.
This study makes several key contributions to the literature. Conceptually, this
study builds on the education production function framework. In particular, we learn
from Heckman and Pinto (2015) that in order to truly understand the mechanisms
through which peer effects operate, we need to combine experimentally assigned
peers with a wide range of potential educational inputs, and perform a formal
mediation analysis. While recent studies in the literature on peer effects have only
been able to either exploit data from settings with quasi-experimental assignments to
peers but few inputs, or survey data with many inputs but no exogenous assignment
to peers, the first contribution of this study is to show in the same setting: i) a
causal effect of being exposed to higher-achieving peers on students’ own academic
achievement; ii) many potential factors that affect academic achievement; iii) causal
effects of being exposed to high-achieving peers on these intermediate factors.
Methodologically, this study also presents a new algorithm combining randomization
inference techniques, a well-known economic indicator of market concentration and
finite mixture-modelling to detect schools which randomly assign students to classes
from schools that do not. Indeed, the empirical findings of this study rely on data
from Taiwan, where a national mandate dictates that middle school children must
be randomly assigned to classes within their school. Because we found evidence of
violation of random assignment in our data, we designed an algorithm to exclude
clusters of schools using systematic assignment rules, such as ability sorting or art
classes. This algorithm thus, opens the door to using many more datasets which
fail to pass classical test of random assignment of students to classes, as well as




Empirically, we estimate the impact of classroom peers on a myriad of educational
inputs, some previously identified or hypothesized as potential mechanisms of
academic peer effects, and several others which have not yet been studied in the
peer effects literature – parenting styles and parental investments in particular. We
find that although high-achieving peers significantly decrease student effort, increase
aspirations and increase parental time investments, a mediation analysis reveals that
these intermediate input responses don’t explain why high-achieving peers increase
student test scores.
Chapter 3 also indicates crucial avenues for future education policies. While the
consensus in the peer effects literature is that reassignment policies have unforeseen
consequences, this study shows several reasons why this might be the case –concep-
tually and methodologically. Peer assignment policies such as tracking or school
admission policies can increase test scores while having several simultaneous effects
on educational inputs which may or may not affect test scores in the short-run. This
implies that in principle, school or classroom assignment policies enforcing exposure
of disadvantaged students to high-achieving could be a low-cost way to reduce
socioeconomic gaps in educational achievement, while nurturing the aspirations of
disadvantaged students.
Chapter IV: Teachers’ Biased Beliefs and Inequality of Opportunity
The fourth chapter of this thesis shows that behavioral barriers can also emerge
from interactions between families and the school system. Chapter 4 reveals that
growing up with a higher-ranked older sibling in primary school test scores, younger
siblings achieve higher test scores, and receive better assessments by teachers above
and beyond their performance.
The first empirical contribution of this study is to show that children’s relative
rank in school also impacts their younger siblings. This finding extends those of an
emerging literature which shows that beyond actual performance, the relative rank
of a child in school impacts his long trajectory in the short and in the long run. This
literature is still in its early days, yet a consistent pattern has emerged in a variety
of settings and at various levels of education: higher ranks in class increases test
scores, boosts academic self-efficacy and attracts students to specialize in courses
where they have highest ranks. This study is the first to show that students’ rank in
class also impacts their younger siblings, and the teachers of their younger siblings:
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younger siblings who grow up with higher ranked older siblings enjoy higher test
scores, and controlling for their test scores, they receive more lenient subjective
assessments from their teachers, and are more likely to graduate high school with
STEM, a specialization with better labor market prospects.
The second contribution of this study is to shed light on two new mechanisms
through which socioeconomic disadvantage can persist: teacher biased expectations
about pupils’ ability, and motivational effects from the relative performance of older
siblings in the schooling system. Exploiting the relative rank of older siblings in
primary school is a simple, common and good experiment to estimate teacher bias
because older sibling’s relative rank is as good as random for the younger sibling,
conditional on the older sibling’s absolute test score. Importantly, while previous
studies have discussed the potential role of teachers in explaining why rank effects
occur, this study is uniquely able to show that teachers do respond to children’s
rank. Yet, disadvantaged pupils are less likely to have high test scores, and thus less
likely to have high ranks in class, such that their younger siblings are less likely to
enjoy the positive spillovers of growing up with successful siblings.
This study delves deeper even into mechanisms and shows that teachers learn from
older siblings’ rank in a manner consistent with statistical discrimination: while
native-born children enjoy the positive spillovers of older siblings’ ranks on test
scores and teacher subjective assessments, children with a migrant background only
enjoy the effect on test scores, but not in teacher assessments; and as much as private
information could explain that teachers are less lenient for migrant children than for
native-born children, such explanations fail at explaining gendered effects.
This study calls for building institutional mechanisms to reduce the potentially
negative impact of teacher bias on children’s educational trajectories. Indeed, while
the actual test score of the older sibling can reveal information about the ability of
the younger sibling, the relative rank of the older sibling contains no information
about the younger child’s ability, since it entirely depends on the cohort composition
of the older sibling. One possibility is to define school admission procedures that
rely on test scores and less on teacher recommendations; some suggestive findings of
this study indicate that teacher bias in subjective assessments declines or disappear
when their weight in the secondary school admission procedures declines.
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Limitations and New Perspectives
Improving our Understanding of Aspirational Poverty Traps
Although Chapter 1 proposes an original methodology to estimate the potential size
of aspirational poverty traps – a quantity that is directly usable for policy makers
–, the exact mechanisms through which aspirational traps appear remain unclear.
While mechanisms may not seem to be of primary importance for the design of
policies, failing to understand the mechanisms driving aspirational poverty traps
can ultimately lead to costly policy failure. Additional work is crucial to identify
the mechanisms driving aspirational poverty traps.
A first avenue for research is to ensure that aspirational poverty traps are truly
driven by low aspirations – low effort choices. If the structural breaks we find are
systematically related to other factors than aspirations, then designing interventions
to lift aspirations could prove costly and useless. We conduct robustness analyses to
show that our breaks are not systematically associated to cognitive traits such as self-
esteem and locus of control, yet our methodology also does not allow us to exclude
definitely the presence of confounding factors affecting individual decisions. To
isolate the specific role of aspirations in individual income growth, future work must
rely on research designs focused on more local shocks to aspirations, as recommended
by Dalton et al. (2016) themselves: comparing the aspirations and later life outcomes
of individuals just above v. below eligibility to social security payments, or comparing
the aspirations of students assigned to better v. worse classroom peers. I pursued
the latter project in Chapter 3 using data from Taiwan, and I plan on pursuing
the former project using social security data from Australia in my post-doctoral
research.
A next avenue for research is to understand to what extent structural breaks are
driven by individual behavioral responses to institutional features. Conceptually, it
is indeed difficult to distinguish institutional features themselves such as tax breaks,
or college admission cutoffs from endogenous changes in aspirations induced by
the presence of such features. Further research could entail geographical and time
comparisons. For example, comparing the size and location of structural breaks in
the income distribution across multiple locations or countries could help identify the
role of specific institutional features driving aspirational poverty traps, exploiting
exogenous changes affecting their opportunities. For example, Beaman et al. (2012)
study how the aspirations of parents for their daughters changed following a policy
202
GENERAL CONCLUSION
in India allowing women to sit on local councils. An advantage of comparing several
geographical contexts – counties, regions or countries – is that it could also indicate
whether our results are specific to the setting we study.
These limitations largely stem from the methodological choices we made for this
study, in response to data limitations. While the study is appealing for its simplicity
and its seemingly small data requirements, the main reason why our methodology
does not allow us to exclude potential confounding factors or identify mechanisms
is that it hinges on an indirect test for the presence of aspirational poverty traps:
we identify the presence of aspirational poverty traps from their consequences
on intragenerational mobility, that is, the presence of structural breaks in the
relationship between initial wealth conditions and later life wealth. A direct test
for the presence of aspirational poverty traps could entail, for example, finding a
treatment lifting aspirations, and comparing the long-run outcomes of individuals
treated v. untreated. A first example of such more direct test is Chapter 3, using
classrooms peers as a potential treatment lifting aspirations. Although a promising
avenue for future research, such studies will need to rely on treatment which have
been shown to improve aspirations, and such treatments are yet to be found.
Another important limitation of this study is the data it uses. We use the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, a widely used and well-known cohort study from
the United States. The NLSY is appealing because it contains detailed information
about individuals throughout their lifetime: family composition and parental earnings
during youth, personality traits measured early in life, personal earned and unearned
income from first labor market entry almost until retirement. In spite of this wealth
of data, the NLSY only contains at best 12,000 individuals, which limits the scope
for analyses exploiting detailed geographical variation or time variation. Further
work will almost certainly use additional data sources, for example data from the
Opportunity Atlas data showcased in Chetty et al. (2020).
Investigating How and Why Financial Aid Uncertainty can Discourage
Students
While Chapter 2 presents the reader with evidence that uncertainty of financial
aid can discourage some students from enrolling in university-preparing education,
our estimates are based on cohort comparisons only – past cohorts are used as
counterfactual group for the cohorts treated with policy announcements. This
chapter estimates the effect of exogenous, unexpected policy announcements to
study how students change their educational orientation in response to increasing
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uncertainty about future higher education financial aid. In principle, the treatment
consists in being exposed to information about the pending reform, such that the ideal
research design would have compared in the same cohort, students who by chance
received the information to those who, by chance, did not. Yet, policy announcements
took place simultaneously at the national level, such that all students in a given
cohort are either treated or not treated when starting secondary school tracks. To
argue that our estimates identify a causal treatment effect of exposure to information,
our best strategy is thus to discuss extent to which policy announcements were as
good as random for students, and to what extent past cohorts are comparable to
treated cohorts.
Additional analyses are, however, necessary to ensure that our results are not con-
founded by factors such as cohort-specific dynamics, or macro-economic conditions.
A first, simple approach, could be to exploit the large number of observations in
administrative data, and compare students at a much finer level of aggregation: for
example, comparing students within schools by estimating models with school fixed
effects, could improve the comparison of cohorts over time; similarly, comparing
students with the exact same test score. An issue with this approach is that with
each additional control variables, results loose interpretability while endogeneity
arising from omitted variables remains largely unaccounted for. Another approach
is to offer multiple comparisons to control groups within each cohort, although
imperfect: ineligible students to means-tested aid, students ineligible to higher
education, foreign students ineligible to student finance altogether, older students
or very younger students. To isolate the pure effect of uncertainty in financial aid
on student outcomes, further research should therefore focus on identifying settings
amenable to more robust research designs.
An additional difficulty with Chapter 2 is that identifying the mechanisms through
which students respond to uncertainty about financial aid remain unclear, largely
due to limitations inherent to administrative data. Indeed, while we build intuition
using our theoretical framework, we cannot exclude that our findings are driven
by genuine changes in preferences induced by policy announcements, rather than
income constraints made salient by policy announcements. In a section dedicated to
robustness, we discuss the possibility of broader changes across cohorts, including
preferences for labor supply over borrowing. Identifying with precision why the
policy announcements we study created a discouragement effect will require, however,
not only additional data such as preference measurement, borrowing behavior and
labor supply, but also a longer time horizon. Alternatively, one could rely on
structural modelling approaches, in which one can calibrate models using past
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data and assigning values to parameters such as risk preferences, and see whether
the calibrated model predicts accurately educational outcomes following policy
announcements.
Lastly, this study is based on data from the Netherlands, a specific setting in which
student finance has been in place since 1986 and is perceived as a right. Thus,
our empirical findings could be context-specific to a large extent. Additional work
in other settings could help establish the robustness of the discouragement effect
induced by uncertainty about student financial aid.
Exploring How Classroom Peers Affect Student Outcomes
Chapter 3 follows up on some of the issues identified from Chapter 1. In particular,
Chapter 3 explores the impact of randomly assigned classrooms peers on aspirations
of students, and the extent to which classroom peers affect test scores through
their impact on aspirations. While this study solves some of the core limitations of
Chapter 1, this study is not exempt of other issues.
One of the key limitations of this study is the linear-in-means model of peer effects
that it relies on, and the conceptual assumptions it implies. Modeling peer effects is
not obvious: there is no consensus in the literature as to how theoretically peer effects
operate, and there is consequently no consensus either regarding the econometric
modelling assumptions required to capture peer effects. In the linear-in-means model,
the researcher implicitly assumes that the benefit of high-achieving peers is spread
equally across all students – an assumption that has already been disproved on
numerous occasions. Yet, the linear-in-means model remains the most common and
parsimonious model of peer effects (see Sacerdote, 2014). We further discuss the
possibility that our absence of mediation is explained by heterogeneity of peer effects
– either in the sense that exposure to high achieving peers benefit children of various
abilities differently, or in the sense that exposure triggers heterogeneous behavioral
responses. While our evidence indicates that our findings are not driven by such
heterogeneity, further analyses are required to fully explore this possibility.
Our analyses could also benefit from additional data. Recent advances in econometric
theory have been instrumental for our empirical analyses to not suffer from a lack
of precision that would have otherwise been a likely concern: Jochmans (2020)
proposed a new sorting test solving an important power issue in the state-of-the-art
test of Guryan et al. (2009), Young (2019) explained in detail how to improve
permutation techniques and report randomization inference statistics, and Clarke
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et al. (2019) recently proposed a Stata package to conduct inference correcting for
multiple hypothesis testing. While our main results don’t suffer from a major lack of
precision, additional observations could be helpful for our discussion of heterogeneous
mediation analyses.
Our analyses could also benefit from observing more inputs. We could be unable to
mediate our peer effects with any of the inputs considered because we are missing
on key drivers of academic peer effects. Even though this seems unlikely, we cannot
exclude this possibility. For example, it could be that our inputs fail at capturing
social pressure in the classroom, a factor which recent research has shown to be an
input driver of effort responses of students Bursztyn et al. (see e.g. 2019).
A natural concern for our findings is that they could reflect norms and institutions
that are specific to Taiwan. For example, that parents invest a lot of money in
tutoring or that the pressure is so high for students to perform in schools could
be highly context specific. While the literature on peer effects in education is at
a mature stage, and the broader literature on interdependent decision-making is
a very active one, some of the crucial advances in the broader empirical literature
on peer effects has come from new datasets in which peers are experimentally or
quasi-experimentally assigned (see e.g. Bursztyn et al., 2014; Oster and Thornton,
2012). In education, however, data originating from such settings remain limited
and not easily accessible. Thus, although our study exploit one such setting, it is
not clear to what extent our findings teach us about peer effects in general, beyond
Taiwan. Using data from the 1999 Trends In International Mathematics And Science
Study (TIMSS), we show that Taiwan seems comparable to other countries on many
commonly used indicators of schools systems, suggesting that our results in Taiwan
may hold in many other settings.
Lastly, as we have already pointed at in our discussion on statistical power, many
econometric advances are still to invent to enable researchers to use more data.
Although the Fishing Algorithm we develop in this study is essential to eliminate
schools where random assignment does not hold, we have also discovered that some
findings can vary importantly depending on few outlier schools. Thus, our next
work seeks to gain further understanding of the statistical properties of the standard
econometric tools used in empirical peer effect research.
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How and Why Teachers’ Expectations Affect Student Outcomes
Chapter 4 indicates that teachers’ expectations about children’s potential is system-
atically biased - in particular, teachers respond to older siblings’ relative rank in
primary school test scores. As much as this finding can seem intuitive, additional
analyses are crucially needed to fully grasp why children’s relative rank in primary
school test scores also affects their younger siblings. The mechanisms behind these
effects are complex. In future work, I expect to be exploring in further details two
specific directions of mechanisms.
On the one hand, building on the literature on rank effects in education, it seems
that top ranked children can be expected to build more self-confidence, which may
or may not affect their siblings. The exact way this spillover could occur remains
unclear: growing up as the younger sibling of a top student could discourage younger
siblings, it could also foster a healthy competition. The magnitude and sign of such
mechanisms could also depend non-linearly on the ability of younger siblings. A
particular avenue for future research, which I have only begun to brush over, is the
gender and ability composition of sibling pairs. On the other hand, building on the
emerging and burgeoning literature on sibling spillover effects, it seems likely that
parents also respond to information about the rank of their child. Previous literature
has shown that parents often optimize parental investments – for example, Black
et al. (2017) show that children who grow up with a disabled sibling benefit from
less parental time. Future work will further explore parental responses to sibling
rank and optimization strategies between siblings.
One of the important limitations of this study is also its strength: the administrative
data it uses. On the one hand, exploiting administrative education records linked
to birth records and family records has provided this study with a large sample
of 530,000 sibling pairs, allowing us to detect small effects with a high degree of
precision. On the other hand, the data remain limited in two ways. First, detailed
information regarding any single individual is scarce and bound to information
collected for administrative purposes, leaving little hope to identify finer mechanisms
such as perceptions, aspirations, parental beliefs and child non-cognitive skills.
The second, and perhaps more important data limitation of Chapter 4, is that its
findings depend crucially on observing primary school test scores. Since primary
school test scores are only reported from 2003, the findings of this study remain
relatively short term, and yet, the empirical relevance of the sibling rank effect for
inequality of opportunity depends on whether and how much sibling rank effects
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affect longer term outcomes, such as earnings and employment.
Lastly, one could also offer alternative interpretations of this study’s findings. I
interpret the effect of siblings’ rank on teacher subjective assessment as teacher
bias, essentially because after controlling for the absolute test score of both siblings,
that teachers remain more likely to recommend the academic track in response to
higher sibling ranks is akin to a boosting effect of siblings rank in the absence of
any additional human capital. Yet, it could also be that teachers are not biased but
rather observe non-cognitive skills of younger siblings, who benefit from growing
up with higher ranking older siblings: if older siblings with higher ranks are more
confident and enjoy a better experience in secondary school, younger siblings could
themselves develop non-cognitive skills which teacher think make them better suited
for the academic track. I perform additional analyses comparing migrant children
to native children on the one hand, and girls and boys on the other and find
evidence suggesting that the results are not solely driven by a motivational effect
of sibling rank, but further analyses are necessary making creative use the limited
data available.
A second alternative explanation is that parents of higher ranks children push
teachers to better assess their younger children. This could explain why the sibling
rank effect on teacher assessment disappears once admissions rely less on teacher
advice – when comparing the rank effect before and after a reform secondary school
admissions, and comparing geographical zones using admissions with lotteries v. not.
However, if parents were indeed pushing teachers to give academic recommendations
to their younger children in response to their older child’s rank, we would expect
this effect to be particularly strong around the cutoff for the academic track. Yet I
show in additional analyses that this is not the case. While we cannot exclude that
some parents do know their child’s rank, and could drive some of the results, further
analyses excluding parents who could know the rank of their child (e.g. excluding
the top and bottom 3 ranks in class)— should help further understand whether and
to what extent parental behavioral responses are likely to contribute to the effects.
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A | Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
For this proof, we simplify notations to: M for M(g̃(θ0)), g̃′ for g̃′(θ0) and M ′ for
M ′(g̃(θ0)).
We first show that 1 ≤ ρ1.
1 ≤ ρ1 ⇔ λ+ (1− λ)
(





2−M − θ0g̃′M ′
)
≥ 1− λ (A.2)
⇔ 2−M − θ0g̃′M ′ ≥ 1 (A.3)
We know that ∀θ0, 0 ≤ M(.) ≤ 1, so 1 ≤ 2−M ≤ 2. This leaves us only to show
that −θ0g̃′M ′ ≥ 0. Since M(g̃(.)) is a decreasing function of θ0, its partial derivative
against θ0 is g̃′M ′ which takes only negative values. Since θ0 ≥ 0, by pre-multiplying
g̃′M ′ by −θ0, we find that −θ0g̃′M ′ ≥ 0 always holds, which implies that 1 ≤ ρ1.
Next, we show that ρ1 ≤ ρ2.
rho1 ≤ ρ2 ⇔ ρ1 ≤ λ+ ρ1 (A.4)
⇔ 0 ≤ λ (A.5)
which is always true by definition since λ is a probability.
Lastly, we show that rho2 ≤ 2.
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rho2 ≤ 2⇔ 2λ+ (1− λ)
(





2−M − θ0g̃′M ′
)
≥ 2(1− λ) (A.7)
⇔ 2−M − θ0g̃′M ′ ≤ 2 (A.8)
⇔M + θ0g̃′M ′ ≥ 0 (A.9)
(A.10)
We know that M + θ0g̃′M ′ is a decreasing function of θ0, so a sufficient condition
for this inequality to hold is that it holds where M + θ0g̃′M ′ reaches its minimum.
On this portion of the income distribution, M + θ0g̃′M ′ reaches its local minimum
at θH . In addition, since M takes values in [0; 1], we only need to show that
θH g̃
′(θH)M




′M ′ = θH g̃
′(θH) lim
θ→θH
M ′(g̃(θ)) = 0
Therefore we have that M + θ0g̃′M ′ ≥ 0 always holds, and thus rho2 ≤ 2 always
holds. This concludes our demonstration of Proposition 1.
A.2 Data Preparation
Income and program participation-related variables Respondents were
asked each survey year how much income they received in the past calendar year
from a specific source: wages and salary, military service, business and farm, alimony,
parental support. Respondents were also asked about the welfare benefits they
received each month and in total in the past calendar: unemployment benefits,
child support, AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), Foodstamps,
SSI (Supplementary Security Income), veteran benefits, disability payments, social
security payments and any other source of public assistance. We focus on yearly
income and welfare variables. Whenever available, we also extract income and
welfare variables related to the spouse of respondents. We do this because these
variables are important for tax simulation, and thus reflect best the true wealth of
households (see e.g. Dahl and Lochner (2012) who simulate EITC payments using
the Taxsim9 tax simulation program from the NBER.1) We use each of the different
sources of income reported by respondents, and group them in the following seven
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categories: (i) Income from wages, salary and tips (including income from military
service), (ii) income from farm or business, (iii) unemployment compensation, (iv)
income from other sources (savings, net rental income, social security income), (v)
veteran benefits, disability payments and worker compensation, (vi) welfare benefits
(AFDC, food stamps, SSI, and any other public assistance), (vii) child support.
Lastly, we further aggregate these sources of income into three main categories which
are used in the analysis: a) earned income (source (i)), b) unearned income (sources
(ii) and (iii)), and c) non-taxable income (sources (iv) to (vii)).2
Cognitive ability We use the Armed Forces Qualifying Test score (AFQT) as a
proxy for cognitive ability. The AFQT is a standardized test composed of a section
for mathematics, vocabulary, science and automotive knowledge. The NLSY79
collects AFQT percentile score, as an indication of the relative performance of
respondents compared to other respondents. The AFQT was administered to all
respondents in 1980 independently of any observable characteristic, in particular
schooling level or age. Thus, AFQT scores in the NLSY79 are likely to reflect true
cognitive ability, as well as cohort, age as well as schooling effects. Following the
literature, we build an adjusted AFQT score for each individual by first regressing
the original AFQT percentile score on quarter of birth and age dummies, then
categorizing the residuals of the regression into 100 percentiles, and finally using the
residuals in the analysis.
Demographic characteristics In all regressions of individual wealth, we con-
trol for the education attainment of respondents, their marital status and their
fertility. Educational attainment is reported in the NLSY79 as the highest number
of completed years of education as of May 1st of the year of interview. Since most
respondents make their decisions regarding higher education before 1983, we can
construct a time invariant measure of highest educational level completed from
1983 onwards. Our variable is an ordered categorical variable taking values 0 for
respondents with less a high school degree (strictly less than 12 years of education), 1
for respondents with a high school degree (12 years of education), 2 for respondents
with some college education (between 12 and 16 years of education), and 3 for
respondents with a 4-college degree (16+ years of education).
Marital status and the number of children of respondents are also included in every
2Taxsim9 is maintained by Daniel Feenberg, NBER and the NBER. For more information, see this
link.
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survey wave. The initial variable for marital status included in the NLSY79 takes
values 0 if the respondent was never married, 1 if he is married, 2 if he is separated,
3 if he is divorced, 5 if he is remarried and 6 if he is widowed. We use this variable
for our analysis of demographic characteristics of respondents. These variables are
important controls in our regression analyses and in our description of rational and
behavioral agents. We construct the number of dependent children as the number of
children younger than 17 years old in the household, and the number of dependent
as the number of children independently of their age.
Imputation procedure We follow Dahl and Lochner (2012)’s imputation method-
ology and impute missing values for each income source separately, marital status,
education, and the number of children of respondents using simple interpolation from
adjacent survey years. For these variables, most missing observations are generated
by the biennial nature of the panel, and imputation should therefore not assign
erroneous values.
A.3 Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A.1: Baseline Intragenerational Mobility (full model)
Final Family Net Worth (ages 40-48, IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial family net worth 0.329∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Zero initial family net worth −2.880∗∗∗ −1.657∗∗∗ −1.202∗∗∗ −1.158∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.377) (0.378) (0.379)
Zero final family net worth −7.759∗∗∗ −6.293∗∗∗ −5.750∗∗∗ −5.653∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.214) (0.221) (0.220)
Female 0.063 −0.188 −0.188
(0.152) (0.151) (0.150)
Black −0.206 −0.429∗ −0.294
(0.239) (0.237) (0.241)
Non-Black, non-Hispanic 1.245∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.215) (0.226)
Never married 2.863∗∗∗ 2.078∗∗∗ 2.065∗∗∗
(0.397) (0.400) (0.400)
Married 7.575∗∗∗ 6.481∗∗∗ 6.403∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.412) (0.412)
No children 1.861∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗ 1.042∗∗
(0.446) (0.438) (0.437)
1 child 1.320∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ 1.225∗∗
(0.486) (0.477) (0.476)
2 children 1.051∗∗ 0.676 0.694
(0.474) (0.464) (0.464)
Lived alone before 1982 −0.505∗ −0.477∗ −0.504∗
(0.273) (0.270) (0.269)
High school diploma 1.006∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.251)
Some college 1.959∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.291)
4-College degree 3.411∗∗∗ 2.746∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.326)
AFQT (percentiles, adjusted) 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)
R2 0.078 0.17 0.26 0.29 0.29
N 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131
Note: This table presents the results of regressions of permanent net worth on initial net worth. Each
column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 1.2 presents a summary version of this model.
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Table A.2: Intragenerational Social Mobility with Two Thresholds (full model)
Final Family Net Worth (ages 40-48, IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial family net worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.038 0.073∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039)
Between Thresholds 1 and 2 −1.782∗∗∗ −1.361∗∗ 1.445∗∗∗ −1.162∗
(0.683) (0.628) (0.324) (0.612)
Above Threshold 2 0.996∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.068) (0.063) (0.067)
Zero Initial Family Net Worth −2.481∗∗∗ −1.451∗∗∗ −1.108∗∗∗ −1.145∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.368) (0.386) (0.384)
Zero Final Family Net Worth −7.405∗∗∗ −6.217∗∗∗ −5.727∗∗∗ −5.659∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.210) (0.217) (0.222)
Female 0.004 −0.240 −0.176
(0.151) (0.149) (0.150)
Black −0.151 −0.371 −0.277
(0.235) (0.234) (0.240)
Non-Black, non-Hispanic 1.085∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗
(0.215) (0.215) (0.226)
Never married 2.854∗∗∗ 2.116∗∗∗ 2.138∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.393) (0.397)
Married 7.291∗∗∗ 6.320∗∗∗ 6.299∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.405) (0.409)
No children 1.967∗∗∗ 1.209∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗
(0.443) (0.435) (0.436)
1 child 1.490∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗
(0.480) (0.471) (0.474)
2 children 1.169∗∗ 0.841∗ 0.674
(0.467) (0.457) (0.462)
Lived alone before 1982 −0.602∗∗ −0.550∗∗ −0.573∗∗
(0.271) (0.267) (0.270)
High school diploma 0.906∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.250)
Some college 1.804∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.290)
4-Year College degree 3.288∗∗∗ 2.665∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.324)
AFQT (percentiles, adjusted) 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
Threshold 1 4.79 4.73 3.05 4.73
Threshold 2 6.24 6.24 5.53 6.24
N 5,346 5,315 5,315 5,131
Note: This table presents the results of threshold regressions of permanent net worth
on initial net worth, using a grid-search algorithm for the detection of thresholds and
the HQIC criterion for model selection. Each column represents a separate regression.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 1.3
presents a summary version of this model.
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Table A.3: Intragenerational Social Mobility with Three Thresholds (full model)
Final Family Net Worth (ages 40-48, IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial family net worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.037 0.073∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 −1.782∗∗∗ −1.358∗∗ 12.727∗∗∗ −1.161∗
(0.683) (0.628) (4.796) (0.612)
Between thresholds 2 and 3 1.064∗∗∗ −5.339 1.427∗∗∗ −6.190
(0.141) (4.795) (0.402) (4.872)
Above Threshold 3 0.384∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.067) (0.063) (0.067)
Zero Initial Family Net Worth −2.483∗∗∗ −1.444∗∗∗ −1.102∗∗∗ −1.140∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.368) (0.386) (0.384)
Zero Final Family Net Worth −7.393∗∗∗ −6.221∗∗∗ −5.728∗∗∗ −5.662∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.210) (0.217) (0.222)
Female 0.012 −0.236 −0.169
(0.151) (0.149) (0.149)
Black −0.152 −0.366 −0.282
(0.235) (0.234) (0.239)
Non-Black, non-Hispanic 1.085∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗
(0.214) (0.215) (0.225)
Never married 2.825∗∗∗ 2.104∗∗∗ 2.109∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.393) (0.398)
Married 7.289∗∗∗ 6.323∗∗∗ 6.293∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.405) (0.409)
No children 1.979∗∗∗ 1.225∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗
(0.442) (0.435) (0.435)
1 child 1.503∗∗∗ 1.391∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗
(0.480) (0.471) (0.474)
2 children 1.174∗∗ 0.834∗ 0.688
(0.466) (0.458) (0.461)
Lived alone before 1982 −0.616∗∗ −0.538∗∗ −0.586∗∗
(0.271) (0.267) (0.269)
High school diploma 0.931∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.250)
Some college 1.827∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.290)
4-Year College degree 3.316∗∗∗ 2.665∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.324)
AFQT (percentiles, adjusted) 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
Threshold 1 4.79 4.73 3.05 4.73
Threshold 2 6.24 6.24 3.53 6.24
Threshold 3 9.84 6.84 5.53 6.84
N 5,346 5,315 5,315 5,131
Note: This table presents the results of threshold regressions of permanent net worth
on initial net worth, using a grid-search algorithm for the detection of thresholds and
the HQIC criterion for model selection. Each column represents a separate regression.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 1.4
presents a summary version of this model.
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Table A.4: Intragenerational Social Mobility and Locus of Control (full model)
Final Family Net Worth
(1) (2) (3)
Initial family net worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.189∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.039) (0.039)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 0.193∗∗∗ −1.305∗∗ −1.292∗∗
(0.022) (0.595) (0.594)
Above Threshold 2 0.169∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Rotter external locus of control (1979) −0.071∗∗
(0.032)
Rotter score by region of initial wealth:
Below Threshold 1 −0.063
(0.062)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 −0.132
(0.127)
Above Threshold 2 −0.071∗
(0.037)
Zero Initial Family Net Worth −1.199∗∗∗ −1.188∗∗∗ −1.188∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.388) (0.387)
Zero Final Family Net Worth −5.662∗∗∗ −5.676∗∗∗ −5.678∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.224) (0.224)
Female −0.171 −0.159 −0.157
(0.151) (0.150) (0.150)
Black −0.295 −0.270 −0.270
(0.242) (0.241) (0.241)
Non-Black, non-Hispanic 0.659∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.226) (0.226)
Never married 2.120∗∗∗ 2.191∗∗∗ 2.188∗∗∗
(0.400) (0.399) (0.399)
Married 6.423∗∗∗ 6.321∗∗∗ 6.319∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.410) (0.410)
No children 0.958∗∗ 1.002∗∗ 1.004∗∗
(0.436) (0.435) (0.435)
1 child 1.236∗∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗
(0.474) (0.473) (0.473)
2 children 0.669 0.672 0.673
(0.461) (0.461) (0.461)
Lived alone before 1982 −0.562∗∗ −0.616∗∗ −0.617∗∗
(0.271) (0.271) (0.271)
High school diploma 0.745∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.251) (0.252)
Some college 1.491∗∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗ 1.394∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.292) (0.292)
4-Year College degree 2.684∗∗∗ 2.594∗∗∗ 2.593∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.325) (0.326)
AFQT (percentiles, adjusted) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Thresholds in locus of control:
Threshold 1 7
Threshold 2 12
Thresholds in initial wealth:
Threshold 1 4.73 4.73
Threshold 2 6.24 6.24
N 5,083 5,083 5,083
Note: This table presents the results of threshold regressions of permanent net worth
on initial net worth augmented by locus of control, using a grid-search algorithm for
the detection of thresholds and the HQIC criterion for model selection. Each column
represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 1.5 presents a summary version of this model.
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Figure A.1: Self-Esteem and Permanent Income
Note: This figure represents the results of the grid-search algorithm to detect the presence
of thresholds in the relationship between Rosenberg’s self-esteem score and log family net
worth at ages 22 to 25. Red horizontal lines represent the location of thresholds in log
family net worth at ages 22 to 25 (initial conditions), and green vertical lines represent
the location of potential thresholds in self-esteem. Dots meeting at the crossing of a green
and a red line indicates that the threshold detected in initial conditions could be driven by
a correlated threshold in self-esteem.
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Table A.5: Intragenerational Social Mobility and Self-Esteem (full model)
Final Family Net Worth
(1) (2) (3)
Initial family net worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.246∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.048) (0.048)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 0.213∗∗∗ 1.660∗∗∗ 1.665∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.332) (0.333)
Above Threshold 2 0.169∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.064) (0.064)
Rosenberg self-esteem (1980) 0.036∗
(0.020)
Rosenberg score by region of initial wealth:
Below Threshold 1 0.074∗
(0.043)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 0.073
(0.057)
Above Threshold 2 0.011
(0.022)
Zero Initial Family Net Worth −1.081∗∗∗ −1.234∗∗∗ −1.220∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.407) (0.409)
Zero Final Family Net Worth −5.551∗∗∗ −5.607∗∗∗ −5.581∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.228) (0.230)
Female −0.189 −0.189 −0.189
(0.152) (0.151) (0.152)
Black −0.295 −0.280 −0.285
(0.246) (0.246) (0.246)
Non-Black, non-Hispanic 0.677∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.230) (0.229)
Never married 2.041∗∗∗ 2.124∗∗∗ 2.125∗∗∗
(0.405) (0.403) (0.403)
Married 6.412∗∗∗ 6.293∗∗∗ 6.287∗∗∗
(0.416) (0.413) (0.413)
No children 1.024∗∗ 1.075∗∗ 1.060∗∗
(0.440) (0.439) (0.439)
1 child 1.160∗∗ 1.199∗∗ 1.180∗∗
(0.478) (0.478) (0.477)
2 children 0.617 0.621 0.616
(0.470) (0.469) (0.469)
Lived alone before 1982 −0.568∗∗ −0.636∗∗ −0.627∗∗
(0.275) (0.276) (0.276)
High school diploma 0.760∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.258) (0.259)
Some college 1.509∗∗∗ 1.428∗∗∗ 1.405∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.300) (0.301)
4-Year College degree 2.717∗∗∗ 2.650∗∗∗ 2.621∗∗∗
(0.336) (0.333) (0.334)





Thresholds in initial wealth:
Threshold 1 3.05 3.05
Threshold 2 5.53 5.53
N 5,020 5,020 5,020
Note: This table presents the results of threshold regressions of permanent net worth on
initial net worth augmented by a measure of self-esteem, using a grid-search algorithm
for the detection of thresholds and the HQIC criterion for model selection. Each column
represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.2: Self-Concept and Permanent Income
Note: This figure represents the results of the grid-search algorithm to detect the presence
of thresholds in the relationship between Pearlin (1992)’s self-concept score and log family
net worth at ages 22 to 25. Red horizontal lines represent the location of thresholds in log
family net worth at ages 22 to 25 (initial conditions), and green vertical lines represent
the location of potential thresholds in self-concept. Dots meeting at the crossing of a green
and a red line indicates that the threshold detected in initial conditions could be driven by
a correlated threshold in self-concept.
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Table A.6: Intragenerational Social Mobility and Self-Concept (full model)
Final Family Net Worth
(1) (2) (3)
Initial family net worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.130∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.054)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 0.217∗∗∗ −1.478∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.646) (0.177)
Above Threshold 2 0.185∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.067) (0.067)
Pearlin self-concept (1992) 0.099∗∗∗
(0.024)
Pearlin score by region of initial wealth:
Below Threshold 1 0.026
(0.049)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 0.254∗∗∗
(0.059)
Above Threshold 2 0.093∗∗∗
(0.028)
Zero Initial Family Net Worth −1.154∗∗∗ −1.114∗∗∗ −1.262∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.389) (0.425)
Zero Final Family Net Worth −5.574∗∗∗ −5.514∗∗∗ −5.453∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.226) (0.231)
Female −0.195 −0.187 −0.199
(0.152) (0.151) (0.151)
Black −0.363 −0.328 −0.342
(0.243) (0.242) (0.242)
Non-Black, non-Hispanic 0.640∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗
(0.225) (0.226) (0.226)
Never married 2.027∗∗∗ 2.112∗∗∗ 2.086∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.402) (0.402)
Married 6.324∗∗∗ 6.226∗∗∗ 6.226∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.412) (0.413)
No children 1.022∗∗ 1.018∗∗ 0.996∗∗
(0.440) (0.439) (0.439)
1 child 1.200∗∗ 1.209∗∗ 1.196∗∗
(0.479) (0.478) (0.478)
2 children 0.599 0.562 0.540
(0.468) (0.466) (0.466)
Lived alone before 1982 −0.463∗ −0.520∗ −0.532∗∗
(0.270) (0.270) (0.270)
High school diploma 0.765∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.252) (0.253)
Some college 1.496∗∗∗ 1.390∗∗∗ 1.398∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.292) (0.293)
4-Year College degree 2.640∗∗∗ 2.540∗∗∗ 2.549∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.328) (0.328)





Thresholds in initial wealth:
Threshold 1 4.83 2.36
Threshold 2 6.24 6.24
N 4,984 4,984 4,984
Note: This table presents the results of threshold regressions of permanent net worth on
initial net worth augmented by a measure of self-concept, using a grid-search algorithm
for the detection of thresholds and the HQIC criterion for model selection. Each column
represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.3: Access to Loans and Aspirational Poverty Traps
(a) Access to Educational Loans
(b) Access to Home-Ownership at Age 25
Note: This figure represents the results of the grid-search algorithm to detect the pres-
ence of thresholds in the relationship between access to college loans (Figure A.3a) and
mortgages ((Figure A.3b)) and log family net worth at ages 22 to 25. Red horizontal
lines represent the location of thresholds in log family net worth at ages 22 to 25 (initial
conditions), and green vertical lines represent the location of potential thresholds in the
share of respondents with college loans before age 22 (Figure A.3a), and the share of
homeowner respondents before age 25 (Figure A.3b). Dots meeting at the crossing of a
green and a red line indicates that the threshold detected in initial conditions could be
driven by a correlated threshold in access to college loans or mortgages, which are our
measures of liquidity constraints.
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Table A.7: Intragenerational Social Mobility and Credit Constraints (full model)
Final Family Net Worth
(1) (2)
Initial family net worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.113∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 −1.162∗ −1.053∗∗
(0.612) (0.526)
Above Threshold 2 0.531∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.074)
Home-ownership at age 25 0.016
(0.181)
Home-ownership by region of initial wealth:
Below Threshold 1 1.068∗∗∗
(0.386)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 0.792
(0.494)
Above Threshold 2 −0.498∗∗
(0.205)
Zero Initial Family Net Worth −1.144∗∗∗ −1.049∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.385)






Non-Black, non-Hispanic 0.550∗∗ 0.561∗∗
(0.226) (0.226)




No children 1.063∗∗ 1.057∗∗
(0.436) (0.436)
1 child 1.248∗∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗
(0.474) (0.473)
2 children 0.673 0.662
(0.462) (0.461)
Lived alone before 1982 −0.574∗∗ −0.569∗∗
(0.270) (0.271)
High school diploma 0.714∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.251)
Some college 1.431∗∗∗ 1.403∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.292)
4-Year College degree 2.668∗∗∗ 2.636∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.330)
AFQT (percentiles, adjusted) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Thresholds in initial wealth:
Threshold 1 4.73 4.73
Threshold 2 6.24 6.46
N 5,131 5,131
Note: This table presents the results of threshold regressions of permanent net worth on
initial net worth augmented by home-ownership status, using a grid-search algorithm for
the detection of thresholds and the HQIC criterion for model selection. Each column
represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.4: Network-Based Job Search Strategies and Initial Family Net Worth
(a) Personal Network (b) Relatives
(c) Community Organization (d) School Placement Office
(e) Former Teachers (f) Personal Contacts
Note: This figure represents the results of the grid-search algorithm to detect the presence of
thresholds in the relationship between six types of job search strategies used by respondents to find
their current job, and log family net worth at ages 22 to 25. Red horizontal lines represent the
location of thresholds in log family net worth at ages 22 to 25 (initial conditions), and green vertical
lines represent the location of potential thresholds in the share of respondents using any of the
six job search strategies. Dots meeting at the crossing of a green and a red line indicates that
the threshold detected in initial conditions could be driven by a correlated threshold in the use of
network-based job search strategies, our measures of network strength.
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Table A.8: Intragenerational Social Mobility and Network-based Job Search
Strategies (full model)
Final Family Net Worth
(1) (2)
Initial family net worth:
Below Threshold 1 0.113∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.033)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 −1.164∗ −15.810
(0.613) (12.854)
Above Threshold 2 0.533∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.068)
Job search through community org. (1982) −0.222
(0.841)
Job search by region of initial wealth:
Below Threshold 1 0.479
(0.953)
Between thresholds 1 and 2 0.000
(0.000)
Above Threshold 2 −1.308
(1.557)
Zero Initial Family Net Worth −1.146∗∗∗ −1.271∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.381)






Non-Black, non-Hispanic 0.549∗∗ 0.551∗∗
(0.226) (0.225)




No children 1.064∗∗ 1.067∗∗
(0.436) (0.435)
1 child 1.250∗∗∗ 1.277∗∗∗
(0.474) (0.475)
2 children 0.675 0.666
(0.462) (0.460)
Lived alone before 1982 −0.573∗∗ −0.580∗∗
(0.270) (0.270)
High school diploma 0.714∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.250)
Some college 1.431∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.291)
4-Year College degree 2.665∗∗∗ 2.705∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.325)
AFQT (percentiles, adjusted) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Thresholds in initial wealth:
Threshold 1 4.73 6.54
Threshold 2 6.24 6.84
N 5,131 5,131
Note: This table presents the results of threshold regressions of permanent net worth on
initial net worth augmented by job-search strategies based on networks, using a grid-search
algorithm for the detection of thresholds and the HQIC criterion for model selection.
Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.1 Institutional Details
General details about the Dutch education system
Education in the Netherlands is compulsory from age 5 until age 18. Most children
enter kindergarten at age 4 and start attending primary school two years later, in
Grade 1. Primary school takes six years to complete and ends with a standardized
test (CITO) which covers mathematics, language and general learning ability. CITO
test scores are used to assign students to the most appropriate high school track
given a child’s abilities and interests. The admission process for high schools is
largely non-selective, meaning that the students can enroll in any high school they
choose, irrespective of their grades and their CITO test scores - although a small
share of selective secondary schools does apply selection criteria often based on prior
test scores; these are almost always specialized in Gymnasium VWO tracks. Figure
B.1 gives a schematic descriptive of the Dutch education system.
Primary schools must, by law, provide Grade 6 students exiting primary school with
an objective measure of academic ability in the form of a standardized test score,
and the school’s recommendation of which high school track the child is best suited
for. This implies that pupils and their parents decide on a high school at the end
of Grade 6 based on three elements: 1) a standardized test score, 2) the primary
school’s advice regarding a high school track that best suits the child’s abilities, 3)
the child and her parents’ preference for education between academic, general and
vocational education.
Most children in our sample are in schools in which the standardized test is the
CITO test. Since its creation in 2005, CITO has been given annually in more than
80% of Dutch schools to all Grade 6 pupils (12-year-olds). Dutch pupils take this test
between February and May during Grade 6 before exiting primary school and receive
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Figure B.1: The Dutch Education System
Note: Authors’ own figure. This is a simplified description of the Dutch education system.
their score in June when they are in the process of choosing their secondary school
from Grade 7 onward. The CITO test is designed every year by the CITOGroep, an
independent private firm specialized in educational testing (akin to ETS in the US),
which also grades the test independently from schools and the central government.
The test is designed to be a test of cognitive ability with sections focusing on
mathematics, language and general learning ability. Scores range between 501 and
550 points and are normalized such that the national annual average is 535 points.
The CITOGroep recommends a mapping from pupils’ scores onto high school types.
The thresholds recommended by CITOGroep are fixed over the time frame of this
study, and the shares of pupils in each bin are stable by construction. These are the
publicly available mapping from CITO score onto high school tracks proposed by
the CITOGroep:
1. 501-532: Vocational high school track
2. 533-536: Pre-Vocational or General high school track
3. 537-539: General high school track
4. 540-544: General or Academic high school track
5. 545-550: Academic high school track
Primary school teachers use their own observation of pupils’ in class, as well as the
CITO outcome of pupils to make their recommendation of high school type to pupils
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and parents. Teachers’ advice is meant to help parents and children to choose the
most appropriate high school for the child’s ability. Over time, teachers gave fewer
mixed recommendations (e.g. vocational/general high school, or general/academic
high school) and slightly higher recommendations. The correlation between the
recommendation that pupils receive, and their choice of high school type remains,
however, stable over our time frame. The Dutch Inspectorate for education reports
annually how children’s chosen high school type relates to their CITO score and
teacher’s recommendation. Over the period we study, approximately 45 to 53% of
pupils choose a high school type matching their recommendation, 23 to 26% choose
a high school of a lower type than their recommendation, and 21 to 23% choose a
type higher than their recommendation.
Students enter secondary school in Grade 7 and start with up to 3 years of common
education, usually referred to as “bridging years”. Following the bridging years,
students are tracked into one of three high school tracks: 1) academic (VWO), 2)
general (HAVO) and 3) vocational (VMBO). The academic track ends in Grade 12
and a diploma from academic high school constitutes the minimum requirement for
enrolling into a university (WO). The general track ends one year earlier (Grade 11)
and prepares students for professionally-oriented higher education. A general high
school diploma constitutes the minimum requirement for enrolling in Universities of
Applied Sciences (HBO) but does not make students eligible for university education.
The vocational track ends in Grade 10 and prepares students for a vocational
secondary education program (MBO), which may or may not take the form of an
apprenticeship. The academic track is usually considered to be more difficult than
the general track, which is usually considered to be more difficult than the vocational
track.
Although secondary schools decide eventually on the track a pupil follows, parents
and their child have a strong influence on this tracking outcome in 2 ways: 1) through
discussion with the primary school on the track recommendation the child receives,
and 2) through the choice of school. According to the principle of “free choice”
defined in the so-called Mammoth Law of 1964, students cannot be strictly denied
entry at any public school in the Netherlands, and schools received governmental
funding according to the number of students annually registered. School funding is
fixed per student irrespective of their high school type, which means that once a
child is enrolled, secondary schools have no incentives to orient students towards
one type of curriculum over another. This system of free choice and unconditional
funding has led to a concentration of secondary schools, with the majority of schools
being very large and offering all types of curriculum.
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A majority of secondary schools offers all tracks, yet the timing of tracking is part
of a school structure, with some schools tracking students as early as grade 7 (first
year of secondary school), thus not offering a bridge year, while other schools track
students as late as grade 10 (fourth year of secondary school, thus offering three
bridging years. Over our timeframe, Grade 7 pupils are about 80% in a bridge year,
while this share reduces to 60% in Grade 8 and 2.5% in Grade 9 (Korthals, 2015).
Once tracked, academic and general education students choose a field of study,
and vocational students choose a professional trade. Fields are chosen by the end
of Grade 9, and the field-specific curriculum spans the remaining years of high
school, two in the case of the general track, and three in the case of the academic
track. Students can choose among the following options: 1) Nature and Technology
(Natuur en Techniek), 2) Nature and health (Natuur en Gezondheid), 3) Economy
and society (Economie en Maatschappij) and 4) Culture and society (Cultuur en
Maatschappij). Students can choose either a single field or a combination of two
fields. Double specializations or mixed profiles are possible, yet students almost
exclusively combine either the two STEM fields (1 and 2), or the two non-STEM
fields (3 and 4). In this study, we consider a simplified choice of specialization, in
which students choose either a curriculum in STEM and Medicine (field 1, field 2,
or their combination), or a curriculum in the Humanities and Social sciences (field
3, field 4, or any remaining combinations).
In the last year of high school, students from the general and academic track apply
to post-secondary institutions, and students from the vocational track apply to
secondary vocational institutions. The admission process is largely non-selective,
allowing students to enroll into any school and program available for their high
school track diploma and their field of study. Applications are submitted through a
unified online platform, where students also apply for student finance.1
1Selective admissions do exist for a small subset of over-demanded programs, such as medicine and
medical sciences. For these programs, the selective admission process is based on a fixed number
of spots (Numerus Fixus), and applications go through a stratified lottery system; applications
for these specific programs are due in January, earlier in the academic year than the standard
applications which are due in April. For a detailed description of the stratified lotteries for Numerus
Fixus programs, see Ketel et al. (2016, 2019); Artmann et al. (2018).
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General details on financial aid in the Netherlands
The Dutch student finance system (Studiefinanciering) has been in place since
1986, and has since been organized into three parts. The first part is a basic,
unconditional grant paid monthly for up to four years of higher education. The
subsidy was intended to cover students’ living expenses, and it was awarded at
two rates, depending on students’ living arrangements. The rates were set by a
decree every calendar year, mirroring the gradual growth of tuition fees. In 2014,
the monthly rate for university students living on their own was €279.14, which
is equivalent to roughly 5.5% of the full-time minimum wage (€1,486 monthly
in 2014). The 2014 monthly rate for students living with parents was €100.25.
The subsidy was also available for adult students attending secondary vocational
education (MBO), and the two subsidy rates were 257.93€ and 79.04€, respectively.
The second type of aid was a means-tested subsidy awarded to students from
disadvantaged backgrounds. The awarded amount was calculated by the Dutch
authorities based on students’ living arrangements, the taxable income of both
parents two years prior to application, and household composition. In 2014, the
maximum amount of means-tested subsidy a student could receive was €258.35
per month. The third type of available aid was an optional low-interest loan. The
loan was provided by a government agency which guaranteed loan financing at
below-market rates. There were three types of loans: 1) A basic loan depending
on individual needs, 2) a loan to smooth payment of tuition fees expenses (“college
tuition credit”), and 3) a loan to increase the duration of coverage of living expenses.
The loan repayment amount was automatically adjusted by the tax office, so that
the amount never exceeded 12% of taxable income. Students were expected to
repay their loans over the period of 15 years following graduation, with monthly
repayments calculated such that the total debt was repaid in exactly 15 years. If
a student’s post-graduation income was below full-time minimum wage, then the
repayment was put on hold, and the residual amount due after 15 years was forgiven.
The third and last type if an opt-in loan with interest rates guaranteed below market
rates. Table B.1 shows all financial aid amounts and conditions granted depending
on a student’s educational level, living situation and parental income. This table
is organized as follows: Panel A shows information relative to higher education
freshmen, and Panel B displays information relative to vocational education freshmen.
In every panel, we decompose financial aid into its main components: i) basic,
unconditional subsidy; ii) means-tested aid; iii) public transport card, iv) maximum
monthly opt-in loan amount; v) tuition fees; and vi) the maximum monthly opt-in
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loan amount beyond the nominal duration of financial aid. In each category, we
first indicate the different amounts granted depending on the living situation of the
student, if applicable, then we show the year-to-change in the granted amount, and
lastly the take-up rate of this aspect of financial aid if applicable. Overall, this table
shows that financial aid conditions and amounts evolve in a smooth way, following
the evolution of the consumer price index.
Google Trends analysis of perceptions in the population
Figure B.2 shows Google trends over the period 2004 to 2017, and reveals which
parts of the student finance reform were known by the general public at which
points in time. The query “basisbeurs” (basic grant) is relatively stable, with three
main peaks in January and June 2010, and October 2012, secondary peaks in
May 2014 and January 2015. In January 2010, large national demonstrations were
organized by student trade unions against budget cuts in education mentioned
during the political campaign. In May 2014, the government announced that the
reform would be postponed by one year, until September 2015. In January 2015,
the first cohort of students under the new regime of student finance started making
their applications via the national platform, Studielink. In comparison, the query
for “Sociaal leenstelsel” only appears in October 2012, precisely the week that the
name of the new “social lending system” is revealed along with the details of its
implementation. We also constructed an aggregate search query by summing queries
on terms related to the abolition of student finance (“afschaffing studiefianciering”,
"afschaffing studiebeurs”, etc. as well as variation on spelling of these queries), and
find that this index peaks exactly in January 2010 and June 2010 as uncertainty,
and disappears progressively after the announcement in October 2012.
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Table B.2: Financial Aid Eligibility and Repayment Conditions, 2002-2018
Means-tested aid: cutoffs in family taxable income Loan










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2002 26,703.50 34,333.10 13,351.80 17,166.60
2003 27,966.60 35,957.10 13,983.30 17,978.50
2004 29,021.00 37,312.70 14,510.50 18,656.30
2005 29,711.70 38,200.70 14,855.80 19,100.40
2006 30,551.30 39,093.90 15,275.70 19,546.90 2.74%
2007 31,008.50 39,497.50 15,504.20 19,748.80 3.70%
2008 31,856.30 40,398.80 15,928.20 20,199.40 4.17%
2009 33,638.90 42,659.50 16,819.50 21,329.70 3.58%
2010 33,775.30 42,832.50 16,887.70 21,416.20 2.39%
2011 34,515.00 43,770.50 17,257.50 21,885.30 1.50%
2012 34,898.10 44,256.40 17,449.10 22,128.20 1.39%
2013 35,337.90 44,814.00 17,668.90 22,407.00 0.60%
2014 35,857.30 45,472.80 17,928.70 22,736.40 0.81%
2015 33,781.20 42,799.00 16,890.60 21,399.50 0.12%
Sept. 2015
2016 34,105.50 43,209.90 17,052.80 21,605.00 0.01%
2017 34,658.00 43,909.90 17,329.00 21,955.00 0.00%
2018 35,243.80 44,652.00 17,621.90 22,326.00 0.00%
Note: Financial aid conditions are taken from Rijksoverkeid and DUO archives and Dutch Statistical
Yearbooks over 2002-2018. The exact amount of means-tested financial aid that students receive
is calculated based on the amounts presented in Columns (1) to (4), which are yearly cutoffs in
household taxable income depending on household composition. Other criteria also apply which are
not publicly available.
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Figure B.2: Google Trends Associated to Student Finance Reform Details
Note: This figure plots Google trends related to details of the old and new student finance
system. Trends correspond to national monthly Google searches, normalized based on
searches for “Basisbeurs” (In Dutch: basic subsidy of student finance), the blue line.
The red line corresponds to “Afschaffing stufi” (in Dutch: removal of student finance), a
synthetic trend we constructed by aggregating searches terms associated to the removal of
Student finance, collected from news clippings. The green line corresponds to “Sociaal
Leenstelsel” (in Dutch: social lending student finance system), the exact name of the new
student finance regime, officially revealed on October 9, 2012.
B.2 Proofs
In this section, we derive comparative statics from our theoretical framework.
The first condition expresses that low-ability students have incentives to attend
vocational education: they would reap negative benefits from enrolling into anything
but the vocational track, because their effort cost would exceed their returns to any
other type of schooling. The second condition expresses that high ability students
have strong incentives to study at the academic track. The last condition describes
the marginal student’s case between general and academic education (with ability
level θ∗A).
We can express θ∗G and θ∗A as a function of the lifetime payoff functions, using the
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equilibrium conditions above. θ∗G solves RGi (θ∗G) = RVi (θ∗G), and since RVi (θ∗G) is
normalized to 0, we can express analytically that:
θ∗G = 1−
1





E(ΠGt+k)− (1 + b)
[
(FG − (1− p0)s0 − (1− p1)s1)(tG − tV − 1)







θ∗G is increasing in κG, illustrating that the harder general education relative to
vocational education, the higher the ability level of the marginal student between
these two options. θ∗G is also increasing in the net additional cost of attending general
education over vocational education, as well as in the cost of borrowing b, and in
the opportunity cost given by the counterfactual wage a student would receive after
graduating from vocational education instead of attending further years of general
education. Lastly, θ∗G is decreasing in the expected premium from general education:
increasing premium from general education over vocational education drives a larger
margin of students into general education.
Similarly, θ∗A solves RAi (θ∗A) = RGi (θ∗A), which eventually leads to:
θ∗A = 1−
1





E(ΠAt+k)− (1 + b)
[
(FA − (1− p0)s0 − (1− p1)s1)(tA − tG − 1)







θ∗A has a similar expression to that of θ∗G, except that for the student who is
indifferent between general and academic education, the relevant counterfactual is
general education, such that i) the counterfactual net cost of attending academic
education is attending general education, and ii) the opportunity cost from attending
academic education is now the premium from general education over vocational
education after graduation from general education until graduation from academic
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education.
Comparative Statics Following Charles et al. (2018), we allow some shock S
to affect sorting through any parameter of the model. Thus, studying the effects
of any policy shock on ability sorting implies taking the derivative of θ∗A and θ∗G
against this policy shock S. Let us spell out how a shock S can affect equilibrium















(FG − (1− p0)s0 − (1− p1)s1)(tG − tV − 1) + (FG − FV )(tV − 1)
]





























Although this expression seems complicated, we can decompose it into terms which
help us structure our thoughts on the possible mechanisms through which any shock
S can affect selection into tracks. The effect of any shock S to the ability threshold
θ∗G, which characterizes the decision problem of a person who is indifferent between
vocational and general education, goes through four possible channels.
The first term represents the effect of S on θ∗G through increasing students’ expecta-
tions about the wage premium of general over vocational education; as such, this
channel attracts to general education a new margin of lower ability students who
would have otherwise chosen to attend vocational education. This effect is weighted
by the relative difficulty and duration of attending general education compared
to vocational education; the harder and longer it is to attend general education
compared to vocational education, the less one should expect S to affect sorting.
The second term represents the intermediate effect of S on θ∗G through a change in
the cost of borrowing to cover the additional costs of attending general education
instead of vocational education; through this channel, S has a positive effect on θ∗G,
such that the marginal student choosing general education has higher ability than
prior to S.
The third term represents the change induced by S in the net cost of attending
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general versus vocational education, which can happen through any elements of
this net cost – tuition fees, unconditional financial aid, means-tested aid, or the
probabilities of having to repay financial aid. We interpret the part of this cost
associated to financial aid as the change in the cost of having to save just in case s0
and s1 must eventually be paid back; this quantity is akin to a liability in accounting
terms.
Lastly, the fourth term corresponds to the change induced by S in the opportunity
cost of attending general over vocational education, i.e. an increase in the outside
wage level students would receive if they were to attend vocational education instead
of general education. Importantly, at fixed level of financial aid s0, a marginal
increase in the probability p0 of having to repay s0 induced by the shock S is likely
to have a positive effect on selection into general education; the same applies for
means-tested aid. This means that shocks to the expected probabilities of repayment
increase resorting mostly among the weakest students who are marginal between
vocational and general education.
Similarly, the effect of S on θ∗A also goes through the same four distinct channels.
Similar to the effect of S on θ∗G, the effect of S through the expected wage premium
from academic versus general education is weighted by the gap in difficulty and
duration between general and academic education. Importantly, the effect of S on
θ∗A are specific to the margin of students indifferent between general and academic
education; for these students, what matters is the relative additional costs from
attending academic over general – not vocational – education. In such, the level of
costs incurred in academic or general education are not relevant, nor is the level of
wages for vocational graduates, but rather the gap in cost between academic and
general education, and outside wage for general education graduates.
Thus, a shock S is expected to affect sorting through potentially four different
types of channels running through changes in the lifetime expected payoff of each
education type, the overall sign and magnitude of the effect being the sum of these
distinct types of effect. In the absence of any other channels, a shock affecting only
repayment uncertainty by increasing p0 and p1 would lower θ∗G and θ∗A, and would
lower θ∗G to a larger extent than θ∗A.
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B.3 Additional Analyses
This section provides detailed additional evidence to support our interpretation that
Dutch students chose alternative tracks in response to reform announcements in
anticipation of future changes to financial aid.
Main effects of reform announcements across subgroups
We investigate differences in responses to reform announcements across groups of
students for which our model predicts larger responses: across family income, ability
and gender. The responses to announcements for these key subgroups that are
more likely to be affected by the policy change in a specific way gives credit to our
interpretation of the policy announcements as shocks to students’ beliefs about the
future of financial aid.
Low v. high ability students’ responses to reform announcements
To compare the responses to announcements of low and high ability students within
their relevant ability-peer group, we estimate the probability to be in a given track in
Grade 10, conditional on the recommendation received by the primary school teacher
around the time of the CITO test. One issue is that, given our data requirement to
observe students in Grade 10, the first cohort for which we can use recommendations
is the 2009 cohort of 10th graders. A second issue is that there seem to be changes
in trends of teachers’ recommendations (see Figure B.10), such that changes in the
probability of being in a given track in Grade 10 must account for changes in the
probability of receiving any recommendation.
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Figure B.3: Enrollment In Tracks, by Ability and Teacher Recommendation
(a) Enrollment in the Academic track, by teacher track advice upon exiting primary school
(b) Enrollment in the General track, by teacher track advice upon exiting primary school
(c) Enrollment in the Vocational track, by teacher track advice upon exiting primary school
Note: This figure presents enrollment shares in the Academic, General and Vocational tracks, split
by the type of track advice children received upon exiting primary school, as a measure of child
cognitive ability. Figures on the left-hand side present these shares in 2010, and figures on the
right-hand side present changes in shares relative to 2010 levels. Red dotted vertical lines mark the
first cohorts of children affected after reform announcements in 2010, 2012 and implementation in
2015.
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Figure B.3 shows the change in the probability of being in a given track in Grade
10 conditional on a given recommendation, adjusting for the underlying trends
in the probability of receiving any recommendation. Within each bin of teacher
recommendation, the share of students going to a lower track than recommended
declines, while the shares of students going to the same level or higher track than
recommended increases. This is suggestive that after 2010, students within each
track in Grade 10 have received relatively better recommendations than previous
cohorts, which is in line with our main prediction on ability sorting.
Income: Responses to reform announcements of low and high income
students
Our findings regarding heterogeneity by family income are also in line with the
predictions we draw from our framework. For this analysis, we split students into
terciles of the distribution of family income, as the lowest income tercile corresponds
roughly to eligibility to means-tested financial aid. Our preferred measure of family
income is the average total annual parental income from labor earnings and business
revenues in the last five years. The means-tested part of student finance is tested
against pooled income of both parents, regardless of whether the parents live together,
thus we also pool maternal and paternal income. We average over five years to
smooth out transitory income shocks. Our first observation is the presence of a
strong income gradient in track choice in Grade 10, in the baseline year 2009. While
68% of low-income students enroll in the vocational track and 10% in the academic
track, only 33% of high-income students enroll in the vocational track and 33.5% in
the academic track.
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Table B.3: Effects on Track Enrollment by Family Income
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
track Resolution implementation
shares (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Track Income: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Academic Low 10.0 −0.61∗∗∗ −1.48∗∗∗ −2.20∗∗∗
Medium 18.0 −1.18∗∗∗ −2.54∗∗∗ −4.09∗∗∗
High 33.5 −1.73∗∗∗ −3.35∗∗∗ −5.11∗∗∗
General Low 22.0 −1.56∗∗∗ −3.13∗∗∗ −5.37∗∗∗
Medium 28.0 −1.11 −2.64∗ −4.97∗∗∗
High 33.5 0.83∗∗∗ 0.64∗ 0.15
Vocational Low 68.0 2.17∗∗∗ 4.61∗∗∗ 7.56∗∗∗
Medium 54.0 2.29∗∗∗ 5.18∗∗∗ 9.06∗∗∗
High 33.0 0.90∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗∗
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Academic Low −5.68∗∗∗ −13.74∗∗∗ −20.45∗∗∗
Medium −7.03∗∗∗ −15.14∗∗∗ −24.39∗∗∗
High −5.26∗∗∗ −10.19∗∗∗ −15.57∗∗∗
General Low −6.89∗∗∗ −13.84∗∗∗ −23.72∗∗∗
Medium −3.83 −9.07∗ −17.09∗∗∗
High 2.46∗∗∗ 1.90∗ 0.44
Vocational Low 3.33∗∗∗ 7.07∗∗∗ 11.60
Medium 4.30∗∗∗ 9.69∗∗∗ 16.97∗∗∗
High 2.82∗∗∗ 8.42∗∗∗ 15.41∗∗∗
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a multinomial logit model of high
school track enrollment as measured in Grade 10, assuming a continued linear pre-trend
extending past 2009. The models are split by parental income terciles, and use respectively
877,855; 889,294; and 898,283 individual observations over years 2005-2017. Controls:
region fixed effects, age, gender, migration status, ethnic background, parental income and
employment status, and an urbanization index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05
significance level, * = 0.1 significance level.
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Table B.3 reports the effects of policy announcements by family income, assuming a
continued linear pre-trend extending beyond 2009. We find that the 2010 announce-
ment had a stronger effect on low-income students, although it led students from all
three income groups to avoid academic and general education. Importantly, the share
of low-income students moving from academic to general education is smaller than
the share moving from general to vocational education. In comparison, the share of
higher income students between academic and general education is larger than that
between general and vocational education, which is in line with our framework’s
predictions. After the 2012 announcement, the magnitude of effects increases for
low-income students, and the most important margin for low-income students is
general to vocational education. For high-income students, resorting mostly happens
at the margin between academic and general education at first, but more resorting
at the margin between general and vocational education starts to occur after 2012
to peak in the later period. Table B.4 further indicates that low-income students
are substantially more likely than their peers from more privileged backgrounds to
move to a lower track in Grade 11 after the announcement shocks in 2010 and 2012.




Outcome: Income: (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Track Dropout Low 2.00∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗ 1.01
Medium 1.44∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 0.69
High 1.29∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 0.75
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Track Dropout Low 38.98∗∗∗ 38.99∗∗ 19.69
Medium 29.54∗∗∗ 36.78∗∗∗ 14.19
High 35.55∗∗∗ 35.99∗∗∗ 20.56
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade 11
high school track dropout, assuming a continued linear pre-trend extending past 2009.
The dataset is split by parental income terciles and uses respectively 198,914; 296,780;
and 458,403 individual observations over years 2006-2017. Controls: region fixed effects,
age, gender, migration status, ethnic background, parental income and employment
status, and an urbanization index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance
level, * = 0.1 significance level.
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Gender: Responses to reform announcements of female and male stu-
dents
Female students are more responsive than male students throughout the entire
period, which partially consistent with the predictions we were able to draft from the
framework. We assumed female students to be more risk averse than male students,
and under this assumption, we predicted that mostly the 2010 announcement shock
would lead girls to avoid general and academic tracks more than boys. We further
predicted gender heterogeneous responses to announcements to at least reduce after
the second announcement which resolving policy uncertainty.
Table B.5: Effects on Track Enrollment by Gender
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
track Resolution implementation
shares (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Track Gender: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Academic Male 21.5 −0.37∗∗∗ −1.41∗∗∗ −2.60∗∗∗
Female 18.5 −1.77∗∗∗ −3.19∗∗∗ −4.54∗∗∗
General Male 28.5 −0.52 −1.67∗∗ −3.44∗∗∗
Female 27.5 −0.57 −1.53∗∗∗ −3.02∗∗∗
Vocational Male 50.0 0.89∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗ 6.04∗∗∗
Female 54.0 2.34∗∗∗ 4.72∗∗∗ 7.57∗∗∗
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Academic Male −2.02∗∗∗ −7.69∗∗∗ −14.18∗∗∗
Female −8.32∗∗∗ −15.03∗∗∗ −21.46∗∗∗
General Male −1.87 −6.01∗∗ −12.38∗∗∗
Female −2.03∗ −5.41∗∗∗ −10.67∗∗∗
Vocational Male 1.73∗∗∗ 5.99∗∗∗ 11.73∗∗∗
Female 4.89∗∗∗ 9.85∗∗∗ 15.79∗∗∗
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a multinomial logit model of high school
track enrollment as measured in Grade 10, assuming a continued linear pre-trend extending past
2009. The models are split by gender and use respectively 1,354,293 and 1,338,730 individual
observations over years 2005-2017. Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration status,
ethnic background, parental income and employment status, and an urbanization index. *** =
0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1 significance level.
Our main results on track enrollments in Grade 10 are reported in Table B.5, which
shows results for the specification using a linear pre-trend continuing beyond 2009.
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We find that as uncertainty rises in 2010, mostly female students shy away from
academic and general education towards vocational education. Yet female enrollment
keeps on dropping relative to baseline in academic and general tracks in favor of
enrollments in the vocational track. This is rather consistent with a progressive
change in the stereotype that vocational education is more for boys than for girls.
These results are also consistent for alternative specifications of time pre-trends.
Consistently, we also find in Table B.6 that the 2010 shock had heterogeneous effects
across gender on the probability to drop out into a lower track. These results are
similar to those found with our alternative specification. Overall, girls dropped out
into a lower track less often than boys, and this gap increased over time, suggesting
that the margin on which girls respond to reform announcements is initial track
choice rather than re-optimizing throughout their track, while the opposite seems
true for boys.




Outcome: Gender: (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Track Dropout Male 1.81∗∗∗ 2.27∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗
Female 1.16∗∗∗ 0.94∗ −0.47
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Track Dropout Male 44.98∗∗∗ 56.37∗∗∗ 51.56∗∗∗
Female 25.35∗∗∗ 20.47∗ −10.25
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade 11
high school track dropout, assuming a continued linear pre-trend extending past 2009.
The models are split by gender and use respectively 440,807 and 517,705 individual
observations over years 2006-2017. Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration
status, ethnic background, parental income and employment status, and an urbanization
index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1 significance
level.
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Additional effects of reform announcements on field of study enrollments
and dropout
We show that students choice of high school major and dropout decisions from
majors is also consistent with students seeking less risky majors in response to policy
uncertainty.
After students choose a track, learning about policy changes can change their
preferred high school major. Under financial aid with higher chances of repayment,
students have an incentive to choose a field of study which higher returns. This
effect has already been documented in Rothstein and Rouse (2011) and Field (2009).
They show that college student in the United-States became more likely to choose
majors yielding lower returns after student loans were turned into grants; both
papers conclude that this behavior is evidence of debt aversion. van den Berge
(2018) shows that Dutch college students who graduate from STEM and Medicine
programs have higher average earnings and better job opportunities than other
Dutch college students, thus we consider specialization in STEM and Medicine fields
of study as specialization in the higher earning majors in our setting.
Enrollments in STEM and Medicine fields of study
Purely descriptively at first, we find similar effects in the Dutch context among
high school students affected by the policy announcements. Figure B.4 shows the
raw share of students in the academic and general tracks enrolling into STEM and
Medicine high school majors. Students’ choice of field of study also seems to be
affected by the reform.
Following the 2010 reform announcement, the share of students choosing STEM
and Medicine has grown substantially from 44% to 50% in the span of three years.
This growth in enrollment in STEM and Medicine levels off in the academic year
2014-2015 (students starting Grade 10 in this year are the first students who finished
primary school following the first reform announcement) and declines somewhat
in the last year of observation. Although STEM and Medicine majors are more
popular in the academic track, trends in enrollments in STEM and Medicine are
similar across general and academic track students after the 2010 announcement.2
2Note that the pre-announcement trend is potentially distorted by a change in the classification of
fields of study, which took place in the academic year 2007-08. Nonetheless, the figure shows a
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Figure B.4: Trends in STEM Specialization in High School
Note: Authors’ calculations of the choice of STEM specialization in Grade 10 over the
period of observation. STEM specialization corresponds to the following curricula: Nature
and Technology, Nature and Health, and the combination thereof. Other curricula include
Economy and Society, Culture and Society, and all other possible combinations. The
line between years 2005-06 is dashed to highlight different curriculum classification rules
which were in place during this period. Dutch education register data for Grade 10 high
school students who were enrolled in either an academic or a general track in Grade 10,
years 2005 to 2017.
Table B.7 reports the effects of the reform announcements on the probability of
choosing STEM or Medicine majors in Grade 10, conditional on being in a given
track. The 2010 policy announcement led students to choose STEM and Medicine
fields of study more significantly than before. We estimate the magnitude of these
changes using a logit model of the choice of field of study.
We add to the baseline model specification a dummy variable for years 2005 and
2006. This is to account for the change of field classification which occurred between
2006 and 2007 and which caused a discontinuity in the pre-2010 trend. We prefer
the specification with a continued linear time trend because the share of students in
STEM and Medicine specialization was increasing throughout the baseline period
2005-2009, and because similar trends have been observed in other countries (see
Figure B.13). The results in column (1) show that the share of STEM and Medicine
students remained stable after the 2010 announcement which increased policy
mild pre-trend.
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Table B.7: Effects on Enrollment in STEM
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
STEM Resolution implementation
share (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Specialization 44.0 0.56 2.38∗∗∗ 3.00∗∗
in STEM (0.44) (0.73) (1.17)
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Specialization −0.99 4.02∗∗∗ 5.27∗∗
in STEM (0.77) (1.28) (2.06)
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade 10
choice of STEM and Medicine specialization in academic and general high school tracks,
with a linear pre-trend extending beyond 2009. The model uses 549,640 individual
observations over years 2005-2017. Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration
status, ethnic background, parental income and employment status, an urbanization
index and a dummy for the differently-classified period 2005-06. *** = 0.01 significance
level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1 significance level.
uncertainty, and rose after the 2012 announcement which resolved policy uncertainty,
to stabilize and peak after implementation in 2015.
Table B.14 in Appendix B.4 shows the results for the alternative specification
in which we assume the linear pre-trend was discontinued in 2009. This second
specification of the model yields larger effects, with the share of STEM and Medicine
students reaching 5.8 percentage points in the implementation period. Importantly,
both model specifications indicate that enrollment in STEM and Medicine did not
respond immediately to the rise in uncertainty in 2010, which is in contrast with
enrollments in tracks. Our interpretation of this ‘delay’ of the reform announcement
effect is that the decision to switch fields requires more effort than the decision to
switch tracks. This is likely to be the case, if students start profiling themselves for
a specific field well-ahead of their actual field choice in Grade 10. Students dropping
out of their tracks into a less academic track are able to resume studying similar
focal subjects, which minimizes the amount of effort and planning involved in the
procedure. The field of study response of cohorts 2010-2012 is therefore diminished
by the fact that these students spent up to three years of high school preparing for
another specialization.
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The results of our analysis of fields of study could be influenced by the compositional
changes among the students enrolling into the academic and general high school
tracks. In principle, the increase of the share of STEM and Medicine could be a
result of a strong outflow of students interested in humanities to the lower tracks of
high school. We conduct supplementary analyses to show that such compositional
changes are unlikely to explain the magnitude of this increase in the take-up of
STEM and Medicine. Specifically, we analyze the field of study choices of students
who switched from the academic track to the general track, and we find no evidence
of a systematic outflow of students interested in social science and humanities. In
fact, the share of STEM and Medicine specializations among the switching students
is increasing, following a pattern similar to the one plotted in Figure 2.2. The share
of STEM and Medicine specializations among switching students is, however, lower
than the share found among students who decided to stay in the academic track.
This can have a direct effect on the composition of fields of study: Assuming that
the 2.5% of Grade 10 students who decided not to pursue the academic track in
response to the reform would have chosen the same field of study as the students who
switched tracks, we calculate that their outflow would account for a 1 percentage
point change of the STEM and Medicine share. The results suggest that in response
to the reform high school students started moving towards specializations which are
associated with better job prospects and higher earnings potential. These results
echo those of Rothstein and Rouse (2011) and Field (2009). Here we argue that
Dutch high school students act upon the knowledge that they will have to take
more student loans in the future and choose fields of study with better labor market
prospects in order to secure the repayment of their student loans.
Dropout of STEM and Medicine field of study
We now focus on the decision to leave the STEM and Medicine curriculum and to
take up the humanities and social sciences curriculum instead. Our focus is one-sided
because switches from humanities to STEM are very rare. Figure B.5 shows the
shares of students dropping out of STEM and Medicine majors in Grade 11 from
2008 onward. Students dropping out of majors represent a relatively small part of
the student pool engaged in the STEM and Medicine specialization. In years 2008
to 2010, they accounted for only 4.5% of students, and this share declined to 3.3%
in 2013 at which point it stabilized.
Table B.8 reports the effects of policy announcements on dropping out of STEM
or Medicine in Grade 11, conditional on being in STEM or Medicine in Grade 10.
The share of students who leave the STEM and Medicine curriculum decreased by
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Figure B.5: Share of Dropout from STEM and Medicine Specialization in High School
Note: Authors’ calculations of the choice to switch from STEM specialization to a non-
STEM specialization in Grade 11 over the period of observation. STEM specialization
corresponds to the following curricula: Nature and Technology, Nature and Health, and
the combination thereof. Other curricula include Economy and Society, Culture and
Society, and all other possible combinations. Dutch education register data for Grade 11
academic or general track high school students who chose the STEM specialization in
Grade 10, years 2008 to 2017.
0.30 percentage points after the 2010 announcement, further decreasing by 1.12
percentage points after the uncertainty is resolved in the 2012 announcement, and
stabilizing at -1.21 percentage points after reform implementation in 2015.
Table B.15 in Appendix B.4 reports the results for the alternative specification
using a continued linear pre-trend, which yields similar results. The first year of
analysis is 2008. We prefer the model specification which does not extrapolate the
pre-trend, as for the model of track dropout in the main results section, because the
time interval used to identify the pre-trend is too short, and because the share of
switching students in the implementation period is sustained. Overall, these results
indicate that students were also re-optimizing their high school orientation in terms
of field of study following the changes in their decision environment induced by the
reform announcements.
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Table B.8: Effects on STEM Dropout
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
STEM Resolution implementation
Dropout (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
STEM Dropout 4.5 −0.30∗∗∗ −1.12∗∗∗ −1.21∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
STEM Dropout −7.93∗∗∗ −29.95∗∗∗ −32.21∗∗
(0.04) (0.08) (0.11)
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade 11 choice
to dropout of STEM and Medicine into another subject specialization, assuming a break in
the pre-trend in 2009. The model uses 451,512 individual observations over years 2006-2017.
Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration status, ethnic background, parental income
and employment status, an urbanization index and a dummy for the differently-classified period
2005-06. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1 significance level.
STEM and Medicine enrollment and dropout by family income
Table B.9 indicates that students are not significantly more likely to enroll in STEM
fields after the initial shock in 2010, irrespective of their family background. Following
uncertainty resolution following the second announcement, however, middle and
high income students became more likely to enroll in STEM fields. These results
with the continued linear pre-trend specification, are similar to those obtained with
the alternative specification (not presented in this chapter), which shows that low
and medium income students were already responsive to the first announcement (by
0.43 percentage points and 0.81 percentage points respectively).
Table B.10 presents suggestive evidence regarding dropout and reorientation after
one year, immediately following exposure to announcement shocks. Low income
students who choose a STEM field are less likely to switch fields after uncertainty
increased in 2010, and persistently after uncertainty is resolved from 2013 onward.
For middle and higher income students, however, dropout rates in STEM majors
peak after the second announcement, in 2013.
These results provide further evidence that high school students respond with
anticipation to the incentives generated by student finance in higher education. As
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Outcome: Income: (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Specialization Low −0.8 1.52∗∗ 1.16
in STEM Medium 0.54 3.02∗∗∗ 5.43∗∗∗
High −1.17 2.00∗∗ 2.09
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Specialization Low −1.45 2.78∗∗ 2.12
in STEM Medium 0.97 5.44∗∗∗ 9.79∗∗∗
High −2.01 3.45∗∗ 3.6
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade
10 choice of STEM and Medicine specialization in academic and general high school
tracks, assuming a continued linear pre-trend beyond 2009. The dataset is split by
parental income terciles and uses respectively 96,694; 150,621; and 299,946 individual
observations over years 2006-2017. Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, mi-
gration status, ethnic background, parental income and employment status, and an
urbanization index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1
significance level.
uncertainty peaked, vulnerable students were the ones responding; as uncertainty
resolved in favor of vulnerable students, those responding most are middle and
high income students who would not be eligible to receive means-tested aid. These
students, therefore, faced the steepest increase of costs, while low-income students
were eventually sheltered from the cost increase.
One issue is that it is difficult to conclude which students are made better or worse off
by policy uncertainty, which led students to choose alternative tracks and high school
majors. The proportion of middle-income students preparing for college dropped
substantially, however among those who remained in the academic track there was
a strong shift towards high-earning subjects. Students in the third income tercile
also lowered their enrollments into the academic-track, yet unlike middle-income
students, they did not change their subject specialization and chose more often
to remain in the general track, rather than spilling over into the vocational track.
Students from the relatively poorer families adjusted their track choices similarly to
middle-income students, however their adjustment was less pronounced, and they
did not adjust their specialization towards fields yielding higher returns.
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Outcome: Income: (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
STEM Low −2.07∗∗∗ −3.43∗∗∗ −5.38∗∗∗
dropout Medium 0.46∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
High 0.33∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
STEM Low −48.08∗∗∗ −79.70∗∗∗ −125.01∗∗∗
dropout Medium 13.14∗∗∗ 11.03∗∗∗ 22.69∗∗∗
High 9.01∗∗∗ −10.74∗∗∗ 15.58∗∗∗
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade
11 choice to switch from STEM and Medicine to another subject specialization,
assuming a continued linear pre-trend beyond 2009. The dataset is split by parental
income tercile and uses respectively 96,693; 138,489; and 218,330 individual
observations over years 2006-2017. Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender,
migration status, ethnic background, parental income and employment status, and
an urbanization index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level,
* = 0.1 significance level.
Gender and STEM and Medicine field of study enrollments
We find strong gender differences in how students respond to reform announcements.
Girls were responsible for almost the entire reform effect on STEM specialization and
re-orientation. Table B.11 shows that girls were more proactive and more flexible in
their choices than boys as early as uncertainty increased in 2010. These results also
hold using our alternative specification (not presented in this chapter).
Once the reform is implemented in 2015, the take-up of STEM and Medicine among
girls had increased by 10% compared to baseline, while the reform announcements
and implementation coefficients for boys are close to zero and failing to yield
statistical significance. At baseline, the take-up of STEM and Medicine among girls
was considerably lower than among boys (38% compared to 50%). The student
finance reform narrowed this gap considerably, although a small disparity remains
even in the last year of observation (48% compared to 51%).
These results could reflect differences in forward-looking behavior of girls and boys.
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Table B.11: Effects on Enrollment in STEM, by Gender
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
STEM Resolution implementation
share (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Outcome: Gender: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Specialization Male 50.0 −1.18 1.31 −0.13
in STEM Female 38.0 −0.35 2.77∗∗∗ 5.22∗∗∗
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Specialization Male −1.91 2.12 −0.21
in STEM Female −0.67 5.3 ∗ ∗∗ 9.98∗∗∗
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade 10 choice
of STEM and Medicine specialization in academic and general high school tracks, assuming
a continuing linear pre-trend extending beyond 2009. The models are split by gender and use
respectively 257,338 and 292,302 individual observations over years 2005-2017. Controls:
region fixed effects, age, gender, migration status, ethnic background, parental income and
employment status, and an urbanization index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05
significance level, * = 0.1 significance level.
They could also indicate gender differences in debt aversion. Lastly, gender differences
in responses to reform announcements could also relate to parents’ willingness to pay
for education of their children, and how much this varies depending on the child’s
gender.
Additional effects of policy announcements on living arrangements and
commuting distance in post-secondary education
We show further evidence in line with students exhibiting debt aversion. To avoid
taking debt, students can prefer reducing expenditures, and living at home after high
school instead of moving closer to university is one way of lowering expenditures.
This decision puts students in front of a new trade-off between choosing a university
closer to home or to commute more. For this exercise, we construct commuting
distance from home to school as the Euclidian distance from the residential address of
a student to his post-secondary institution. Addresses of post-secondary vocational
institutions are not available in our data, so we focus on Universities of Applied
Sciences and University students.
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Figure B.6: Living Arrangements and Commuting Distance
(a) Living arrangements of first-year higher education students
(b) Geographical distance from parental home to school
(c) Commuting distance form parental home to school
Note: Authors’ calculations of the living arrangement choices among of first year students enrolled
in vocational and higher education institutions. Living arrangements are retrieved at the end of
the first semester; students are classified as living with their parents if parents are registered at
the same residential address. The distance measures correspond to Euclidean distance between the
student’s residence and the institution attended. Dutch education register and municipal register
data for first year students enrolled in vocational and higher education institutions, years 2010 to
2017.
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Figure B.6 plots changes in living arrangements and commuting distance of students
in their first year after graduating from high school, over our time frame. Figure B.6a
show the probability that students live at home over time, depending on the type
of post-secondary education they are enrolled in. The figure reveals two important
patterns: 1) 95% of all vocational students, who eventually were not affected in 2015,
consistently live at home in their first year after high school, while 2) professional
and academic higher education students are less likely to still live at home, but this
probability increases dramatically in 2015, the first cohort of students eventually
affected by the reform. This suggests that these students, who had no choice but to
take-up loans, adjust their expenditures by living at home, and not having to pay
rent for an independent apartment.
Figure B.6b shows that the distance from students’ home to their university or
institution remained stable throughout, suggesting that students are not choosing
different universities than they did prior to 2015. Figure B.6c completes the picture
by showing that these new living arrangements were made at the cost of commuting
distance, and not the choice of institution. Students who entered higher education
in 2015 under the new student finance regime preferred commuting slightly more to
their institution rather than choosing institutions closer to home.
These new living arrangements are further evidence that students avoided accumu-
lating debt in response to the new policy environment.
Additional effects of policy announcements on labor supply and take-up
of financial aid in post-secondary education
We study students’ labor supply, which is another margin on which students are
likely to adjust to the new system of student finance. Previous literature (e.g.
Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010) has shown that parental transfer, financial aid
and students’ labor supply are substitutes, such that when financial aid decreases,
students receiving low parental transfers are likely to increase labor supply.
Under the new regime of student finance, students faced higher costs of attending
higher education (but not vocational education). Thus, we can expect to find
an increase in the labor supply of higher education freshmen from 2015 onward,
compared to baseline. Figure B.7 shows the employment rate of students in their
first year after high school, relative to the employment rate of students in the same
education level in 2006. We find that labor supply dynamics are similar across levels
of education, suggesting that labor supply was not a margin that students heavily
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Figure B.7: Labor Supply of Young Adults in the Netherlands, Years 2006-2017
Note: Authors’ calculations of the employment rates among vocational-
school graduates and freshmen enrolled in higher education institutions
over the period of observation. Employment is recorded if the young
adult was recorded to work within the span of the academic year
starting in the respective calendar year. Dutch education register and
tax register data for young adults, years 2006-2017.
used in our setting.
Other sources suggest that one reason why we are not finding that students labor
supply changed in response to the new student finance environment, is that freshmen
in 2015 re-optimized through other margins, in particular living arrangements.
To complement our main results from administrative records, we refer the reader to
annual reports of the Studenten Monitor, a longitudinal survey of a representative
sample of approximately 20,000 students in higher education, which has been
collected since 2001 at the initiative of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture
and Science. The Studenten Monitor contains a battery of questions on students’
beliefs and perceptions about student finance, labor supply, as well as sources of
income and budgeting choices during higher education.
The Studenten Monitor reveals three changes which suggest that students re-
optimized their budget to avoid accumulating debt. The first change is a decline
in the take up of student loans. After 2015, roughly 3% of all Dutch freshmen had
not applied to any financial aid. The take-up of student loans among freshmen
respondents only increased by 20 percentage points in 2015, from a stable 27%
from 2001 to 2014 to 47% after 2015. This is suggestive that there is a substantial
share of students who preferred not claiming financial aid under the new system of
student finance, with smaller differences in take-up behavior across family income
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after 2015. The share of students who claimed 90% of more of the maximum amount
they are entitled to has declined over time, down to 31% in 2015. This result is in
line with the general pattern of under-utilization of student loans found in many
settings, including the Dutch context. The average monthly amounts borrowed
among students with a student loan has increased after the introduction of the
new student finance regime, from €394 to €439 per month (an increase of €44 per
month), with variation across type of higher education.3
The second change is a decline in the labor supply of students, compensated by
an increase in parental investments. Freshmen in 2015 and onward choose more
often than previous cohorts to neither take-up a student loan nor work – this is in
line with the absence of significant change in labor supply which we found in the
administrative records in Figure B.7. These students are supported by their parents
both directly through increased parental transfers, and indirectly parents covering
expenditures, including in-kind transfers through living arrangements at home.
The third change is in increase in the preferences of freshmen in 2010 for minimizing
debt compared to previous cohorts. Among respondents who did not take-up a
student loan, the main reasons for not borrowing remain stable over the time frame,
and relate to either parents not agreeing with student borrowing (mostly highly
educated parents), or having fundamental objections with borrowing (mostly lower
educated parents), or students lacking knowledge about borrowing conditions. From
2015 onward, however, respondents were more likely to answer that they receive
enough parental monetary support and don’t feel the need to take up a loan, and
substantially less likely to respond that they perform paid work to avoid taking-up
a loan. 2015 freshmen who do, however, take up loans, are more likely to have been
advised by their parents to take-up a loan, and less likely to declare that they are not
willing to work to finance their studies. This suggests that even among borrowers,
the trade-off over labor supply and loan take-up is less important than we expected,
largely because families re-optimized their budget through living arrangements.
Overall, these changes in students’ preferences and beliefs about debt and labor
supply are suggestive of debt aversion. That students re-optimized their budget and
avoided taking up loans from 2015 onward is suggestive that these preferences were
already latent when the 2015 cohort was entering high school 5 years earlier, around
the time of the 2010 announcement which increased policy uncertainty about the
3see also van den Broek et al. (2017)
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future of financial aid.
B.4 Sensitivity Analyses
Results under Alternative Specification
Table B.12: Alternative Specification - Main Effects on Track Enrollment
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
track Resolution implementation
shares (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Academic 21.0 −0.39∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ −1.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
General 29.0 0.57∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Vocational 50.2 −0.18 0.32∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Academic −1.92∗∗∗ −4.67∗∗∗ −6.00∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
General 1.98∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Vocational −0.34 0.66∗ 1.14∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a multinomial logit model
of high school track enrollment as measured in Grade 10, using a linear pre-trend that
does not extend beyond 2009. The model uses 2,692,887 individual observations over
years 2005-2017. Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration status, ethnic
background, parental income and employment status, and an urbanization index. ***
= 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1 significance level. This
is an alternative specification compared to results shown in Table 2.3.
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Table B.13: Alternative Specification - Main Effects on Track Dropout
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
track Resolution implementation
dropout (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Track Dropout 4.1 1.46∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 0.71
(0.33) (0.50) (0.76)
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Track Dropout 33.78∗∗∗ 35.83∗∗∗ 16.37
(7.55) (11.47) (17.50)
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of track dropout measured
in Grade 11 compared to high school track observed in Grade 10, using a linear pre-trend extending
beyond 2009. The model uses 958,512 individual observations over years 2006-2017. Controls: region
fixed effects, age, gender, migration status, ethnic background, parental income and employment
status, and an urbanization index. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * =
0.1 significance level. This is an alternative specification compared to results shown in Table 2.4.
Table B.14: Alternative Specification - Effects on Enrollment in STEM
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
STEM Resolution implementation
share (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
Specialization 44.0 0.25 3.91∗∗∗ 5.83∗∗∗
in STEM (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
Specialization 0.44 6.87∗∗∗ 10.26∗∗∗
in STEM (0.38) (0.38) (0.39)
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade 10 choice of
STEM and Medicine specialization in academic and general high school tracks, assuming a break
in the pre-trend in 2009. The model uses 549,640 individual observations over years 2005-2017.
Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration status, ethnic background, parental income
and employment status, an urbanization index and a dummy for the differently-classified period
2005-06. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1 significance level. This
is an alternative specification compared to results shown in Table B.7.
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Table B.15: Alternative Specification - Effects on STEM Dropout
Baseline Uncertainty Uncertainty Post-
STEM Resolution implementation
Dropout (%)
(2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2014) (2015-2017)
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Absolute Effects (in percentage points)
STEM Dropout 4.5 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Panel B: Relative Effects (in percent)
STEM Dropout −3.25∗∗∗ −20.60∗∗∗ −15.94∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.28) (0.42)
Note: Authors’ estimates of three reform coefficients from a logit model of Grade 11 choice
to dropout of STEM and Medicine into another subject specialization, assuming a break in
the pre-trend in 2009. The model uses 451,512 individual observations over years 2006-2017.
Controls: region fixed effects, age, gender, migration status, ethnic background, parental income
and employment status, an urbanization index and a dummy for the differently-classified period
2005-06. *** = 0.01 significance level, ** = 0.05 significance level, * = 0.1 significance level.
This is an alternative specification compared to results shown in Table B.8.
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Potential Confounding Factors
In this subsection of Appendix B.4, we systematically explore potential confounding
factors which could bias our results. We explore these factors by order of relevance,
based on our conceptual framework.
Expected Wage Premia and Opportunity Cost
A natural concern is that the changes in track and study choice are a result of
changes in track specific changes in returns to education and opportunity cost of
studying.
Expected Wages Premia Using Dutch administrative data, van den Berge
(2018) shows that earnings profiles of graduates from academic Universities (WO)
and Universities of Applied Sciences (HBO) are very comparable since 1999, such
that the wage premium from academic over general education is almost constant over
time. As the framework indicates, the marginal student who is indifferent between
general and academic education will consider not his expected level of earnings
in academic or in general education, but rather his expected wage premium from
graduating with an academic degree over a general degree. Similarly, the share of
full-time students employed directly after education is very high, comparable and
more importantly stable over our entire time period between graduates of vocational,
general and academic education (see Table B.16).
We cannot directly observe students’ wage premium expectations nor their expected
employment probabilities. A growing body of work on the formation of beliefs (see e.g.
Delavande and Zafar, 2019) shows, however, that students’ expectations are realistic.
Consequently, under the assumption that students have realistic expectations, it
is unlikely that the effect of policy announcements on track choice and dropout
would be driving solely by diverging expectations about wage premiums of general
education over vocational education, and of academic over general education.
Opportunity Cost of Studying An important aspect of students’ decision
making is the opportunity cost of studying. For a student who is indifferent between
academic and general education, the opportunity cost of studying is the premium the
student would receive from graduating earlier from general education and receiving
a general education wage premium. For a student who is indifferent between general
and vocational education, however, this opportunity cost is the vocational graduate
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Table B.16: Employment Prospect of Tracks, by Education Level
Academic year: 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Panel A. Share of cohort in paid employment 6 months after leaving education
Vocational education (MBO):
Dropout 67.0 58.6 57.4 57.3 54.1 51.0 51.7 56.2
Graduate 86.9 83.0 82.2 81.9 79.8 78.0 77.5 79.7
Uni. Applied Sciences (HBO):
Dropout 80.1 79.7 75.3 73.9 75.3 73.3 70.0 71.6 74.0
Graduate 88.7 88.4 86.0 86.0 86.6 85.0 84.1 84.9 86.2
University (WO):
Dropout 72.1 70.8 65.1 64.7 64.7 62.8 56.4 56.7 59.8
Graduate 81.8 81.1 79.3 77.4 77.9 75.9 74.0 75.7 76.7
Panel B. Year-to-year % changes
Vocational education (MBO):
Dropout -13 -2 0 -6 -6 1 9
Graduate -4 -1 0 -3 -2 -1 3
Uni. Applied Sciences (HBO):
Dropout 0 -6 -2 2 -3 -5 2 3
Graduate 0 -3 0 1 -2 -1 1 2
University (WO):
Dropout -2 -8 -1 0 -3 -10 1 5
Graduate -1 -2 -2 1 -3 -3 2 1
Note: CBS Statline - aggregate administrative data publicly available.
wage a student would receive for graduating earlier from vocational education over
general education.
Our main findings are not in line with an alternative explanation relying on the Great
Recession. Indeed, we would expect that the Great Recession increases incentives
to choose longer educational tracks which promise higher labor market returns,
compared to shorter tracks with lower labor market returns.
In addition, we can show that i) minimum wage is stable over the entire period
and mandated by law, and ii) youth unemployment rate shows no sign of trend
breaks between 2000 and 2017, in spite of the Great Recession. Figure B.8 shows the
national youth unemployment rate for the 15-19 year old across countries surrounding
the Netherlands, over the period 2000 to 2018. The Dutch unemployment rate is
around 10 to 14% for the 15-19-year-old population, making it one of the lowest
in the European Union and most stable throughout the crisis. Thus, it seems also
unlikely that students’ opportunity cost of studying suddenly increased in light
of the policy announcement in 2010. Similar rates and dynamics also apply for
other age ranges. Thus, the opportunity cost of studying is stable throughout our
time-frame, and changes in the opportunity cost of studying would not explain away
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our results on either sorting into tracks nor dropout rates.
Figure B.8: Youth Unemployment Rate, 15 to 19 Year-Old Population
Note: This figure is based on data from the OECD Dataset Labour
Force Survey by sex and age – indicators; Data extracted on 23 Jan
2020 00:45 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
Psychological Cost of Studying: Education Difficulty and Duration of
Studies
One might be concerned that our results are driven by changes in students’ underlying
cost of studying, either because high school track curricula or duration of studies
coincidentally changed in 2010.
High School Graduation Rates Panel A of Table B.17 shows that high school
graduation rates are stable over time. Using aggregate data from the Dutch Ministry
of Education (DUO Statline), we first note that the probability of graduating is
highest for vocational students around 96%, and lowest for academic students around
88%. Second, we find a decline in graduation rates at academic and general high
school in 2008 which is likely linked to curriculum reform which took place in 2007.
The gap in graduation probabilities is stable between general and academic tracks,
and remains small between general and vocational tracks before reverting to baseline
from 2012 onward. Importantly, splitting these graduation probabilities by high
school major within tracks, we see no differences between majors, such that diverging
trends in the difficulty of tracks and majors within tracks cannot explain our results
on selection into tracks, resorting after one year, major choice within tracks and
major resorting after one year.
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Average Time to Graduation in Higher Education Another way to think
about the psychic cost of studying in a given educational track is to consider the
average time to graduation in post-secondary education, as shown in Panel B of
Table B.17. From 2003 until 2012, we find that the average time to graduation for
students enrolled full-time in a first bachelor degree – the average scenario on which
we expect prospective students to form expectations – is stable over time, ranging
from between 4.25 up to 5 years across majors and type of institution. Students
enrolled in Universities of Applied Sciences take on average 4.5 years to graduate
from their first bachelor degree irrespective of whether they study in STEM or
non-STEM majors, while students enrolled in research universities take on average
4.25 years if enrolled in non-STEM majors and 5 years if enrolled in STEM majors.
Thus, diverging expectations about the psychic costs of studying across tracks and
the natural following type of studies are unlikely to be main channel driving our
results.
Net Direct Out-of-Pocket Cost of Studying
A concern could be that other direct costs of studying changed coincidentally at
the time of reform announcements. Table B.1 shows that any costs associated to
attending post-secondary were stable, as well as financial aid amounts. Table B.1
provides amounts of every aspect of financial aid since 2002, and Table B.2 shows
that of loan conditions are also stable since 1996.
Interest Rate of Student Loans Loan reimbursement schemes are fixed over
the period. The interest rate applied for students reimbursing their student loans
varies from year to year, but varies very little (over the entire period, from 0% to
4%), and is consistently below market rates for commercial loans. Over the period,
interest rates follow a decreasing trend, from around 4% before 2008 to less than 1%
from 2013 onward.
Tuition Fees Tuition fees are virtually non-existent in the Dutch education sys-
tem until only post-secondary education. Parents may give a voluntary contribution
to their child’s school, e.g. for extra-curricular activities and school outings, but
these contributions are negligible. No compulsory tuition can be charge to parents in
either primary or secondary school. Tuition fees do, however, exist in post-secondary
education and in secondary vocational education, yet these are low, and indexed to
inflation, such that they increase at a low and stable rate over time of a few dozens
of euros yearly.
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Financial Aid Amounts Student finance is stable until the 2015 reform. Amounts
of grants are indexed to inflation and increase at a slow and steady pace. Income
thresholds determining eligibility to the means-tested grant are also indexed and
increase at the same rate. Eligibility conditions for the various part of student
finance are fixed over the period. Overall, the policy announcements are unlikely to
have affected students’ sorting through changes in students’ net cost of studying, as
interest rates on student loans, tuition fees, and all other aspects of financial aid
but repayment probabilities changed over the time-frame of our study.
Thus, we conclude that the 2010 and 2012 announcements affected students’ sorting
chiefly through a shock to students’ subjective probabilities of repayment of financial
aid.
Parental Unemployment and the Great Recession
A concern could be that we observe students shying away from academic and general
education from 2010 onward not because of policy announcements about financial
aid, but rather because their parents push them to enroll in vocational education
which provides learning paths through paid apprenticeships. This could be the
case if parental employment suddenly declined in 2010 and continued throughout.
Yet, parental unemployment is mostly stable over the entire course of this study:
Figure B.9 shows that fathers of students in our sample are employed in roughly
74% of cases, and mothers in roughly 67% of cases. Thus, changes in parental
unemployment around the time of the policy announcements we study are unlikely
to confound the effects we find. To reduce any remaining concern, we control for
parental employment status and earnings in all our specifications.
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Figure B.9: Parental Unemployment Rate in our Estimation Sample, Since 2004
Note: Authors’ calculations of the employment rates among parents
of students in our main estimation sample. Employment is recorded
if the parent was recorded to work within the span of the academic
year starting in the respective calendar year. Dutch education register
and tax register data, years 2004-2017.
Education Supply and School Capacity Constraints
Another concern could be that the changes in students’ selection into tracks occurs
because of underlying changes to the number of available spots in each track in
2010 and onward. School capacity constraints are not an issue in our setting for
institutional reasons; Table B.18 provides yearly number of schools at all levels of
education.
Over the period, the number of primary schools declined at a steady pace, from 7,500
institutions in 2007 down to 2,750 in 2013. This could suggest a strain on educational
resources, if student to teacher ratios increased, but instead the average number of
students in each school remains remarkably stable, at about 220 pupils per school
over the same period. Instead, cohorts are getting smaller over the period, which
would eventually result in smaller cohorts of secondary school students in subsequent
years – thus freeing spots in every track and making it unlikely for potential capacity
constraints to start binding for later cohorts. Smaller cohorts over time can become
a concern if 1) later cohorts become smaller at the time of policy announcements,
and 2) if the “missing students” were those who would have otherwise chosen to
study in the academic and general tracks. We see a steady decline in cohort size,
with no trend break in 2010, suggesting that this is not concern a likely potential
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confound for our effects.
The supply of education in secondary school provide further answers. The number
of secondary schools is almost fixed over 2007 to 2013. The distribution of these
schools by type of track offer is also fixed, with a stable 50% of these offering all
three tracks to students, and 75% offering at least two tracks out of three. Of
the remaining 25% of institutions, about 4% offers the general track only, 6% the
academic track only, and 15% offers the vocational track only. One could worry that
the distribution of students across these school changes as a result of the changing
size of cohorts, yet this distribution is also remarkably stable, with almost 75% of
students attending an institution offering all tracks. The average number of pupils
per institution is, however, increasing, from approximately 1,400 students in 2007 to
1,460 in 2013 – this increase represents approximately an increase of 2 classes over
the time-frame. These facts together reinforce our finding that capacity constraints
are not concerning in the Dutch education system, as the cohort size variation seems
to be distributed equally across the various types of institutions, as shown by the
stable shares of students across the different types of schools and the stable number
of schools of each type.
Lastly, the number of Universities (15) and Universities of Applied Sciences (40) is
stable over the period of observation, as well as the number of vocational institutions
(60). This stability indicates no openings or closings of post-secondary education
institutions, thus leaving unchanged students’ proximity to post-secondary education
institutions over the time-frame of this study. Consequently, one should not be
concerned that students’ expectations regarding the possibility of attending post-
secondary education should change over the period, lest for the reform information
shocks that we study in this paper.
Changes to School Funding Rules, Selection Rules, Education Policies
Apart from the reform of student finance, the Netherlands was not subject to
any other major reforms of either primary, secondary or tertiary education over
the period of observation. The funding mechanisms for secondary and tertiary
schools have not changed since the 1963 Mammoth Law of Secondary Education.
The Mammoth Law develops the principle of “Free School Choice” ensures that
students (and their parents) can choose any school of their liking. For all schools,
the central government allocates budgets to schools according to the number of
students enrolled as of October 1st. Schools that specialize in one type of track
can, however, deny enrollment to students whose recommendation and CITO score
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does not match the school’s track – yet this concerns only a small minority of
school (around 5% of institutions, for about 2 to 3% of the student population –
see Table B.18). Thus, students’ high school choice should not, in principle, be
affected by capacity constraints. Similarly, application processes to secondary and
post-secondary institutions are fixed over our time frame, as well as requirements
for tertiary majors in the vast majority of programs. In a similar vein, the number
of selective majors and their admission criteria are also stable over the period.
We found little evidence of other policies that could explain away our results.
Two policy discussions required careful analysis. The first concern is a debate
regarding the relative importance of CITO and of teacher recommendations in
guiding students ending primary school towards their preferred track in secondary
school. This discussion could be concerning if it changed trends in 2010 towards
academic and general tracks. This debate, however, is not too concerning as it was
a longstanding debate in the Dutch education system, which eventually led to a
reform in 2014, with no specific highlights in 2010 that could explain trend breaks
in enrollment in tracks, and even more strikingly dropout rates in 2010.
The second policy discussion that could have been concerning is a discussion fostered
by the European Commission since 2004 regarding STEM fields, which the objective
to improve regional economic integration. This policy discussion could be concerning
if it created an underlying trend toward STEM fields. It is, however, not so
concerning for two main reasons. First, although the discussion at the European
level led to the creation of national agencies which role was to inform and incentivize
students to study STEM topics, the Dutch agency Platform Beta-Techniek mostly
used small-scale information interventions until 2012. Only in 2018 has this agency
merged with industry lobbies to increase its impact. An exploration of Google
Searches of terms associated to this discussion shows no sign that this was a wide
concern for public opinion (not presented in this chapter).
Broader Trends
Trends in Scores and Teacher Recommendations Exiting Primary School
A concern could be changing underlying patterns of unobserved heterogeneity driving
results on enrollments in tracks in Grade 10. Cohorts of students could change
over time in their academic ability. The concern is that, the school system being
comparable over time, students’ ability is declining over time, such that fewer
students enrolling in academic and general education reflects not a response to policy
announcements but rather unobserved changes in the ability distribution in the
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student population.
Figure B.10: Teacher Track Recommendations over Time
Note: Authors’ calculations of teacher track recommendation trends for students in our main
estimation sample. Track recommendations are recorded with CITO test score information each
calendar year over our time-frame. Dutch education register, years 2006-2017.
Figure B.11: CITO-Based Track Recommendations over Time
Note: Authors’ calculations of CITO-based track recommendation trends for students in our main
estimation sample. CITO test score results are recorded each calendar year over our time-frame.
For each child with a CITO score, we construct a CITO-based track recommendation using the
publicly available threshold in CITO scores recommended by the CITOGroep (see Appendix B.1 for
exact thresholds). Dutch education register, years 2006-2017.
We perform two types of checks: i) we check whether trends changed in the track
recommendations that students receive at the end of primary school (Figure B.10),
and ii) we check whether there are changes in the track recommendations that
students would receive only based on their CITO scores, that is, whether students
get worse CITO scores over time (Figure B.11). Track recommendations are given
in the last year of primary school (Grade 6), and are available from the academic
year 2005-2006 which implies that we do not observe the recommendations and test
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scores for the first four cohorts of students in our main dataset of Grade 10 students
(these are the students who started Grade 6 in years 2001 to 2004).
Figure B.10 shows the initial distribution of teacher recommendations in year 2006
and the changes of the distribution over the period of observation, taking the 2006
levels as the starting point. The initial distribution of teacher’s recommendations
shown in the first panel is remarkably close to the distribution of actual Grade 10
track shares in 2005. The second panel shows that teachers’ recommendations have
been changing over time, yet in the opposite direction as would be consistent with a
general decline in ability. Over our period, cohorts exiting primary school in 2007
to 2011 – whose final track assignment takes place between 2010 and 2014, during
our policy announcements - received on average better track recommendations than
earlier cohorts, yet these students end up choosing tracks that are lower than earlier
cohorts – a pattern that goes against the hypothesis that teacher recommendations
explaining resorting to lower tracks.
Figure B.11 shows high school recommendations over time as based on the CITO test
scores directly, using the recommendations cut-offs recommended by the CITOGroep.
If the test was not designed to be comparable across years, one could consider test-
based recommendations to be noisier as scores could in principle be influenced by
year-to-year variation in the difficulty of the CITO test. The design of the test
insures against this concern. Recommendations based on CITO scores are consistent
over time, thus changing students’ abilities over time do not appear as a serious
potential explanation for the trend reversal in high school track choice that we
observe in 2010. However, the trend in test-based recommendations shows a break
in 2013: fewer students achieve scores in the middle of the distribution. The cohort
of pupils exiting primary school in 2013 differed from the 2012 cohort in that they
were informed about the specific contents and the timeline of the financial aid
reform. In the absence of any other change in 2012 regarding the test structure, we
interpret this break as revealing a change in effort provision of students after the
2012 announcement.
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Table B.18: Number of Schools, Pupils, and Education Expenditures in the
Netherlands
Academic year: 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Panel A. Number of schools and institutions
Elementary 7,537 7,528 7,515 7,480 7,434 7,360 7,261
Secondary 645 647 644 646 646 645 645
Vocational (MBO) 61 60 59 58 57 57 57
Uni. Applied Sciences (HBO) 37 36 36 35 35 35 34
University (WO) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Panel B. Average number of students per institution, by level of education
Elementary 220 221 221 220 219 219 218
Secondary 1,404 1,391 1,401 1,406 1,421 1,440 1,458
Vocational (MBO) 7,821 7,994 8,239 8,438 8,396 8,269 8,195
Uni. Applied Sciences (HBO) 9,888 10,413 10,942 11,629 11,835 11,769 12,639
University (WO) 17,222 17,833 18,842 19,528 19,736 19,369 20,010
Panel C. Cumulative distribution of secondary school types by track offered (in %)
All tracks 47 46 45 46 45 45 45
Academic/General 68 67 66 67 66 66 66
General/pre-voc. 73 73 72 73 72 72 72
Academic 79 79 78 79 78 78 79
General 81 81 80 81 81 81 82
Pre-vocational 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel D. Cumulative distribution of secondary school students by school type (in %)
All tracks 71 71 72 71 71 71 71
Academic/General 90 90 91 90 90 90 90
General/pre-voc. 93 93 94 93 93 93 93
Academic 96 96 97 96 96 96 97
General 97 97 98 97 97 97 98
Pre-vocational 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel E. Cumulative distribution of education expenditures by education level (in %)
Elementary 32.3 33.3 34.3 35.3 36.3 37.3 38.3
Secondary 55.0 54.8 56.0 55.6 55.0 56.0 56.2
Voc./adult education 67.1 66.6 68.0 67.5 66.6 67.6 67.4
Uni. Applied Sciences (HBO) 74.8 74.3 75.9 75.9 75.0 76.0 75.7
University (WO) 88.1 87.3 88.9 88.9 88.1 89.3 88.7
Student Finance 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Source Rijksoverheid and Ministry of Education, Education Statistical yearbooks
(2007-2013).
294
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Macro-Trends in Europe Regarding University-Preparing Education and
STEM Fields We show that the dynamics of educational choices in the Nether-
lands are unlikely to be driven by changes of macroeconomic conditions and other
international trends. Figure B.12 shows academic high school enrollments in the
Netherlands compared to neighboring European countries (Belgium (Wallonia and
Flanders), Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway). These countries 1) are in the
proximity of the Netherlands, 2) use comparable systems of secondary education,
and 3) publish yearly statistics of high school track enrollments since 2005 at least,
which we used to construct this figure. The figure plots the trend in the Netherlands
against the country-specific trends indicated by grey lines, and their arithmetic
average indicated by the dashed line. From the figure, we see that the dynamics of
education choices in the Netherlands clearly deviate from the trends in comparison
countries. In most countries, enrollments into academic high schools gradually rose
over time, following sustained linear trajectories. None of the countries recorded a
trend reversal similar to the one we observe in the Netherlands in 2010-2015. This
gives us confidence that the results presented in our paper are not an artifact of
broader changes of socio-economic and geo-political conditions in western Europe.
Figure B.12: European Trends Towards Vocational Education over Time
Note: This figure is based on statistical yearbooks and online publicly available aggregate adminis-
trative data of Norway, Denmark, France, Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Germany.
295
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Figure B.13: European Trends Towards STEM Fields in Tertiary Education over Time
Note: This figure is based on Unesco UIS online data. Own calculations aggregating percentage of
students in tertiary education enrolled in three fields of study: 1) Engineering, Manufacturing and
Construction programs, 2) Information and Communication Technologies programs, and 3) Natural
Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics programs. Both sexes. Data extracted on 22 Oct 2019 03:57
UTC (GMT) from UIS.Stat.
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C.1 Construction of Standardized Scales in TEPS
We summarize the wealth of data available in TEPS into standardized summary
indices using commonly used data reduction methods. We proceed as following:
1. Compute Spearman correlation of all potential variables in the factor to
construct: eliminate very low correlates; Run preliminary PCA on remaining
variables
2. Count number of missing values by individual across variables
3. Standardize each variable, construct preliminary index as row-mean across
standardized variables
4. Cut preliminary index into deciles: construct bins of similar input
5. For each variable, construct median within index decile among people used for
imputation. If missing item and less than 1/3 missing, replace missing value
by median within index decile.
6. Re-run PCA now using variables with imputed values, to check visually that
factor with and without imputed values have same distribution
In the long table below, we report for each index we use:
1. the items used and their respondent (Teacher, Student or Parents),
2. the initial number of observations for each of these items separately,
3. PCA factor loadings before and after imputation,
4. the number of observations for the factor before and after imputation,
5. the eigenvalue of the first and second factors before and after imputation,
Factor for which no imputation has been performed are indicated by blanks for
factor loadings after imputation, observations after imputation and eigenvalue of
first factor after imputation.
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Table C.1: Construction of Standardized Scales of Educational Inputs in TEPS
Scale and Survey items used in scale Factor loadings
Obs. Resp. Original Imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effort wave 1
Chinese teacher’s assessment of student effort in class 18,508 T 0.75 0.76
English teacher’s assessment of student effort in class 17,961 T 0.73 0.75
Math teacher’s assessment of student effort in class 18,126 T 0.71 0.72
Dao Shi report student always completes homework on time 18,571 T 0.62 0.63
Chinese teacher’s report always completes homework on time 18,627 T 0.70 0.71
English teacher’s report always completes homework on time 18,233 T 0.67 0.68
Math teacher’s report always completes homework on time 18,394 T 0.65 0.66
Factor observations 16,004 19,231
First factor eigenvalue 3.35 3.46
Second factor eigenvalue 0.16 0.14
Effort wave 2
Chinese teacher’s assessment of student effort in class 17,120 T 0.78 0.79
English teacher’s assessment of student effort in class 16,509 T 0.76 0.77
Math teacher’s assessment of student effort in class 16,612 T 0.74 0.76
Dao Shi report student always completes homework on time 17,161 T 0.71 0.72
Chinese teacher’s report always completes homework on time 17,107 T 0.68 0.69
English teacher’s report always completes homework on time 16,657 T 0.63 0.65
Math teacher’s report always completes homework on time 16,698 T 0.62 0.64
Factor observations 14,251 17,950
First factor eigenvalue 3.48 3.62
Second factor eigenvalue 0.13 0.11
Mental health wave 1
How often feeling down or frustrated 19,781 S 0.74 0.74
How often feeling troubled, worried 19,877 S 0.74 0.73
How often want to scream or smash something 19,854 S 0.64 0.64
How often feeling body shaking, unable to focus 19,839 S 0.68 0.68
How often feeling lonely 19,793 S 0.76 0.76
How often hopeless 19,856 S 0.75 0.75
Factor observations 19,493 19,934
First factor eigenvalue 3.09 3.09
Second factor eigenvalue 0.33 0.32
Mental health wave 2
How often feeling down or frustrated 18,716 S 0.71 0.71
How often want to scream or smash something 18,712 S 0.67 0.67
How often feeling body shaking, unable to focus 18,695 S 0.62 0.62
How often feeling lonely 18,676 S 0.64 0.64
How often feeling that you have bad fortune 18,658 S 0.59 0.59
How often feeling easily irritated by others 18,682 S 0.62 0.62
How often guilty, regret over some things 18,654 S 0.58 0.58
Factor observations 18,355 18,782
First factor eigenvalue 2.82 2.83
Second factor eigenvalue 0.24 0.24
Note: This table presents detailed factor loadings and number of observations used in the construction
of our summative scales as imputation procedure. Col. (1) reports the initial number of complete
observations available, Col. (2) indicates whether teachers (T), parents (P) or students (S) respond
to each item, Cols. (3) and (4) report factor loadings on the first factor respectively before and
after imputation. See Appendix C.1 for details about our imputation procedure.
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Table C.1: Construction of Standardized Scales of Educational Inputs in TEPS (continued)
Scale and Survey items used in scale Factor loadings
Obs. Resp. Original Imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Truancy wave 1
How often cutting or skipping classes 19,846 S 0.70 0.70
How often physical fights or quarrels with teachers 19,790 S 0.61 0.6
How often watching porn 19,867 S 0.65 0.64
How often substance abuse (tobacco, alcohol, drugs) 19,865 S 0.74 0.73
How often running away from home 19,880 S 0.73 0.73
How often stealing or destroying others’ property 19,862 S 0.68 0.67
Factor observations 19,614 19,929
First factor eigenvalue 2.83 2.77
Second factor eigenvalue -0.002 -0.01
Truancy wave 2
How often cutting or skipping classes 18,718 S 0.51 0.52
How often physical fights or quarrels with teachers 18,737 S 0.59 0.59
How often watching porn 18,729 S 0.42 0.42
Factor observations 18,611 18,799
First factor eigenvalue 0.78 0.79
Second factor eigenvalue -0.07 -0.07
Self-efficacy wave 1
I am good at presentations or expressing my points of view 19,749 S 0.65 0.65
I am good at coordinating with other people in a group 19,800 S 0.68 0.68
I can plan things well no matter how trivial they are 19,810 S 0.74 0.73
I cooperate with everyone very well 19,798 S 0.62 0.62
I always come up with solutions to problems 19,758 S 0.57 0.57
I have always reviewed what I learn since elementary school 19,847 S 0.59 0.59
I always try to figure out answers whenever have questions 19,808 S 0.59 0.59
Factor observations 19,346 19,909
First factor eigenvalue 2.83 2.83
Second factor eigenvalue 0.17 0.16
Self-efficacy wave 2
I am good at presentations or expressing my points of view 18,686 S 0.54 0.53
I am good at coordinating with other people in a group 18,744 S 0.58 0.58
I can plan things well no matter how trivial they are 18,731 S 0.65 0.64
I cooperate with everyone very well 18,709 S 0.55 0.54
I always come up with solutions to problems 18,708 S 0.62 0.62
My friends think of me as a person who always has lots of ideas 18,606 S 0.54 0.54
Factor observations 18,384 18,795
First factor eigenvalue 2.02 2.01
Second factor eigenvalue 0.05 0.05
Note: This table presents detailed factor loadings and number of observations used in the construction
of our summative scales as imputation procedure. Col. (1) reports the initial number of complete
observations available, Col. (2) indicates whether teachers (T), parents (P) or students (S) respond
to each item, Cols. (3) and (4) report factor loadings on the first factor respectively before and
after imputation. See Appendix C.1 for details about our imputation procedure.
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Table C.1: Construction of Standardized Scales of Educational Inputs in TEPS (continued)
Scale and Survey items used in scale Factor loadings
Obs. Resp. Original Imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initiative in class wave 1
Chinese teacher report student initiative to participate in class 18,635 T 0.52 0.53
English teacher report student initiative to participate in class 18,307 T 0.52 0.54
Math teacher report student initiative to participate in class 18,367 T 0.52 0.54
Factor observations 17112 19219
First factor eigenvalue 0.81 0.86
Second factor eigenvalue -0.16 -0.16
Initiative in class wave 2
Chinese teacher report student initiative to participate in class 17,161 T 0.58 0.61
English teacher report student initiative to participate in class 16,787 T 0.61 0.64
Math teacher report student initiative to participate in class 16,698 T 0.59 0.62
Factor observations 15,426 17,791
First factor eigenvalue 1.06 1.16
Second factor eigenvalue -0.16 -0.16
Money wave 1
Hours per week spent on tutoring in/outside school 19,851 P 0.60 0.60
Amount paid for this child’s tutoring classes 19,710 P 0.60 0.60
Factor observations 19,573 19,988
First factor eigenvalue 0.71 0.73
Second factor eigenvalue -0.25 -0.25
Money wave 2
Hours per week spent on tutoring outside school 18,747 P 0.78 0.78
Monthly expenditures this semester for this child’s tutoring 18,755 P 0.78 0.78
Factor observations 18,586 18,916
First factor eigenvalue 1.21 1.22
Second factor eigenvalue -0.21 -0.20
Time wave 1
How often parents go to bookstores or expos with child 19,750 P 0.53 0.53
How often parents go to concerts or performances with child 19,750 P 0.53 0.53
Factor observations 19,743 19,757
First factor eigenvalue 0.55 0.55
Second factor eigenvalue -0.24 -0.24
Time wave 2
Weekly number of dinners with the child 18,783 P 0.44 0.45
Spouse: Weekly number of dinners with the child 18,493 P 0.44 0.45
Factor observations 18,457 18,819
First factor eigenvalue 0.39 0.41
Second factor eigenvalue -0.21 -0.21
Note: This table presents detailed factor loadings and number of observations used in the construction
of our summative scales as imputation procedure. Col. (1) reports the initial number of complete
observations available, Col. (2) indicates whether teachers (T), parents (P) or students (S) respond
to each item, Cols. (3) and (4) report factor loadings on the first factor respectively before and
after imputation. See Appendix C.1 for details about our imputation procedure.
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Table C.1: Construction of Standardized Scales of Educational Inputs in TEPS (continued)
Scale and Survey items used in scale Factor loadings
Obs. Resp. Original Imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parent strictness wave 1
My father is strict 19,851 S 0.51 0.51
My mother is strict 19,842 S 0.51 0.51
Factor observations 19,739 19,928
First factor eigenvalue 0.52 0.53
Second factor eigenvalue -0.23 -0.24
Parent strictness wave 2
How many of your parents set strict rules for your daily routine? 18,828 S 0.61 0.61
How many of your parents set strict rules about spending money? 18,819 S 0.54 0.54
How many of your parents set strict rules about demeanor? 18,806 S 0.63 0.63
How many of your parents set strict rules about health habits? 18,731 S 0.60 0.60
How many of your parents set strict rules about making friends? 18,821 S 0.57 0.57
How many of your parents uses guilt and emotional blackmail? 18,821 S 0.51 0.51
How many of your parents does not allow you to argue with them? 18,816 S 0.50 0.50
How many of your parents discipline you very strictly? 18,809 S 0.53 0.53
Factor observations 18,648 18,831
First factor eigenvalue 2.54 2.55
Second factor eigenvalue 0.15 0.15
Parent emotional support wave 1
My father discusses student’s future study and career 19,854 S 0.46 0.46
My father discusses my feelings and thoughts 19,764 S 0.59 0.58
My mother discusses student’s future study and career 19,822 S 0.49 0.50
My mother discusses my feelings and thoughts 19,816 S 0.64 0.64
My father accepts me as I am 18,993 S 0.49 0.51
My mother accepts me as I am 19,370 S 0.49 0.49
My family provides strong emotional support 19,652 S 0.53 0.54
In my family, we discuss together important decisions 19,528 S 0.56 0.57
Factor observations 17,729 19,973
First factor eigenvalue 2.28 2.33
Second factor eigenvalue 0.56 0.52
Parent emotional support wave 2
My parents pay attention to my ideas and thoughts 18,816 S 0.66 0.66
I seek my parents’ help when I encounter difficulties 18,811 S 0.67 0.67
My parents accept me as I am 18,799 S 0.62 0.62
Factor observations 18,769 18,827
First factor eigenvalue 1.27 1.27
Second factor eigenvalue -0.15 -0.15
Note: This table presents detailed factor loadings and number of observations used in the construction
of our summative scales as imputation procedure. Col. (1) reports the initial number of complete
observations available, Col. (2) indicates whether teachers (T), parents (P) or students (S) respond
to each item, Cols. (3) and (4) report factor loadings on the first factor respectively before and
after imputation. See Appendix C.1 for details about our imputation procedure.
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Table C.1: Construction of Standardized Scales of Educational Inputs in TEPS (continued)
Scale and Survey items used in scale Factor loadings
Obs. Resp. Original Imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
School environment wave 1
My school is an interesting place 19,513 S 0.47 0.48
My school is fair in terms of rewards and grading 19,557 S 0.54 0.55
The campus of my school is safe 19,567 S 0.63 0.63
My school cares about their students 19,481 S 0.71 0.71
My school has a great atmosphere for learning 19,456 S 0.64 0.65
Factor observations 18,701 19,903
First factor eigenvalue 1.83 1.86
Second factor eigenvalue -0.006 -0.013
School environment wave 2
My school’s requirements on students are quite reasonable 18,614 S 0.39 0.39
My school is fair in terms of rewards and grading 18,741 S 0.46 0.46
The campus of my school is safe 18,709 S 0.56 0.56
My school cares about their students 18,340 S 0.62 0.62
My school has a great atmosphere for learning 18,690 S 0.52 0.52
Factor observations 18,053 18,814
First factor eigenvalue 1.33 1.34
Second factor eigenvalue 0.015 0.013
Teacher engagement in class wave 1
How many of my teachers know the name of every student 19,865 S 0.38 0.39
How many teachers encourage student when they study hard 19,780 S 0.48 0.48
How many teachers use different teaching methods/materials 19,846 S 0.55 0.55
How many teachers give homework to increase students’ 19,836 S 0.48 0.49
chance to practice
How many teachers ask reasons when students fail homework 19,812 S 0.46 0.48
How many teachers give a review after every exam 19,604 S 0.48 0.49
Factor observations 19,210 19,953
First factor eigenvalue 1.35 1.4
Second factor eigenvalue 0.11 0.11
Teacher engagement in class wave 2
How many teachers talk about people skills in class 18,795 S 0.70 0.70
How many teachers often discuss life goals, do career advice 18,784 S 0.73 0.73
How many teachers often recommend books, encourage reading 18,783 S 0.62 0.62
How many teachers often use real life and practical examples 18,772 S 0.62 0.62
How many teachers take free time to help students 18,795 S 0.53 0.53
with personal issues
How many teachers often use guilt or emotional blackmail 18,784 S 0.45 0.45
How many teachers praise me when I study hard 18,744 S 0.53 0.53
Factor observations 18,590 18,820
First factor eigenvalue 2.56 2.56
Second factor eigenvalue 0.17 0.17
Note: This table presents detailed factor loadings and number of observations used in the construction
of our summative scales as imputation procedure. Col. (1) reports the initial number of complete
observations available, Col. (2) indicates whether teachers (T), parents (P) or students (S) respond
to each item, Cols. (3) and (4) report factor loadings on the first factor respectively before and
after imputation. See Appendix C.1 for details about our imputation procedure.
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C.2 Additional Tables
Table C.2: The Effect of Peer Test Scores on Students’ Own Test Scores
in Wave 2
Outcome: Student test scores in wave 2 [std]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer test scores [std] 0.041∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Own test scores [std] 0.737∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
R2 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.68
School FE Y Y Y Y
Balancing controls Y Y
W1 inputs Y Y
Schools 232 232 232 232
Classes 872 872 850 850
Students 13,086 12,173 11,702 11,029
Note: This table reports estimates of regressing standardized student test scores in
wave 2 on standardized average peer test scores in wave 1 in our sample contain-
ing 232 schools, 850 classrooms, and up to 11,029 students. Balancing controls
include household income, family engagement with homework, gifted art classroom
assignment, and parents’ efforts to get child assigned to a particular classroom. W1
inputs include standardized scales of student inputs (school effort, initiative in class,
truancy, academic self-efficacy, and mental health), parent inputs (investment in
private tutoring, time investments, parental strictness and parental support), school
and teacher inputs (school environment and teacher engagement). Standard errors
clustered at the classroom level in parentheses. Estimates in this figure are also
shown in Figure 3.3.
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Table C.3: The Effect of Peer Test Scores on Educational Inputs in Wave 2
Treatment variable: Peer test scores [std]
Coef. Std. err. R2 Classrooms Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes: educational inputs
School effort [std] −0.052∗∗ (0.024) 0.56 849 10659
Initiative in class [std] −0.015 (0.024) 0.46 849 10558
Truancy [std] 0.009 (0.021) 0.18 850 11113
Cheated on exams [.48] 0.015 (0.013) 0.12 850 11078
Academic self-efficacy [std] −0.017 (0.021) 0.15 850 11113
Mental health [std] −0.030 (0.019) 0.16 850 11103
University aspirations [.57] 0.016∗ (0.009) 0.28 850 11115
University expectations [.44] 0.020∗∗ (0.009) 0.29 850 11105
Private tutoring [std] −0.002 (0.019) 0.37 850 11164
Time with parents [std] 0.081∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.08 850 11111
Conflict with parents [.31] −0.017 (0.010) 0.06 850 11086
Parental strictness [std] 0.036∗ (0.020) 0.16 850 11133
Parental support [std] 0.029 (0.020) 0.2 850 11133
Harsh parenting [.33] 0.015 (0.009) 0.08 850 11133
Parent uni. aspirations [.51] 0.001 (0.010) 0.33 850 11022
School environment [std] −0.029 (0.024) 0.17 850 11126
Classroom hard to manage [.33] −0.040 (0.033) 0.35 836 10534
Teacher engagement [std] 0.022 (0.023) 0.11 850 11129
Teacher tired of teaching [.49] −0.042 (0.031) 0.31 836 10527
Note: This table reports estimates of regressing educational input measures in wave 2 on standardized
average peer test scores in wave 1 in our sample containing 232 schools, 850 classrooms, and up to 11,164
students. Rows present results of models with different educational inputs as outcomes. Unconditional
means of each outcome are shown in square brackets, and [std] marks outcomes that have been standardized
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. All models control for school fixed effects, student
test scores in wave 1, balancing controls, and educational inputs in wave 1. Standard errors clustered at
the classroom level in parentheses. Estimates in this table are also shown in Figure 3.4.
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Table C.4: Returns to Educational Inputs from Cumulative Value-Added Models
Outcome: Student test scores in wave 2 [std]
Total effect Partial effect
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatments:
School effort [std] 0.166∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.098∗∗∗ (0.010)
Initiative in class [std] 0.161∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.109∗∗∗ (0.009)
Truancy [std] −0.039∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.008 (0.007)
Cheated on exams [.48] −0.053∗∗∗ (0.011) −0.015 (0.012)
Academic self-efficacy [std] −0.009 (0.006) −0.024∗∗∗ (0.006)
Mental health [std] 0.009 (0.007) −0.002 (0.007)
University aspirations [.57] 0.151∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.046∗∗∗ (0.014)
University expectations [.44] 0.209∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.131∗∗∗ (0.015)
Private tutoring [std] 0.040∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.025∗∗∗ (0.007)
Time with parents [std] −0.003 (0.006) −0.004 (0.006)
Conflict with parents [.31] 0.070∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.013)
Parental strictness [std] −0.028∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.039∗∗∗ (0.006)
Parental support [std] 0.029∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.019∗∗∗ (0.007)
Harsh parenting [.33] −0.056∗∗∗ (0.011) −0.020∗ (0.012)
Parent uni. aspirations [.51] 0.141∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.013)
School environment [std] 0.026∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.006 (0.006)
Class hard to manage [.33] −0.016 (0.017) −0.01 (0.016)
Teacher engagement [std] 0.016∗∗ (0.006) 0.006 (0.006)





Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of regressing student test scores in wave 2
on educational inputs in wave 2 in our estimation sample containing 232 schools, up to
850 classrooms, and up to 11,029 students. Rows present coefficients of different regressors.
Unconditional means of each input are shown in square brackets and [std] marks inputs that
have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Total effects
are estimated one input at the time, whereas partial effects are estimates of all inputs jointly.
All models control for school fixed effects, student test scores, average peer test scores, and
educational inputs in wave 1. Standard errors clustered at the classroom level in parentheses.
These results are also available in Figure 3.5.
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Table C.5: Academic Peer Effect Mediated by Educational
Inputs
Student test scores in wave 2 [std]
Coef. Est. Std. err.
(1) (2)
Total mediated effect −0.008 (0.005)
Mediated effect by:
School effort −0.006∗∗∗ (0.002)
Initiative in class −0.001 (0.003)
Truancy −0.000 (0.000)
Cheated on exams −0.000 (0.000)
Academic self-efficacy 0.001 (0.001)
Mental health 0.000 (0.000)
University aspirations 0.000 (0.000)
University expectations 0.001 (0.001)
Private tutoring 0.000 (0.000)
Time with parents −0.000 (0.000)
Conflict with parents −0.000 (0.000)
Parental strictness −0.001 (0.001)
Parental support 0.000 (0.000)
Harsh parenting −0.000 (0.000)
Parent uni. Aspirations −0.000 (0.001)
School environment −0.000 (0.000)
Classroom hard to manage 0.000 (0.001)
Teacher engagement 0.000 (0.000)
Teacher tired of teaching −0.001 (0.001)
Note: This table reports the mediated effects based on Gelbach’s (2016)
decomposition of our academic peer effect estimate using only within-
school variation in our estimation sample containing 232 schools, up
to 850 classrooms, and up to 11,029 students. These estimates are
produced using a modified version of the b1x2 Stata package. Rows
present the mediated effect of different educational inputs in wave 2.
All models control for school fixed effects, student test scores, average
peer test scores, and educational inputs in wave 1. Standard errors
clustered at the classroom level in parentheses. These results are also
available in Figure 3.6.
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Classrooms 0.10 0.05 0.01 p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-assignment characteristics:
Student test scores 853 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.486
Female student 853 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.562
Student born before 1989 853 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.490
Monthly household income > NT$100,000 853 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.491
College-educated parent(s) 853 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.485
Parent(s) work in government 853 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.487
Ethnic minority parent(s) 853 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.494
Since primary school:
Student always prioritized studies 853 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.491
Student always reviews lessons 853 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.478
Student likes new things 853 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.465
During primary school:
Student was truant 853 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.498
Student had mental health issues 853 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.495
Student quarreled with parents 853 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.503
Before junior high school:
Student had private tutoring 853 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.479
Family help with homework 853 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.496
Student enrolled in gifted academic class 853 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.466
Student enrolled in arts gifted class 853 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.447
Parents made efforts to place student 853 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.465
in better class
Note: This table shows the results of permutation-based class-level sorting tests, in our estimation
sample containing 227 schools, 853 classrooms, and 12,816 students. For these tests, we simulate
10,000 classrooms under the null of random assignment of students to classrooms within schools,
calculate the mean of pre-treatment characteristics in synthetic classroom, and construct class-level
empirical p-values as the share of times synthetic classroom means were more extreme than actual
classroom means relative to the schools mean. Each row presents class-level empirical p-values
for a different pre-assignment characteristic. The last column shows the average p-value for all
classrooms.
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regressions 0.10 0.05 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-assignment characteristics:
Student test scores 227 0.06 0.04 0.03
Female student 216 0.05 0.02 0.02
Student born before 1989 227 0.12 0.03 0.01
Monthly household income > NT$100,000 208 0.09 0.04 0.00
College-educated parent(s) 204 0.13 0.07 0.02
Parent(s) work in government 205 0.06 0.02 0.01
Ethnic minority parent(s) 179 0.06 0.02 0.01
Since primary school:
Student always prioritized studies 227 0.12 0.06 0.01
Student always reviews lessons 227 0.10 0.06 0.02
Student likes new things 227 0.14 0.10 0.02
During primary school:
Student was truant 227 0.10 0.03 0.01
Student had mental health issues 227 0.12 0.07 0.01
Student quarreled with parents 227 0.10 0.04 0.00
Before junior high school:
Had private tutoring 227 0.13 0.08 0.02
Family help with homework 226 0.08 0.06 0.02
Student enrolled in gifted academic class 206 0.11 0.05 0.02
Student enrolled in arts gifted class 186 0.15 0.09 0.07
Parents made efforts to place student 225 0.14 0.10 0.04
in better class
Note: This table shows the results of non-parametric school-level sorting tests in our estimation
sample containing 227 schools, 853 classrooms, and 12,816 students. School-by-school, we regress
each pre-treatment characteristics on a set of class dummies, F-test them for joint significance,
and calculate the share of times the F-tests p-values fall under typical significance thresholds. Each
row presents class-level empirical p-values for a different pre-assignment characteristic. We use
cluster-robust covariance matrices at the classroom level for each test.
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Table C.8: Sensitivity of Estimates to Latent Class Threshold in Posterior Probability in the
Fishing Algorithm
Effect of peer test scores [std] with different posterior probability
thresholds for classification as defier school
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test scores [std] 0.052∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
School effort [std] −0.052∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.039∗ −0.025 −0.026∗ −0.018
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014)
Initiative in class [std] −0.015 −0.001 −0.016 −0.008 −0.015 −0.008
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
Truancy [std] 0.009 0.007 −0.007 −0.015 −0.011 −0.017
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Cheated on exams [.48] 0.015 0.027∗∗ 0.012 0.013 0.015∗ 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Academic self-efficacy [std] −0.017 −0.004 −0.005 0.005 0.002 0.008
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Mental health [std] −0.030 −0.020 −0.016 −0.013 −0.014 −0.009
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
University aspirations [.57] 0.016∗ 0.013 0.012 0.008 0.011∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
University expectations [.44] 0.020∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.012∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Private tutoring [std] −0.002 0.024 0.020 0.015 0.012 0.001
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
Time with parents [std] 0.081∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Conflict with parents [.31] −0.017 −0.017∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.008 −0.003
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Parental strictness [std] 0.036∗ 0.029 0.024 0.011 0.011 −0.000
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Parental support [std] 0.029 0.031∗ 0.031∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
Harsh parenting [.33] 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.004 −0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Parent uni. aspirations [.51] 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.018∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
School environment [std] −0.029 −0.029 −0.022 −0.006 0.005 0.018
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014)
Classroom hard to manage [.33] −0.040 −0.037 −0.052∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017)
Teacher engagement [std] 0.022 0.052∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.021 0.020 0.022
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014)
Teacher tired of teaching [.49] −0.042 −0.016 −0.027 −0.026 −0.012 0.009
(0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020)
Excluded school if prob. of defier < 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic -0.5 0.9 1.9 4.2 5.3 6.6
Schools 232 247 257 283 306 328
Classes 850 911 951 1,046 1,129 1,206
Students 11,029 11,800 12,302 13,526 14,665 15,687
This table reports coefficient estimates of regressing student outcomes in wave 2 on standardized average
peer ability in wave 1 in samples defined by taking different thresholds in the school-level posterior
probability of being a defier school, as defined by our fishing algorithm. All models include school fixed
effects, and students’ own ability and educational inputs in wave 1. At the bottom we report Jochmans
(2020)’s sorting t-statistic, noting that its reference distribution is the standard normal. T-statistics
larger than critical values for a two-sided test are shown in italics for 95% confidence and in bold for
99% confidence. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level. *, ** and *** denote significance
levels at the 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table C.9: Oster (2019) Proportional Selection on Unob-
servable Characteristics in Initial Sample
Degree of selection required
to explain effect of peer
test scores on outcomes
(1) (2)
Outcomes:
Test scores 0.0 −0.2
School effort 0.0 −0.1
Initiative in class 0.0 −3.0
Truancy −0.1 2.4
Cheated on exams 0.0 −0.5
Academic self-efficacy 0.0 −5.7
Mental health 0.0 −0.7
University aspirations 0.0 −1.0
University expectations 0.0 −1.1
Private tutoring −0.1 0.1
Time with parents 0.1 −0.4
Conflict with parents −0.1 −3.4
Parental strictness −0.1 −1.6
Parental support −0.1 −0.5
Harsh parenting 0.0 −4.8
Parent uni. Aspirations −0.1 0.0
School environment 0.0 −0.7
Classroom hard to manage 0.1 −0.1
Teacher engagement 0.0 −0.9
Teacher tired of teaching 0.0 0.0
Selection proportional to:
Balancing controls Y Y
W1 inputs Y
This table reports Oster’s (2019) δ, the share of proportional se-
lection needed to explain away each estimate in our initial sample
332 schools, 1,241 classrooms and 14,383 students. Values of δ
between zero and one imply that, under reasonable assumption,
the effect can be explained by correlated unobservable character-
istics. Each cell is an estimate from a separate analysis. All
estimates are calculated using Oster (2019)’s psacalc Stata
package, and assume a theoretical maximum R-square of one.
All models control for school fixed effects and student test scores
in wave 1. Pre-assignment characteristics are listed in Section
3.4.2. Educational inputs in wave 1 are listed in Section 3.5.1.
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Table C.10: The Effect of Peer Ability on Students’ Own Ability, Using Alternative
Measures of Ability
Outcome: Student ability in wave 2 [std]
Measure of Ability used:
IRT Bayesian posterior mean of:
Analytical Math General Analytical Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Peer ability [std] 0.042∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Own ability [std] 0.389∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
R2 0.46 0.61 0.70 0.49 0.64
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of regressing student’s own ability in wave 2 on
standardized average peer ability and own ability in wave 1 in our estimation sample containing
232 schools, 850 classrooms, and 11,029 students. The columns vary the measure of ability used for
the analysis. The identification of analytical and mathematical subcomponents of ability and the
Bayesian posterior mean calculation based on Item Response Theory (IRT) models, the TEPS team
could also identify two highly correlated but distinct subcomponents measuring analytical ability
and mathematical ability based on disjoint subsets of test questions. The IRT models were also
used to produce the standardized Bayesian posterior means of the three components identifiable
in the test—the general ability component and the analytical ability and mathematical ability
subcomponents. All models include school fixed effects and educational inputs in wave 1. Standard
errors are clustered at the classroom level. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%
and 1%.
Table C.11: The Effect of Better Peer Ability on Students’ Own Ability, Using Instru-
mental Variable Estimators to Account for Measurement Error in Ability
Outcome: Student ability in wave 2 [std]
Measure of Ability used:
Analytical Mathematical Mixed
(1) (2) (3)
Peer ability [std] 0.054∗ 0.042∗ 0.068∗
(0.029) (0.025) (0.029)
Instrument Mathematical Analytical Alt. mixed
t-statistic of first-stage coefficient 30.53 28.25 27.01
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of instrumental variable regressions of student’s test
scores in wave 2 on standardized average peer ability in wave 1 in our estimation sample containing
232 schools, 850 classrooms, and 11,744 students. The measures of ability and the instrument vary
across columns, as described in Section 3.6.2. All models include school fixed effects, and students’
own test scores and educational inputs in wave 1. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom
level. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table C.12: The Effect of Peer Ability on Educational Inputs, Using a
Mixed Ability IV Approach
Mixed IV effect of peer ability [std]
Coef. Est. Std. err.
(1) (2)
Outcome: Educational inputs
School effort [std] −0.072∗∗ (0.034)
Initiative in class [std] 0.002 (0.038)
Truancy [std] 0.019 (0.034)
Cheated on exams [.48] 0.013 (0.022)
Academic self-efficacy [std] −0.014 (0.034)
Mental health [std] −0.052 (0.034)
University aspirations [.57] 0.022 (0.014)
University expectations [.44] 0.021 (0.016)
Private tutoring [std] −0.006 (0.031)
Time with parents [std] 0.113∗∗∗ (0.038)
Conflict with parents [.31] −0.016 (0.017)
Parental strictness [std] 0.057∗ (0.031)
Parental support [std] 0.037 (0.031)
Harsh parenting [.33] 0.025∗ (0.014)
Parent uni. aspirations [.51] 0.011 (0.017)
School environment [std] −0.008 (0.037)
Classroom hard to manage −0.026 (0.050)
Teacher engagement [std] 0.022 (0.035)
Teacher tired of teaching −0.066 (0.048)
This table reports coefficient estimates of instrumental variable regressions of
student’s educational inputs in wave 2 on standardized average peer ability
in wave 1 in our estimation sample containing 232 schools, 850 classrooms,
and 11,744 students. Peer ability and its instrument are constructed using the
"mixed IV" approach described in Section 3.6.2. All models include school fixed
effects, and students’ own ability and educational inputs in wave 1. Standard
errors are clustered at the classroom level. *, ** and *** denote significance
levels at the 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table C.13: Effects of Peer Ability Using Sojourner (2013) Correction for Incomplete
Classroom Sampling
Effect of peer test scores [std] with Sojourner (2013)
correction for peer test scores missing not at random
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test scores [std] 0.133∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
School effort [std] −0.020 −0.028 −0.030 −0.038 −0.046 −0.042
(0.055) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049)
Initiative in class [std] −0.064 −0.057 −0.057 −0.067 −0.074 −0.069
(0.062) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053)
Truancy [std] −0.028 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004
(0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
Cheated on exams [.48] 0.050 0.026 0.032 0.043 0.040 0.042
(0.034) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Academic self-efficacy [std] −0.026 −0.019 −0.014 −0.006 0.000 0.006
(0.054) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Mental health [std] −0.036 −0.037 −0.035 −0.033 −0.025 −0.018
(0.050) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
University aspirations [.57] 0.050∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.039∗ 0.037∗ 0.035∗ 0.035∗
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
University expectations [.44] 0.050∗∗ 0.033 0.032 0.028 0.033∗ 0.036∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Private tutoring [std] −0.001 0.006 −0.006 0.008 0.028 0.023
(0.048) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Time with parents [std] 0.098∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Conflict with parents [.31] 0.004 −0.011 −0.010 −0.012 −0.017 −0.015
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Parental strictness [std] 0.030 0.046 0.060 0.053 0.057 0.058
(0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Parental support [std] 0.035 0.032 0.045 0.042 0.049 0.054
(0.049) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Harsh parenting [.33] 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.021 0.016 0.011
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Parent uni. aspirations [.51] 0.022 0.003 0.003 −0.000 0.002 0.004
(0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
School environment [std] 0.004 −0.049 −0.045 −0.044 −0.059 −0.050
(0.066) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054)
Classroom hard to manage [.33] −0.153∗ −0.113 −0.117 −0.132∗ −0.124∗ −0.124∗
(0.079) (0.073) (0.072) (0.076) (0.073) (0.073)
Teacher engagement [std] 0.080 0.026 0.025 0.008 0.021 0.024
(0.058) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051)
Teacher tired of teaching [.49] −0.166∗∗ −0.098 −0.091 −0.127∗ −0.130∗ −0.114
(0.082) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076) (0.073) (0.073)
Share peers observed:
× School FE Y
× School K-cile FE 25 20 15 10 5
This table reports coefficient estimates of regressing student outcomes in wave 2 on standardized
average peer ability in wave 1 in our estimation sample containing 232 schools, 850 classrooms,
and 11,029 students. These estimates correct for peer test scores missing not at random following
Sojourner (2013) and implemented using Correia (2018)’s reghdfe Stata package. All models
include school fixed effects, and students’ own ability and educational inputs in wave 1. Standard
errors are clustered at the classroom level. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%
and 1%.
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Table C.14: Corrected P-values for the Effect of Peer Ability using Young (2019)’s
Randomization Inference, and Romano and Wolf (2005b)’s Step-Down Familywise Error
Rate Adjustment Procedures
Corrected p-values for the
effect of peer test scores [std] using:
Young (2019) Romano and Wolf (2005b)
Randomization-t inference Step-down procedure
(1) (2)
Outcomes:
Test scores 0.008 0.036
School effort 0.058 0.382
Initiative in class 0.589 0.948
Truancy 0.673 0.956
Cheated on exams 0.287 0.860
Academic self-efficacy 0.487 0.914
Mental health 0.176 0.774
University aspirations 0.122 0.680
University expectations 0.078 0.394
Private tutoring 0.928 0.982
Time with parents 0.000 0.014
Conflict with parents 0.146 0.742
Parental strictness 0.136 0.670
Parental support 0.220 0.800
Harsh parenting 0.192 0.774
Parent uni. Aspirations 0.916 0.982
School environment 0.305 0.860
Classroom hard to manage 0.248 0.858
Teacher engagement 0.421 0.890
Teacher tired of teaching 0.216 0.838
This table corrected p-values for our main results using i) Young (2019)’s randomization-t inference
procedure to account for high-leverage, finite sample properties of the model error term, and the
complex sampling structure of our data (Col. (1) based on 499 permutations), and ii) Romano and
Wolf (2005b)’s step-down procedure for controlling for familywise error rate in multiple hypotheses
testing implemented using Clarke et al. (2019) rwolf Stata package (Col. (2), based on 499
replications). p-values smaller than 0.10 are shown in italics and smaller than 0.05 in bold.
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Table C.15: Heterogeneous and Mediated Effects of Peer Ability
Mediated effect
Academic by Student by Parent by School
Peer effect Total inputs inputs inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
by monthly household income:
Less than NT$20,000 0.052∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.019 −0.011 −0.000
(0.027) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005)
NT$20,000 to NT$50,000 0.051∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002 0.001 −0.002
(0.018) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
NT$50,000 to NT$100,000 0.049∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.007 −0.001 −0.000
(0.018) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
More than NT$100,000 0.052∗∗ −0.020 −0.016 −0.004 0.000
(0.023) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.003)
by parent(s) education:
No college degree 0.049∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.004 −0.002 −0.001
(0.017) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
College degree 0.038 −0.009 −0.008 −0.005 0.004
(0.024) (0.016) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005)
by student test scores:
Bottom tertile 0.035∗∗ −0.005 −0.004 −0.001 −0.000
(0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Middle tertile 0.070∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.001 −0.004 0.001
(0.018) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Top tertile 0.045∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.010 −0.003 −0.002
(0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
by student gender:
Male 0.054∗∗∗ −0.012∗ −0.008 −0.004∗ −0.000
(0.018) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.055∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.006 0.001 −0.002
(0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
by school type:
Public 0.045∗∗∗ −0.009∗ −0.005 −0.002∗ −0.001
(0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Private 0.100∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.002 −0.002 0.010∗
(0.034) (0.013) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006)
by Dao Shi experience:
10 years or less 0.063∗∗∗ −0.017∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.000 0.002
(0.021) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
More than 10 years 0.042∗∗ −0.003 0.001 −0.003 −0.001
(0.017) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
This table reports peer and mediated effects based on Gelbach (2016)’s decomposition
using only within-school variation in our estimation sample containing 232 schools, 850
classrooms, and 11,029 students. These estimates are produced using a modified version of
the b1x2 Stata package. Rows present the peer and mediated effects for different subgroups
defined based on wave 1 variables. All models control for school fixed effects, student test
scores, average peer test scores, and educational inputs in wave 1. Standard errors are
clustered at the classroom level. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%
and 1%.
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Table C.16: Heterogeneous Value-Added
Outcome: Student test scores in Wave 2 [std]
Coef. Est. Std. err.
(1) (2)
Value-added coef. interaction:
peer test scores [std] with:
School effort [std] 0.019∗∗ (0.008)
Initiative in class [std] 0.029∗∗∗ (0.007)
Truancy [std] −0.007 (0.007)
Cheated on exams [.48] 0.011 (0.011)
Academic self-efficacy [std] −0.003 (0.006)
Mental health [std] −0.003 (0.006)
University aspirations [.57] 0.013 (0.015)
University expectations [.44] −0.012 (0.015)
Private tutoring [std] −0.019∗∗∗ (0.007)
Time with parents [std] −0.013∗∗ (0.005)
Conflict with parents [.31] −0.008 (0.012)
Parental strictness [std] −0.004 (0.006)
Parental support [std] −0.016∗∗ (0.006)
Harsh parenting [.33] −0.006 (0.012)
Parent uni. aspirations [.51] 0.013 (0.013)
School environment [std] 0.008 (0.006)
Class hard to manage [.33] −0.045∗∗∗ (0.016)
Teacher engagement [std] −0.001 (0.006)





This table reports coefficient estimates of regressing student test scores in wave
2 on educational inputs in wave 2, all interacted with peer test scores in wave 1,
in our estimation sample containing 232 schools, 833 classes, and up to 10,490
students. Rows present coefficients of different regressors interacted with peer test
scores. Unconditional means of each input are shown in square brackets and [std]
marks inputs that have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. All models control for main effects of wave 2 inputs, school
fixed effects, student test scores, average peer test scores, and educational inputs
in wave 1. Standard errors clustered at the classroom level in parentheses.
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Table C.17: 35 Education Systems in Comparative Perspective in TIMSS 1999
Average Student- School- Study Percentage of:
class to-teacher days hours Math in absent school parents 5+ y. exp. weekly+
size ratio yearly daily groups daily dropout monitoring teachers class disr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Australasia and Pacific
Taiwan 39 18 221 2.0 12.5 1.3 1.7 33.4 67.7 30.1
Japan 36 20 223 1.7 12.5 3.0 0.3 4.0 32.3 4.5
South Korea 42 24 225 1.6 18.5 0.5 0.8 9.2 20.6 43.0
Hong Kong 39 20 176 1.6 6.9 1.4 1.9 6.9 64.7 36.2
Singapore 37 20 180 3.5 32.5 1.6 1.0 1.8 49.1 32.2
Indonesia 42 23 251 3.0 27.5 2.7 1.9 74.6 75.6 20.5
Malaysia 38 19 198 3.8 38.2 3.8 3.9 28.5 42.4 25.6
Philippines 51 35 204 3.3 53.0 5.1 8.5 28.0 65.0 27.4
Thailand 39 31 202 2.9 51.1 3.7 3.1 57.0 64.7 12.6
New Zealand 26 16 188 2.0 43.5 6.9 7.9 0.8 55.7 68.1
Australia 26 16 196 2.0 27.8 7.6 6.0 0.1 57.7 73.1
Europe and Central Asia
Netherlands 25 17 191 2.2 27.8 3.0 2.0 1.0 77.5 76.1
Belgium 19 10 175 3.0 7.3 3.0 2.2 3.6 74.1 40.4
Italy 20 13 210 3.6 27.7 6.3 1.5 20.7 63.7 46.6
Cyprus 29 14 160 2.8 16.8 3.1 2.2 4.3 23.1 54.5
Finland 20 12 186 1.8 18.5 5.2 1.4 1.5 70.7 50.0
Latvia 22 13 176 3.0 11.3 5.2 2.0 17.1 71.4 37.5
Moldova 26 17 205 3.3 31.2 4.5 2.7 34.8 78.0 29.1
Czech 24 19 197 1.9 8.5 7.7 1.8 4.8 66.1 62.9
Hungary 32 12 185 2.8 7.3 4.7 2.2 3.8 71.6 41.2
Bulgaria 21 15 172 3.0 27.9 6.9 2.5 8.6 71.2 22.0
Romania 24 19 159 3.4 23.9 3.5 1.9 12.3 65.9 17.0
Slovak 25 18 194 2.3 15.9 7.0 1.7 3.1 66.8 59.8
Slovenia 22 14 175 2.5 10.3 3.0 1.2 12.0 75.3 61.1
Macedonia 27 21 176 3.5 41.8 1.9 1.5 15.5 78.7 13.1
Russia 24 15 195 3.2 15.6 4.2 2.5 32.8 73.6 13.4
Turkey 39 63 181 3.6 22.2 3.2 4.9 32.2 52.0 14.5
North America
Canada 27 20 188 2.2 40.1 5.4 5.5 4.6 58.2 60.3
United States 26 18 180 2.1 44.9 5.6 9.0 7.7 60.9 69.3
Central and Latin America
Chile 34 37 193 2.4 57.6 6.4 5.1 2.5 67.1 45.9
Middle East and Africa
Iran 32 27 209 4.1 38.6 2.4 2.3 27.5 26.7 21.4
Israel 34 14 199 2.7 39.8 5.1 1.6 3.5 61.5 60.8
Jordan 35 23 191 3.8 50.6 2.9 3.4 21.3 55.2 27.6
Morocco 28 24 207 3.3 44.5 4.0 7.6 11.0 70.7 31.5
South Africa 48 37 194 3.1 53.3 8.3 8.3 40.0 68.0 38.6
Tunisia 34 23 205 3.7 24.3 2.4 2.3 61.1 26.2 54.0
Note: This table presents some key features of junior high school in 35 countries participating in TIMSS 1999.
TIMSS 1999 data is publicly available through the TIMSS 1999 International Database. This table presents
means using sampling weights and Jackknife repeated replications, following the TIMSS 1999 User Guide. All
features are reported by school principals, except daily study hours and Math taught in small groups (cols. (4)
and (5) reported by students).
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C.3 The Fishing Algorithm
In this Appendix, we explain the steps of our Fishing Algorithm introduced in
Section 3.4.2 in detail. We illustrate its use in the TEPS data. We also provide
simulation evidence of its performance in Appendix C.4.
C.3.1 Sorting of students into classrooms within schools in TEPS
As discussed in Section 3.3, Taiwan has an explicit mandate of random assignment
of students to classrooms within schools. We first test whether the TEPS data is
consistent with this mandate without imposing any sample restrictions and refer to
this as our “initial sample”. This initial sample includes a total of 20,055 students
assigned to 1,244 classrooms across 333 schools in wave 1, for whom we have data
from either students, parents, teachers or school administrators’ questionnaires.
Most students can be matched across questionnaires—we lose fewer than 1,000
observations due to questionnaire non-match—yet we estimate our initial tests on
this unrestricted sample to limit the influence of selective questionnaire attrition.
We first run sorting tests on student wave 1 standardized test scores, as well as
on each characteristic that we can unambiguously treat as pre-assignment; that is,
variables capturing either fixed traits or events prior to entering junior high school.
Standardized test scores are not strictly measured pre-assignment; they were taken
by students during the first weeks of the first junior high school academic year,
shortly after assignment to classrooms. However, it is highly doubtful that only
a few weeks’ worth of exposure to peers could generate considerable peer effects
already. Moreover, these test scores were never revealed to students, parents,
teachers or school administrators so there is no chance of re-sorting of classrooms
after initial assignment based on the results of these exams. However, finding sorting
on standardized test scores would still be consistent with students being assigned to
classrooms based on other ability or academic performance measures that are either
known to the parents, teachers, or school administrators. In this spirit, we analyze
standardized test scores in this paper.
To run sorting tests loosely follow the within-school equation:
Yics1 = βȲ
−i
ics1 + µs + εics1, (C.1)
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where Yics1 is the characteristic of student i in class c in school s in wave 1, which
is pre-determined at the time of assignment, Ȳ −iics1 is the class leave-out mean of
the same variable Y at wave 1 (the classroom peer mean of characteristic ), µs is
school-invariant unobserved heterogeneity which we account for using school fixed
effects, and εics1 is a conditionally uncorrelated model error term.
The sorting statistic of interest is closely related to with the standard normal as
a reference distribution in large samples. A positive over critical values in the
distribution indicates positive sorting of students into classrooms based on the tested
pre-determined characteristic. However, Guryan et al. (2009) observe that, under
random assignment, β̂ presents a small negative bias which seems to disappear
when controlling for school-level leave-out-mean of the characteristic in sorting tests.
Jochmans (2020) shows that Guryan et al. (2009)’s empirical correction results
in low power for detecting sorting, derives analytical expressions for this bias in
within-school estimators and proposes a bias-corrected that solves this power issue.
In our sorting tests, we present t̂ using the more commonly found Guryan et al.
(2009) method and the very recent Jochmans (2020) improvement.
The second and third columns of Table C.18 show the sorting test statistics for all pre-
determined characteristics we consider. There is plenty of evidence suggesting that
students are sorted into classrooms with similar peers in the initial sample – certainly
for test scores, but also for family income and parental education, intellectual curiosity
during primary school, private tutoring before entering junior high school, gifted
academic and art class assignment, and on parents’ efforts to influence the student’s
classroom assignment. Sorting on test scores in this sample is already reason enough
for thinking that estimates of higher-ability peer effects might be biased. Yet
further balancing tests on higher-ability peers—which regress Yics1 on TestScoresics1
— also show that higher-ability peers are also related to several pre-determined
characteristics at baseline. These balancing test results are shown in the last two
columns of Table C.18.1
1Note that, due to the large number of pre-treatment characteristics we test and the many students
and classes in TEPS, we are more likely to find imbalances than many previous academic peer
effect studies. The size of our detected imbalances is relatively small generally (very) small. In fact,
simple back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that in other datasets commonly used to estimate
peer effects, such as the Project STAR data, imbalances of this size would have gone undetected.
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Table C.18: Balancing and Sorting Tests on the TEPS Initial Sample
Sorting tests (t-statistic) Balancing tests
Treatment Variable: Peer outcome Peer ability
leave-out mean leave-out-mean [std]
Students Guryan et al. Jochmans Coef. Std. err.
(2009) (2020)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-assignment characteristics:
Student test scores [std] 19,957 3.0 6.6
Female student 19,957 2.2 -0.9 0.012 (0.007)
Student born before 1989 19,866 -0.4 1.4 −0.011∗∗ (0.005)
Household income > NT$100k/mo. 19,629 0.9 2.2 0.014∗∗∗ (0.004)
College-educated parent(s) 19,073 1.1 3.5 0.036∗∗∗ (0.005)
Parent(s) work in government 18,979 1.3 2.2 0.024∗∗∗ (0.004)
Ethnic minority parent(s) 19,070 1.5 1.9 −0.011∗∗∗ (0.004)
Since primary school:
Student always prioritized studies 19,830 -2.1 1.5 −0.006 (0.005)
Student always reviews lessons 19,813 0.0 2.6 −0.002 (0.004)
Student likes new things 19,771 1.0 2.9 0.005 (0.006)
During primary school:
Was truant in primary school 19,674 1.3 0.4 −0.022∗∗∗ (0.005)
Student had mental health issues 19,670 0.0 0.3 0.001 (0.006)
Student quarreled with parents 19,691 -0.5 -1.0 −0.006 (0.006)
Before junior high school:
Had private tutoring 19,720 1.5 2.5 0.024∗∗∗ (0.006)
Family help with homework 18,976 1.3 1.2 0.006 (0.004)
Student in gifted academic class 19,779 2.3 4.3 0.074∗∗∗ (0.009)
Student in arts gifted class 19,779 4.8 5.5 0.033∗∗∗ (0.010)
Parents made efforts to place child 19,698 5.8 4.8 0.050∗∗∗ (0.006)
in better class
Note: Estimates in our trimmed sample of 333 schools and 1,257 classrooms. All estimators include
school fixed effects. The reference distribution for the Guryan et al. (2009) and the Jochmans (2020)
sorting statistics is the standard normal. t-statistics larger than critical values for a two-sided test
are shown in italics for 95% confidence and in bold for 99% confidence. The last column reports
cluster-robust standard errors at the classroom level. ***, ** and * mark estimates statistically different
from zero at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence level.
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Our next step is to characterize the deviations from random assignment in this
initial sample in order to hopefully correct them. In Taiwan, class assignment is
tasked to schools themselves, as opposed to being done at the regional or school
district level. Because of this, we suspect that deviations from random assignment
in our data could come directly from having (hopefully few) non-compliant schools,
and direct our efforts towards finding these schools. All results in Table C.18 suggest
that, in these sorter schools, students assigned to higher-ability peers are also higher
ability themselves and are also generally more advantaged in other respects. These
schools might have sorted students into classrooms directly based on academic
ability/performance, perhaps by assignment them to “gifted” classrooms together,
and perhaps also as a response of parental pressure on the school. All these are
informative insights in the next steps of our Fishing Algorithm.
C.3.2 The Fishing Algorithm
The Fishing Algorithm is a data-driven method we developed to detect schools
that are likely not compliant with Taiwan’s national mandate to randomly assign
students to classrooms. The algorithm combines permutation-based measures of the
degree of sorting in the data with latent-class modeling techniques. Despite seeming
complex, the intuition behind the procedure is simple and its implementation is fast.
Its steps are described in Box 1.
In the first step, we identify whether there is evidence of sorting and/or imbalance
in the data. Table C.18 describes the results of these tests for the TEPS initial
sample. Since our study focuses on estimating the effect of higher-ability classroom
peers, we identify student test scores as our key pre-assignment characteristic for
the remaining steps.
In the second step, we construct our school-level measure of sorting of students
into classrooms based on standardized test scores. We base our measure on the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the most prominent measure of market concentration









Where TestScorescs is the average standardized test score in classroom c of school
s.2Hs is a measure of the concentration (or sorting) of student test scores into
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Algorithm 1 The Fishing Algorithm
1: Identify sorted/imbalanced pre-assignment characteristics. Identify your key
measure of interest and, if sorted/imbalanced, continue to step 2.
2: Construct a school-level measure of sorting in your key measure of interest for
each school s = 1 . . . S. We propose a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index for
concentration of the key student characteristic into classrooms in each school.
Call this measure Hs.
3: For each school, simulate the counterfactual Hs under random assignment of
students to classrooms, while keeping school size, class size, number of classrooms
and student compositions constant. Call this counterfactual assignment Hrandoms .
Use B permuted random assignments of students to classrooms to derive the
school-level distributions of Hs for each school s. Using these distributions,
construct the school-level share of permutations for which Hs is larger than
Hrandoms and call it Ss ∈ [0, 1]. Ss measures the degree of sorting of students to
classrooms in each school over and above what chance would predict.
4: Use latent class models to predict Ss. Since Ss is censored below at 0 and above
at 1, we propose fitting finite mixture tobit regressions. Select the number of
latent classes in the model using a pre-determined goodness-of-fit measure (e.g.,
AIC, BIC). (If available, use school-level predictors for sorter schools informed by
your knowledge of the data. You can use likelihood ratio tests to decide whether
these class predictors are worth including in the model.) Identify the latent
class(es) associated with high Ss (close to 1); these are likely to identify sorter
schools. Using model estimates, construct the school-level posterior probability
of belonging to a latent sorter class. Call this measure Ps.
5: Construct a sorter flag for each school based on whether Ps exceeds a pre-
determined threshold. We suggest using a “most likely sorter” rule: flag schools
which are most likely to belong to a latent sorter class than to any other latent
class as sorter schools. Remove flagged schools from your estimation sample,
call this the trimmed sample. Re-estimate your balancing and sorting tests in
this sample.
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classrooms within each school, and it will range between 1/C (if TestScorescs is
identical in all classrooms) to 1 (if all students with positive test scores are together
in one classroom—which is ridiculous with test scores but more easy to think of
when measuring sorting by e.g., race or gender). At this point our constructed Hs
includes test score sorting data for each of the 333 schools in TEPS.3
In the third step, we construct counterfactual distributions of Hs for each of the 333
schools in TEPS that reflect random assignment of students to classrooms within
schools. To do this, we construct B = 400 permutations of random assignment of
students to classroom within each school maintaining each schools’ data structure;
that is, maintaining the student number and composition in each school, and the
exact number and size of classrooms in each school. Ensuring the data structure is
maintained is crucial for computing randomization-based statistics (Young, 2019).
For each permutation b = 1 . . . B we thus end up with a measureHrandoms that reflects
one way that school sorting could have looked like if classrooms were randomly
assigned within schools. Since we do this B = 400 times, we end up with a
distribution of this school concentration index based on 400 counterfactual classroom
assignments for each school. We then construct Ss for each school: the share of
the 400 permutations for which the actual school concentration Hs strictly exceeds
the simulated concentration under random assignment Hrandoms . For example, in a
school where the actual score concentration was larger than 350 out of 400 simulated
concentrations, Ss would take the value of 350/400 = 0.875.
At this point, it is important to highlight why Ss is a superior measure of classroom
sorting than Hs, especially to capture sorting on characteristics that are relatively
rare. To do this, imagine trying to measure sorting based on race in a school with
three classrooms and one racial minority student. Even if this school fully complies
with random assignment, the measure Hs will equal 1, implying full sorting. This is
because, in any classroom configuration“all” minority students will be in the same
classroom. The measure Ss, however, will equal 0 — implying perfect sorting —
because in no permutation will Hs strictly exceed Hrandoms . Generalizing based on
this example, the key lesson is that Ss naturally normalizes classroom concentration
to reflect the rarity of the characteristic of interest at the school level, a very useful
3It is important to note that by standardized test scores we mean “scores from a standardized
test” rather than “test scores that have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one”. Steps 3 through 5 of the Fishing Algorithm work much better if Hs is constructed
from test scores (or any other measure) that is weakly positive (i.e., with support in [0;∞) ).
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Figure C.1: The School-Level Concentration of Classrooms Based on Test Scores, With
B = 400 Classroom Assignment Permutations
Note: This figure shows the school-level distribution of our measure for whether
schools sort students into classrooms more strongly than chance would allow,
given the school size, number and classroom size and student composition. The
probability of being a sorter school is the posterior probability of being in a
latent class classified as sorters by us and calculated based on a finite mixture
model of school sorting using several school averages of parental characteristics
as class predictors.
property.4
Figure C.1 shows the distribution of our school-level measure of classroom con-
centration based on test scores, Ss, for all 333 schools in the TEPS data. If all
schools in TEPS would have perfectly complied with random assignment of students
to classrooms, we would expect this to closely resemble a standardized uniform
distribution. The figure suggests that most schools are likely complying with the
random assignment mandate, yet a small but non-negligible share of schools show
very high degree of sorting that is inconsistent with random assignment. With a
quick graphical analysis of the distribution, one could conclude that schools in the
rightmost part of the distribution—with Ss > 0.9 which adds up to roughly 80
schools—are much more likely be defying the mandate of random assignment.
4A second, perhaps subtler, lesson is that we can only interpret as evidence of strong classroom
non-sorting when the characteristic of interest is prevalent in the school (i.e., when the number of
students with that characteristic exceed the number of classes in the school).
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At this stage just dropping these 80 schools from our data would be rather crude.
Under random assignment, we should still expect that some schools, by chance,
ended up grouping students with similar test scores. Blindly trimming these schools
could therefore lead to “over-trimming”: removing schools that have high sorting by
chance. One problem with over-trimming is that it can lead to negative sorting tests
in the trimmed sample. Another, perhaps more serious, problem is that it would
remove legitimate variation from the estimation sample that could be crucial for
identifying peer effect. These worst-case scenarios could result in a loss of power
for identifying peer effects in the trimmed sample and, if peer effects are extremely
non-linear, over-trimming could bias peer effect estimates downwards. In the fourth
and key innovative step of our Fishing Algorithm, we try to disentangle schools
that have strong sorting by chance from schools that are defying the mandate of
random assignment using latent class models of Ss. Our preferred method is to fit
a finite mixture model (FMM) of Ss to recover a predicted probability of being a
school defying the mandate of random assignment to classrooms for each school.5
One good reason for using FMM is that, based on its estimates, we can construct
the posterior probability of belonging to each latent class modeled and. Once we
have identified which class is likely to capture sorter schools, this gives us a direct
estimate of school-level probability to be a sorter, which we then use to construct
our likely sorter school flag.
For this step, there are four key choices to make: i) the correct model given the
distribution of Ss, ii) the number of latent classes, iii) the class-level predictors (if
any), and iv) the classification rule that flags a school as sorter. We discuss these
choices and our approach to making them in turn:
1. For modelling the distribution of Ss, we opted for fitting a FMM tobit to
account for the censoring of Ss at 1. For other characteristics or in other
datasets where Ss shows less censoring, one can always fit beta or linear
regression FMMs instead. In the TEPS data all these alternatives yield similar
results.
2. We chose the number of latent classes that minimizes the Bayesian Information
Criterion. In the TEPS data this was a 3-class model. Of these three classes,
5We have also worked on procedures that detect sorter schools based on several Ps indices —
to detect, for example, one type of sorter school that sorts students to classrooms based on test
scores, and a second type that sorts students based on their history of truancy—using unsupervised
machine learning techniques such as hierarchical cluster analysis.
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only one had a conspicuously large predicted mean for Ss, which was very close
to 1. We identified this as the latent class of sorter schools. The other two
classes had much lower predicted means for Ss, both close to 0.5. Using the
Akaike Information Criterion we would have chosen a 2-class model instead;
a sorter latent class with a predicted very close to 1 and a non-sorter latent
class with predicted close to 0.5. Both models would have classified schools
near-identically. Models with more than 3 latent classes did not improve fit
much but did increase optimization complexity and often had issues converging.
3. We chose school-level class predictors that were significantly related to Ss.
In the TEPS data these are schools means for: children who report being
in academically gifted classrooms, parents who push for their children to be
assigned to particular classrooms, ethnic minority students, private tutoring
lessons before joining junior high school, and two measures of baseline student
effort. All these measures were positive predictors of belonging to the sorter
latent class, most of the statistically significant at conventional levels. These
predictors meaningfully improved the model performance and, since models
with and without class predictors are nested, one can make the choice to
include these in the final model specification based on a likelihood ratio test.
4. For flagging schools as sorters we constructed for each school the probability
of belonging to the sorter latent class Ps—the class with predicted Ss close
to 1—based on the FMM estimates with class predictors. We then opted for
classifying sorter schools as schools which were most likely to belong to the
sorter latent class than to any other class. Different thresholds can of course
be justified, but this is a reasonable one with a clear a priori justification. Our
model results are not sensitive to other reasonable classification thresholds
such as Ps being larger than the sum of all other predicted class probabilities.
Table C.19 shows the results of the Finite Mixture Model estimation in the TEPS
data. The latent class marginal means and variances suggest that the third latent
class clearly identifies sorter schools, and the posterior latent class probability for
this class suggests that 24.6 percent of schools might be sorters. The latent class
predictor coefficients are also consistent with the third latent class identifying sorter
schools, and most of these predictors are statistically significant.
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Table C.19: The Fishing Algorithm: Finite-Mixture Model Estimates
Model latent class:
1 2 3
Latent class marginal mean 0.106 0.616 0.989
(0.017) (0.032) (0.010)
Latent class variance 0.007 0.057 0.003
(0.002) (0.011) (0.001)
Posterior latent class probabilities 0.139 0.615 0.246
(0.020) (0.044) (0.039)
Class predictor coefficients (base: Class 1):
Student enrolled in gifted academic class 3.658 10.093∗∗
(4.245) (4.334)
Parents made efforts to place student in better class −0.155 4.350∗
(2.399) (2.418)
Ethnic minority parent(s) −3.013 −4.027∗
(1.867) (2.112)
Had private tutoring before junior high 1.310 −2.604
(2.611) (2.891)
Reviews lessons since primary school 12.728∗∗ 10.587∗∗
(5.022) (5.254)




LR test for class predictors [p-value] < 0.001
Schools 333
Note: Finite Mixture Model (FMM) estimates in the complete TEPS sample of 333 schools using
school-level data. The dependent variable is modeled via a Tobit, and class posterior predicted
probabilities of an FMM model without class covariates are used as initial values to improve model
convergence. ***, ** and * mark estimates statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95% and
99% confidence level.
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Figure 3.2 in Section 3.4.2 shows the schools eventually flagged as sorters by our
Fishing Algorithm across the distribution of Ss. We overlay the probability of
being a sorter school Ps (on the right y-axis) in a scatterplot, with 0.5 as a dashed
horizontal reference line. Our Fishing Algorithm flags 106 schools where Ps is largest
as sorters. As expected, most flagged schools have Ss > 0.9, though a few schools
with lower values of Ss are also flagged. In the TEPS data, the algorithm failed to
identify non-sorter schools with very high Ss. It is possible, of course, that all these
schools with high Ss are in fact sorters, yet it is more likely that the FMM class
predictors are just not strong enough to discern the non-sorters among this group.
As discussed above and in Section 3.4.2, this could lead to over-trimming and in
fact we do see some evidence of this in Table 3.2, which shows sorting and balancing
tests in our sample trimmed of the 106 schools flagged as sorters. Yet evidence of
over-trimming is not strong enough to be concerning.
As a final point in this appendix, we show that out applying our Fishing Algorithm in
the TEPS data does not introduce any evident selectivity in our estimation samples.
Table C.20 shows that our initial sample including all the TEPS data remains very
similar to our trimmed sample—which includes all information from schools not
flagged as sorters by our Fishing Algorithm, and also remains similar to the our most
restricted estimation sample—which includes only students for which we observe
test scores, educational inputs and other key characteristics in both TEPS waves.
The only difference is that the more restrictive samples have slightly larger schools,
which can easily happen if smaller schools are more likely to systematically sort
students into classrooms (because e.g., they are more likely to be special schools
with exeptions to the national mandate, or have lower invigilance).
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Table C.20: Summary Statistics of Key Variables in TEPS Across Samples




Student test scores (unstandardized) 40.85 40.59 41.05
Female student 0.50 0.50 0.48
Student year of birth 1988.59 1988.59 1988.60
No. of siblings of student 1.77 1.77 1.75
Responding parent is female 0.64 0.64 0.63
Ethnic minority father 0.05 0.05 0.04
Two-parent household 0.86 0.86 0.87
Father’s birth year 1958.61 1958.67 1958.63
Father has post-secondary education 0.12 0.12 0.12
Unemployed father 0.11 0.11 0.10
Household monthly income is
NT$20,000 or less 0.11 0.11 0.10
NT$20,000-NT$50,000 0.41 0.41 0.41
NT$50,000-NT$100,000 0.35 0.35 0.36
More than NT$100,000 0.14 0.14 0.14
Classroom size 35.88 36.41 36.51
Male-to-female students ratio 0.52 0.52 0.52
Number of sampled students in school 67.03 67.66 65.60
School size 4,122 5,040 5,220
School sampling rate 0.19 0.18 0.17
No. of students (approx.) 20,055 14,044 11,029
Note: This table presents summary statistics of student and parent demographic characteris-
tics in the initial TEPS sample, the sample trimmed using our Fishing Algorithm, and the
final estimation sample.
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C.4 Fishing Algorithm in Simulated Data
In this appendix, we use simulated data to validate our fishing algorithm and
investigate its performance. Ideally, we would want to provide evidence from Monte-
Carlo simulations of the performance of the algorithm in detecting schools that
systematically sort students into classrooms. Unfortunately, we cannot provide
Monte-Carlo evidence over many simulations—say, over 10,000 realizations of the
same data generating process—since i) Steps 4 and 5 of the algorithm require
making some decisions that cannot be automatized (see Box 1 in C.3) and ii) the
finite mixture models in Step 4 often have convergence issues that demand making
additional decisions, such as trying out different optimization procedures, grid search
across different parameter values, or try out various initial latent class probabilities.
Nevertheless, we provide as extensive evidence of the performance of our fishing
algorithm as our setting allows, and highlight lessons learned along the way. These
lessons will prove useful to researchers intending to implement our fishing algorithm
in their data. In addition, we have coded flexible simulation programs in Stata
which will be available with the published version of this paper.
C.4.1 The Data Generating Process (DGP) for our Simulations
We simulate data that closely follows our empirical setting in Taiwan: students
are divided into schools and, within schools, assigned to classrooms. The only
characteristic that varies across students is their ability. Classrooms are simple
groupings of students within schools. Students in the same classroom can end up
being similar or dissimilar to one another, depending partly on chance and partly on
whether their school randomly assigns students to classrooms. Schools can differ in
two dimensions: whether they actively sort students of similar ability into classrooms
(sorter schools) or not (non-sorter schools), and—for sorter schools—the degree to
which they sort students into classrooms. In addition, we also simulate a school-level
variable that predicts whether the school is sorting or non-sorting. These three
parameters—the number of sorting schools, the strength of sorting within sorting
schools, and the strength of the sorting school predictor—are the key parameters we
vary across our simulations. All other parameters, such as school size and classroom
size, are kept constant across DGPs.
Specifically, for each DGP we simulate data from 300 schools. We stochastically
vary the number of students across schools between 50 and 70 with an independent
uniform distribution, U [50, 70], mostly as a legacy for implementing the Guryan et al.
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(2009) sorting test. Their method accounted for a small negative bias in classical
sorting tests by controlling for school-level leave-out-mean of student ability, but
this correction only works well when there is variation in school size in the data. For
our exercises, however, we implement instead the solution proposed by Jochmans
(2020), who derives analytical expressions for this negative bias and proposes a bias-
corrected test with better power and implementable without school-size variation.
Once we have schools filled with students, we assign ability to students according to
ability ∼ U [0, 1].
At this point, we randomly determine which schools are the sorting schools that
sort students into classrooms based on ability, and which schools are non-sorting
schools. The number of sorting schools, Nsorting, is the first key parameter we vary
across DGPs. Here we also generate predictor, the variable predicting whether a
school is a sorter or a non-sorter, given by:
predictor = 1{sortingschool} × p+ U [0, 1]× (1− p)
where 1{sortingschool} is a dummy variable which flags sorting schools, p ∈ [0, 1] is a
predictor strength parameter, and U [0, 1] is another independent random uniform. If p
equals 1, predictor will be a perfect determinant of whether a school is systematically
sorting students into classrooms; if p equals zero, predictor will be completely
uninformative for school type. The predictor strength p is the second key parameter
we vary across DGPs.
Within each school we then sort students based on the sortingstrength parameter in
this school, and then sequentially assign them to similar-sized classrooms of roughly
15 students. sortingstrength is key for simulating student sorting into classrooms
for some schools but not others, as is defined as:
sortingstrength =
θability + (1− θ)U [0, 1] if student is in a sorting schoolU [0, 1] otherwise
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter that governs the sorting strength in sorting schools
and we vary it across DGPs. The way this parameter works is best explained with a
few examples.
When θ is one, sortingstrength equals ability in sorting schools and a random
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uniform for non-sorting schools. This implies that in sorting schools, students will
be assigned to classrooms based on their ability, with the first classroom having the
top 15 students, the second classroom the top 15 among the remaining students, and
so on. This simulates very strong sorting of students into classrooms in a scenario
we refer to as “perfect stacking”. In non-sorter schools, students will be randomly
assigned to classrooms. If instead θ is zero, sortingstrength becomes a random
uniform for all schools (sorting and non-sorting, resulting in random assignment of
students to classrooms across the entire simulated data. Values of θ between zero
and one will vary the strength of sorting, or stacking, in sorting schools while keeping
random assignment in non-sorting schools. This θ is the second key parameter we
vary across DGPs.
To make sure there is enough identifying variation in peer aggregates of ability, we
ensure that no classroom has fewer than 10 students—which can happen because
initial classroom size is set to 15 but variation in school size can occasionally lead to
a classroom of fewer than 10 students. When this happens, we randomly redistribute
students in these small classrooms to all other remaining classrooms, such that
classrooms are always larger than 15 students.
We test the performance of our fishing algorithm using simulated data from three ver-
sions of our DGP that correspond to cases of particular interest for an econometrician
interested in applying our method:
1. Nsorting = 50; θ = 0.8; p = 0.8 : 50 strongly sorting schools with a good sorting
predictor
2. Nsorting = 50; θ = 0.8; p = 0.1 : 50 strong sorting schools with a weak sorting
predictor
3. Nsorting = 300; θ = 0.15 : all schools are weak sorters, with a good sorting
predictor
The first is an ideal case where the researcher can detect the few schools that
violate random assignment in the data, and has access to good enough predictors
to detect whether a school is sorting systematically students. The second case
showcases the limitations of our fishing algorithm when the researcher does not
have access to reasonable predictors of sorter schools. The third case simulates the
unfortunate situation where all schools sort students into classrooms, enough to
invalidate random assignment in the data but with no hopes of being able to fish
out sorter schools with our method—or any other for that matter.
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C.4.2 Performance of the Fishing Algorithm
After producing data using this DGP, we then i) test the degree of sorting in the
simulated data, ii) run our fishing algorithm following the steps in Box 1, iii) evaluate
the performance of our fishing algorithm in detecting sorter schools in the simulated
data, and iv) estimate the degree of sorting in the data once the detected sorter
schools are removed. These four sets of results are presented in Panels A, B, C and
D in the tables below.
We simulate five different realizations of each DGP and present the results of our
fishing algorithm for each. For each simulation, we present our results in columns (1)
through (5) of the tables below. The downslide of this approach is that it produces
less systematic evidence of the performance of our algorithm than would Monte
Carlo simulations. The upside, apart from being feasible, is that we can demonstrate
the several decisions required from the researcher to use our method, explain the
reasoning behind them, and showcase results of situation when, by chance, our
method does not perform well.
Case 1: Few Strong Sorter Schools and a Strong Class Predictor
Table C.21 shows the performance of the Fishing algorithm in five simulated datasets
with 50 strongly sorting schools and access to a good predictor for whether schools
are sorters. Panel A shows Jochmans’ (2020) sorting test t-statistic estimated using
the simulated student-level data. When positive and larger than critical values
of the standard normal distribution, these t-statistics indicate positive sorting of
students into classrooms based on ability. As expected, our simulated data shows
strong evidence of sorting (first row) and this evidence is coming solely from the few
sorter schools (second and third rows).
Panel B shows the steps to select the best Finite Mixture Models (FMM) to detect
sorter schools. These FMMs are estimated using school-level data where the outcome
is our measure of ability concentration in classrooms (Ss, see C.3). We first estimate
FMMs with 2, 3, and 4 potential latent classes. We select the best among these
models based on goodness of fit, using the smallest Bayesian Information Criteria
(BIC); the BIC of the preferred model is marked in bold in each column.
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Table C.21: Fishing Algorithm Performance in Five Simulated Datasets with 50 Strongly
Sorting Schools (Nsorting = 50, θ = 0.8 ) and Access to a Good Predictor for Whether
Schools Are Sorters (p = 0.8)
Simulation number = (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Sorting t-statistic in student-level data if DGP were known
Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic:
for all schools 6.4 6.6 6.6 6.9 6.7
for non-sorter schools -1.2 -0.5 -0.4 1.7 0.1
for sorter schools 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.8
Panel B: Finite Mixture Model selection on school-level data
Model BIC for:
2 latent classes 316.7 336.7 326.6 313.4 327.8
3 latent classes 327.3 344.5 322.4 320.6 327.0
4 latent classes 318.6 350.5 334.6 325.3 330.3
LR for model with sorting predictor (p-value) 0.000 - - 0.000 -
Predicted sorting strength measure for:
class 1 0.48 0.13 0.09 0.53 0.11
class 2 1.02 0.73 0.53 1.01 0.55
class 3 - - 1.03 - 1.02
class 4 - - - - -
Panel C: Selected FMM model performance for defier classification
Schools identified as defiers 50 225 76 50 71
Correctly classified schools (as %) 100.0 41.7 91.3 100.0 93.0
Pr[Non-sorter school | Defier] 0.0 77.8 34.2 0.0 29.6
Pr[Sorter school | Complier] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Panel D: Sorting t-statistics in student-level data in classified schools
Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic:
for classified complier schools -1.2 -6.7 -4.2 1.7 -3.9
for classified defier schools 6.6 7.0 7.1 6.7 7.1
In Panels A and D, numbers in bold mark values larger than the 5% critical value in the reference
a standard normal distribution. In Panel B, numbers in bold correspond to the smallest Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) and the largest predicted outcome mean, used to select the preferred
model, and numbers in italics correspond to models that did not comply with convergence criteria.
A missing Likelihood Ratio (LR) test p-value is missing in Panel B, indicating that either the model
using sorting predictors for the latent classes or the model without predictors did not converge
(almost always the former).
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FMMs often have convergence issues—one of the reasons why we cannot produce
complete Monte Carlo evidence in this Appendix. We mark models that failed to
converge in italics. After choosing the preferred number of latent classes based on the
BIC, we then choose whether the preferred model will include the variable predictor
as a latent class predictor. For this, we estimate FMMs with and without this latent
class predictor and use a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test to choose between these nested
models. Rejecting the null that the models are equal leads us to choose the model
that includes predictor as a latent class predictor. Here too, we have missing values
for the p-value of this LR test when either model does not converge. Finally, we
show the marginal means for each class—the average outcome predicted for schools
in each latent class—in the preferred model. These correspond to the predicted level
of classroom concentration in schools in each latent class. We interpret the latent
class(es) with unusually high predicted means as those that identify sorter schools.
These are also marked in bold.
There are three broad lessons from Panel B of Table C.21. First, models with two or
three latent classes are generally preferred, and models with four latent classes often
have convergence issues. This relatively simple latent class structure is partly a direct
result of our DGPs—which have, in fact, two latent classes of sorter and non-sorter
schools—yet it confirms that the FMMs do not tend to over-fit latent classes in
the data. Second, models that use latent class predictors also suffer convergence
issues. This is a potential shortcoming, since we later show that these predictors
can meaningfully improve the performance of our fishing algorithm. Third, there is
almost always a latent class with a clearly larger predicted sorting strength, and the
closer this prediction is to 1 it is that this class identifies sorter schools.
Panel C summarizes the performance of the preferred FMM for classifying sorter
schools—schools which, in violation of random assignment, systematically sort
students into classrooms. We flag sorter school as those for which the posterior
latent class probability for the sorter class is larger than the sum of all the other
posterior latent class probabilities, as described in C.3. We report four standard
indicators to describe the performance of our algorithm at detecting schools that
systematically sort students into classrooms: i) the number of schools classified as
sorters (out of 300), ii) the percentage of schools that are correctly classified as sorter
schools by the fishing algorithm and are truly sorter schools, iii) the probability of
being wrongly classified as a sorter school and actually being a non-sorter school
(false positives), and iv) the probability of being classified as a non-sorter school and
truly being a sorter school (false negative). Overall, the algorithm performs very
well for this DGP: in 2 out of 5 simulations, the algorithm perfectly separates sorter
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and non-sorter schools (col. (1) and col. (4)), and in 2 additional simulations it
identifies no false negatives and only a few false positives (col. (3) and col. (5)).
In column (2) the fishing algorithm somewhat fails: the algorithm indicates that
the majority of schools as sorters, over 50% of which are actually non-sorter schools.
This failure is not complete, however, in the sense that the algorithm only becomes
too stringent, but does not misclassify sorter schools as compliant. The good news
is that our exercise reveals why this failure occurred: the selected FMM model in
this instance could not use as a latent class predictor to identify the latent class
with sorter schools, and consequently the predicted sorting strength for this model
is 0.73, well below that of all other models. The lesson for researchers applying
our method here is that having access to a good predictor of whether schools
are sorting will meaningfully improve the performance of our fishing algorithm,
even in settings with few strongly sorting schools. Panel D shows the sorting test
performance from Jochmans (2020) back in the student-level simulated data in non-
sorter schools—those classified as non-sorters by the fishing algorithm. For the two
models with perfect performance (Columns (1) and (4)), we see that the t-statistics
match the non-sorter t-statistics in Panel A. For the other three models, we see
negative and significant t-statistics (Columns (3) and (5)); much more negative for
the worst-performing model (Column (2)).
Negative and significant t-statistics of sorting tests become increasingly more frequent
as the rate of false positives increases – that is, the probability of wrongly classifying
non-sorting schools as sorter schools. In C.3, we call this situation “over-trimming”,
corresponding to situations when the fishing algorithm wrongly excludes schools
that are actually compliant with random assignment. The issue with over-trimming
is that it could lead to censuring the distribution of peer effects.
Importantly, our algorithm can be used as a diagnostic tool for over-trimming, since
a clear sign of over-trimming is a “flipping” sign of Jochmans (2020)’s t-statistic:
a positive and significant t-statistic in the untrimmed data (as in Panel A) and a
negative and significant t-statistic in the trimmed data (as in panel D). When this
occurs, we suggest going back to the FMM specification to improve the classification
performance, either my changing the number of classes or by exploring additional
and hopefully better class predictors. An important early sign that the algorithm is
able to discern sorter from non-sorter schools is a high predicted sorting strength
for at least one latent class, like in Column (1), and Columns (3) to (5) in Panel B.
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Case 2: Few Strong Sorter Schools and a Weak Class Predictor
Table C.22 shows the performance of our algorithm in a DGP where there are still
50 strongly sorting schools, but the researcher only has access to a much weaker
predictor of whether schools are sorters. This reflects the situation of researchers with
either limited data or limited institutional knowledge to construct such predictors.
Panel A confirms that our simulated data conform to the intended DGP. Panel B
illustrates that i) in these data the FMMs generally choose simpler 2-class structures,
that ii) even with a much weaker predictor the FMMs tend to prefer models with
class predictors, but that iii) the predicted sorting strength for the high-sorting
class is much weaker (between 0.73 and 0.78) than when a good class predictor is
available (in Table C.21). As a direct result, Panel C shows much higher rates of
misclassification, driven entirely by a higher rate of non-sorter schools identified
as sorters; all sorter schools are always correctly classified. As explained above,
this will lead to over-trimming, Panel D confirms the presence of over-trimming:
we find strong evidence of negative sorting in classified non-sorter schools, and
positive sorting in the classified sorter schools. In sum, Table C.22 corroborates
the importance of having a strong sorting predictor for good performance of our
fishing algorithm, but it also indicates two useful diagnostics that can tell the
researcher whether the algorithm is likely to be performing poorly: a relatively low
predicted sorting strength for the high-sorting latent class, and a strong flipping
for the Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic for the classified non-sorters subsample.
Compared to the findings of Table C.21, the findings of Table C.22 indicate that
finding one or multiple strong class predictors is crucial for preventing the algorithm
from over-trimming the sample.
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Table C.22: Fishing Algorithm Performance in Five Simulated Datasets with 50 Strongly
Sorting Schools (Nsorting = 50, θ = 0.8 ) but Only a Weak Predictor for Whether Schools
Are Sorters (p = 0.1)
Simulation number = (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Sorting t-statistic in student-level data if DGP were known
Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic:
for all schools 6.7 7.0 6.5 6.7 6.6
for non-sorter schools 0.6 1.6 -1.8 -0.4 -0.8
for sorter schools 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7
Panel B: Finite Mixture Model selection on school-level data
Model BIC for:
2 latent classes 307.5 322.9 324.1 308.7 323.4
3 latent classes 317.2 325.4 331.5 313.3 331.4
4 latent classes 329.7 336.9 342.0 330.1 346.1
LR for model with sorting predictor (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
Predicted sorting strength measure for:
class 1 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22
class 2 0.73 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.77
class 3 - - - - -
class 4 - - - - -
Panel C: Selected FMM model performance for defier classification
Schools identified as defiers 228 233 192 199 207
Correctly classified schools (as %) 40.7 39.0 52.7 50.3 47.7
Pr[Non-sorter school | Defier] 78.1 78.5 74.0 74.9 75.8
Pr[Sorter school | Complier] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Panel D: Sorting t-statistics in student-level data in classified schools
Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic:
for classified complier schools -5.9 -5.2 -8.8 -7.8 -6.8
for classified defier schools 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.0
In Panels A and D, numbers in bold mark values larger than the 5% critical value in the reference
a standard normal distribution. In Panel B, numbers in bold correspond to the smallest Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) and the largest predicted outcome mean, used to select the preferred
model, and numbers in italics correspond to models that did not comply with convergence criteria.
A missing Likelihood Ratio (LR) test p-value is missing in Panel B, indicating that either the model
using sorting predictors for the latent classes or the model without predictors did not converge
(almost always the former).
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Case 3: Weak but Generalized Sorting
Table C.23 shows the performance of our fishing algorithm in a DGP that simulates
sorting in all schools, weaker relatively to the previous DGP but strong enough that
it would be detected by Jochmans (2020) t-statistic. This corresponds to setting
with generalized violations of random assignment, such that no natural experiment
could be salvaged from the data using our algorithm.
Panel A confirms that our simulated data conforms to this setting, producing t-
statistics that significant around the 1% level. Panel B shows that i) the FMMs in
this setting tend to choose 3- and 4-class structures, ii) the sorter school predictor is
never statistically significant at conventional levels, which was to be expected since
all schools are sorters, and iii) the predicted sorting strength in the high-sorting
latent class is higher than in Table C.22 but lower than in Table C.23. This high
predicted sorting strength results in relatively few schools identified as sorters,
as show in Panel C. Because the FMMs classify as sorters the schools where the
strongest sorting occurs, Panel D again shows strong flipping in the Jochmans (2020)
t-statistic.
Overall, Table C.23 indicates that situations where all schools sort students into
classrooms (generalized sorting) compared to clustered sorting (cases 1 and 2) are
characterized by i) relatively complex latent class structures, ii) relatively low model
fit yet iii) high predicted sorting strengths for the high-sorting latent class even
in the absence of good sorting school predictors (Panel B), and iv) flipping of the
Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic for identified non-sorter schools (Panel D).
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Table C.23: Fishing Algorithm Performance in Five Simulated Datasets with All
Weakly Sorting Schools (Nsorting = 300, θ = 0.15 )
Simulation number = (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Sorting t-statistic in student-level data if DGP were known
Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic:
for all schools 3.6 4.5 4.3 4.6 3.0
for non-sorter schools - - - - -
for sorter schools 3.6 4.5 4.3 4.6 3.0
Panel B: Finite Mixture Model selection on school-level data
Model BIC for:
2 latent classes 105.0 103.7 85.4 104.9 99.4
3 latent classes 93.4 92.5 66.3 103.1 95.0
4 latent classes 95.1 84.9 70.4 88.7 91.9
LR for model with sorting predictor (p-value) 0.818 0.280 0.170 0.066 0.850
Predicted sorting strength measure for:
class 1 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.05
class 2 0.56 0.41 0.52 0.52 0.38
class 3 0.93 0.72 0.92 0.90 0.81
class 4 - 0.95 - - 0.96
Panel C: Selected FMM model performance for defier classification
Schools identified as defiers 79 66 82 107 46
Correctly classified schools (as %) 26.3 22.0 27.3 35.7 15.3
Pr[Non-sorter school | Defier] - - - - -
Pr[Sorter school | Complier] - - - - -
Panel D: Sorting t-statistics in student-level data in classified schools
Jochmans (2020) sorting t-statistic:
for classified complier schools -4.7 -3.6 -3.9 -4.7 -3.2
for classified defier schools 6.7 6.9 7.5 7.5 5.6
In Panels A and D, numbers in bold mark values larger than the 5% critical value in the
reference a standard normal distribution. In Panel B, numbers in bold correspond to the
smallest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the largest predicted outcome mean, used
to select the preferred model, and numbers in italics correspond to models that did not comply
with convergence criteria. A missing Likelihood Ratio (LR) test p-value is missing in Panel
B, indicating that either the model using sorting predictors for the latent classes or the model
without predictors did not converge (almost always the former).
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C.4.3 A Practitioner’s Guide for Researchers Wanting to Use our
Fishing Algorithm
Our fishing algorithm combines several intuitive steps which are nonetheless some-
what technically complex. Drawing on the lessons illustrated in this section and on
our own experience in developing this algorithm, we make the following suggestions
to researchers intending to use our method:
1. Strive to find predictors of whether a school sorts students into classroom, even
if these predictors are not perfect. Good predictors will meaningfully improve
the performance of our method, even if it can still be applied without them.
Place more trust in applications with institutionally sound sorting predictors
that are also statistically and quantitatively strong inputs in your latent class
model.
2. Your latent class that captures sorting schools will have a predicted sorting
strength close to or exceeding 1. By the nature of our measure of sorting
strength, sorting schools should have strengths very close to or greater than 1.
Latent classes with predicted sorting strengths much below 1 are therefore more
likely to also capture non-sorting schools, increasing over-trimming problems.
If your latent class model is not identifying classes with high enough predicted
sorting strengths, this could be a sign that i) the class structure is not complex
enough (solved by testing models with more latent classes), ii) your sorting
school predictors are not good enough (solved by finding better predictors or
a better structure for existing ones), or iii) sorting is too widespread in your
data (only solved, sadly, by finding other data that reflects a better natural
experiment).
3. Beware of sorting test flipping. Sorting test flipping—a large and positive
sorting t-statistic in the whole data and a large and negative sorting t-statistic
in the subsample of identified non-sorter schools—is a sign of either over-
trimming or widespread sorting.
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D | Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Data Preparation
In this section, I explain how I construct my estimation sample, going from registry
data to a dyadic sibling pair dataset. The estimation sample is a dyadic dataset,
containing for every child, information about his closest older sibling. I first construct
a dataset containing for each pupil her rank among her primary school classmates,
along with information at the school-cohort level such as cohort size for each subject
and for the complete standardized test. I start by appending yearly registries into a
dataset of repeated cross-sections of pupils taking the standardized test. Few pupils
repeat the test; I reshape the data into wide format and focus only on the first test,
as I will later exclude test repeaters from my estimation sample. I keep these pupils
for now, as I am interested in children’s rank in their cohort, including classmates
who are retaking the test. I set this dataset aside for later merging.
To construct a dataset of sibling which I later reshape into dyadic sibling pair format,
I start from the national population registry, which records every person residing in
the Netherlands. I keep only persons born since 1980, either born in the Netherlands
or abroad; at this stage I have roughly 16.2 million persons. I merge in parental
identifiers using family records, which yields 7,437,636 matches. I construct a mother
identifier, to mark all children recorded with the same mother; only 32,636 children
have no recorded mother.
I then merge education test taking registry information, and the dataset containing
rank and school-cohort information. This match yields 1,670,714 matched obser-
vations; non-matched observations are mostly children residing in the Netherlands
with no test taking information (5.75 million) and few are children with test taking
information but not recorded as residents of the Netherlands (13,618 children). As
records for the standardized test start in 2006, most non-matched children are simply
born too early.
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At this stage, I make the following sample selection decisions that will later allow me
to reshape the data into a dyadic sibling pair dataset: I drop all children in 1) families
where no child ever took the test (4,761,458 children), 2) families with at least once
two children taking the test the same year (77,424 children), and 3) families with
at least one test repeater child (12,424 children). I drop 4,852,653 unique child
observations, and have a remaining sample of 2,643,323 children including 955,846
children with no test taking information.
I then construct sibling pair identifiers. I follow Karbownik and Özek (2019) and
Black et al. (2017) and define a sibling as a child born to the same mother – and for
87% of children in the Netherlands, this also means living in the same residence. For
every child, I assign a pair identifier that is only shared by the next oldest sibling
who took the standardized test last, and who has not taken his first attempt on
the standardized test at the same time as another sibling. Importantly, a child can
be a younger child for one pair with pair identifier 1, and also be an older child
for another pair with pair identifier 2. To be able to reshape the data into dyadic
format, I expand observations for children simultaneously belonging to two pairs. I
then reshape the data to obtain one observation per sibling pair, in which the older
sibling is always sibling 1 and the younger sibling is always sibling 2. In this process,
I am able to construct 531,780 unique pairs, for 975,256 unique children (1,063,560
observations after including expanded observations). These pairs constitute the
baseline estimation sample.
Before reshaping the data into a dyadic format, I merge additional information in
wide format for each child corresponding to the year immediately preceding the
primary school exit test: 1) maternal and paternal employment status, working hours,
earned income and taxable income, 2) maternal and paternal residence, 3) later life
education records such as secondary school attendance, track and major, graduation,
time to graduation, and post-secondary education attendance, and major. After
merging this information to every single child in the sibling pairs dataset, I reshape
the data into dyadic format and construct final variables which required information
for both siblings of a pair to be constructed, such as age difference, same gender,
and likelihood of having had the same primary school teacher.
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D.2 Empirical Specification
Which Fixed Effects Should We Include?
Table D.1 shows how the effect of older sibling rank on score varies across models
including different types of fixed-effect. Columns (4) to (6) show our estimates
of the effect of older sibling rank on scores across different types of fixed effect
specifications, when I restrict the sample to siblings attending the same primary
school. I find similar estimates when my model includes two-way fixed effects for
the younger child’s cohort and school (Column (4)) and when I add a fixed effect
for the older sibling’s cohort (Column (5)). I find a small estimate when I include
a cohort-by-school fixed effect for the younger child’s cohort and school, and a
fixed effect for the older sibling’s cohort. In this final specification, I find that a 1%
increase in sibling’s rank increases my standardized score by 1.4 point (corresponding
roughly to 0.14SD). Columns (1) to (3) show corresponding estimates when I don’t
restrict to siblings attending the same schools. Overall, estimates are similar, which
is not surprising since 82% of siblings attend the same primary school.
Following Elsner and Isphording (2017), my preferred specification includes a cohort-
by-school fixed effect for the younger sibling, as this specification yields the most
conservative estimates for the effect I am interested in estimating. Importantly,
including one type of fixed effect over another has conceptual implications. A
model with two-way fixed effect captures separately school-specific heterogeneity
and cohort-specific heterogeneity. A model with cohort-by-school fixed-effect allows
for nested heterogeneity.
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Table D.1: The Effects of Older Sibling Rank on Younger Sibling Test Scores Across
Specifications
Sample restrictions: In same primary school Likely same teacher
Younger sibling outcome: CITO points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Older sibling rank 2.533∗∗∗ 2.518∗∗∗ 1.489∗∗∗ 2.463∗∗∗ 2.457∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗
in std. test score (0.149) (0.149) (0.173) (0.191) (0.191) (0.245)
Mean of dep.var 536.02 536.02 536.02 535.75 535.75 535.75
SD of dep.var 9.44 9.44 9.44 9.51 9.51 9.51
R-Squared 0.26 0.26 0.37 0.27 0.27 0.43
Yg sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Yg sib: School FE Y Y Y Y
Old sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Yg sib: school-by-cohort FE Y Y
N. yg sib. schools 6,144 6,144 6,144 5,950 5,950 5,950
Observations 384,276 384,276 384,276 198,432 198,432 198,432
Note: This table shows the results of dyadic regression analyses of the effect of older siblings’ rank
on younger siblings’ standardized test score. Control variables: standardized test score of the older
sibling (point dummies), number of parents with a migrant background (dummies), birth year of the
younger sibling (dummies), household taxable income in the year preceding the younger sibling’s
test. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the younger sibling’s school. *, **, and *** denote
significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Which Functional Form to Control for Sibling Absolute Ability?
Table D.2 shows how our estimated effects vary depending on how we control for
the older sibling’s ability (in columns), across six different outcomes (in lines). This
table shows results of regressions of the effect of older sibling rank on scores (line 1)
and on teacher recommendations controlling linearly for the younger child’s score
(lines 2 to 6). For these regressions, I include school-by-cohort fixed effects for the
younger sibling, older sibling cohort fixed effect, and restrict the sample to siblings
likely to share the same primary school teacher. Column (1) shows our estimate
when we control linearly for sibling standardized test score; Columns (2), (3) and
(4) when I use respectively a quadratic, cubic and quartic polynomial; Column (5)
when I use vintile dummies of raw score, and finally Column (6) when I use point
dummies of the raw score.
Overall, we see that the effect size is relatively stable across controls of ability
346
APPENDIX D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
functional form for each outcome. When I study the effect of older sibling rank
on standardized test scores, the estimate is smallest when controlling for sibling
ability using a quadratic and cubic polynomial, but I prefer the specification with
the point dummies because it is the most flexible specification. This specification
also yields the most conservative estimates for the effect of older sibling rank on
track recommendations, after controlling linearly for the younger child’s score.
Based on my preferred specification, older sibling rank has a positive effect on
standardized scores, but once I control for this score effect, there is no remaining
effect on average on the track recommendations that younger siblings receive.
Table D.2: The Effects of Older Sibling Rank on Younger Sibling Test Scores Across
Ability Functional Form
Control function: Older sibling std. test score:
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic Vintile FE Point FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Younger sibling Outcomes:
Std. test score 2.821∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 1.761∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.242) (0.242) (0.244) (0.242) (0.245)
Track recommendation:
Academic 0.122∗∗∗−0.009 −0.009 0.004 0.009 0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
General −0.036∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.013 0.008 0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Vocational −0.031∗∗∗−0.018∗ −0.018∗ −0.009 −0.006 −0.006
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Old sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Yg sib: school-by-cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N. young sib. schools 5,950 5,950 5,950 5,950 5,950 5,950
Observations 198,432 198,432 198,432 198,432 198,432 198,432
Note: This table shows the results of dyadic regression analyses of the effect of older siblings’
rank on younger siblings’ score and teacher subjective assessment, using various types of control
function for older sibling overall test score. Each line and column represents one regression. Control
variables: standardized test score of the older sibling, number of parents with a migrant background
(dummies), birth year of the younger sibling (dummies), household taxable income in the year
preceding the younger sibling’s test. Regressions on younger sibling recommendations include an
additional control variable for the standardized test score of the child (linear). Standard errors are
clustered at the level of the younger sibling’s school. Sample restriction: siblings likely to have the
same primary school teacher. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
347
APPENDIX D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
D.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Table D.3: The Effects of Older Sibling Ranks on Younger Sibling Track
Recommendation, Controlling for Older and Younger Sibling Overall Score




Overall rank 0.001 0.008 −0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Dutch rank 0.020∗∗ 0.007 0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Math rank 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Mean of dep.var 0.12 0.12 0.30
SD of dep.var 0.33 0.33 0.46
Old sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y
Young sib: school-by-cohort FE Y Y Y
N. young sib. schools 5,950 5,950 5,950
Observations 198,432 198,432 198,432
Note: This table shows the results of dyadic regression analyses of the effect of older
siblings’ overall and subject-specific ranks on the track recommendations received by
younger siblings, controlling for younger sibling overall score. Each cell represents
one regression. Control variables: point dummies for older sibling overall score,
number of parents with migrant background (categorical), year of birth of the younger
sibling (categorical), taxable income of the household in the year preceding the
younger sibling’s standardized test. Sample restriction: siblings likely to have the
same primary school teacher. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the younger
child’s school. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
348
APPENDIX D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Table D.4: The Effect of Older Sibling Rank on Younger Sibling Track
Recommendation, Controlling for Older Sibling Subject Scores and Younger
Sibling Overall Score




Overall rank 0.010 0.008 −0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Dutch rank 0.015∗ 0.011 −0.019∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Math rank 0.018∗∗ 0.012 −0.024∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Mean of dep.var 0.12 0.12 0.30
SD of dep.var 0.33 0.33 0.46
Old sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y
Young sib: school-by-cohort FE Y Y Y
N. young sib. schools 5,950 5,950 5,950
Observations 198,432 198,432 198,432
Note: This table shows the results of dyadic regression analyses of the effect of older
siblings’ overall rank on the track recommendations received by younger siblings,
controlling for younger sibling overall score. Each cell represents one regression.
Control variables: point dummies for older sibling subject-specific score (resp. overall
score, Dutch language score and Math score), number of parents with migrant
background (categorical), year of birth of the younger sibling (categorical), taxable
income of the household in the year preceding the younger sibling’s standardized test.
Sample restriction: siblings likely to have the same primary school teacher. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of the younger child’s school. *, ** and *** denote
significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table D.5: Robustness of Sibling Rank Effects to Strategic Delay
Sample restrictions: In school-age cohort:
Younger sibling outcomes: On time Test Scores: Any teacher
Overall Dutch Math assessment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Older sibling overall rank 0.032∗∗ 1.407∗∗∗ 1.725∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.0132) (0.282) (0.421) (0.370) (0.004)
Mean of dep.var 0.83 536.31 80.28 47.59 0.75
SD of dep.var 0.37 9.14 16.91 13.37 0.43
R-Squared 0.31 0.43 0.62 0.55 0.92
Yg sib in school-age cohort Y Y Y
Old sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y
Yg sib: school-by-cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y
N. yg sib. schools 5,872 5,892 5,892 5,892 5,950
Observations 154,780 160,537 160,537 160,537 198,432
Note: This table shows the results of dyadic regression analyses of the effect of older siblings’ rank
on younger siblings’ probability to finish primary school on time (col. 1), on the scores of younger
siblings who are on time (col. (2) to (4)), and on the probability of younger siblings to have a teacher
subjective assessment. Each column represents one regression. Control variables: point dummies
for older sibling score, number of parents with a migrant background (categorical), birth year of the
younger sibling (categorical), the taxable income of the household in the year preceding the young
child’s test. Sample restriction: siblings likely to have the same primary school teacher, and from
column (2) children who are in their “normal” testing year given their date of birth - that is, turning
12 within the year of their CITO first attempt. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
younger child’s school. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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APPENDIX D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Table D.9: Heterogeneous Effects of Older Siblings’ Rank: by Presence in the Household of
Older Child Eligible to Means-Tested Higher Education Financial Aid
Eligible Sibling: None At least one
Test scores: Overall Dutch Math Overall Dutch Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interaction: At least one −0.119 −0.144 −0.276 0.435 0.791 1.654
# older sibling rank (0.534) (0.806) (0.713) (3.885) (5.967) (5.157)
Mean of dep.var 535.77 79.65 47.08 535.52 80.08 46.92
SD of dep.var 9.52 17.35 13.72 9.31 17.09 13.67
R-Squared 0.44 0.62 0.55 0.86 0.90 0.88
Old sib Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Yg. sib school-by-cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N. yg siblings’ schools 5,939 5,939 5,939 4,194 4,194 4,194
Observations 185,723 185,723 185,723 12,541 12,541 12,541
Note: This table shows the results of dyadic regression analyses of the effect of older siblings’ overall
rank on younger siblings’ scores, split by whether or not there was any older child eligible to means-tested
financial aid for post-secondary education present in the household at the time when the younger sibling
is taking his CITO test. Columns (1) to (3) show results for families where no other child was eligible
to means-tested financial aid when the older sibling was taking the test, and while columns (4) to (6)
show results for families where at least one other child was eligible at the time. Each column represents
one regression. Control variables: point dummies for older sibling score, number of parents with a
migrant background (categorical), birth year of the younger sibling (categorical), the taxable income of
the household in the year preceding the young sibling’s test. Sample restriction: siblings likely to have
the same primary school teacher. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the younger child’s school.
*, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table D.10: Heterogeneous Effects of Older Siblings’ Rank: by Sibling Gender-Match
Panel A. Older brothers
Younger sibling outcomes: Test Scores: Teacher Assessment:
Overall Dutch Math Academic General Vocational
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interaction: Male # rank 0.325 1.840∗∗∗−1.091∗∗∗ 0.009 0.002 −0.000
(0.268) (0.402) (0.347) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Mean of dep.var 535.77 79.64 47.16 0.12 0.12 0.30
SD of dep.var 9.47 17.29 13.67 0.33 0.33 0.46
R-Squared 0.54 0.69 0.63 0.53 0.42 0.68
Old sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Yg. sib: school-by-cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N. young sib. schools 5,807 5,807 5,807 5,807 5,807 5,807
Observations 99,837 99,837 99,837 99,837 99,837 99,837
Panel B. Older sisters
Younger sibling outcomes: Test Scores: Teacher Assessment:
Overall Dutch Math Academic General Vocational
Interaction: Female # rank 0.500∗ −0.599 1.620∗∗∗ 0.016∗ −0.002 −0.011
(0.271) (0.406) (0.347) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Mean of dep.var 535.73 79.71 46.97 0.12 0.12 0.30
SD of dep.var 9.55 17.38 13.76 0.33 0.33 0.46
R-Squared 0.55 0.69 0.64 0.53 0.42 0.68
Old sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Yg. sib: school-by-cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N. young sib. schools 5,784 5,784 5,784 5,784 5,784 5,784
Observations 98,595 98,595 98,595 98,595 98,595 98,595
Note: This table shows the results of dyadic regression analyses of the effect of older siblings’ overall rank
on their younger siblings’ scores and subjective assessment of teachers, depending on gender composition
of sibling pairs. Each column represents one regression. Control variables: point dummies for older
sibling score, younger sibling score, number of migrant parents (categorical), birth year of the younger
sibling (categorical), the taxable income of the household in the year preceding the young sibling’s test.
Sample restriction: siblings likely to have the same primary school teacher. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the younger child’s school. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and
1% respectively.
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Table D.11: Sibling Rank When the Importance of Teacher Assessment
Increases
Younger sibling outcome: Teacher Assessment:
Academic General Vocational
(1) (2) (3)
Interaction: Post reform # rank 0.067∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ −0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Mean of dep.var 0.12 0.12 0.30
SD of dep.var 0.32 0.33 0.46
R-Squared 0.43 0.29 0.60
Old sib: Cohort FE Y Y Y
Yg. sib: school-by-cohort FE Y Y Y
N. young siblings’ schools 5,791 5,791 5,791
Observations 193,243 193,243 193,243
Note: This table shows the results of dyadic regression analyses of the effect of older
siblings’ rank on teacher subjective assessment of younger siblings, before and after a
policy change in 2014. The 2014 reform decreases the weight of standardized scores
compared to teacher recommendations for determining secondary schools and track
admissions. Each column represents one regression. Control variables: point dummies
for older sibling score, number of parents with migrant background (categorical), birth
year of the younger sibling (categorical), the taxable income of the household in the
year preceding the young sibling’s test. Sample restriction: siblings likely to have
the same primary school teacher. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
younger child’s school. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and
1% respectively.
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D.4 Long-Run Impacts of Own-Rank on Human Capital
Accumulation
I show in the main body of my study that older sibling rank has an effect on tracking
recommendations of younger siblings. In this Appendix, I replicate results from the
literature on rank in my setting for comparison.
Table D.12 reports estimates of the effect of own rank on later outcomes in the
educational system; These results replicate some of the earlier findings in the
literature on rank. I restrict the sample to children who are older siblings in pairs,
and whose younger sibling is likely to have the same primary school teacher. I cluster
standard errors at the school level.
Several articles on peer effects and rank effects effectively use school transitions from
primary to secondary school the identification strategy (e.g. Kiss, 2013; Kramarz
et al., 2015; Murphy and Weinhardt, Forthcoming; Denning et al., 2020). Secondary
school peers are mostly new peers, because primary schools are typically chosen
at the neighborhood level and are relatively small – roughly 7500 primary schools
across the country, with on average 220 children registered in total -, compared
to secondary schools which are chosen at a larger geographical area and are much
larger institutions – roughly 650 schools across the country, with on average 1400
students registered in total.
Table D.12 reveals that own rank in primary school increases by 5.4 percentage point
the probability to graduate from the general track, and decreases by 4.6 percentage
point the probability to graduate from the vocational track. These results are in
line with Elsner and Isphording (2017) who find that having a higher rank in middle
school increases the probability of graduating from high school. I find that, however,
rank in primary school has no significant effect on average on the quality of secondary
school attended, as measured by the average score of pupils starting secondary school
in the same cohort, and by the share of pupils with standardized scores above 545.
I interpret these results as evidence that rank contains an additional signaling value
compared to standardized score alone, but mostly for pupils who would be candidates
for the vocational or general track, but not really the top track.
The last part of Table D.12 shows that rank also has longer term effects on educational
outcomes. My results are, however, in contrast with those found by Elsner and
Isphording (2017) and Denning et al. (2020) on university enrolment. I find that
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at fixed ability, moving from the lowest to the best rank in one’s primary school
decreases on average by 2.3 percentage point the probability of ever being registered
in post-secondary education. This negative effect is likely driven by institutional
features of the Dutch educational system, in particular tracking. Rank shifts pupils
from vocational education towards general education, and students graduating from
general high school more likely to take a gap year before enrolling in university
compared to vocational students who often work part-time in apprenticeships.
Another interpretation is that put forward by Murphy and Weinhardt (Forthcoming)
when they consider heterogeneity of the effect of class rank across SES. Lastly, I
find that among students who do enroll in post-secondary education, moving from
the worst to the best rank also decreases by 5 percentage point the probability
of dropping out of one’s university major, which is more in line with Elsner and
Isphording (2017) and Murphy and Weinhardt (Forthcoming) who find that rank
effects are mostly driven by students feeling more confident and becoming persistent
in their later educational career.
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This dissertation investigates the role of aspirations and beliefs in explaining chil-
dren’s educational outcomes, and explores how they can exacerbate socioeconomic
disadvantage in education. Apart from the academic contribution of highlighting
the importance of internal constraints in educational outcomes, the findings of this
dissertation are also directly useful for policy making.
Chapter 1 proposes an easily-implementable methodology to estimate the potential
size of aspirational poverty traps in a given population, and applies this methodology
to the United States to show that 5.5 to 7% of the population could be located in
aspirational poverty traps. This important result indicates that social interventions
and welfare programs lifting aspirations could have a high potential for reducing
achievement gap.
Chapter 2 shows that policy uncertainty about student finance can alone create
or exacerbate achievement gaps as early as upon entering middle school. This
finding highlights i) that access to higher education could be improved by reducing
uncertainty in student finance, and ii) that uncertainty about future policies can
harm vulnerable populations, exacerbating inequality of opportunity.
Chapter 3 indicates that high-achieving peers not only improve test scores, but also
make children pay exert less school effort but increases their aspiration to go to
university, and increase the time they spend with their parents. This study also
finds that peer effects in test scores are not explained by intermediate effects on
students’ effort, aspirations and parental time investments. Together, these findings
suggest that educational policies manipulating peer assignment - such as tracking,
school admission policies, or classroom assignment policies - can in principle be
leveraged to reduce achievement gaps, while increasing students’ aspirations.
Chapter 4 shows that i) teachers rely on imperfect signals about children’s ability,
and form systematically biased expectations about their potential, ii) teacher bias
can disadvantage migrant children, and iii) has long-lasting consequences on STEM
major choice in high school. Suggestive findings also indicate that teacher bias
can be limited through admissions policies in which teacher assessments have little
weight. This study overall indicates that eliminating teacher bias should be a priority
for education policies and explores the scope of two educational policies to this end.
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